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Jurisdictional Statement 
This is an appeal from an order dismissing derivative claims brought by 
Plaintiffs on behalf of Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Association, Phase II 
("HOA") against its directors —Keith Emmer, Tom Williams, Anthony Sarra, 
Arlene Johnson and Carol Dean ("Directors"). This court has jurisdiction under 
Utah Code sections 78A-3-102(3) and 16-6a-612(4)(g), which permits an appeal of 
right from orders dismissing derivative claims under Utah Code section 16-6a-
612(4)(a). Because only the derivative claims are at issue in this appeal, the 
appellant is the HOA and the appellees are the Directors. 
Statement of the Issues 
Under Utah law, members of a nonprofit corporation may bring derivative 
claims in the name of the corporation against its directors when those directors 
harm the corporation or otherwise do not act in its best interest. Utah Code §16-
6a-612. Utah law also provides a mechanism to dismiss derivative claims, not on 
their merits, but on the ground that their maintenance is not in the corporation's 
best interest. To ensure dismissal is in the corporation's best interest—rather 
than a self-serving decision of its directors —the best-interest determination must 
be made by a person or group capable of exercising independent business 
judgment: (i) a quorum of independent directors; (ii) a person or group 
appointed by the court acting in place of the directors; or (iii) an independent 
special litigation committee consisting of members appointed by independent 
directors and acting in place of the directors. Utah Code §16-6a-612(4)(b), (4)(f). 
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Here, the Directors did not ask the court to appoint anyone to evaluate the 
derivative claims. And because there was not a quorum of independent 
Directors, the Directors created a special litigation committee. Under section 16-
6a-612(4)(a), a special litigation committee must be independent and conduct a 
reasonable inquiry to determine whether maintenance of the derivative claims is 
in the best interest of the corporation. And under section 16-6a-612(e)(l), if a 
majority of Directors are not independent, then the directors have the burden of 
proving the special litigation committee complied with subsection (4)(a). 
In this case, the Directors who committed and profited from the alleged 
wrongdoing appointed a special litigation committee populated by other 
defendants who committed and profited from the alleged wrongdoing. The 
committee made observations and recommendations, but did not consider 
whether maintenance of the derivative claims was in the best interest of the HOA 
and did not recommend dismissal of the claims. Instead, the Directors 
themselves voted to direct counsel to move to dismiss the derivative claims. 
Issue 1: Whether directors have the burden to prove compliance with 
Utah Code section 16~6a-612(4)'s standards that govern the appointment and 
conduct of special litigation committees where (i) the plaintiff presents evidence 
in a verified complaint that a majority of the directors were not independent 
because they engaged in and profited from the alleged wrongdoing and 
(ii) section 16-6a-612(4)(e) places the burden of proof on the directors where a 
majority of directors are not independent. 
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Standard of Review: Because the district court refused to rule on this 
issue, this court interprets the statute in the first instance. (R.1562-63,1761-64.) 
Issue 2: Whether a special litigation committee is independent under 
section 16-6a-612(4)(b) where its members engaged in and profited from the 
alleged wrongdoing and were appointed by directors who engaged in and 
profited from the alleged wrongdoing. 
Issue 3: Whether a special litigation committee conducts a reasonable 
inquiry under section 16-6a-612(4)(a), where the committee provides only a legal 
analysis of the derivative claims but does not make the ultimate decision 
concerning whether dismissal of the derivative claims would be in the best 
interest of the corporation. 
Standard of Review: The standard of review constitutes a separate issue 
in this appeal, but is an issue on which both parties and the district court agree. 
This court has not articulated a standard of review for orders dismissing 
derivative claims under section 16-6a-612(4), but courts in other jurisdictions 
review such orders under the summary judgment standard that requires viewing 
the facts and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to appellants. 
Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 788 (Del. 1981); Tanssen v. Best & 
Flanagan, 662 N.W.2d 876,889 (Minn. 2003); Finley v. Superior Court 80 Cal. 
App. 4th 1152,1160-61 (2000). This court should apply the same standard, 
especially since the Directors urged the district court to apply—and the court did 
apply-Rule 56 standards in adjudicating the motion. (R. 1382,1388,1405.) 
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Preservation: All three issues were preserved in the memoranda in 
opposition to the motions to dismiss, (R.1547,1556,1561-66), and again at oral 
argument on the motion to dismiss. (R.1892:21-22,33,46.) 
Determinative Provisions 
The following provisions are set forth at Addendum B: 
Utah Code §16-6a-612 
Utah Code §16-6a-822 
Utah Code §16-10a- 740 
Model Business Corporations Act §§1.43, 7.44 
Model Nonprofit Corporations Act §§1.40,13.03,13.05 
Principles of Corporate Governance §§1.23, 7.09 
The following cases are at Addendum C: 
Einhornv.Culea, 612 N.W.2d 78 (Wis. 2000) 
Tanssen v. Best & Flanagan, 662 N.W.2d 876 (Minn. 2003) 
London v. Tyrrell, Civ. No. 3321-CC, 2010 WL 877528 (Del. Ch. 
Mar. 11,2010) 
Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981) 
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Statement of the Case 
I. Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings 
On November 25,2009, Plaintiffs filed a verified complaint against the Hi-
Country Estates Homeowners Association, Phase II ("HOA"), and the five 
members of its board of directors: Keith Emmer, Tom Williams, Anthony Sarra, 
Arlene Johnson, and Carol Dean ("Directors"). (R.l-16.) Those claims remain 
pending in the district court and are not at issue in this appeal. Plaintiffs also 
filed a derivative claim on behalf of the HOA against the Directors for breach of 
fiduciary duty. (Id.) Only the derivative claim is at issue in this appeal. 
Instead of addressing the merits of the derivative claims, the Directors 
appointed a special litigation committee to evaluate the claims and then moved 
to dismiss under Utah Code section 16-6a-612.1 (R.316A-316C.) Once the 
Directors filed that motion, the court stayed the merits to allow the parties to 
conduct discovery on whether the special litigation committee was independent, 
conducted a reasonable inquiry, and acted in good faith. (R.1039-40.) After 
limited discovery, the Directors renewed their motion to dismiss. (R.1381-83.) 
1
 "A derivative proceeding shall be dismissed by the court on motion by the 
corporation if a person or group specified in Subsection (4)(b) or (4)(f) 
determines in good faith, after conducting a reasonable inquiry upon which the 
person's or group's conclusions are based, that the maintenance of the derivative 
proceeding is not in the best interest of the nonprofit corporation. 
[T]he determination in Subsection (4)(a) shall be made by . . . a majority vote of a 
committee consisting of two or more independent directors appointed by a 
majority vote of independent directors present at a meeting of the board of 
directors . . . . " Utah Code §16-6a-612(4)(a)-(b). 
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On February 23, 2012, the court granted the motion, ruling that the 
Directors had demonstrated that there was no genuine issue of material fact 
concerning the special litigation committee's independence, its good faith, the 
reasonableness of its inquiry, or whether it had determined that maintenance of 
the derivative claims is not in the best interest of the HOA. (R.1761-64;Add. A.) 
The HOA appealed under section 16-6a-612(4)(g), which provides an 
appeal of right from orders dismissing derivative claims under section 16-6a-612. 
II. Statement of Facts 
A. Hi-Country Estates Phase II, HOA, & Board 
The Hi-Country Estates Phase II ("HCEII") development has been located 
in the southwest corner of Salt Lake County near Herriman since the mid-1970s. 
(R.3,482.) The HOA has a five-person board of directors. (R.1519-20.) The 
Directors also hold management positions, including President, Vice President, 
Director of Legal, Director of the Architectural Control Committee, Director of 
Roads, Director of Water, and Director of Community Affairs. (R.440,442,455.) 
The HOA board has three main functions: road maintenance, maintain the 
common area, and administer the water system. (R.464-65.) Those functions are 
funded from annual assessments and income from its water system. (R.464.) 
Because the water system pays for itself and the common area is a bus shelter 
and mailbox structure, the annual assessments are primarily for road 
maintenance — e.g., more than 97% of the proposed non-water-system 
maintenance budget in 2009-2010 was devoted to roads. (R.464;1493.) 
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Although HOA has a Director of Roads, every member of the board 
participates in road maintenance. (R.344.) Board members annually "drive the 
HOA area and identify deteriorated areas on roads that lead to residences" and 
"respond to complaints regarding the condition of roads." (Id.) 
B. The Derivative Claims Are Based Upon Discriminatory Board 
Decisions Over the Past Twenty Years 
Plaintiffs are lot owners in "Area D" of HCEII and members of the HOA. 
(R.1051-52.) For twenty years, Plaintiffs, as well as other lot owners in Area D, 
have been unable to develop their lots —which are many acres in size — due to the 
Directors' discriminatory allocation of road maintenance resources that has 
resulted in Area D roads that are accessible only by foot, horseback, or ATV. 
(R.49-51,1056-57,1444,441 (one Plaintiff hampered by road issues since 1992); 
R.410 (Area D lot owners threatened suit in 1993 based upon neglect of roads).) 
Due to the discriminatory allocation of road maintenance resources, on 
June 12,2009, Plaintiffs sent a notice of claim and written demand to the 
Directors under Utah Code section 16-6a-612(3)(a). (R.53-57.) On September 10, 
2009, the Directors elected a special litigation committee to investigate the claims. 
(R.59-60.) After expiration of the 90-day waiting period set forth in Utah Code 
section 16~6a-612(3)(a), Plaintiffs filed their claims on November 25,2009. (R.14.) 
C All Directors Participated in and Profited from the Alleged 
Wrongful Conduct 
At the time the special litigation committee was selected, there were five 
members on the HOA board: Keith Emmer, Arlene Johnson, Tom Williams, 
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Anthony Sarra, and Carol Dean. (R.1520.) Over the past twenty years, each 
Director played a significant role in the discrimination against lot owners in Area 
D. (R.1519-20.) A review of the committee report reveals that issues concerning 
the poor condition of the Area D roads arose at least yearly, and sometimes 
monthly, during the time Mr. Emmer, Ms. Johnson, Mr. Williams, Mr. Sarra, and 
Ms. Dean served in their decision-making roles. (R.348,350-51.) 
A brief summary of each Director's involvement in road decisions is 
relevant to the independence of (i) Directors who appointed the members of the 
special litigation committee, (ii) members of the committee, and (iii) the Directors 
who decided that dismissal was in the best interest of the HOA. (R.1477.) 
Keith Emmer. Mr. Emmer is a Director who appointed the members of the 
special litigation committee and is a defendant to the derivative claim who 
engaged in " self -dealing and favoring services to and improvements benefitting" 
his own property. (R.1561.) 
Mr. Emmer has served on the board of directors for more than 15 years. 
(R.1519-20.) He has held a number of important board positions, ranging from 
Director of the Architectural Control Committee to President of the Board. 
(R.435,440,442,444,445,455,459,461,500.) As a result, he has been an integral 
player in the lengthy dispute with the Plaintiffs over road maintenance. (R.420-
25 (correspondence between Emmer and the HOA's attorney in 1995 regarding 
roads in Area D); R.569-70 (email from Emmer justifying the neglect of Area D 
roads); R.579 (email from Emmer analyzing claims).) 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
As President, Mr. Emmer often took a lead role in investigating and 
addressing disputes regarding the condition of roads. (R.450 (presented on road 
damage at 2007 annual meeting); R.456 (discussed committee to create long-term 
road plan at the 2008 annual meeting).) Emmer had frequent contact with 
Howard Lundgren, the HOA's attorney, on matters relevant to the derivative 
claims. (R.633-37 (letter from Lundgren to Emmer regarding claims); R.677-79 
(email between Emmer and Lundgren regarding same).) Despite Mr. Emmer's 
involvement in the alleged wrongful conduct, it was Mr. Emmer who first 
contacted Kim Wilson (discussed below) about serving as the chairperson of the 
special litigation committee. (R.1482.) 
Arlene Tohnson. Ms. Johnson is a Director, member of the special litigation 
committee, and a defendant who engaged in "self-dealing and favoring services 
to and improvements benefitting" her own property. (R.1561.) 
Ms. Johnson made road maintenance decisions for the HOA for more than 
a decade. (R.1496.) Ms. Johnson served on the board from 1991 to 1995 and since 
2001. (R.1519-20.) Notably, Ms. Johnson served as Director of Roads during a 
substantial period of her time on the board. (R.435,440-48,455,459,461,500.) 
As Director of Roads, she presented on the status of roads and prioritized 
road improvements. (R.438 (presented "wish list for improvements" and four-
year plan for road paving at 2005 annual meeting); R.446 (reported on road 
issues at September 2006 monthly meeting); R.451 (same at 2007 annual meeting); 
R.455 (explained road proposals at 2008 annual meeting); R.461 (arranged for 
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road improvements at October 2008 monthly meeting); R.501 (tasked with road 
improvements at November 2008 monthly meeting).) 
Anthony Sarra. Mr. Sarra is a Director and member of the special litigation 
committee, as well as a defendant who engaged in "self-dealing and favoring 
services to and improvements benefitting" his own property. (R.1561.) 
Mr. Sarra has served on the board since 2002. (R.435~36,1520.) He served 
as Vice President and Director of Legal. (R.435,440-45,455,459,461,500.) As 
Director of Legal, Mr. Sarra investigated and opined on legal issues related to 
roads at nearly every meeting and interacted with the HOA's counsel— 
Mr. Lundgren—to obtain guidance. (R.437 (presented plan based upon 
Lundgren recommendation to "avoid future problems" at 2005 annual meeting); 
R.446 (provided update on legal issues at September 2006 monthfy meeting); 
R.451 (update on legal issues concerning roads at 2007 annual meeting).) 
Mr. Sarra worked closely with Ms. Johnson and Mr. Williams in assessing 
the condition of the roads, presumably to assess any legal issues related to roads. 
(R.446 (at September 2006 monthly meeting, Sarra, Johnson, and Williams jointly 
assessed the status of one of the road projects in HCEII).) 
Tom Williams. Mr. Williams is a Director who appointed members of the 
special litigation committee and a defendant who engaged in "self-dealing and 
favoring services to and improvements benefitting" his own property. (R.1561.) 
Mr. Williams has served on the board of directors since 2003. (R.1520.) 
Although he was not directly in charge of roads, Mr. Williams was active in road 
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improvement issues. (R.446 (moving to consider road improvements and use of 
Sunrise Engineering, Inc. at September 2006 meeting).) 
Carol Dean. Ms. Dean was a Director at the time the Notice of Claim was 
served on the board, having served as a Director from 2007 to 2009. (R.1520.) 
She served as the Director of Community Affairs. (R.455,459,461,500.) Although 
Ms. Dean's title appears unrelated to road maintenance, Mr. Emmer stated that 
all of the Directors were responsible for monitoring the roads within HCEII, 
responding to road complaints, and identifying deteriorated areas. (R.344.) 
Ms. Johnson testified that road maintenance decisions were made by consensus 
after the Directors drove the roads. (R.1491,1496.) Thus, each Director had 
substantial participation in the wrongful conduct alleged in the derivative claim. 
In total, the Directors had collectively served over forty years on the board, 
and, with the possible exception of one year, at least one of the five served on the 
board since road disputes began in 1992. (R.1519-20; R.441 (Plaintiff hampered 
by road issues since 1992); R.410 (Area D lot owners threaten suit in 1993); R.438 
(complaints about Area D roads at June 11,2005 annual meeting); R.441 (impact 
of poor roads in Area D, including inability to get building permits, discussed at 
January 2006 monthly meeting); R.449 (Area D roads discussed at 2007 annual 
meeting); R.460 (discussing document request related to road issues at 
September 2008 monthly meeting); R.463 (February 27, 2009 letter alerting board 
of its discrimination and fiduciary duties); R.501 (poor conditions of Area D 
roads discussed at November 2008 monthly meeting).) 
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D. The Members of the Special Litigation Committee 
All Directors elected two Directors —Arlene Johnson and Anthony Sarra — 
and one past Director to serve on the special litigation committee and perform 
the inquiry into the derivative claims. (R.59.) Ms. Johnson and Mr. Sarra's heavy 
involvement with the HCEII road decisions has been set forth above. 
The third member of the special litigation committee was Kim Wilson. 
(R.59.) Although Mr. Wilson was the only committee member not serving on the 
board during the years leading up to the filing of the derivative claims, he was 
similarly tainted by his service on the board from 1994 to 1999 and his business 
relationship with the HOA. (R.446,1519-20,1579-80.) Between 1994 and 1999, the 
HOA faced the same legal issues concerning road maintenance. (R.441,410.) 
Mr. Wilson owns property within HCEII accessed by Shaggy Mountain 
Road, one of the roads the derivative claim alleges received preferential 
maintenance. (R.374.) And Mr. Wilson worked for Sunrise Engineering, Inc., a 
company the Directors hired to work on HCEII's roads, (R.1579-80), and from 
which the Directors sought bids for road maintenance projects. (R.446.) 
E- The Special Litigation Committee's Investigation 
The committee's investigation was based in substantial part on documents 
from and interviews with the Directors. For example, Mr. Emmer, one of the 
Directors who selected the committee, was (i) interviewed extensively, (R.2; 
R.725-38), (ii) asked to present "statements] of facts/' (R.502-03), and (iii) asked 
to print out his emails, many of which are relied upon in the committee report. 
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(R.339-40 nn.30-39,529-667 (section entitled "Keith Emmer's Emails").) Given the 
Directors' close collaboration on the road issues, it was no surprise that other 
Directors—including Ms. Johnson, Mr. Sarra, Mr. Williams, and Ms. Dean—were 
frequently the drafters or recipients of those emails, many of which discuss the 
derivative claims. (R.530 (Emmer to Johnson, Sarra, Dean); R.544 (Sarra to 
Emmer); R.547 (Emmer to Sarra, Johnson, Dean); R.548 (Emmer to Sarra, 
Johnson, Dean, Williams); R.563-64, 568-70 (Sarra, Emmer, Williams, Johnson, 
and Dean); R.628-37 (Emmer, Sarra, Williams, Johnson, Dean, and Lundgren 
[HOA's attorney]); R.640-43 (Emmer, Johnson, Sarra, Williams, and Dean).) 
Tom Williams, another Director who selected members of the special 
litigation committee, responded to written questions regarding the derivative 
claim, and those responses were used to assess the merits of the claims. 
(R.336,362n.224.) Parts of the committee report were based upon a review of 
"correspondence by Arlene Johnson/' who both elected herself to serve on the 
committee and drafted the committee report. (R.340n.40,1507-08.) 
The committee conducted a number of interviews with Directors, other 
HOA members, and the Plaintiffs. (R.1392.) The committee did not interview 
Ms. Johnson or Mr. Sarra —who served on the committee —even though they 
were Director of Roads and Director of Legal. (R. 1393,1486.) 
Tellingly, during the interviews, Ms. Johnson, Mr. Sarra, and Mr. Wilson, 
(likely due to their active participation in the events in question), often testified 
as to their version of the events, led the witnesses based on their recollection, and 
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debated with witnesses about the merits of the derivative claims. (R.757 
(Hoffman interview in which Wilson testified as to why a road was closed by the 
County); R.759-63 (Hoffman interview in which both Wilson and Johnson 
interject facts they learned as Directors and Johnson directs questions to the 
"combined memory of all [of] us"); R.769-72 (Midlestadt interview in which 
Johnson testifies about rules applicable to unincorporated areas); R.780 
(Messemer interview in which Johnson explains the HOA's handling of a 
nuisance near the interviewee's property); R.792-93 (Plaintiffs interview in 
which Johnson and Wilson argue with Plaintiff about the board's cost estimates 
for improving roads); R.797-98 (Plaintiffs interview in which Wilson testifies 
about road conditions near his lot); R.799 (Plaintiffs interview in which Johnson 
testifies how road issues related to certain lots were funded in the 1990s); R.801 
(Plaintiffs interview in which Wilson interprets HOA policies in light of events 
in the 1990s); R.806-08 (Plaintiffs interview in which Wilson and Johnson testify 
about their experience with County zoning regulations).) 
F. The Special Litigation Committee Report 
The special litigation committee issued its report on May 29,2010. (R.333-
73.) While the report was principally authored by Ms. Johnson, its contents were 
a result of collaboration among (i) the committee members, (ii) Mr. Lundgren, 
the HOA's attorney, and (iii) Mr. Emmer, President of the board. (R.1507-08.) 
Importantly, the report contains no conclusion as to whether it was in the 
HOA's best interest to maintain the derivative proceeding. (R.1584.) Instead, the 
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report made fourteen "observations" and three "recommendations," nearly all of 
which concern the merits of the claims instead of what is in the best interest of 
the HOA. (R.333-66.) For example, the report "recommended" that the Directors 
cooperate with one of the Plaintiffs and share financial records to "clear up any 
communication problems" and seek legal counsel concerning the fact that some 
of its records contain confidential personal information. (R.339,358.) And 
Observation #1 states "The Plaintiffs did not show that there is or has been a de 
facto residency requirement to be on the board;" Observation #6 states "The 
Board's legal counsel's opinion differs from [appellants' counsel's] opinion. 
Where an issue results in a conflicting interpretation of the law between 
Attorneys, the Board's most responsible option is to act according to the opinion 
of their legal counsel." (R.340,349.) 
Mr. Emmer, after reviewing the report, recommended that the Directors 
instruct the HOA's attorneys to move to dismiss the derivative claims under 
Utah Code section 16-6a-612(4)(a). (R.813.) In his email recommendation, 
Mr. Emmer listed the Directors by name, indicated that Mr. Sarra and 
Ms. Johnson would abstain from voting, stated that he would be voting to accept 
the committee report, and then filled in votes of acceptance for Mr. Williams and 
Mr. Brown.2 (Id) 
2
 The HOA has been unable to locate any emails from Mr. Williams and 
Mr. Brown indicating their vote. 
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Summary of the Argument 
The district court erred in dismissing the derivative claims under Utah 
Code section 16-6a-612(4)(a). Section 16-6a-612(4) provides the directors of a 
corporation a mechanism to dismiss derivative claims, not on their merits, but on 
the ground that maintenance of the claims is not in the best interest of the 
corporation. The mechanism has roots in the business judgment rule, under 
which courts defer to the business judgment of directors with regard to litigation 
in the corporation's name. For obvious reasons, courts do not defer to the 
judgment of directors when the derivative lawsuit alleges that those directors 
engaged in self-dealing or otherwise harmed the corporation. To do so would 
allow wrongdoers to control the lawsuit designed to expose their wrongdoing. 
Where directors are tainted by their involvement in the wrongdoing, 
section 16-6a-612(4)(b)(ii) permits the appointment of a special litigation 
committee to exercise independent business judgment in determining whether 
maintenance of the lawsuit is in the best interest of the corporation. Specifically, 
section 16-6a-612(4)(b)(ii) allows the independent directors of a corporation to 
appoint a special litigation committee that can recommend dismissal after 
conducting a good faith inquiry into whether maintenance of the derivative 
claims is in the best interest of the corporation. To warrant deference under the 
business judgment rule, however, the members of the special litigation 
committee must be "independent/7 not unlike arbitrators. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In this case, the derivative claims allege that the Directors of the HOA 
engaged in self-dealing by maintaining roads (the primary function of the HOA) 
adjacent to their own properties and neglecting roads adjacent to the Plaintiffs' 
properties to the point that they became impassable by cars. That neglect has 
negatively affected Plaintiffs' ability to obtain building permits and the value of 
their properties. Each Director participated in road-maintenance decisions and 
benefitted from the discriminatory practices. Yet those same Directors appointed 
the members of the special litigation committee and two of those Directors 
served on the committee. In addition, as the third committee member admitted 
in his deposition, the committee did not consider whether maintenance of the 
claims is in the best interest of the corporation. And ultimately the Directors, not 
the committee, made the decision to move to dismiss the derivative claims. 
A motion to dismiss under section 16-6a-612 is governed by summary 
judgment standards, so dismissal was appropriate only if there was no genuine 
issue of material fact concerning the committee's independence and its inquiry 
and recommendations. Under that standard, the appointment and constitution 
of the committee violated the independence requirement in section 16-6a-
612(4) (b)(ii) and its inquiry and recommendations violated the good faith inquiry 
requirement in section 16-6a-612(4)(a). 
First, section 16-6a-612(4)(b)(ii) allows only "independent" directors to 
appoint members of a special litigation committee. Here, all Directors, including 
those who committed the wrongdoing, appointed members of the committee. 
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Second, members of the committee must be independent. Here, two 
members were Directors who committed the wrongdoing and the third member 
was a past Director who had previously engaged in similar wrongdoing. 
Third, the committee's inquiry must be reasonable. Here, the committee 
allowed the Directors to control important aspects of its inquiry and relied upon 
the very corporate counsel who had approved the discriminatory practices 
described in the derivative claims in the first place. 
Fourth, the committee must exercise business judgment and make the 
decision of whether to move to dismiss the derivative claims. Here, one member 
of the committee testified that the committee did not consider the best interest of 
the HOA and, as the committee report confirms, the committee did not employ 
business judgment to recommend dismissal. That decision was left to the 
Directors whose lack of independence required the appointment of a special 
litigation committee in the first place. 
For all of those reasons, there are at least genuine issues of fact concerning 
whether the Directors satisfied section 16-6a-612(4) in their motion to dismiss the 
derivative claims. This court should vacate the order dismissing the derivative 
claims to allow those claims to be evaluated on their merits. 
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Argument 
The district court dismissed the derivative claims after ruling that there is 
no genuine issue of fact concerning whether the Directors and members of the 
special litigation committee were independent. The court based its ruling on its 
view that (i) the relationships between the Directors and members of the 
committee were "casual social relationship [s]" and (ii) being named as 
defendants in the derivative action does not negate independence. (R.1761-
64,1893:1-5.) The court also ruled that the committee had concluded, and had a 
reasonable basis for concluding, that "the derivative proceeding is not in the best 
interest of HCEII." (R.1763.) 
As demonstrated below, the district court erred in dismissing the 
derivative claims under section 16-6a-612(4) because the special litigation 
committee was not independent, as required by section 16-6a-612(4)(b)(ii), and its 
inquiry into whether maintenance of the derivative claims is in the best interest 
of the HO A was inadequate under section 16-6a-612(4)(a). 
Because the mechanism for dismissing derivative claims in section 16-6a-
612(4) is unusual, this brief proceeds as follows. First, it discusses the standard 
of review because this court has not interpreted the dismissal mechanism in 
section 16-6a-612. Second, it sets forth the relevant statutory language. Third, 
because many operative terms in section 16-6a-612 are not defined and have their 
origin in case law—especially Delaware case law—the brief summarizes the 
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history of the dismissal mechanism that became section 16-6a-612.3 Fourth, the 
brief addresses the three issues presented by interpreting the statute in light of 
that history as well as (i) commentary to the Model Nonprofit Corporation Act 
("MNCA") on which section 16-6a~612 is based and (ii) case law in jurisdictions 
with similar statutes. 
The issues addressed are (i) which party had the burden of proving that 
the special litigation committee satisfied the requirements in section 16-6a-
612(4) (a), something the district court never decided; (ii) whether the special 
litigation committee was independent under section 16-6a-612(4)(b)(ii); and, if so, 
(iii) whether the committee conducted a reasonable inquiry and concluded that 
maintenance of the derivative claims was not in the best interest of the HOA. 
I. The Summary Judgment Standard Applies to Motions to Dismiss Filed 
Under Utah Code Section 16-6a-612(4) (a) 
Courts routinely apply the summary judgment standard in adjudicating 
motions to dismiss derivative claims under dismissal mechanisms like the one in 
section 16-6a-612(4). This court should adopt the same standard, especially since 
the Directors applied the summary judgment standard in the district court. 
As the Delaware Supreme Court4 has noted, because the type of motion at 
issue here involves control of the corporation, it is a "hybrid [motion] derived by 
analogy to a motion to dismiss a derivative suit based upon a voluntary 
3
 For reasons explained below, the issues presented here also implicate derivative 
claims filed on behalf of for-profit corporations under section 16-10a-740. 
4
 The Directors relied on Delaware law in the district court. (R.1405,1660.) 
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settlement reached between the parties and to a motion brought pursuant to Rule 
41(a)(2) whereby a plaintiff unilaterally seeks a voluntary dismissal of the 
complaint subsequent to the filing of an answer by the defendant/7 Kaplan v. 
Wyatt, 484 A.2d 501, 506-07 (Del. Ch. 1984). But despite its unique nature, 
Delaware applies "the normal burden under Rule 56 that there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to [judgment] 
as a matter of law." Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 788 (Del. 1981). 
Other states have followed Delaware in applying the summary judgment 
standard. Finley v. Superior Court 80 Cal. App. 4th 1152,1160-61 (2000) (citing 
numerous cases for the proposition that "courts which have considered the issue 
have concluded that judicial review of the independence, good faith, and 
investigative techniques of a special litigation committee is governed by 
traditional summary judgment standards"); Boland v. Boland, 31 A.3d 529,561-
63 (Md. 2011) (applying summary judgment standard); Janssen v. Best & 
Flanagan, 662 N.W.2d 876, 889 (Minn. 2003) ("Generally, when the committee 
authorized with making a business decision for the corporation is found to lack 
the independence needed to grant summary judgment, or where the 
independence is uncertain, the derivative suit proceeds on its merits."). 
This court should apply the summary judgment standard not only because 
it is applied in a majority of jurisdictions, but also because the Directors invited 
the district court to apply that standard, stating that "if there are no genuine 
issues of material fact regarding the committee's independence, good faith and 
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investigative techniques, the derivative suit must be dismissed/' (R. 1405; see 
also R.1382 ("undisputed material facts show that the board members acted in 
good faith, with the care of ordinarily prudent persons, and in a manner 
reasonably believed to be in the best interests of the nonprofit corporation").) 
The Directors should not be able to argue for a different standard for the 
first time in this court. Will v. Engebretson & Co., 213 Cal. App. 3d 1033,1043 
(1989) (having chosen to frame its special litigation committee dismissal papers 
as governed by the summary judgment standard, the party was "bound to follow 
it in all its particulars"). Perhaps more important, the district court accepted the 
Directors' invitation and applied the summary judgment standard. (R.1763 ("no 
genuine issues of material fact").) This court should do the same. 
If there exists a genuine issue of material fact, this court should reverse the 
order dismissing the derivative claims. 
II. Under Section 16-6a-612, the District Court Erred in Dismissing the 
Derivative Claims Because There Were Genuine Issues of Material Fact 
Concerning Independence and the Reasonableness of the Inquiry 
Utah Code section 16-6a-612 governs both how plaintiffs file derivative 
claims on behalf of nonprofit corporations and how their directors may seek 
dismissal of derivative claims without adjudicating the merits. While the statute 
sets forth the general mechanism for dismissing derivative claims, its language is 
ambiguous with regard to a number of key components. For that reason, after 
setting forth the procedure and standards in section 16-6a-612, this brief 
discusses both the origin of the dismissal process codified in section 16-6a-612, 
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the commentary to the model acts on which section 16-6a-612 is based, and case 
law interpreting similar statutes. 
A. The Procedures and Standards in Utah Code Section 16-6a-612 
Derivative claims are an exception to the presumption that boards of 
directors exercise sound business judgment in governing corporations. That 
presumption is embodied in the so-called "business judgment rule," a 
"presumption protecting conduct by directors that can be attributed to any 
rational business purpose." Dennis J. Block, et al., The Business Judgment Rule: 
Fiduciary Duties of Corporate Directors 18 (5th ed. 1998). Under the business 
judgment rule, "as long as the disinterested director(s) made an informed 
business decision, in good faith, without an abuse of discretion, he or she will not 
be liable for corporate losses resulting from his or her decision." Id. at 39. Utah 
recognizes a version of the business judgment rule: Utah Code §16-6a-822. 
1. Written Demand 
Derivative claims allow members and shareholders to bring claims on 
behalf of the corporation against those (including its directors) who have 
harmed, or otherwise not acted in the best interest of, the corporation. The right 
to bring derivative claims is tempered to ensure that corporations are not forced 
to pursue claims when their merit is outweighed by the time and resources 
necessary to prevail. Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994,1000-01 (N.Y. 1979). 
Thus, before a plaintiff can commence a derivative lawsuit, "a written demand 
[must be] made upon the nonprofit corporation to take suitable action." Utah 
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Code §16-6a-612(3)(a)(i); see also Utah Code §16-10a-740(3)(a) (same requirement 
with for-profit corporations). 
2. Verified Complaint 
In Utah, once the demand is made a complaint may be filed (i) after the 
expiration of 90 days; (ii) if the directors reject the demand; or (iii) if irreparable 
injury would result from waiting. IcL §16-6a-612(3)(a). The complaint must be 
verified and allege with particularity the demand made upon the directors. IcL 
§16-6a-612(3)(b). And if the complaint is filed after the directors reject the 
demand, the complaint also must allege with particularity that (i) a majority of 
the board of directors were not independent or (ii) why the rejection of the 
demand was legally inadequate. Id. §16-6a-612(4)(d). 
3, Dismissal Mechanism 
The district court may stay the lawsuit to allow the directors to conduct an 
inquiry. Id. §16-6a-612(3)(d). The stay provides an independent person or group 
time to determine "in good faith, after conducting a reasonable inquiry upon 
which the person's or group's conclusions are based, that the maintenance of the 
derivative proceeding is not in the best interest of the nonprofit corporation/7 Id. 
§16-6a-612(4)(a) (emphasis added). 
There are three types of persons or groups who can make the subsection 
(4)(a) determination and recommend dismissal: (i) a majority of "independent 
directors present at a meeting of the board of directors, if the independent 
directors constitute a quorum;" (ii) a special litigation committee "consisting of 
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two or more independent directors appointed by a majority vote of independent 
directors/7 or (iii) a court appointed "panel of one or more independent 
persons."* Id §16-6a-612(4)(b), (4)(f). 
If dismissal is recommended, then the plaintiff may conduct discovery 
akin to Rule 56(f) that is "limited to facts relating to whether the person or group 
conducting the inquiry is independent and disinterested; the good faith of the 
inquiry; and the reasonableness of the procedures followed by the person or 
group conducting the inquiry." Id §16-6a-612(3)(e) (emphasis added). 
Discovery does not extend to the merits of the derivative claims. Id 
4. Burden of Proof 
The burden of proving compliance with subsection (4) (a) is governed by 
sections 16-6a-612(4)(e), (4)(f). If a court-appointed person or group makes the 
subsection (4)(a) determination, then "the plaintiff has the burden of proving that 
the requirements of Subsection (4)(a) are not met." Id §16-6a-612(f)(ii). 
Otherwise, the burden is determined by whether "a majority of the board of 
directors consists of independent directors at the time the determination is made 
to reject a demand by a complainant." Id §§16-6a-612(4)(e). If a majority is 
independent, the plaintiff has the burden; if a majority is not independent, then 
the directors must prove compliance with subsection (4)(a). Id 
5
 The HOA requested a court appointed person, but the Directors refused. 
(R.235,1892:22.) Had the district court appointed someone under section 16-6a-
612(f) (i), the issue here regarding independence likely would never have arisen. 
Brewster v. Brewster, 2010 UT App 260, f 17 n.8, 241 P.3d 357. 
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5. Unanswered Questions 
The language of section 16-6a-612 leaves a number of questions 
unanswered. First, it does not define "independent" or indicate whether the 
scope of the limited discovery under section 16-6a-612(3)(e) — whether the person 
or group was " independent and disinterested" — reveals that the 
"independence]" required of a director in subsections (4)(a) and (4)(e) also 
requires the director to be disinterested. If the requirement does not include 
disinterestedness, then it is unclear why the plaintiff can conduct limited 
discovery on that issue. 
Second, the language does not indicate whether the independence 
required to determine who has the burden of proving compliance with 
subsection (4) (a) is the same independence required of the person or group 
conducting the inquiry under subsection (4)(a). If it is the same independence, 
then the burden of proof determination appears to overlap with the issue on 
which a party has the burden, namely director independence. 
Finally, the language does not indicate what constitutes a good faith and 
reasonable inquiry into whether the derivative claims are in the best interest of 
the corporation. For example, the statute does not specify what role the non-
independent directors may play in the work of a special litigation committee. 
Fortunately, the history of the dismissal mechanism that became section 
16-6a~612 provides clear answers to those questions. 
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B. The Origin of Derivative Claims and Special Litigation 
Committees 
The right to prosecute derivative claims on behalf of a corporation dates 
back to 1856. Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 331 (1856). Directors of a 
corporation could defend against derivative claims under the business judgment 
rule. United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261, 263-64 
(1917). As long as the directors' decision not to pursue or maintain the claim 
reflected a business judgment, the derivative claim was dismissed. Thus, for 
example, where shareholders filed an antitrust claim on behalf of the corporation 
against a competitor, dismissal in light of the business judgment of the directors 
was fairly straightforward. But where the derivative claim alleged self-dealing 
by a director, deferring to director business judgment was more complicated. 
By 1934, the Securities and Exchange Commission began playing a 
significant role in regulating corporations. In the 1970s, the SEC enforcement 
division began requiring corporations to appoint independent directors to 
conduct internal investigations with the assistance of outside counsel. Kenneth 
B. Davis, Jr., The Forgotten Derivative Suit 61 Vand. L. Rev. 387,393-95 (2008) 
("Forgotten Derivative Suit"). In some instances, the SEC required corporations 
to create special litigation committees to "review pending and future claims and 
questions of conflict of interest involving the company's officers, directors, 
controlling persons, and employees/' Id at 394-95. 
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C. Case Law Developing the Use of Special Litigation Committees 
In 1976, a federal judge was presented with a detailed report of a special 
litigation committee that, with the assistance of outside counsel, concluded that 
maintenance of a derivative lawsuit was not in the best interest of the 
corporation. Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508, 514 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). The 
court ruled that the decision of the special litigation committee fell within the 
business judgment rule because its members had acted in good faith and were 
independent of the tainted board of directors in the sense that they had not acted 
in an advisory capacity. Id. at 514-19. The court denied the motion, but only to 
permit the plaintiffs "to test the bona fides and independence of the Special 
Committee through discovery and, if necessary, at a plenary hearing." IdL at 520. 
The procedure approved in Gall has been adopted by nearly every 
jurisdiction. Forgotten Derivative Suit at 390. Most famously, the Delaware 
Supreme Court adopted the dismissal procedure in Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 
430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).6 Zapata recognized the value of special litigation 
committees in allowing corporations to maintain the business judgment rule 
defense where their boards are "tainted by the self-interest of a majority of its 
members/7 Id. at 786. The court noted that "[i]t thus appears desirable to us to 
find a balancing point where bona fide stockholder power to bring corporate 
6
 In Delaware, and in some other states, the doctrine has been governed by case 
law interpreting the business judgment rule and the general authority of 
directors to form committees, but has never been codified. IdL at 782; Finley, 80 
Cal.App. 4th at 1158-60. 
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causes of action cannot be unfairly trampled on by the board of directors, but the 
corporation can rid itself of detrimental litigation/ , IdL at 787. 
An independent special litigation committee was the answer as long as the 
committee—not the directors — (i) considered relevant "factors ethical, 
commercial, promotional, public relations, employee relations, fiscal as well as 
legal," (ii) produced a "thorough written record of the investigation and its 
findings and recommendations/7 and (iii) "cause[d] its corporation to file a 
pretrial motion to dismiss/7 IcL at 788. Even with those protections, courts 
recognized that the use of special litigation committees is "[t]he only instance in 
American Jurisprudence where a defendant can free itself from a suit by merely 
appointing a committee to review the allegations of the complaint/' Lewis v. 
Fuqua, 502 A.2d 962, 967 (Del. Ch. 1985). Indeed, the procedure is "designed to 
provide a means, if warranted, to throw a derivative plaintiff out of Court before 
he has an opportunity to engage in any discovery whatever in support of the 
merits of his cause of action/' Kaplan, 484 A.2d at 509. 
The "fox guarding the henhouse" nature of the process —sometimes 
described as "structural bias" — requires courts "to be mindful of the need to 
scrutinize carefully the mechanism by which directors delegate to a minority 
committee the business judgment authority to terminate derivative litigation, 
particularly when the lawsuit is directed against some or a majority of the 
directors." Will, 213 Cal. App. 3d at 1043 (1989). Much like the inquiry to ensure 
arbitrator independence, the inquiry into the independence of special litigation 
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committees is important "to retain its integrity, a quality that is, in turn, essential 
to the utility of that process/7 In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917, 
940 (Del. Ch. 2003).7 The type of independence required is "like Caesar's wife— 
above reproach/7 Beam ex rel. Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. v. 
Stewart 845 A.2d 1040,1055 (Del. 2004) (quoting Lewis, 502 A.2d at 967). 
Because of the importance of independence, the burden to demonstrate 
independence shifts from the plaintiff to the directors when the claims move 
from a pre-suit demand to a post-suit motion to dismiss. Independence 
determinations at the post-suit motion to dismiss stage involve "diametrically-
opposed burdens" from those in the pre-suit demand context. Beam, 845 A.2d at 
1055. In the pre-suit demand context, the plaintiff must rebut the presumption in 
favor of the board's independence by establishing in a verified complaint "a 
reasonable doubt that a majority of the board could have acted independently." 
Id. at 1048-49. In the post-suit context involving a special litigation committee, 
the directors carry "the burden of proving independence, good faith and a 
reasonable investigation, rather than presuming independence, good faith and 
reasonableness." Zapata, 430 A.2d at 788. 
7 See also London v. Tyrrell, Civ. No. 3321-CC, 2010 WL 877528, at *16 (Del. Ch. 
Mar. 11, 2010) ("members should be selected with the utmost care to ensure that 
they can, in both fact and appearance, carry out the extraordinary responsibility 
placed on them"); Principles of Corporate Governance §7.10 cmt. d ("[Gjiven the 
possible perception that board members may be consciously or unconsciously 
partial to the interests of their colleagues who are defendants, some judicial 
oversight of this process is important in order to maintain public and investor 
confidence in the integrity of corporate governance."). 
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In a second holding that was not universally followed, Zapata held that, 
even if the directors establish good faith and independence as a matter of law, 
the court must"determine, applying its own independent business judgment, 
whether the motion should be granted/' IcL at 789. The New York Court of 
Appeals had rejected that view and held that courts should not review the 
business judgment of the committee as long as its independence is beyond 
question. Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994 (N.Y. 1979). All courts agree, 
however, on the importance of independence and that the directors had the 
burden of demonstrating independence and good faith in the post-suit context. 
Drilling v. Berman, 589 N.W.2d 503, 508 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999) (outlining the 
difference between the Auerbach approach and the Zapata approach). 
What emerges from the early case law is the following. A plaintiff must 
make a pre-suit demand. If the demand is rejected, the plaintiff must establish in 
a verified complaint that a majority of the board of directors who rejected the 
demand was not independent or that the rejection was wrongful. The directors 
then can delegate to an independent special litigation committee the authority to 
evaluate whether maintenance of the derivative claims is in the best interest of 
the corporation. If the committee recommends dismissal, the directors must 
show that there is no disputed issue of fact concerning whether the committee 
(i) was independent, meaning "like Caesar's wife—above reproach;7' 
(ii) conducted a reasonable inquiry; and (iii) acted in good faith. The directors 
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also must show that the committee had fully delegated (not advisory) authority 
to conduct its inquiry and make its dismissal recommendation. 
D. The MBCA, the MNCA, and Case Law Interpreting Their 
Provisions Reveal That the District Court Misinterpreted Utah 
Code Section 16-6a-612 
Beginning in 1992, the Model Business Corporations Act ("MBCA") 
codified the special litigation committee procedures and standards. The Model 
Nonprofit Corporations Act ("MNCA") followed suit in 2000. A copy of the 
various versions of the MBCA and MNCA are at Addendum B. The comments 
to both the MBCA and MNCA—which are virtually identical —shed more light 
on (i) the burden of proof in section 16-6a-612(4)(e), (ii) what constitutes 
independence for a special litigation committee under section 16-6a-612(4)(b)(ii), 
and (iii) what is a good faith, reasonable inquiry under section 16-6a-612(4)(a). 
1. The Verified Complaint's Allegations That a Majority of 
Directors Were Not Independent Shifted the Burden of 
Proof to the Directors 
Like the Delaware procedure, section 16-6a-612 contemplates that a 
plaintiff will make a demand on the board of directors before filing a derivative 
lawsuit. If the demand is rejected, then the verified complaint must establish 
that either a majority of the board of directors lacked independence or their 
rejection did not comply with subsection (4)(a). Utah Code §16-6a-612(4)(d). If 
the complaint establishes that a majority of directors lacked independence, then 
"the corporation has the burden of proving that the requirements of Subsection 
(4)(a) are met." Id §16~6a-612(4)(e)(i). 
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The commentary to the MNCA confirms that the verified complaint is 
where a lack of independence is established for determining the burden of proof. 
That commentary explains that the burden shifting provisions in the MNCA 
were designed in "response to concerns of structural bias" in the dismissal 
mechanism. MNCA 13-17 (2008). As courts have noted, "[i]t is not cynical to 
expect that [special litigation] committees will tend to view derivative actions 
against the other directors with skepticism." Toy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 888 (2d 
Cir. 1982). To solve that problem, the directors bear the burden "where a 
majority of directors is not independent, and the determination is made by [a 
special litigation committee] specified in subsection [(4)](b)(ii)." MNCA 13-17. 
The commentary notes that the burden shifting procedures are not 
identical to those in Delaware law because, unlike Delaware law, under the 
MNCA there are no "demand-excused situation[s]" that allow plaintiffs to 
bypass the demand procedure by preemptively pleading "particularized facts 
that create a reasonable doubt that a majority of directors at the time [a] demand 
would be made are independent or disinterested." MNCA 13-14. In Delaware, 
when a plaintiff establishes a lack of independence in the verified complaint— 
whether to excuse the demand or in response to its rejection—the directors may 
reassert the right to control the litigation by forming a special litigation 
committee. But the directors then "bear the burden of proving the independence 
of the committee, the reasonableness of its investigation, and the reasonableness 
of the bases of its decision reflected in the motion." MNCA 13-14 to 13-15. 
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Under the MNCA, the plaintiff must always make a demand. MNCA 
§13.03 & 13-16. Despite that difference, the MNCA retained the distinction under 
Delaware law by assigning to "the plaintiff the threshold burden of alleging facts 
establishing that a majority of the board is not independent." MNCA 13-16. 
Thus, it is in the verified complaint that a plaintiff establishes a lack of 
independence of the majority of the board, which operates to determine which 
party has the burden of proving the independence of the special litigation 
committee and "the propriety of [its] inquiry and determination." MNCA 13-16. 
Here, the operative verified complaint alleges that each Director was 
engaged in self-dealing and personally benefitted from the decisions concerning 
which roads to build and maintain within the HOA. (R.1056 ("the roads located 
near the homes owned by the Board's members are maintained and improved 
with monies paid by all members of the Association, while other roads are left to 
deteriorate and have been rendered impassable due to intentional neglect"); 
R.1562-63 (Directors have burden of proving compliance with subsection (4)(a).) 
Therefore, the Directors bore the burden of proving compliance with 
subsection (4)(a), something the district court refused to acknowledge. (R.1761-
64.) Ultimately, however, the burden of proof has little significance given the 
motion papers filed in this case because the HOA had to demonstrate only a 
disputed issue of material fact concerning compliance with subsection (4)(a). 
Thus, regardless of which party has the burden in this case, disputed issues of 
fact precluded the dismissal of the derivative claims. 
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2. A Genuine Issue of Material Fact Exists With Regard to 
Whether the Special Litigation Committee Was Independent 
Under Section 16-6a-612(4)(b)(ii) 
Section 16-6a-612(4)(b)(ii) governs special litigation committees. That 
section requires "a majority vote of a committee consisting of two or more 
independent directors appointed by a majority vote of independent directors 
present at a meeting of the board of directors." Utah Code §16-6a-612(4)(b)(ii) 
(emphasis added). Thus, the members of a special litigation committee can be 
appointed only by independent directors and the committee itself must consist of 
at least two independent directors. If there are not two independent directors, 
then only a court-appointed group can determine whether maintenance of the 
derivative claims is in the best interest of the corporation. Id. §16-6a~612 (4)(f). 
While section 16-6a-612 does not define " independent/7 it does specify 
what does not, by itself, negate independence: 
None of the following by itself causes a director to be 
considered not independent for purposes of this section: 
(i) the nomination or election of the director by 
persons 
(A) who are defendants in the derivative 
proceeding; or 
(B) against whom action is demanded; 
(ii) the naming of the director as 
(A) a defendant in the derivative proceeding; or 
(B) a person against whom action is demanded; or 
(iii) the approval by the director of the act being 
challenged in the derivative proceeding or 
demand if the act resulted in no personal benefit 
to the director. 
Utah Code §16-6a-612(4)(c) (emphasis added). The key language is "by itself." 
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The commentary to the MNCA explains that the section was designed to 
reject "the concept that the mere appointment of new directors [to the board, not 
the special litigation committee] by the non-independent directors makes the 
new directors not independent in making the necessary determination because of 
an inherent structural bias." MNCA 13-12. The commentary also explains that 
"the mere fact that a director has been named as a defendant or approved the 
action being challenged does not cause the director to be considered not 
independent." IcL The commentary thus makes clear that courts should assess 
"actual bias" instead of applying a per se rule that a director is not independent 
if the director (i) is appointed by a non-independent director, (ii) is a defendant, 
or (iii) approved the challenged action (without personal gain). Id. 
That interpretation has been adopted in other jurisdictions. For example, 
the Wisconsin Supreme Court explained that, even though those three factors 
that are not, by themselves, enough to negate independence, courts should "give 
weight to these factors; [as] the statute simply states that the presence of one or 
more of these factors is not solely determinative of the issue of whether a director 
is independent." Einhorn v. Culea, 612 N.W.2d 78, 86 (Wis. 2000). 
Thus, in this case the district court erred in refusing to consider the fact 
that both the Directors who appointed members of the special litigation 
committee and members of the special litigation committee were defendants to 
the derivative claims and approved the acts at issue —i.e., the discriminatory 
funding of roads to favor the Directors' properties. (R.1561,1893:3-4.) The 
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district court instead should have determined whether that evidence, coupled 
with additional evidence of actual bias described below, created a disputed issue 
of fact concerning independence. 
a. The Current Versions of the MBCA and the MNCA 
Specify What Constitutes Independence for a Special 
Litigation Committee 
Despite the fact that most cases involving special litigation committees 
focus on independence, early versions of the MNCA did not define the term 
"independent/' MNCA §§1.40,13.05. The Utah Code also uses the phrase 
"independent director" and similarly does not define "independent." 2006 Utah 
Laws Ch. 228, §2 (West) (S.B. 84) (amending section 16-6a-612 to introduce the 
term "independent director[]"); 2000 Utah Laws Ch. 130, §1 (West) (H.B. 86) 
(amending section 16-10a-740 to introduce the term "independent director[]").8 
In 2005, the MBCA, but not the MNCA, began using the phrase "qualified 
director" instead of "independent director" and defined the term "qualified." 
MBCA §7.44. A "qualified director," under the revised MBCA, is a director who 
"does not have (i) a material interest in the outcome of the proceeding, or (ii) a 
material relationship with a person who has such an interest." MBCA §1.43(a)(l) 
(2011). A "material interest" is "an actual or potential benefit or detriment (other 
than one which would devolve on the corporation or the shareholders generally) 
8
 The dismissal procedure in Utah Code section 16-10a-740 (Utah Revised 
Business Corporation Act) came from the MBCA in 2000, and the dismissal 
procedure in section 16-6a-612 (Utah Revised Nonprofit Corporation Act) came 
from section 16-10-a-740, as the MNCA did not contain the dismissal mechanism 
until 2008. MNCA §13.05. 
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that would reasonably be expected to impair the objectivity of the director's 
judgment when participating in the action to be taken." Id. §1.43(b)(2). And a 
"material relationship" is "a familial, financial, professional, employment or 
other relationship that would reasonably be expected to impair the objectivity of 
the director's judgment when participating in the action to be taken." Id. 
§1.43(b)(l). 
Use of the phrase "qualified director" was intended to distinguish the 
more common definition of "independent director" as a director who is not also 
an officer or employee of the corporation. MBCA §1.43 cmt. 2; see also Oracle, 
824 A.2d at 941 n.62 (quoting NASD Rules 4200 & 4350). Like the MBCA, the 
MNCA makes clear that "independent" does not have that more common 
meaning: "The concept of an independent director is not intended to be limited 
to nonofficer or 'outside' directors but may in appropriate circumstances include 
directors who are also officers." MNCA §13.05 cmt. I.9 
9
 There is some irony, then, in the fact that the only Utah legislative history 
concerning the meaning of the phrase "independent director" came in the 2000 
floor debate on section 16-10a-740, when Senator Valentine explained that 
"independent director" carries the same meaning as the more common 
definition. He explained that the bill had 
a mechanism where a majority of board of directors who are 
independent members of the board of directors may make an 
action and then stop the derivative action. They may make the 
action that the people who were the shareholders wanted. Now 
what are independent board members and what are non-
independent board members. An independent board member 
is one that is outside of the organization. He or she is not an 
officer, is not an employee, doesn't receive any compensation 
from the corporation with the exception of the compensation 
for serving as a director of the corporation. . . . In those kinds of 
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The comments to the MBCA explained the change in terminology as 
clarifying, not substantive: 
Although the term " qualified director" embraces the 
concept of independence, it does so only in relation to 
the director's interest or involvement in the specific 
situations to which the definition applies. Thus, the 
term " qualified director" is distinct from the generic 
term "independent director" used in section 8.01(c) of 
the Act to describe a director's general status. As a 
result, an "independent director" may in some 
circumstances not be a "qualified director," and vice 
versa. 
MBCA §1.43 cmt.2. 
Unlike the MBCA, the MNCA does not employ the phrase "qualified 
director." MNCA §13.05. But it now defines "independent director" as the 
MBCA defines "qualified director." Id. The MNCA definition is as follows: 
A person is independent for purposes of this section if 
the person does not have (1) a material interest in the 
outcome of the proceeding, or (2) a material relationship 
with a person who has such an interest. 
cases, you can look to that independent board to determine 
whether the action proposed by the shareholder is proper or not 
proper and that is what [the bill] does; it allows us a way to 
alleviate the litigation in a derivative action context by the 
independent board's action. 
Senate Floor Debate, H.B. 86,53rd Utah Leg., 2000 Gen. Sess. (Feb. 28, 2000) 
(statement of Sen. John L. Valentine). Senator Valentine's definition finds 
support in some case law holding that "independent" means outside directors, 
i.e., "directors who were not also officers or employees of [the corporation]." In 
re Abbott Labs. Derivative S'holders Litig., 325 F.3d 795,801 (7th Cir. 2003). If 
that definition applies here, then none of the Directors were independent, as they 
were all officers of the HO A. 
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MNCA §13.05(f).1o In fact, the definition section of the MNCA expressly 
indicates that its definitions of "material interest'7 and "material relationship77 are 
"[patterned after Model Business Corporation Act.77 MNCA §1.40(34), (35) 
(citing MBCA §1.43(b)(l), (b)(2)). 
The clarifications in the MBCA and MNCA should apply to the 
interpretation of Utah Code sections 16-6a-612 and 16-10a-740. Both sections of 
the Utah Code allow limited discovery on whether the person or group 
conducting the subsection (4)(a) determination is "independent and 
disinterested.77 Utah Code §§16~6a-612(3)(e)(i)(A), 16-10a-740(3)(e)(i)(A). And 
the comments to the most recent version of the MNCA make clear that the new 
definition clarifies that being disinterested was part of being independent: 
The decisions that have examined the qualifications of 
directors making the determination have required that 
the directors be both "disinterested77 in the sense of not 
having a personal interest in the transaction being 
challenged (as opposed to a benefit which devolves 
upon the corporation or all shareholders generally) and 
"independent77 in the sense of not being influenced in 
favor of the defendants by reason of personal or other 
relationships. See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 743 A.2d 805, 
812-16 (Del. 1984). Only the word 'independent7 has 
been used in Section 13.05(b) because it is believed that 
a person who has an interest in the transaction would 
not be independent 
MNCA §13.05 cmt. 1. 
10
 The comments to uniform acts are "the only thing that could be described as 
legislative history77 of the Utah provisions adopting a uniform act. Schurtz v. 
BMW of N.Am., Inc., 814 P.2d 1108,1113 (Utah 1991); McLaughlin v. Schenck, 
2009 UT 64, f 35,220 R3d 146,160. 
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The American Law Institute's Principles of Corporate Governance is 
consistent with the definitions in the MBCA and MNCA.11 It defines 
"interested" to apply to directors who (i) are a party to the transaction of 
conduct, (ii) have a business7 financial or familial relationship with a party to the 
transaction or conduct, (iii) have a material pecuniary interest in the transaction 
or conduct, or (iv) are subject to a controlling influence by a party to the 
transaction or conduct or a person who has a material pecuniary interest in the 
transaction or conduct. Principles of Corporate Governance §§1.23, 7.09 (2012).12 
A copy of the full definition is at Addendum B. 
This court should accept the clarifying definition in the MNCA and hold 
that directors are independent if they are disinterested in the litigation in the 
sense that they have no material interest in its outcome or material relationship 
with a person with such an interest. Under section 16-6a-612(4)(b)(ii), the 
11
 This court may rely upon such treatises when interpreting corporate law. R& 
R Indus. Park, L.L.C. v. Utah Prop. & Cas. Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 2008 UT 80, ^[28,199 
P.3d 917 ("Where legislative history is absent or unclear, model codes can be a 
useful resource in determining the intent of the legislature and underlying policy 
issues/7); see also McLaughlin, 2009 UT 64, Tf35 (using the comments to the 
MBCA to interpret the term "transaction"); Aurora Credit Servs., Inc. v. Liberty 
West Dev., Inc., 970 P.2d 1273,1280 (Utah 1998) (relying on the Principles of 
Corporate Governance). 
12
 The ALI's definition of "interested" is narrower, as it disqualifies a director (or 
an associate of the director) who is a named party, but otherwise is similar to the 
definitions for "qualified" in the MBCA and "independent" in the MNCA. 
Compare Principles of Corporate Governance §1.23 ("reasonably . . . expected to 
[adversely] affect the director's . . . judgment") with MBCA 81.43(b) ("reasonably 
. . . expected to impair the objectivity of the director's judgment") and MNCA 
§1.40(34), (35) ("reasonably . . . expected to impair the objectivity of [the 
director's] judgment"). 
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directors who appoint members of the special litigation committee13 and the 
directors who serve on the committee must be independent. As demonstrated 
next, the case law interpreting "independence" in similar statutes is in accord. 
b. Case Law Confirms What Constitutes Independence 
for a Special Litigation Committee 
A number of courts have articulated factors to consider in determining 
whether members of a special litigation committee are independent. For 
example, the Wisconsin Supreme Court considers factors consistent with the 
current definition in the MNCA, but expressly sets forth as a factor whether 
corporate counsel or independent counsel assisted the special litigation 
committee. Einhorn, 612 N.W.2d at 89-90;14 Davidowitz v. Edelman, 153 Misc.2d 
853,857 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992) (refusing to defer to committee's recommendation in 
part because its counsel was chosen by corporate counsel); In re Par Pharm., Inc. 
Derivative Litig., 750 F. Supp. 641, 647 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (refusing to defer to 
committee recommendation in part because it failed to retain outside counsel); 
13
 To illustrate the importance of independent directors appointing members of 
the special litigation committee, in Iowa, if a majority of the board is not 
independent, only the court can appoint the independent committee. Miller v. 
Register & Tribune Syndicate, Inc., 336 N.W.2d 709, 718 (Iowa 1983). 
14
 The factors are: (1) "status as a defendant and potential liability;" (2) 
"participation in or approval of the alleged wrongdoing or financial benefits 
from the challenged transaction;" (3) "past or present business or economic 
dealings with an individual defendant;" (4) "past or present personal, family, or 
social relations with individual defendants;" (5) "past or present business or 
economic relations with the corporation;" (6) "[t]he number of members on [the] 
special litigation committee;" and (7) "[t]he roles of corporate counsel and 
independent counsel." Einhorn, 612 N.W.2d at 89-90. 
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Principles of Corporate Governance §7.09 cmt. d (although at times "the 
committee may retain the counsel who earlier served the board to advise it 
further/7 it may not do so "if the earlier inquiry and evaluation were conducted 
or guided by interested directors"). 
In Tennessee, the list of factors is similar, but includes whether the special 
litigation committee itself was independent of the directors in the sense that the 
committee—not the directors—made the final determination concerning whether 
to move to dismiss the derivative claims. Lewis v. Boyd, 838 S.W.2d 215,224 
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1992);15 see also Tanssen, 662 N.W.2d at 884 ("The key element is 
that the board delegates to a committee of disinterested persons the board's 
power to control the litigation. A mere advisory role of the special litigation 
committee fails to bestow a sufficient legitimacy to warrant deference to the 
committee's decision by the court."); Par Pharm., Inc. Derivative Litig., 750 
F. Supp. at 647-48 (no deference to business judgment of special litigation 
committee if it makes only a recommendation to the board); Greenfield v. 
Hamilton Oil Corp., 760 P.2d 664, 668 (Colo. App. 1988) ("to be entitled to 
judicial deference, the committee must be given the ultimate power of decision 
or, at the least, any recommendation made by the committee must be finally 
passed upon only by other disinterested members of the board of directors"); cf. 
15
 The factors are: "(1) the size of the committee, (2) the committee members' 
relationship with the corporation's officers and directors, (3) the committee 
members7 qualifications and experience,... (4) the scope of the committee's 
authority, and (5) the committee's autonomy from the directors, officers, and 
corporate counsel." Boyd, 838 S.W.2d at 224. 
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Swensonv.Thibaut, 250 S.E.2d 279,298 (N.C. Ct App. 1978) (involvement of 
interested directors in the decision to dismiss negated good faith under business 
judgment rule).16 
The Minnesota Supreme Court has attempted to compile all of the factors 
considered by various courts: "(1) whether the members are defendants in the 
litigation; (2) whether the members are exposed to direct and substantial liability; 
(3) whether the 'members are outside, non-management directors'; (4) whether 
the members were on the board when the alleged wrongdoing occurred; (5) 
whether the 'members participated in the alleged wrongdoing'; (6) whether the 
members approved conduct involving the alleged wrongdoing; (7) whether the 
members or their affiliated firms 'had business dealings with the corporation 
other than as directors'; (8) whether the members 'had business or social 
relationships with one or more of the defendants'; (9) whether the members 
received advice from independent counsel or other independent advisors; 
(10) the severity of the alleged wrongdoing; and (11) the size of the committee." 
In re UnitedHealth Grp. Inc. S'holder Derivative Litig., 754 N.W.2d 544, 560 n. l l 
16
 The ALI's official commentary states that although "§ 7.09 does not preclude a 
committee from reporting back to the board with its determinations for approval 
by the board as a whole," there are two important requirements for corporations 
that do. Principles of Corporate Governance §7.09 cmt. d. First, the vote on the 
report must take place "minus any members whose status as defendants in the 
action would impair their objectivity." Id. (emphasis added). Second, "during 
the period that any committee is conducting its evaluation, care should be taken 
to minimize the contacts between the committee and the remainder of the board 
with respect to the committee's deliberations." Id. (emphasis added). 
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(Minn. 2008).17 Under any of those tests, the special litigation committee in this 
case lacked independence. 
c. The Special Litigation Committee Was Not 
Independent Under Section 16-6a~612(4)(b)(ii) 
Under the general definition of "independent" in the MNCA and the more 
detailed list of factors relevant to determining independence in the case law—as 
well as under the more strict definition of independence under Delaware law, 
"like Caesar's wife, be above reproach", Lewis, 502 A.2d at 967-the special 
litigation committee here was not independent. At the very least, a genuine issue 
of fact exists concerning its independence. 
(i) The Special Litigation Committee Was Not 
Independent Under the MNCA 
Under the MNCA, a person is independent "if the person does not have 
(1) a material interest in the outcome of the proceeding, or (2) a material 
relationship with a person who has such an interest." MNCA §13.05(f). Under 
that definition, neither the directors who appointed the members of the special 
litigation committee nor the members of the committee were independent. 
17
 Courts routinely find that special litigation committees lack independence 
based upon such factors. Where two members of a special litigation committee 
had to serve on the board of directors with the defendant to the derivative 
claims, the committee lacked independence even though it had hired outside 
counsel. McDonough v. Americom Int'l Corp., 905 F. Supp. 1016,1021 (M.D. Fla. 
1995). Where the members of a committee were not only defendants but also 
could realistically face liability, they were not independent. Kloha v. Duda, 226 
F. Supp. 2d 1342,1344 (M.D. Fla. 2002). In some cases, a "prior affiliation with 
the corporation" is enough to negate independence. Hasan v. Clevetrust Realty 
Investors, 729 F.2d 372,379 (6th Cir. 1984). 
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Each Director owns a lot within the HO A, and each Director benefitted 
from and participated in the decisions concerning which roads to build and 
maintain. (R.374,1056-57,1446,1448-49,1561.) Each Director engaged in "self-
dealing and favoring services to and improvements benefitting" his own 
property. (R.1561.) And all Directors participated in the election of members of 
the special litigation committee at one of the board's regular meetings. (R.1428.) 
The members of the special litigation committee also lacked independence 
because each of them—Ms. Johnson, Mr. Sarra, and Mr. Wilson—owns a lot 
within HCEII that has benefitted from preferential treatment. (R.374,1561,1564.) 
Each member of the special litigation committee has a material interest in the 
past discriminatory allocation of road maintenance resources and whether those 
resources continue to be used in the same discriminatory manner. Under the 
MNCA definition, then, no Director—those who appointed members to the 
special litigation committee or those on the committee—was independent. That 
alone was sufficient to defeat the motion to dismiss in this case. 
The language in section 16-6a-612(4)(c) confirms this result. That section 
states that a director's approval "of the act being challenged in the derivative 
proceeding" does not "by itself" result in the director's lacking independence "if 
the act resulted in no personal benefit to the director." Utah Code §16-6a-
612(4)(c)(iii). The clear implication of that language is that where, as here, the act 
did result in a personal benefit to the director, that fact "by itself" is sufficient to 
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indicate a lack of independence. Because all Directors lacked independence, the 
district court erred in dismissing the derivative claims. 
(ii) The Special Litigation Committee Was Not 
Independent Under Multi-Factor Tests 
Articulated in the Case Law 
The result is no different under the various lists of factors concerning 
independence in the case law. In fact, every factor listed in those cases indicates 
a lack of independence here. Consider each set of factors in turn. 
The first set of independence factors includes those that section 16-6a-612 
and the MNCA consider insufficient, by themselves, to negate independence — 
whether the Directors are defendants and whether the directors approved the 
acts being challenged in the derivative claims. UnitedHealth Grp. Inc., 754 
N.W.2d at 560 n i l ; Einhorn, 612 N.W.2d at 89. Again, while those factors, by 
themselves, do not indicate a lack of independence, they are relevant to the 
independence determination. Here, all Directors are defendants and all 
Directors participated in the acts, i.e., the decisions concerning which roads to 
build and maintain. (R.1556,1561,1564.) And two members of the special 
litigation committee were Director of Roads (Ms. Johnson) and Director of Legal 
(Mr. Sarra), during which time they were intimately involved in such decisions. 
(R.437,445-46,451,1519-20.) The third member of the special litigation committee, 
Mr. Wilson, was a director during the 1990s when the HOA faced the same legal 
issues concerning Area D roads. (R.410,441,1519.) 
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A second independence factor is whether the directors were outside, non-
management directors. UnitedHealth Grp. Inc., 754 N.W.2d at 560 n.l l . Here, all 
of the Directors, including the two who served on the special litigation 
committee, were inside, management directors. All Directors own property 
within the HOA. (R.374,1056,1561.) Ms. Johnson was Director of Roads. (R.435.) 
Mr. Sarra was Director of Legal. (Id.) Mr. Emmer was Director of the 
Architectural Control Committee and President of the HOA. (R.435,440,444-
45,455,459,461,500.) Ms. Dean was Director of Community Affairs. 
(R.455,459,461,500.) 
A third set of independence factors includes (i) whether the directors were 
on the board when the wrongdoing occurred, (ii) whether the directors 
participated in the alleged wrongdoing, and (iii) whether the directors approved 
of the conduct involved in the wrongdoing. UnitedHealth Grp. Inc., 754 N.W.2d 
at 560 n.l l ; Einhorn, 612 N.W.2d at 89. Here, all Directors were on the board 
when it made the discriminatory decisions concerning road maintenance, 
participated in those decisions, and approved the conduct that constituted the 
wrongdoing. (R.1556,1561,1564.) And the third member of the special litigation 
committee was a past director who participated in and approved of the same 
types of decisions. (R.410,441,1519.) 
A fourth independence consideration is whether the directors had business 
dealings with the corporation. UnitedHealth Grp. Inc., 754 N.W.2d at 560 n.ll; 
Einhorn, 612 N.W.2d at 89. Here, all Directors own lots in the HCEII and served 
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in management capacities within the HO A. (R.374,435,455,1056.) In addition, 
Mr. Wilson was employed by Sunrise Engineering, Inc., a company the Directors 
hired in the past to work on HCEII's roads and that continues to deal with road 
maintenance projects. (R.446,1579-80.) 
A fifth factor is whether a director has a social relationship with the tainted 
directors. UnitedHealth Grp. Inc., 754 N.W.2d at 560 n.ll; Einhorn, 612 N.W.2d 
at 89. Here, the district court acknowledged the social relationship Mr. Wilson 
had to the tainted Directors, but found it insignificant. (R.1734.) 
A sixth factor is whether the special litigation committee hired 
independent counsel or used the very corporate counsel who approved of the 
wrongful conduct in the first place. UnitedHealth Grp. Inc., 754 N.W.2d at 560 
n i l ; Einhorn, 612 N.W.2d at 89-90. Here, the report of the special litigation 
committee was the result of a collaboration among the committee members, the 
HOA's attorney (Mr. Lundgren), and the most tainted Director (Mr. Emmer). 
(R.333-67,1508.) During its inquiry, the special litigation committee not only 
used the corporate counsel who approved of the discriminatory practices, 
(R.1448 ("Howard Lundgren's verbal advice to the Board was that the Board was 
within its rights to manage the road maintenance projects according to a 
consistent business plan,,))/ but expressly relied upon the legal opinions of that 
counsel during its inquiry without doing any independent investigation. 
(R.1447.) For example, the report repeatedly states that "[w]here an issue results 
in a conflicting interpretation of the law between Attorneys, the Board's most 
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responsible option is to act according to the option of their legal counsel/7 
(R.1447,1451,1455,1461.) 
A seventh factor is whether the wrongdoing is severe. UnitedHealth Grp. 
Inc., 754 N.W.2d at 560 n . l l . Here, while the wrongdoing may not be severe in 
the abstract, because the vast majority of the HOA budget is allocated to road 
maintenance, the wrongful discrimination in road maintenance is severe in 
practice. Most of the assessments paid by residents and lot owners of HCEII are 
used for road maintenance, i.e., the 2009-10 proposed budget shows that over 
97% of the HOA's non-water system maintenance budget was devoted to road 
maintenance. (R.387,464,1493.) And the roads leading to Plaintiffs7 lots are not 
just unmaintained, but at this point are impassible except on foot, on horseback, 
or via ATV. (R.49-51,441,1056-57,1444.) 
An eighth factor is the size of the special litigation committee. 
UnitedHealth Grp. Inc., 754 N.W.2d at 560 n . l l ; Boyd, 838 S.W.2d at 224; 
Einhorn, 612 N.W.2d at 89-90. Here, the committee had three members, two 
current Directors and one former director. If the committee had five members 
and only one tainted member, then the size may mitigate the problem. But the 
size of the committee cannot mitigate the problem here. 
A ninth factor is whether the special litigation committee operates 
independently from the tainted directors, i.e., the board delegates full authority 
to conduct the inquiry and determine whether to move to dismiss the derivative 
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claims.** Tanssen, 662 N.W.2d at 884; Boyd, 838 S.W.2d at 224. Here, there was 
no such delegation, and the committee did not recommend dismissal. (R.1431-
64.) Instead, the very Directors (including Mr. Emmer) who determined that a 
special litigation committee was needed made the final determination concerning 
whether to instruct counsel to move to dismiss the derivative claims.19 (R.813.) 
All of the factors courts use to assess independence indicate that the 
special litigation committee here was not independent under section 16-6a-
612(4) (b)(ii). At the very least, genuine issues of fact exist concerning 
independence, which is enough to defeat the motion to dismiss. As one court 
put it, courts must "be mindful of the need to scrutinize carefully the mechanism 
by which directors delegate to a minority committee the business judgment 
authority to terminate derivative litigation, particularly when the lawsuit is 
directed against some or a majority of the directors/' Will, 213 Cal.App.3d at 
1043-44. The district court here failed to do that. This court should reverse so the 
derivative claims can be adjudicated on their merits. 
18
 "The key element is that the board delegates to a committee of disinterested 
persons the board's power to control the litigation. A mere advisory role of the 
special litigation committee fails to bestow a sufficient legitimacy to warrant 
deference to the committee's decision by the court/' Tanssen v. Best & Flanagan, 
662 N.W.2d 876, 884 (Minn. 2003). 
19
 The procedure followed by Mr. Emmer is exactly backwards. Special litigation 
committees are appointed to prevent interested members of a board from taking 
a decision making role in recommending dismissal of a claim. Oracle, 824 A.2d 
at 940 (the special litigation committee process "presents an opportunity for a 
board that cannot act impartially as a whole to vest control of derivative 
litigation in a trustworthy committee of the board—Le^ one that is not 
compromised in its ability to act impartially."). 
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III. The Committee Did Not Conduct a Reasonable Inquiry Because It Failed 
To Consider What Was In the Best Interest of the HOA and Did Not 
Recommend Dismissal as Required Under Section 16-6a-612(4)(a) 
The district court also erred in dismissing the derivative claims because 
genuine issues of material fact exist concerning whether the special litigation 
committee satisfied the requirements in section 16-6a-612(4)(a). Those 
requirements include that the committee (i) act in good faith in conducting a 
reasonable inquiry and (ii) determine in its business judgment whether 
maintenance of the derivative claims is in the best interest of the HOA. Utah 
Code §16-6a-612(4)(a). The special litigation committee here failed in both tasks. 
A. The Special Litigation Committee Inquiry Was Not Reasonable 
The special litigation committee's inquiry was not reasonable. In 
determining whether the inquiry was reasonable, courts examine "(1) the length 
and scope of the investigation, (2) the committee's use of independent counsel or 
experts, (3) the corporation's or the defendants' involvement, if any, in the 
investigation, and (4) the adequacy and reliability of the information supplied to 
the committee." Drilling v. Berman, 589 N.W.2d 503, 506 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999); 
see also Lewis v. Boyd, 838 S.W.2d 215, 224 (Term. Ct. App. 1992) (same). 
Here, as stated above, the committee did not use independent counsel and 
allowed the tainted Directors to participate and guide their investigation. Supra 
Facts II; infra Arg. III.B. In addition, the interviews conducted by the special 
litigation committee undermined the reliability of the information gathered by 
the committee. In the interviews, committee members often testified as to their 
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version of the events, led the witnesses based on their recollection of the events, 
or debated with witnesses as to the merits of the derivative claims. (R.757 
(Wilson stated why a road was closed by the County); R. 759-63 (Wilson and 
Johnson interject facts learned during their involvement with the HOA and 
Johnson directs questions to the "combined memory of all [of] us"); R.764,766 
(Johnson testifies about the interviewee's landscaping); R.769-72 (Johnson 
testifies about various rules for unincorporated areas); R.780 (Johnson explains 
the HOA's handling of a nuisance near the interviewee's property); R.792-93 
(Johnson and Wilson argue with a Plaintiff about cost estimates for improving 
roads); R. 797-98 (Wilson testifies about road conditions near his lot); R.799 
(Johnson testifies as to how roads were funded in the 1990s); R.801 (Wilson offers 
his interpretation of HOA policies in light of events in the 1990s); R.802 (Wilson 
testifies as to why a hydrant and water line were put on one Plaintiffs property); 
R.806-08 (Wilson and Johnson testify as to their experience with the County's 
zoning regulations). 
The inquiry was not conducted in a manner to ensure an independent 
determination of whether maintenance of the derivative claims is in the best 
interest of the HOA. 
B. The Special Litigation Committee Did Not Use Business Judgment 
to Conclude That Maintenance of the Derivative Claims Is Not In 
the Best Interest of the HOA 
The special litigation committee also failed to perform the very task it is 
given under section 16-6a-612(4)(a) - using business judgment to determine 
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whether dismissal of the derivative claims is in the best interest of the 
corporation. As Zapata explained, the special litigation committee should 
(i) consider relevant "factors ethical, commercial, promotional, public relations, 
employee relations, fiscal as well as legal," (ii) produce a "thorough written 
record of the investigation and its findings and recommendations/7 and 
(iii) "cause its corporation to file a pretrial motion to dismiss." Zapata, 430 A.2d 
at 788. The special litigation committee failed in all three ways. 
First, as outlined above the committee failed to make any recommendation 
concerning dismissal, let alone "cause" the filing of the motion to dismiss, as 
required under the case law.20 (R.1431-64.) Instead, the Directors (including Mr. 
Emmer) made that final determination. (R.813.) 
Second, the special litigation committee made no best interest 
determination in its report. (R.1431-64.) Instead, the report makes fourteen 
"observations" and three "recommendations," none of which concern the best 
interest of the HO A. (Id.) In fact, Mr. Wilson—chair of the committee — admitted 
at his deposition that he never evaluated whether "it would be in the best 
interest of the [HOA] to pursue a claim against the Board for failing to maintain 
all of [HCEII's] roads[.]" (R.1584.) That is confirmed by the fact that the 
committee's report- attached at Addendum D — reveals no consideration of 
"factors ethical, commercial, promotional, public relations, employee relations, 
fiscal as well as legal." Zapata, 430 A.2d at 788. 
20
 Zapata, 430 A.2d at 788; Tanssen, 662 N.W.2d at 884. 
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Third, the special litigation committee did not use business judgment in its 
inquiry, but instead performed a legal analysis of the derivative claims based 
upon the advice of the very corporate counsel who approved the wrongful 
conduct in the first place. (R.1447.) When a special litigation committee provides 
only legal opinions, its recommendations do not deserve deference under the 
business judgment rule. Tanssen, 662 N. W.2d at 888-89 (special litigation 
committee provided a legal, not business, opinion concerning the likelihood of 
success of the derivative claims). Here, the report states that its purpose is "to 
determine if [the claims] have merit." (R.1433.) And the recommendations in the 
report merely provide legal analysis. (R.1437,1447,1450,1456.) The report, and 
therefore the work of the committee, was inadequate under subsection (4)(a). 
For all of those reasons, there is at least a genuine issue of fact concerning 
the adequacy of the special litigation committee's inquiry and whether it 
performed its task under section 16-6a-612(4)(a). This court should reverse. 
Conclusion 
The Directors who appointed members of the special litigation committee 
were not independent, as required under section 16-6a-612(4)(b)(ii). The 
committee members themselves also were not independent as required under 
section 16-6a-612(4)(b)(ii). In addition, the committee's inquiry was tainted, as it 
never exercised business judgment to determine whether maintenance of the 
derivative claims is in the best interest of the HO A, as required under section 16-
6a-612(4)(a). 
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For all of those reasons, this court should reverse the order dismissing the 
derivative claims and mandate that they be adjudicated on their merits. Tanssen, 
662 N. W.2d at 890 (no second bite on remand when an order granting a motion 
to dismiss is reversed). 
DATED this 21st day of August 2012. 
ZIMMERMAN JONES BOOHER LLC 
Troy L. Booher 
Clemensf A. Landau 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
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Glenn C. Hanni (No. A1327) 
Stuart H. Schultz (No. 2886) 
Andrew D. Wright (No. 8857) 
STRONG & HANNI 
3 Triad Center, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180 
Telephone: (801) 532-7080 
Facsimile: (801) 596-1508 
Attorneys for Defendants 
m THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HI-COUNTRY PROPERTY RIGHTS 
GROUP, LINDSAY ATWOOD, JERRY 
GILMORE, and BRANDON FRANK, 
individually and for and on behalf of HI-
COUNTRY ESTATES HOMEOWNERS 
ASSOCIATION, PHASE II, a Utah Non-profit 
corporation, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
KEITH EMMER, TOM WILLIAMS, 
ANTHONY SARRA, ARLENE JOHNSON, 
CAROL DEAN, HI-COUNTRY ESTATES 
HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, PHASE II, 
a Utah non-profit corporation; and DOES 1 -
100 i \j\jy i 
Defendants, 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL OF 
PLAINTIFFS' SECOND CAUSE OF 
ACTION, DERIVATIVE CLAIM FOR 
BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES 
AGAINST DEFENDANTS EMMER, 
WDLLIAMS, SARRA, JOHNSON AND 
DEAN 
Civil No. 090920250 
Judge Tyrone E. Medley 
Defendants Renewed Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
as to Plaintiffs' Second Cause of Action for Breach of Fiduciary Duty was heard on January 18, 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
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2012, before the Honorable Tyrone E. Medley, District Judge. Wade R. Budge and Michael J. 
Thomas of the Law Firm Snell & Wilmer appeared on behalf of plaintiJBFs. Stuart H. Schultz of 
the Law Finn Strong & Haoni and A. Howard Lundgren of the Law Firm Durham, Jones & 
Pinegar appeared on behalf of defendants. The Court, having reviewed the motions, the 
memoranda and papers filed in support of, and in opposition to, the motions, having heard oral 
argument from the parties, having taken the matter under advisement, and having rendered the 
Court's ruling during a telephone conference with counsel on January 30, 2012, and good cause 
appearing, now, therefore; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. Defendants' Renewed Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Second Cause of Action 
for Derivative Relief and Breach of Fiduciary Duties is granted for the reasons set forth more 
fully below, and, as a consequence of the Court granting the Renewed Motion to Dismiss, 
Defendants' Alternative Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the Second Cause of Action 
for Breach of Fiduciary Duties, is rendered moot; 
2. Defendants' Renewed Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Second Cause of Action 
for Derivative Relief and for Breach of Fiduciary Duties against Defendants Emmer, Williams, 
Sarra, Johnson and Dean as members of the Board of Directors of Hi-Country Estates 
Homeowners Association, Phase II (hereinafter "HCEII") is granted and the Second Cause of 
Action against said defendants is dismissed, with prejudice, and on the merits, for the following 
reasons: 
2 
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(a) All the necessary elements for dismissal of a derivative proceeding under 
Utah Code Ann. § 16-6a-612(4)(a) are met, including that a special litigation committee ("SLC") 
appointed by the Board of Directors of HCEII determined in good faith, after conducting a 
reasonable inquiry upon which the SLC's conclusions were based, that the maintenance of the 
derivative proceeding is not in the best interest of the non-profit corporation, HCEII; 
(b) There are no genuine issues of material fact with respect to the independence 
of the members of the SLC, that the SLC made a determination in good faith, conducted a 
reasonably inquiry upon which its decision was based, and that there is a reasonable basis for the 
SLC's conclusion that the derivative proceeding is not in the best interest of HCEII; 
(c) Specifically with respect to the question of the independence of the members 
of the SLC, the Court finds first, based on the Kaplan v. White and London v. Tvrell cases that 
the alleged casual social relationship between Kim Wilson and the alleged business relationship 
between Sunrise Engineering and board members were limited in nature and did not create a 
genuine issue of material fact as to the independence of Mr. Wilson; second, that board 
membership alone is not a basis to find a lack of independence on the part of a member of the 
SLC; and third, that Utah Code Ann. § 16-6a-612(4)(c) states that being named as a director 
defendant does not create a lack of independence as a member of the SLC. Further, the Court 
concludes that the Beam case cited by plaintiffs supports granting the Motion to Dismiss, and 
that the Oracle case cited by Plaintiffs is inapposite because the facts are so extraordinarily 
different than the facts in the instant matter. 
3 
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Based on the foregoing, and good cause appearing, now, therefore; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Judgment of 
Dismissal is hereby entered with respect to Plaintiffs* Second Cause of Action—Derivative 
Claim for Breach of Fiduciary Duties against Williams, Emmer, Sana, Johnson and Dean and 
said Second Cause of Action and all claims alleged therein is hereby dismissed, with prejudice, 
on the merits, no cause of action, 
DATED this ^"clay of February, 2012. 
BY THE COURT: 
i TyrondE. Medley 
Third District Court Judge 
Approved as to Form: 
SWELLS WiytfgR 
w l | K Budge ^%~ 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
4 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
fi**\ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this of February, 2012, a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Order of Dismissal of Plaintiffs' Second Cause of Action, Derivative Claim 
for Breach of Fiduciary Duties against Defendants Emmer, Williams, Sarra, Johnson and 
Dean was served by the method indicated below to the following: 
Wade R. Budge 
Michael J. Thomas 
SNELL&WILMER 
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
A. Howard Lundgren 
DURHAM, JONES & PINEGAR 
111 E. Broadway,#900 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
{^f U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
{jf U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
001287.00384 
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§ 16-6a-612. Derivative suits, UT ST § 16-6a-612 
West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 16. Corporations 
Chapter 6A. Utah Revised Nonprofit Corporation Act (Refs & Annos) 
Part 6. Members 
U.CJL 1953 § i6-6a-6i2 
§ i6-6a-6i2. Derivative suits 
Currentness 
(1) Without affecting the right of a member or director to bring a proceeding against a nonprofit corporation or its directors or 
officers, a proceeding may be brought in the right of a nonprofit corporation to procure a judgment in its favor by a complainant 
who is: 
(a) a voting member; or 
(b) a director in a nonprofit corporation that does not have voting members. 
(2) A complainant may not commence or maintain a derivative proceeding unless the complainant: 
(a) is a voting member, or a director in a nonprofit corporation that does not have voting members, at the time the proceeding 
is brought; and 
(b) fairly and adequately represents the nonprofit corporation's interests in enforcing the nonprofit corporation's right. 
(3)(a) A complainant may not commence a derivative proceeding until: 
(i) a written demand is made upon the nonprofit corporation to take suitable action; and 
(ii) 90 days have expired from the date the demand described in Subsection (3)(a)(i) is made, unless: 
(A) the complainant is notified before the 90-day period expires that the demand is rejected by the nonprofit corporation; 
or 
(B) irreparable injury to the nonprofit corporation would result by waiting for the 90-day period's expiration. 
(b) A complaint in a derivative proceeding shall be: 
(i) verified; and 
(ii) allege with particularity the demand made to obtain action by the board of directors. 
(c) A derivative proceeding shall comply with the procedures of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 23.1. 
(d) The court shall stay any derivative proceeding until the inquiry is completed and for an additional period as the court 
considers appropriate if: 
(i) the nonprofit corporation commences an inquiry into the allegations made in the demand or complaint; and 
(ii) a person or group described in Subsection (4) is conducting an active review of the allegations in good faith. 
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(e) If a nonprofit corporation proposes to dismiss a derivative proceeding pursuant to Subsection (4)(a), discovery by a 
complainant in the derivative proceeding: 
(i) is limited to facts relating to: 
(A) whether the person or group conducting the inquiry is independent and disinterested; 
(B) the good faith of the inquiry; and 
(C) the reasonableness of the procedures followed by the person or group conducting the inquiry; and 
(ii) may not extend to any facts or substantive issues with respect to the act, omission, or other matter that is the subject 
matter of the derivative proceeding. 
(4)(a) A derivative proceeding shall be dismissed by the court on motion by the corporation if a person or group specified in 
Subsection (4)(b) or (4)(f) determines in good faith, after conducting a reasonable inquiry upon which the person's or group's 
conclusions are based, that the maintenance of the derivative proceeding is not in the best interest of the nonprofit corporation. 
(b) Unless a panel is appointed pursuant to Subsection (4)(f), the determination in Subsection (4)(a) shall be made by: 
(i) a majority vote of independent directors present at a meeting of the board of directors, if the independent directors 
constitute a quorum; or 
(ii) a majority vote of a committee consisting of two or more independent directors appointed by a majority vote of 
independent directors present at a meeting of the board of directors, whether or not the independent directors appointing 
the committee constituted a quorum. 
(c) None of the following by itself causes a director to be considered not independent for purposes of this section: 
(i) the nomination or election of the director by persons: 
(A) who are defendants in the derivative proceeding; or 
(B) against whom action is demanded; 
(ii) the naming of the director as: 
(A) a defendant in the derivative proceeding; or 
(B) a person against whom action is demanded; or 
(iii) the approval by the director of the act being challenged in the derivative proceeding or demand if the act resulted in 
no personal benefit to the director. 
(d) If a derivative proceeding is commenced after a determination is made rejecting a demand by a complainant, the complaint 
shall allege with particularity facts establishing either: 
(i) that a majority of the board of directors did not consist of independent directors at the time the determination was 
made; or 
(ii) that the requirements of Subsection (4)(a) are not met. 
(e)(i) If a majority of the board of directors does not consist of independent directors at the time the determination is made to 
reject a demand by a shareholder, the corporation has the burden of proving that the requirements of Subsection (4)(a) are met. 
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(ii) If a majority of the board of directors consists of independent directors at the time the determination is made to reject 
a demand by a complainant, the plaintiff has the burden of proving that the requirements of Subsection (4)(a) are not met. 
(f)(i) The court may appoint a panel of one or more independent persons upon motion by the corporation to make a 
determination whether the maintenance of the derivative proceeding is in the best interest of the corporation. 
(ii) If the court appoints a panel under Subsection (4)(f)(i), the plaintiff has the burden of proving that the requirements 
of Subsection (4)(a) are not met. 
(g) A person may appeal an interlocutory order of a court that grants or denies a motion to dismiss brought pursuant to 
Subsection (4)(a). 
(5) On termination of a derivative proceeding the court may order: 
(a) the nonprofit corporation to pay the plaintiffs reasonable expenses, including attorney fees, incurred in the proceeding, 
if it finds that the proceeding results in a substantial benefit to the nonprofit corporation; 
(b) the plaintiff to pay a defendant's reasonable expenses, including attorney fees, incurred in defending the proceeding, if 
it finds that the proceeding was commenced or maintained: 
(i) without reasonable cause; or 
(ii) for an improper purpose; or 
(c) a party to pay an opposing party's reasonable expenses, including attorney fees, incurred because of the filing of a pleading, 
motion, or other paper, if the court finds that the pleading, motion, or other paper was: 
(i)(A) not well grounded in fact, after reasonable inquiry; or 
(B) not warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law; 
and 
(ii) interposed for an improper purpose, such as to: 
(A) harass; 
(B) cause unnecessary delay; or 
(C) cause needless increase in the cost of litigation. 
Credits 
Laws 2000, c. 300, § 56, eff. April 30, 2001; Laws 2006, c. 228, § 2, eff. May 1, 2006. 
Notes of Decisions (4) 
U.C.A. 1953 § 16-6a-612,UTST§ 16-6a-612 
Current through 2012 General Session 
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§ 16-6a-822. General standards of conduct for directors and officers, U i ST § 16-6a-822 
West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 16. Corporations 
Chapter 6A. Utah Revised Nonprofit Corporation Act (Refs & Annos) 
Part 8. Directors and Officers 
U.GA. 1953 § i6-6a-822 
§ i6-6a-822. General standards of conduct for directors and officers 
Currentness 
(l)(a) A director shall discharge the director's duties as a director, including the director's duties as a member of a committee 
of the board, in accordance with Subsection (2). 
(b) An officer with discretionary authority shall discharge the officer's duties under that authority in accordance with 
Subsection (2). 
(2) A director or an officer described in Subsection (1) shall discharge the director or officer's duties: 
(a) in good faith; 
(b) with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would exercise under similar circumstances; and 
(c) in a manner the director or officer reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the nonprofit corporation. 
(3) In discharging duties, a director or officer is entitled to rely on information, opinions, reports, or statements, including 
financial statements and other financial data, if prepared or presented by: 
(a) one or more officers or employees of the nonprofit corporation whom the director or officer reasonably believes to be 
reliable and competent in the matters presented; 
(b) legal counsel, a public accountant, or another person as to matters the director or officer reasonably believes are within 
the person's professional or expert competence; 
(c) religious authorities or ministers, priests, rabbis, or other persons: 
(i) whose position or duties in the nonprofit corporation, or in a religious organization with which the nonprofit corporation 
is affiliated, the director or officer believes justify reliance and confidence; and 
(ii) who the director or officer believes to be reliable and competent in the matters presented; or 
(d) in the case of a director, a committee of the board of directors of which the director is not a member if the director 
reasonably believes the committee merits confidence. 
(4) A director or officer is not acting in good faith if the director or officer has knowledge concerning the matter in question 
that makes reliance otherwise permitted by Subsection (3) unwarranted. 
(5) A director, regardless of title, may not be considered to be a trustee with respect to any property held or administered by the 
nonprofit corporation including property that may be subject to restrictions imposed by the donor or transferor of the property. 
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(6) A director or officer is not liable to the nonprofit corporation, its members, or any conservator or receiver, or any assignee 
or successor-in-interest of the nonprofit corporation or member, for any action taken, or any failure to take any action, as an 
officer or director, as the case may be, unless: 
(a) the director or officer has breached or failed to perform the duties of the office as set forth in this section; and 
(b) the breach or failure to perform constitutes: 
(i) willful misconduct; or 
(ii) intentional infliction of harm on: 
(A) the nonprofit corporation; or 
(B) the members of the nonprofit corporation; or 
(iii) gross negligence. 
Credits 
Laws 2000, c. 300, § 97, eff. April 30, 2001; Laws 2006, c. 228, § 6, eff. May 1, 2006; Laws 2007, c. 306, § 12, eff. April 
30, 2007. 
Notes of Decisions (2) 
U.C.A. 1953 § 16-6a-822, UT ST § 16-6a-822 
Current through 2012 Fourth Special Session. 
End of Document © 2012 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 
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§ 16-10a-740. Procedure in derivative proceedings, UT ST § 16-10a-740 
West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 16. Corporations 
Chapter 10A. Utah Revised Business Corporation Act 
Part 7. Shareholders 
U.C A. 1953 § i6-ioa-740 
§ i6-loa-74<x Procedure in derivative proceedings 
Currentness 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "derivative proceeding" means a civil suit in the right of: 
(i) a domestic corporation; or 
(ii) to the extent provided in Subsection (7), a foreign corporation; and 
(b) "shareholder" includes a beneficial owner whose shares are held: 
(i) in a voting trust; or 
(ii) by a nominee on the beneficial owner's behalf. 
(2) A shareholder may not commence or maintain a derivative proceeding unless the shareholder: 
(a)(i) was a shareholder of the corporation at the time of the act or omission complained of; or 
(ii) became a shareholder through transfer by operation of law from one who was a shareholder at the time of the act or 
omission complained of; and 
(b) fairly and adequately represents the interests of the corporation in enforcing the right of the corporation. 
(3)(a) A shareholder may not commence a derivative proceeding until: 
(i) a written demand has been made upon the corporation to take suitable action; and 
(ii) 90 days have expired from the date the demand described in Subsection (3)(a)(i) is made unless: 
(A) the shareholder is notified before the 90 days have expired that the demand has been rejected by the corporation; or 
(B) irreparable injury to the corporation would result by waiting for the expiration of the 90-day period. 
(b) A complaint in a derivative proceeding shall be: 
(i) verified; and 
(ii) allege with particularity the demand made to obtain action by the board of directors. 
(c) A derivative proceeding shall comply with the procedures of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 23 A. 
(d) The court shall stay any derivative proceeding until the inquiry is completed and for such additional period as the court 
considers appropriate if: 
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(i) the corporation commences an inquiry into the allegations made in the demand or complaint; and 
(ii) a person or group described in Subsection (4) is conducting an active review of the allegations in good faith. 
(e) If a corporation proposes to dismiss a derivative proceeding pursuant to Subsection (4)(a), discoveiy by a shareholder 
following the filing of the derivative proceeding in accordance with this section: 
(i) shall be limited to facts relating to: 
(A) whether the person or group described in Subsection (4)(b) or (4)(f) is independent and disinterested; 
(B) the good faith of the inquiry and review by the person or group described in Subsection (4)(b) or (4)(f); and 
(C) the reasonableness of the procedures followed by the person or group described in Subsection (4)(b) or (4)(f) in 
conducting its review; and 
(ii) may not extend to any facts or substantive matters with respect to the act, omission, or other matter that is the subject 
matter of the derivative proceeding. 
(4)(a) A derivative proceeding shall be dismissed by the court on motion by the corporation if a person or group specified in 
Subsections (4)(b) or (4)(f) determines in good faith after conducting a reasonable inquiry upon which its conclusions are based 
that the maintenance of the derivative proceeding is not in the best interests of the corporation. 
(b) Unless a panel is appointed pursuant to Subsection (4)(f), the determination in Subsection (4)(a) shall be made by: 
(i) a majority vote of independent directors present at a meeting of the board of directors if the independent directors 
constitute a quorum; or 
(ii) a majority vote of a committee consisting of two or more independent directors appointed by a majority vote of 
independent directors present at a meeting of the board of directors, whether or not such independent directors appointing 
the committee constituted a quorum. 
(c) None of the following shall by itself cause a director to be considered not independent for purposes of this section: 
(i) the nomination or election of the director by persons: 
(A) who are defendants in the derivative proceeding; or 
(B) against whom action is demanded; 
(ii) the naming of the director as: 
(A) a defendant in the derivative proceeding; or 
(B) a person against whom action is demanded; or 
(iii) the approval by the director of the act being challenged in the derivative proceeding or demand if the act resulted in 
no personal benefit to the director. 
(d) If a derivative proceeding is commenced after a detennination has been made rejecting a demand by a shareholder, the 
complaint shall allege with particularity facts establishing either: 
(i) that a majority of the board of directors did not consist of independent directors at the time the determination was 
made; or 
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(ii) that the requirements of Subsection (4)(a) have not been met. 
(e)(i) If a majority of the board of directors does not consist of independent directors at the time the determination is made 
rejecting a demand by a shareholder, the corporation has the burden of proving that the requirements of Subsection (4)(a) 
have been met. 
(ii) If a majority of the board of directors consists of independent directors at the time the determination is made rejecting 
a demand by a shareholder, the plaintiff has the burden of proving that the requirements of Subsection (4)(a) have not 
been met. 
(f)(i) The court may appoint a panel of one or more independent persons upon motion by the corporation to make a 
determination whether the maintenance of the derivative proceeding is in the best interests of the corporation. 
(ii) If the court appoints a panel under Subsection (4)(f)(i), the plaintiff has the burden of proving that the requirements 
of Subsection (4)(a) have not been met. 
(g) A person may appeal from an interlocutory order of a court that grants or denies a motion to dismiss brought pursuant 
to Subsection (4)(a). 
(5)(a) A derivative proceeding may not be discontinued or settled without the court's approval. 
(b) If the court determines that a proposed discontinuance or settlement will substantially affect the interests of the 
corporation's shareholders or a class of shareholders, the court shall direct that notice be given to the shareholders affected. 
(6) On termination of the derivative proceeding the court may order: 
(a) the corporation to pay the plaintiffs reasonable expenses, including counsel fees, incurred in the proceeding, if it finds 
that the proceeding has resulted in a substantial benefit to the corporation; 
(b) the plaintiff to pay any defendant's reasonable expenses, including counsel fees, incurred in defending the proceeding, if 
it finds that the proceeding was commenced or maintained: 
(i) without reasonable cause; or 
(ii) for an improper purpose; or 
(c) a party to pay an opposing party's reasonable expenses, including counsel fees, incurred because of the filing of a pleading, 
motion, or other paper, if it finds that the pleading, motion, or other paper was: 
(i)(A) not well grounded in fact, after reasonable inquiry; or 
(B) not warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law; 
and 
(ii) interposed for an improper purpose, such as to: 
(A) harass; 
(B) cause unnecessary delay; or 
(C) cause needless increase in the cost of litigation. 
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(7)(a) In any derivative proceeding in the right of a foreign corporation, the matters covered by this section shall be governed by 
the laws of the jurisdiction of incorporation of the foreign corporation except for Subsections (3)(c), (3)(d), (5), and (6), which 
are procedural and not matters relating to the internal affairs of the foreign corporation. 
(b) In the case of matters relating to a foreign corporation under Subsection (3)(c): 
(i) references to a person or group described in Subsection (4) are considered to refer to a person or group entitled under the 
laws of the jurisdiction of incorporation of the foreign corporation to review and dispose of a derivative proceeding; and 
(ii) the standard of review of a decision by the person or group to dismiss the derivative proceeding is to be governed by 
the laws of the jurisdiction of incorporation of the foreign corporation. 
Credits 
Laws 1992, c. 277, § 79; Laws 2000, c. 130, § 1, eff. May 1, 2000; Laws 2012, c. 369, § 2, eff. May 8, 2012. 
Notes of Decisions (46) 
U.C.A. 1953 § 16-10a-740, UT ST § 16-10a-740 
Current through 2012 Fourth Special Session. 
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SECTION 1.43 
identified as owner of the shares in the corporations records, sub-
ject to certain provisos. If the corporations record of shareholders 
has not been maintained in accordance with accepted practice, 
a person who would have been identified in the record if it had 
been so maintained is included. In addition to provisions simi-
lar to subdivisions (2), (3), and (4) of section 1.42, the Cahfornia 
statute contains provisions relating to shares held subject to a vot-
ing trust or in a form used primarily to circumvent the provisions 
of the statute. 
The remaining jurisdictions do not have comparable provi-
sions in their general corporation acts. The close corporation stat-
utes of many states contain analogous numerical limitations. 
SELECTED CASES 
No significant reported case for this section was found. 
SELECTED REFERENCES 
No significant reference for this section was found. 
§ 1.43. QUALIFIED DIRECTOR 
(a) A "qualified director" is a director who, at the time action is 
to be taken under: 
(1) section 7.44, does not have (i) a material interest in the 
outcome of the proceeding, or (ii) a material relationship 
with a person who has such an interest; 
(2) section 8.53 or 8.55, (i) is not a party to the proceeding, 
(ii) is not a director as to whom a transaction is a 
director's conflicting interest transaction or who sought 
a disclaimer of the corporations interest in a business 
opportunity under section 8.70, which transaction' or 
disclaimer is challenged in the proceeding, and (iii) 
does not have a material relationship with a director 
described in either clause (i) or clause (ii) of this 
subsection (a)(2); 
(3) section 8.62, is not a director (i) as to whom the transaction 
is a directors conflicting interest transaction, or (ii) who Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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has a material relationship with another director as to 
whom the transaction is a director s conflicting interest 
transaction; or 
(4) section 8.70, would be a quahfied director under 
subsection (a)(3) if the business opportunity were a 
directors conflicting interest transaction. 
(b) For purposes of this section: 
(1) "material relationship" means a familial, financial, 
professional, employment or other relationship that 
would reasonably be expected to impair the objectivity of 
the director s judgment when participating in the action 
to be taken; and 
(2) "material interest" means an actual or potential benefit or 
detriment (other than one which would devolve.on the 
corporation or the shareholders generally) that would 
reasonably be expected to impair the objectivity of the 
directors judgment when participating in the action to 
betaken. 
(c) The presence of one or more of the following circumstances 
shall not automatically prevent a director from being a 
qualified director: 
. (1) nomination or election of the director to the current 
board by any director who is not a qualified director 
with respect to the matter (or by any person that has a 
material relationship with that director), acting alone or 
participating with others; 
(2) service as a director of another corporation of which 
a director who is not a qualified director with respect 
to the matter (or any individual who has a material 
relationship with that director), is or was also a 
director; or 
(3) with respect to action to be taken under section 7.44, 
status as a named defendant, as a director against whom 
action is demanded, or as a director who approved the 
conduct being challenged. 
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SECTION 1.43 
CROSS-REFERENCES 
Advance for expenses, see §833 . ~" : 
Business opportunities, see § 8.70. 
Determination and authorization for indemnification, 
see § 8.55. 
Directors' action in directors conflicting interest transaction, 
see § 8.62. 
Dismissal of derivative proceeding, see § 7.44. 
OFFICIAL COMMENT 
The definition of the term "qualified director" identifies those 
directors: (i) who may take action on the dismissal of a derivative 
proceeding (section 7.44); (ii) who are eligible to make, in the 
.first instance, the authorization and determination required in 
connection with the decision on a request for advance for expens-
es (section 8.53(c)) or for indemnification (sections.8.55(b) and 
(c)); (iii) who may authorize a director s conflicting interest trans-
action (section 8.62); and (iv) who may disclaim the corporations 
interest in a business opportunity (section 8.70(a)). 
The judicial decisions that have examined the qualifica-
tions of directors for such purposes have generally required that 
directors be both disinterested, in the sense of not having expo-
sure to an actual or potential benefit or detriment arising out 
of the action being taken (as. opposed to an actual or potential 
benefit or detriment to the corporation or all shareholders gen-
erally), and independent, in the sense of having no personal or 
other relationship with an interested director {e.g., a director 
who is a party to a transaction with the corporation) that pres-
ents a reasonable likelihood that the directors objectivity will 
be impaired. The 'qualified director" concept embraces both 
of those requirements, and its application is situation-specific; 
that is, "qualified director" determinations will depend upon the 
directly relevant facts and circumstances, and the disqualifica-
tion of a director to act arises from factors that would reasonably 
be expected to impair the objectivity of the directors judgment. 
On the other hand, the concept does not suggest that a "qualified Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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director" has or should have special exp ertise to act on the matter in 
question. 
J. Disqualification Due to Conflicting Interest 
The "qualified director" concept prescribes significant dis-
qualifications, depending upon the purpose for which a direc-
tor might be considered eligible to participate in the action to be 
taken. In each context in which the definition applies, it excludes 
directors who should not be considered disinterested: 
— In the case of action on dismissal of a derivative proceeding 
under section 7.44, the definition excludes directors who 
have a material interest in the outcome of the proceeding, 
such as where the proceeding involves a challenge to 
the validity of a transaction in which the director has 
a material financial interest As defined in subsection 
(b)(2), a "material interest"'in the outcome of the 
* proceeding involves an actual or potential benefit (other 
than one that would devolve on the corporation of the 
shareholders generally) that would arise from dismissal 
of the proceeding and would reasonably be expected to 
impair the objectivity of the directors judgment in acting 
on dismissal of the proceeding. 
— In the case of action to approve indemnification or 
advance of funds for expenses, the definition excludes 
directors who are parties to the proceeding (see section 
8.50(6) for the definition of'party" and section 8.50(7) for 
the definition of "proceeding"). It also excludes a director 
who is not a party to the proceeding but as to whom a 
transaction is a director s conflicting interest transaction 
or who sought a disclaimer of the corporations interest 
in a business opportunity, where that transaction or 
disclaimer is challenged in the proceeding. 
— In the case of action to approve a directors conflicting 
interest transaction, the definition excludes any director 
whose interest, knowledge or status results in the 
transaction being treated as a "directors conflicting 
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interest transaction." See section 8.60(1) for the definition 
of "directors conflicting interest transaction." 
— Finally, in the case of action under section 8.70(a) to 
disclaim corporate interest in a business opportunity, 
the definition excludes any director who would not be 
corsidereda"qualineddjhector"ifmebusinessopportunity 
wet a "directors conflicting interest transaction." 
Whether a i;hector has a material interest in the outcome of a 
proceeding j a which the director does not have a conflicting per : 
sonal inter).:* is heavily fact-dependent Such cases He along a 
spectrum.. I: one end of the spectrum, if a claim against a direc-
tor is clearly frivolous or is not supported by particularized and 
well-plead ed facts, the director should not be .deemed to have a 
"material interest in the outcome of the proceeding" within the 
meaniDg of subsection (a)(1), even though the director is named 
as a defendant At the other, end of the spectrum, a director nor-
mally should be deemed to have a "material interest in the out-
come of the proceeding" within the meaning of subsection, (a) 
(1) if a claim against the director is supported by particularized 
and well-pleaded facts-which, if true, would be likely to give rise 
to a significant adverse outcome against the director. Whether a 
directc-r should be deemed to have a "material interest in the out-
come of the proceeding" based on a claim that lies between these 
two ends of the spectrum, will depend on the application of that 
test to the claim, given all the facts and circumstances. 
2. L isqualification Due to Relationships 
yitk Interested Persons 
In each context in which the "qualified director" definition 
appl 1 es, it also excludes a director who has a "material relationship" 
with another director who is not disinterested for one or more of 
the reasons outlined in the preceding paragraph. Any relationship 
with such a director, whether the relationship is familial, financial, 
profess onal, employment or otherwise, is a "material relation-
ship," a.» that term is defined in subsection (b)(1), where it would 
reasonably be expected to impair the objectivity of the directors' 
judgment when voting or otherwise participating in action to be Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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taken on a matter referred to in subsection (a). The determination 
of whether there is a "material relationship' should be based on 
the practicalities of the situation rather than on formalistic con-
siderations. For example, a director employed by a corporation 
controlled by another director should be regarded as having an 
employment relationship with that director. On the other hand, 
a casual social acquaintance with another director should not be 
regarded as a disqualifying relationship. See Beam ex ret Martha 
Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1050 
(Del. 2004). 
Although the term "qualified director" embraces the concept 
of independence, it does so only in relation to the director s inter-
est or involvement in the specific situations to which the defini-
tion apphes. Thus, the term "qualified director" is distinct from 
the generic term "independent director" used in section 8.01(c) 
of the Act to describe a director s general status. As a result, an 
"independent director" may in some circumstances not be a 
"qualified director," and vice versa. For example, in action being 
taken under section 8.70 concerning a business opportunity, an 
"independent" director who has a material interest in the busi-
ness opportunity would not be a "qualified director" eligible to 
vote on the matter. Conversely, a director who does not have 
"independent" status may be a "qualified director" for purpos-
es of voting on that action. See also the Official Comment to 
section 8.01(c). 
3. Elimination of Automatic Disqualification 
in Certain Circumstances 
— Subsection (c) of the definition of "qualii e i director" 
addresses three categories of circumstances !ii it, if present 
alone or together, do not automatically prev. it a director 
. from being a qualified director. 
— Subsection (c)(1) makes it clear that the * rticipation 
of nonqualified directors (or interested sha, ** olders or 
other interested persons) in the nomination J election 
of a director does not automatically prevent ir i :irector 
so nominated or elected from being qualified fecial 
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litigation committees acting upon the dismissal of 
derivative litigation often consist of directors elected 
(after the alleged wrongful acts) by directors named as 
defendants in the action. In other settings, directors 
who are seeking indemnification, or who are interested 
in a director's conflicting interest transaction, may have 
participated in the nomination or election of an individual 
director who is otherwise a "qualified director." 
— Subsection (c)(2) provides, in a similar fashion, that the 
mere fact that an individual director is or was a director 
of another corporation—on the board of which a director 
who is not a "qualified director" also serves or has served— 
does not automatically prevent qualification to act. 
— Subsection (c)(3) confirms a number of decisions, 
involving dismissal of derivative proceedings, in which 
the court rejected a disqualification claim predicated 
on the mere fact that a director had been named as 
a defendant, was an individual against whom action 
has been demanded, or had approved the action being 
challenged. These cases have held that, where a directors 
approval of the challenged action is at issue, approval does 
not automatically make the director ineligible to act. See 
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 816 (Del. 1984); Lewis v. 
Graves, 701 E2d 245 (2d Cir.1983). On the other hand, for 
example, director approval of a challenged transaction, 
in combination with other particularized facts showing 
that the director's ability to act objectively on a proposal 
to dismiss a derivative proceeding is impaired by a 
material conflicting personal interest in the transaction, 
disqualifies a director from acting on the proposal to 
dismiss the proceeding. 
Where status as a qualified director is challenged in a litiga-
tion context, the court must assess the likelihood that an inter-
est or relationship has impaired a directors objectivity, without 
the need for any presumption arising from the presence of one 
or more of the three specified circumstances. Thus, the effect of 
subsection (c) of the definition, while significant, is limited. It Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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merely precludes an automatic inference of director disqualifica-
tion from the circumstances specified in clauses (1), (2) and (3) 
of subsection (c). 
ANNOTATION 
HISTORY 
Model Act Derivation 
1984 Act § 1.43 added by amendment, proposed 
60 Bus. LAW 341 (2004), adopted, 60 Bus. 
LAW. 943 (2005) 
Historical Background . 
Section 1.43 is a refined and expanded version of the term 
'qualified director" as first used in section 8.62 to describe the 
characteristics of directors eligible to approve a director's conflict-
ing interest transaction. The definition continues to be applicable • 
to director action approving a directors conflicting interest under 
section 8.62 but now also applies to director action with respect 
to derivative suits (section 7.44), indemnification (sections 8.53 
and 8.55), and disavowal of the corporations interest in a business 
opportunity (section 8.70). Hie term "qualified director'7 is differ-
ent than the concept of "independent director'5 that is referred to 
in section 8.01 and the Official Comment to section 8.25. The term 
"independent director" is not defined in the Act, but is variously 
defined in the listing standards for several securities market As 
used in such standards, 'independent director" is largely defined 
in terms of the absence of relationships (other than serving as a 
director) between the corporation and the director. Accordingly 
"independent director" does not relate to the directors disinter-
estedness with respect to a particular matter, and it is the latter 
concept with which section 1.43 is concerned. 
<€ <tf M r%. 
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STATUTES 
Conn. Gen. Stat Ann. § 33-605 (West) 
Me. Rev. Stat fit 13C, § 102 (32A) 
Miss. Code Ann. § 79-4-1.43 
Wyo. Stat § 17-16-143 
STATUTORY COMPARISON 
Connecticut, Maine, Mississippi, and Wyoming have adopt-
ed section 1.43, thereby applying the uniform "qualified direc-
tor" definition to board action concerning dismissal of derivative 
suits, permissive indemnification and advance of expenses, and 
director conflicting interest transactions. For statutes applying a 
similar concept in those circumstances, see the Annotations to 
sections 7.44, 8.53, 8.55, and 8.62. 
SELECTED CASES AND REFERENCES 
See the Annotations to section 8.62; see also Annotations to sec-
tions 7.44, 8.53 and 8.55. 
§1.44. HOUSEHOLDING 
(a) A corporation has delivered •written notice or any other report 
or statement under this Act, the articles of incorporation 
or the bylaws to all shareholders who share a common 
address if. 
(1) The corporation delivers one copy of the notice, report or 
statement to the common address; 
(2) The corporation addresses the notice, report or statement 
to those shareholders either as a group or to each of 
those shareholders individually or to the shareholders in 
a form to which each of those shareholders has consented; 
• and 
(3) Each of those shareholders consents to delivery of a 
single copy of such notice, report or statement to the 
shareholders' common address. 
Any such consent shall be revocable by any of such 
/shareholders who deliver written notice qf revocation Digitized by th  Howar  W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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STATUTORY COMPARISON 
Each of the jurisdictions listed above has adopted section 7.43 
with little substantive change. Texas, however, requires the corpo-
ration to notify the court and plaintiff upon completion of review; 
the initial stay of 60 days may be renewed for one or more addi-
tional 60-day periods if the corporation files a written statement 
describing the status of the review and the reasons why additional 
time is needed. The Texas statute also describes the effect of filing 
demand on the applicable statute of limitations. 
For comparison to other state statutes, see the Annotation to 
section 7.40. 
§7.44. DISMISSAL 
(a) A derivative proceeding shall be dismissed by the court on 
motion by the corporation if one of the groups specified in 
subsection (b) or subsection (e) has determined in good 
faith, after conducting a reasonable inquiry upon which its 
conclusions are based, that the maintenance of the derivative 
proceeding is not in the. best interests of the corporation. 
(b) Unless a panel is appointed pursuant to subsection (e), the 
determination in subsection (a) shall be made by: 
(1) a majority vote of qualified directors present at a meeting 
of the board of directors if the qualified directors consti-
tute a quorum; or 
(2) a majority vote of a committee consisting of two or more 
qualified directors appointed by majority vote of qualified 
directors present at a meeting of the board of directors, 
regardless of whether such qualified directors constitute 
a quorum. 
(c) If a derivative proceeding is commenced after a determina-
tion has been made rejecting a demand by a shareholder, the 
complaint shall allege with particularity facts establishing 
either (1) that a majority of the board of directors did not 
consist of qualified directors at the time the determination 
was made or (2) that the requirements of subsection (a) have 
not been met. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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(d) If a- majority of the board of directors consisted of qualified 
directors at the time the determination was made, the plain-
tiff shall have the burden of proving that the requirements of 
subsection (a) have not been met; if not, the corporation shall 
have the burden of proving that the requirements of subsec-: 
tion (a) have been met 
(e) Upon motion by the corporation, the court may appoint a 
panel of one or more individuals to make a determination 
whether the maintenance of the derivative proceeding is in 
the best interests of the corporation. In such case, the plain-
tiff shall have the burden of proving that the requirements of 
subsection (a) have not been met 
CROSS-REFERENCES 
Board of directors: 
committees, see § 8.25. 
meetings, see § 8.20. 
quorum and voting, see § 8.24. 
Demand, see § 7.41. 
"Derivative proceeding" defined, see § 7.40. 
"Qualified director" defined, see § 1.43. 
"Shareholder" defined, see § 7.40. 
OFFICIAL COMMENT 
At one time, the Model Act did not expressly provide what 
happens when a board of directors properly rejects a demand to 
bring an action. In such event, judicial decisions indicate that the 
rejection should be honored and any ensuing derivative action 
should be dismissed. SeeAronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805,813 (Del. 
1984). The Model Act was also'silent on the effect of a determina-
tion by a special litigation committee of qualified directors that 
a previously commenced derivative action should be dismissed. 
Section 7.44(a) specifically provides that the proceeding shall be 
dismissed if there is a proper determination that the maintenance 
of the proceeding is not in the best interests of the corporation. 
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That determination can be made prior to commencement of the 
derivative action in response to a demand or after commence-
ment of the action upon examination of the allegations of the 
complaint. 
Ihe procedures set forth in section 7.44 are not intended 
to be exclusive. As noted in the comment to section 7.42, there 
may be instances where a decision to commence an action falls 
within the authority of an officer of the corporation, depending 
•upon the amount of the claim and the identity of the potential 
defendants. 
I . The Persons Making the Determination 
Section 7.44(b) prescribes the persons by whom the determi-
nation in subsection (a) may be made. Subsection (b) provides 
that the determination may be made (1) at a board meeting by 
a majority vote of qualified directors if the qualified directors 
constitute a quorum, or (2) by a majority vote of a committee 
consisting of two or more qualified directors appointed at a board 
meeting by a vote of the qualified directors in attendance, regard-
less of whether they constitute a quorum. (For the definition of 
"qualified director," see section 1.43 and the related official com-
ment) These provisions parallel the mechanics for determining 
entitlement to indemnification (section 8.55), for authorizing 
directors' conflicting interest transactions (section 8.62), and for 
renunciation of the corporations interests in a business opportu-
nity (section 8.70). Subsection (b)(2) is an exception to section 
8.25 of the Model Act, which requires the approval of at least a 
majority of all the directors in office to create a committee and 
appoint members. This approach has been taken to respond to 
the criticism expressed in a few cases that special litigation com-
mittees suffer from a structural bias because of their appointment 
by vote of directors who at that time are not qualified directors. 
See Hasan v. Trust Realty Investors, 729 E2d 372,376-77 (6th Or. 
1984). 
Subsection (e) provides, as an alternative, for a determination 
by a panel of one or more individuals appointed by the court The 
subsection provides for the appointment only upon motion by 
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the corporation. This would not, however, prevent the court on 
its own initiative from appointing a special master pursuant to 
applicable'state rules of procedure. (Although subsection (b)(2) 
requires a committee of at least two qualified directors, subsec-
tion (e) permits the appointment by the court of only one person 
in recognition of the potentially increased costs to the corpora-
tion for the fees and expenses of an outside person.) 
This panel procedure may be desirable in a number of cir-
cumstances. If there are no qualified directors available, the 
corporation may not wish to enlarge the board to add qualified 
directors or may be unable to find persons willing to serve as 
qualified directors. In addition, even if there are directors who 
ire qualified, they may not be in a position to conduct the inquiry 
in an expeditious manner. 
Appointment by the court should also eliminate any ques-
tion about the qualifications of the individual or individuals 
constituting the panel making the determination. Although the 
corporation may wish to suggest to the court possible appointees, 
the court will not be bound by those suggestions and, in any case, 
will want to satisfy itself with respect to each candidates impar-
tiality .When the court appoints a panel, subsection (e) places the 
Durden on the plaintiff to prove that the requirements of subsec-
tion (a) have not been met. 
2. Standards to Be Applied 
Section 7.44(a) requires that the determination, by the appro-
priate person or persons, be made "in good faith, after conducting 
i reasonable inquiry upon which their conclusions are based" 
Ihe phrase "in good faith" modifies both the determination and 
:he inquiry This standard, which is also found in sections 8.30 
'general standards of conduct for directors) and 8.51 (author-
.ty to indemnify) of the Model Act, is a subjective one, meaning 
"honestly or in an honest manner" See also Corporate Directors 
Guidebook (Fifth Edition), 59 Bus. LAW 1057, 1068 (2007). As 
jtated in Abella v. Universal Leaf Tobacco Co., 546 E Supp. 795, 
300 (ED. Va. 1982), "the inquiry intended by this phrase goes 
:o the spirit and sincerity with which the investigation was 
f m\ Mf\ 
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conducted, rather than the reasonableness of its procedures or 
basis for conclusions." 
The word "inquiry"—rather than "investigation"—has been 
used to make it clear that the scope of the inquiry will depend 
upon the issues raised and the knowledge of the group making 
the determination with respect to those issues. In some cases, the 
issues may be so simple or the knowledge of the group so exten-
sive that little additional inquiry is required In other cases, the 
group may need to engage counsel and possibly-other profession-
als to make an investigation and assist the group in its evaluation 
of the issues. 
The phrase "upon which its conclusions are based" requires 
that the inquiry and the conclusions follow logically This stan-
dard authorizes the court to examine the determination to ensure 
that it has some support in the findings of the inquiry. The burden 
of convincing the court about this issue lies with whichever party 
has the burden under subsection (d). This phrase does not require 
the persons making the determination to prepare a written report 
that sets forth their determination and the bases therefor, since 
circumstances will vary as to the need for such a report. There 
will be, in all likelihood, many instances where good corporate 
practice will commend such a procedure. 
Section 7.44 is not intended to modify the general standards 
of conduct for directors set forth in section 8.30 of the Model 
Act, but rather to make those standards somewhat more explicit 
in the derivative proceeding context. In this regard, the qualified 
directors making the determination would be entitled to rely on 
information and reports from other persons in accordance with 
section 8.30(d). 
Section 7.44 is similar in several respects and differs in 
certain other respects from the law as it has developed in Dela-
ware and been followed in a number of other states. Under the 
Delaware cases, the role of the court in reviewing the directors' 
determination varies depending upon whether the plaintiff is in a 
demand-required or demand-excused situation. 
Since section 7.42 requires demand in all cases, the distinc-
tion between demand-excused and demand-required cases Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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does not apply Subsections (c) and (d) carry forward that dis-
tinction, however, by establishing pleading rules and allocating 
the burden of proof depending on whether there is a majority 
of qualified directors on the board. Subsection (c), like Delaware 
law, assigns to the plaintiff the threshold burden of alleging facts 
estabhshing that the majority of the directors on the. board are 
not qualified. If there is a majority then the burden remains with 
the plaintiff to plead and establish that the requirements of sub-
section (a) section 7.44(a) have not been met If there is not a 
majority of qualified directors on the board, then the burden is on 
the corporation to prove that the issues delineated in subsection 
(a) have been satisfied; that is, the corporation must prove both 
the eligibility of the decision makers to act on the matter and the 
propriety of their inquiry and determination. 
Thus, the burden of proving that the requirements of subsec-
tion (a) have not been met will remain with the plaintiff in several 
situations. First, where the determination to dismiss the deriva-
tive proceeding is made in accordance with subsection (b)(1), the 
burden of proof will generally remain with the plaintiff since the 
subsection requires a quorum of qualified directors and a quo-
rum is.normally a majority See section 8.24. The burden will also 
remain with the plaintiff if a majority of qualified directors has 
appointed a committee under subsection (b)(2), and the qualified 
directors constitute a majority of the board. Under subsection (e), 
the burden of proof also remains with the plaintiff in the case of a 
determination by a panel appointed by the court. 
The burden of proof will shift to the corporation, however, 
where a majority of the board members are not qualified and the 
determination is made by a committee under subsection (b)(2). 
It can be argued that, if the directors making the determination 
under subsection (b)(2) are qualified and have been delegated 
full responsibility for making the decision, the composition of 
the entire board is irrelevant. This argument is buttressed by the 
sections method of appointing the group specified in subsection 
(b)(2), since it departs from the general method of appointing 
committees and allows only qualified directors, rather than a 
majority of the entire board, to appoint the committee that will 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
SECTION 7.44 
make the determination. Subsection. (d)s response to objections 
suggesting structural bias is to place the burden of proof on the 
corporation (despite the fact that the committee making the 
determination is composed exclusively of qualified directors). 
Finally, section 7.44 does not authorize the court to review 
the reasonableness of "the determination to reject a demand or 
seek dismissal. This contrasts with the approach in some states 
that permits a court, at least in some circumstances, to review the 
merits of the determination (see Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 
A.2d 779, 789 (Del. 1981)) and is similar to the approach taken 
in other states [see Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1002-03 
(N.Y. 1979)). 
3. Pleading 
The Model Act previously provided that the complaint in a 
derivative proceeding must allege with particularity either that 
demand had been made on the board of directors, together with 
the boards response, or why demand was excused. This require-
ment is similar to rule 23.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Since demand is now required in all cases, this provision is no 
longer necessary. 
Subsection (c) sets forth a modified pleading rule to cover the 
typical situation where the plaintiff makes demand on the board, 
the board rejects that demand, and the plaintiff commences an, 
action. In that scenario, in order to state a cause of action, subsec-
tion (c) requires the complaint to allege with particularity facts 
demonstrating either (1) that no majority of qualified directors 
exists or (2) why the determination made by qualified directors 
does not meet the standards in subsection (a). Discovery should 
be available to the plaintiff only after the plaintiffhas successfully 
stated a cause of action by making either of these two showings. 
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ANNOTATION 
HISTORY 
Model Act Derivation 
1984 Act § 7.44 amended, proposed 60 Bus. LAW. 341 
(2005), adopted 60 Bus. LAW. 943 (2005) 
See also the Annotation to section 7.40. 
STATUTES 
Ariz. Rev. Stat Ann. § 10-744 
Conn. Gen, Stat. Ann. § 33-724 (West) 
Ha. Stat Ann. § 607.07401(3) 
Ga. Code Ann. § 14-2-744 
Haw. Rev. Stat § 414-175 
Idaho Code § 30-1-744 
Iowa Code Ann. § 490.744 (West) 
Me. Rev. Stat Ann. tit 13-C, § 755 
Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 156D, § 7.44 (West) 
Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 450.1491a, 450.1495 (West) 
Miss. Code Ann. § 79-4-7.44 
Mont Code Ann. § 35-1-545 
Neb. Rev. Stat § 21-2074 
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 293-A:7.44 
N.C. Gen. Stat § 55-7-44 
R.I. Gen. Laws § 7-1.2-710(E) 
S.D. Codified Laws §§ 47-1A-744-47-1A-744.5 • 
Tex. Bus. Org. Code Ann. § 21.558 (Vernon) 
Va. Code Ann. § 13.1-672.4 
• Wis, Stat Ann. § 180.0744 (West) 
Wyo. Stat §17-16-744 
For a list of other statutes dealing with derivative proceedings, 
see the Annotation to section 7.40. 
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the circumstances, which would include oral notice through voice 
mail or other similar means. It also deals with situations where 
notice may be sought to be given to persons for whom no current 
address is available, or where personal notice is impractical. No-
tice delivered to the person*s last known address is effective as 
described in section L41(e) even though never actually received 
by the person. Section 1.41(b) also authorizes notice by publi-
cation in some circumstances, including radio, television, or other 
form of public wire or wireless communication. 
Section 1.4.1(g) recognizes that other sections of the Act pre-
scribe specific notice requirements for particular situations—e.g., 
service of process on a corporation's registered agent under sec-
tion 5.04—and that these specific requirements, rather than the 
general requirements of section 1.41, control. Finally, the second 
sentence of subsection 1.41(g) permits a corporation's articles of 
incorporation or bylaws to prescribe the corporation's own notice 
requirements, if they are not inconsistent with the general re-
quirements of this section or specific requirements of other sec-
tions of the Act. 
The rules set forth in section 1,41 permit many other sections 
of the Model Act to be phrased simply in terms of giving or 
delivering notice without repeating details with respect to how 
notice should be given and when it is effective in various circum-
stances, 
§ 1,42. NUMBER OF SHAREHOLDERS 
(a) For purposes of this Act, the following identified as a share-
holder in a corporation's current record of shareholders con-
stitutes one shareholder: 
(1) three or fewer co-owners; 
(2) a corporation, partnership, trust estate, or other entity; 
(3) the trustees, guardians, custodians, or other fiduciaries 
of a single trust, estate, or account 
(b) For purposes of this Act, shareholdings registered in sub-
stantially similar names constitute one shareholder if it is 
1-50 
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reasonable to believe that the names represent the same 
person, 
CROSS-REFERENCES 
Board of directors, see § 8<QL 
Close corporations, see Model Statutory Close Corporation 
Supplement 
"Entity" defined, see § 1.40. 
Record of shareholders, see §§ 7.20 & 16.01. 
"Shareholder" defined, see § 1,40. 
Voting trusts, see § 7.30. 
OFFICIAL COMMENT 
Section 1.42 provides rules for determining the number of 
shareholders in a corporation. The Model Act generally avoids 
provisions that are based on the number of shareholders of a 
corporation, since these provisions may encourage individual 
shareholders to divide or combine their holdings for private stra-
tegic advantage. But in one instance the number of shareholders 
is important: to permit a corporation to elect close corporation 
status under the Model Statutory Close Corporation Supplement, 
The determination of the precise number of shareholders may also 
become important in other contexts in the future* 
§ 1,43, QUALIFIED DIRECTOR 
(a) A "qualified director" is a director who, at the time action is 
to be taken under; 
(1) section 7.44, does not have (i) a material interest in the 
outcome of the proceeding, or (ii) a material relation-
ship with a person who has such an interest; 
(2) section 8.53 or 8,55, (i) is not a party to the proceeding, 
(ii) is not a director as to whom a transaction is a dh 
1-51 
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rector's conflicting interest transaction or who sought 
a disclaimer of the corporation's interest in a business 
opportunity under section 8.70, which transaction or 
disclaimer is challenged in the proceeding, and (rii) 
does not have a material relationship with a director 
described in either clause (i) or clause (ii) of this sub-
section (a)(2); 
(3) section 8.62, is not a director (i) as to whom the trans-
action is a director's conflicting interest transaction, or 
(ii) who has a material relationship with another direc-
tor as to whom the transaction is a director's conflicting 
interest transaction; or 
(4) section 8.70, would be a qualified director under sub-
section (a)(3) If the business opportunity were a direc-
tor's conflicting interest transaction, 
(b) For purposes of this section, 
(1) "material relationship" means a familial, financial, pro-
fessional, employment or other relationship that would 
reasonably be expected to impair the objectivity of the 
director's judgment when participating in the action to 
be taken; and 
(2) "material interest" means an actual or potential benefit 
or detriment (other than one which would devolve on 
the corporation or the shareholders generally) that 
would reasonably be expected to impair the objectivity 
of the director's judgment when participating in the ac-
tion to betaken. 
(c) The presence of one or more of the following circumstances 
shall not automatically prevent a director from being a qual-
ified director: 
(1) nomination or election of the director to the current 
board by any director w h o is not a qualified director 
wi th respect to the matter (or by any person that has 
a material relationship with that director), acting alone 
or participating with others; 
(2) service as a director of another corporation of which a 
director w h o is not a qualified director with respect to 
1-52 
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the matter (or any individual who has a material rela-
tionship with that director), is or was also a director; or 
(3) with respect to action to be taken under section 7.44, 
status as a named defendant, as a director against 
whom action is demanded, or as a director who ap-
proved the conduct being challenged. 
CROSS-REFERENCES 
Advance for expenses, see § 8,53 
Determination and authorization for indemnification, see 
§8.55 
Directors' action in director's conflicting interest transaction, 
see § 8.62 
Dismissal of derivative proceeding, see § 7.44 
OFFICIAL COMMENT 
The definition of the term *'qualified director" identifies those 
directors; (i) who may take action on the dismissal of a derivative 
proceeding (section 7.44); (ii) who are eligible to make, in the 
first instance, the authorization and determination required in con-
nection with the decision on a request for advance for expenses 
(section 8.53(c)) or for indemnification (sections 8.55(b) and (c)); 
(iii) who may authorize a director's conflicting interest transac-
tion (section 8.62); and (iv) who may disclaim the corporation's 
interest in a business opportunity (section 8.70(a)). 
The judicial decisions that have examined the qualifications 
of directors for such purposes have generally required that direc-
tors be both, disinterested, in the sense of not having exposure to 
an actual or potential benefit or detriment arising out of the action 
being taken (as opposed to an actual or potential benefit or det-
riment to the corporation or all shareholders generally), and in-
dependent, in the sense of having no personal or other relationship 
with an interested director (e.g., a director who is a party to a 
transaction with the corporation) that presents a reasonable like-
lihood that the director's objectivity will be impaired. The "qual-
ified director" concept embraces both of those requirements, and 
1-53 
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its application is situation-specific; that is, "qualified director" 
determinations will depend upon the directly relevant facts and 
circumstances, and the disqualification of a director to act arises 
from factors that would reasonably be expected to impair the 
objectivity of the director's judgment. On the other hand, the 
concept does not suggest that a "qualified director" has or should 
have special expertise to act on the matter in question, 
L DISQUALIFTCATION DUE TO CONFLICTING INTEREST 
The "qualified director" concept prescribes significant dis-
qualifications, depending upon the purpose for which a director 
might be considered eligible to participate in the action to be 
taken. In each context in which the definition applies, it excludes 
directors who should not be considered disinterested: 
—In the case of action on dismissal of a derivative proceeding 
under section 7.44, the definition excludes directors who 
have a material interest in the outcome of the proceeding, 
such as where the proceeding involves a challenge to the 
validity of a transaction in which the director has a material 
financial interest. As defined in subsection (b)(2), a "ma-
terial interest" in the outcome of the proceeding involves 
an actual or potential benefit (other than one that would 
devolve on the corporation of the shareholders generally) 
that would arise from dismissal of the proceeding and 
would reasonably be expected to impair the objectivity of 
the director's judgment in acting on dismissal of the pro-
ceeding, 
—In the case of action to approve indemnification or advance 
of funds for expenses, the definition excludes directors who 
are parties to the proceeding (see section 8.50(6) for the 
definition of "party" and section 8.50(7) for the definition 
of "proceeding"). It also excludes a director who is not a 
party to the proceeding but as to whom a transaction is a 
director's conflicting interest transaction or who sought a 
disclaimer of the. corporation's interest in a business op-
portunity, where that transaction or disclaimer is chal-
lenged in the proceeding. 
—In the case of action to approve a director's conflicting 
interest transaction, the definition excludes any director 
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whose interest, knowledge or status results in the transac-
tion being treated as. a "director's conflicting interest ..trans-
action." See section 8.60(1) for the definition of "direc-
tor's conflicting interest transaction." 
—Finally, in the case of action under section 8.70(a) to dis-
claim corporate interest in a business opportunity, the def-
inition excludes any director who would not be considered 
a "qualified director" if the business opportunity were a 
"director's-conflicting interest transaction/' 
Whether a director has a material interest In the outcome of 
a proceeding in which the director does not have a conflicting 
persona] interest is heavily fact-dependent. Such cases lie along 
a spectrum. At one end of the spectrum, if a claim against a 
director is clearly frivolous or is not supported by particularized 
and well-pleaded facts, the director should not be deemed to have 
a "material interest in the outcome of the proceeding" within the 
meaning of subsection (a)(1), even though the director is named 
as a defendant. At the other end of the spectrum, a director nor-
mally should be deemed to have a *'material interest in the out-
come of the proceeding" within the meaning of subsection (a)(1) 
if a claim against the director is supported by particularized and 
well-pleaded facts which, if true, would be likely to give rise to 
a significant adverse outcome against the director. Whether a di-
rector should be deemed to have a "material interest in the out-
come of the proceeding" based on. a claim that lies between these 
two ends of the spectrum will depend on the application of that 
test to the claim, given all the facts and circumstances. 
2, DISQUALIFICATION DUE TO RELATIONSHIPS WITH 
INTERESTED PERSONS 
In each context in which the "qualified director" definition 
applies, it also excludes a director who has a *'material relation-
ship0 with another director who is not disinterested for one or 
more of the reasons outlined in the preceding paragraph. Any 
relationship with such a director, whether the relationship is fa-
milial,- financial, professional, employment or otherwise, is a 
"material relationship," as that term is defined in subsection 
(b)(1), where it would reasonably be expected to impair the ob-
jectivity of the director's judgment when voting or otherwise par-
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icipating in action to be taken on a matter referred to in subsec-
ion (a)? The determination of whether them is a 44material 
elationship" should be based on the practicalities of the situation 
ather than on formalistic considerations, For example, a director 
mployed by a corporation controlled by a director should be 
sgarded as having an employment relationship with that director, 
)n the other hand, a casual social acquaintance with another dir-
ector should not be regarded as a disqualifying relationship. See 
-earn ex rel Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. v. Stewart, 
45 A,2d 1040, 1050 (Del 2004). 
Although the term "qualified director" embraces the concept 
f independence, it does so only in relation to the director's in-
srest or involvement in the specific situations to which the def-
lition applies. Thus, the term "qualified director" is distinct 
:Om the generic term "independent director" used in section 
.01(c) of the Act to describe a director's general status. As a 
asult, an "independent director" may in some circumstances not 
e a "qualified director," and vice versa. For example, in action 
eing taken under section 8:70 concerning a business opportunity, 
2 "independent' * director who has a material interest in the busi-
e s opportunity would not be a "qualified director" eligible to 
Dte on the matter. Conversely, a director who does not have 
independent!' status may be a "qualified director" for purposes 
F voting on that action. See also the Official Comment to section 
01(c). 
ELIMINATION OF AUTOMATIC DISQUALIFICATION IN CERTAIN 
CIRCUMSTANCES 
—Subsection (c) of the definition of "qualified director" ad-
dresses three categories of circumstances that, if present 
alone or together, do not automatically prevent a director 
from being a qualified director. 
—Subsection (c)(1) makes it clear that the participation of 
non-qualified directors (or interested shareholders or other 
interested persons) in the nomination or election of a di-
rector does not automatically prevent the director so nom-
inated or elected from being qualified. Special litigation 
committees acting upon the dismissal of derivative litiga-
tion often consist of directors elected (after the alleged 
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wrongful acts) by directors named as defendants in the ac-
tion. In other settings, directors who are seeking indemni-
fication, or who are interested in a director's conflicting 
interest transaction, may have participated in the nomina-
tion or election of an individual director who is otherwise 
a "qualified director/' 
—Subsection (c)(2) provides, in a similar fashion, that the 
mere fact that an individual director is or was a director of 
another corporation—on the board of which a director who 
is not a "qualified-director" also serves or has served— 
does not automatically prevent qualification to act. 
—Subsection (c)(3) confirms a number of decisions, involv-
ing dismissal of derivative proceedings, in which the court 
rejected a disqualification claim predicated on the mere fact 
that a director had been named as a defendant, was an in-
dividual against whom action has been demanded, or had 
approved the action being challenged. These cases have 
held that, where a director* s approval of the challenged 
action is at issue, approval does not automatically make the 
director ineligible to act, SctAronsan v. Lewis, 473 A, 2d 
805, 816 (Del. 1984); Lewis v. Graves, 701 R2d 245 (2d 
Cir.1983). On the other hand, for example, director ap-
proval of a challenged transaction, in combination with 
other particularized facts showing that the director's ability 
to act objectively on a proposal to dismiss a derivative pro-
ceeding is impaired by a material conflicting personal in-
terest in the transaction, disqualifies a director from acting 
on the proposal to dismiss the proceeding. 
Where status as a qualified director is challenged in a litigation 
context, the court must assess the likelihood that an interest or 
relationship has impaired a director's objectivity, without the 
need for any presumption arising from the presence of one or 
more of the three specified circumstances. Thus, the effect of 
subsection (c) of the definition, while significant, is limited. It 
merely precludes an automatic inference of director disqualifi-
cation from the circumstances specified in clauses (I), (2) and (3) 
of subsection (c). 
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inquiry is completed or, if suit is commenced, the corporation can 
apply to the court for a stay under section 7.43. 
Two exceptions are provided to the 90-day waiting period. 
The first exception is the situation where the shareholder has been 
notified of the rejection of the demand prior to the end of the 90 
days. The second exception is where irreparable injury to the 
corporation would otherwise result if the commencement of the 
proceeding is delayed for the 90-day period. The standard to be 
applied is intended to be the same as that governing the entry of 
a preliminary injunction. Compare Gimbel v\ Signal Gw„,'316 
A.2d 599 (Del. Ch. 1974) with Gelco Corp. v, Coniston Partners, 
811 F.2d 414 (8th Cir. 1987). Other factors may also be consid-
ered, such as the possible expiration of the statute of limitations, 
although this would depend on the period of time during which 
the shareholder was aware of the grounds for the proceeding. 
It should be noted that the shareholder bringing suit does not 
necessarily have to be the person making the demand, Only one 
demand need be made in order for the corporation to consider 
whether to take corrective action. 
4. RESPONSE BY THE CORPORATION 
There is no obligation on the part of the corporation to re-
spond to the demand. However, if the corporation, after receiving 
the demand, decides to institute litigation or, after a derivative 
proceeding has commenced, decides to assume control of the lit-
igation, the shareholder's right to commence or control the pro-
ceeding ends unless it can be shown that the corporation will not 
adequately pursue the matter. As stated in Lewis- v, Graves, 701 
R2d 245, 247-48 (2d Cir. 1983): 
The [demand] rule is intended "to give the derivative cor-
poration itself the opportunity to take over a suit which was 
brought on its behalf in the first place, and thus to allow the
 ? M 
directors the chance to occupy their normal status as conducg^*?| 
tors of the corporation's affairs/' Permitting corporations^ 
assume control over shareholder derivative suits also has T 
merous practical advantages. Corporate management way^^g 
in a better position to pursue alternative remedies, resolving^ 
grievances without burdensome and expensive litigation. D ^ i | 
&Sr 
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erence to directors* judgments may also result, in the termi-
nation of meritless actions brought solely for their settlement 
or harassment value. Moreover, where litigation is appropri-
ate, the derivative corporation will often be in a better position 
to bring or assume the suit because of superior financial re-
sources and knowledge of the challenged transactions, [Ci-
tations omitted.] 
JT7.43. STAY OF PROCEEDINGS 
If the corporation commences an inquiry into the allegations 
made in the demand or complaint the court may stay any deriv-
ative proceeding for such period as the court deems appropriate* 
CROSS-REFERENCES 
Demand, see §7-41. 
"Derivative proceeding" defined, see § 7.40. 
OFFICIAL COMMENT 
Section 7.43 provides that if the corporation undertakes an 
inquiry, the court may in its discretion stay the proceeding for 
such period as the court deems appropriate. This might occur 
where the complaint is filed 90 days after demand but the inquiry 
into matters raised by the demand has not been completed or 
.where a demand has not been investigated but the corporation 
'commences the inquiry after the complaint has been filed. In ei-
ther case, it is expected that the court will monitor the course of 
;the inquiry to ensure that it is proceeding expeditiously and in 
'good faith. 
m S n 1 ^ h P r o C e e d l r i 8 . S h a I ' b e d i s ™ ^ d by the court-on 
motion by the corporation if one of the groups s p e £ ° n 
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subsection (b) or subsection (e) has determined in good 
faith, after conducting a reasonable inquiry upon which its 
conclusions are based, that the maintenance of the deriva-
tive proceeding is not in the best interests of the corporation. 
(b) Unless a panel is appointed pursuant to subsection (e), the 
determination in subsection (a) shall be made by: 
(1) a majority vote of qualified directors present at a meet-
ing of the board of directors if the qualified directors 
constitute a quorum; or 
(2) a majority vote of a committee consisting of two or 
more qualified directors appointed by majority vote of 
qualified directors present at a meeting of the board of 
directors, regardless of whether such qualified directors 
constitute a quorum. 
(c) If a derivative proceeding is commenced after a determi-
nation has been made rejecting a demand by a shareholder, 
the complaint shall allege with particularity facts establish-
ing either (1) that a majority of the board of directors did 
not consist of qualified directors at the time the determi-
nation was made or (2) that the requirements of subsection 
(a) have not been met 
(d) If a majority of the board of directors consisted of qualified 
directors at the time the determination was made, the plain-
tiff shall have the burden of proving that the requirements 
of subsection (a) have not been met; if not the corporation 
shall have the burden of proving that the requirements of 
subsection (a) have been met 
(e) Upon motion by the corporation, the court may appoint a 
panel of one or more individuals to make a determination 
whether the maintenance of the derivative proceeding is in 
the best interests of the corporation. In such case, the plain-
tiff shall have the burden of proving that the requirements 
of subsection (a) have not been met 
CROSS-REFERENCES 
Board of directors: 
committees, see § 8.25. 
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meetings, see § 8.20. 
quorum and voting, see § 8*24. 
Demand, see §7.41. 
"Derivative proceeding" defined, see § 7.40. 
"Qualified director" defined, see §1.43. 
"Shareholder" defined, see § 7.40. 
OFFICIAL COMMENT 
At one time, the Model Act did not expressly provide what 
happens when a board of directors properly rejects a demand to 
bring an action. In such event, judicial decisions indicate that the 
rejection should be honored and any ensuing derivative action 
should be dismissed. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 813 
(Del 1984). The Model Act was also silent on the effect of a 
determination by a special litigation committee of qualified di-
rectors that a previously commenced derivative action should be 
dismissed. Section 7.44(a) specifically provides that the proceed-
ing shall be dismissed if there is a proper determination that the 
maintenance of the proceeding is not in the best interests of the 
corporation. That determination can be made prior to commence-
ment of the derivative action in response to a demand or after 
commencement of the action upon examination of the allegations 
of the complaint. 
The procedures set forth in section 7,44 are not intended to 
be exclusive. As noted in the comment to section 7.42, there may 
be instances where a decision to commence an action falls within 
the authority of an officer of the corporation, depending upon the 
amount of the claim and the identity of the potential defendants, 
L THE PERSONS MAKING THE DETERMINATION 
Section 7.44(b) prescribes the persons by whom the deter-
mination in subsection (a) may be made. Subsection (b) provides 
that the determination may be made (1) at a board meeting by a 
majority vote of qualified directors if the qualified directors con-
stitute a quorum, or (2) by a majority vote of a committee con-
sisting of two or more qualified directors appointed at a board 
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meeting by a vote of the qualified directors in attendance, re-
gardless of whether they constitute a quorum. (For the definition 
of'"qualified director/* see section L43 and the related official 
comment.) These provisions parallel the mechanics for determin-
ing entitlement to indemnification (section 8.55) and for author-
izirig directors* conflicting interest transactions (section 8.62). 
Subsection (b)(2) is an exception to section 8,25 of the Model 
Act, which requires the approval of at least a majority of all the 
directors in office to create a committee and appoint members. 
This approach has been taken to respond to the criticism ex-
pressed in a lew cases that special litigation committees suffer 
from a structural bias because of their appointment by vote of 
directors who at that time are not qualified directors. See Hasan 
v. Trust Realty Investors, 729 R2d 372, 376-77 (6th Cir. 1984). 
Subsection (e) provides, as an alternative, for a determination 
by a panel of one or more individuals appointed by the court. The 
subsection provides for the appointment only upon motion by the 
corporation. This would not, however, prevent the court on its 
own initiative from appointing a special master pursuant to ap-
plicable state rules of procedure, (Although subsection (b)(2) re-
quires a committee of at least two qualified directors, subsection 
(e) permits the appointment by the court of only one person in 
recognition of the potentially increased costs to the corporation 
for the fees and expenses of an outside person.) 
This panel procedure may be desirable in a number of cir-
cumstances. If there are no qualified directors available, the cor-
poration may not wish to enlarge the board to add qualified di-
rectors or may be unable to find persons willing to serve as 
qualified directors. In addition, even if there are directors who are 
qualified, they may not be in a position to conduct the inquiry in 
an expeditious manner. 
Appointment by the court should also eliminate any question 
about the qualifications of the individual or individuals consti-
tuting the panel making the determination. Although the corpo-
ration may wish to suggest to the court possible appointees, the 
court will not be bound by those suggestions and, in any case, 
will want to satisfy itself with respect to each candidate's impar-
tiality. When the court appoints a panel, subsection (e) places the 
burden on the plaintiff to prove that the requirements of subsec-
tion (a) have not been met. 
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2. STANDARDS TO BE APPLIED 
Section 7.44(a) requires that the determination, by the appro-
priate person or persons, be made "in good faith, after conducting 
a reasonable inquiry upon which their conclusions are based." 
The phrase "in good faith** modifies both the determination and 
the inquiry. This standard, which is also found in. sections 830 
(general standards of conduct for directors) and 8,51 (authority 
to indemnify) of the Model Act, is a subjective one, meaning 
"honestly or in an honest manner/' See-also * 'Corporate Direc-
tor's Guidebook (Fourth Edition)," 59 Bus. Law, 1057, 1068 
(2004). As stated in Abella v. Universal Leaf Tobacco Co., 546 
R Supp. 795, 800 (E.D. Va. 1982), "the inquiry intended by this 
phrase goes to the spirit and sincerity with which the investigation 
was conducted, rather than the reasonableness of its procedures 
or basis for conclusions." 
The word "inquiry" —rather than "investigation" —has 
been used to make it clear that the scope of the inquiry will de-
pend upon the issues raised and the knowledge of the group mak-
ing the determination with respect to those issues. In some cases, 
the issues may be so simple or the knowledge of the group so 
extensive that little additional inquiry is required. In other cases, 
the group may need to engage counsel and possibly other pro-
fessionals to make an investigation and assist the group in its 
evaluation of the issues. 
The phrase "upon which its conclusions are based" requires 
that the inquiry and the conclusions follow logically. This stan-
dard authorizes the court to examine the determination to ensure 
that it has some support in the findings of the inquiry. The burden 
of convincing the court about this issue lies with whichever party 
has the burden, under subsection (d). This phrase does not require 
the persons making the determination to prepare a written report 
that sets forth their determination and the bases therefor, since 
circumstances will vary as to the need for such a report. There 
will be, in all likelihood, many instances where good corporate-
practice will commend such a procedure. 
Section 7,44 is not. intended to modify the general standards 
of conduct for directors set forth in section 8,30 of the Model 
Act, but rather to make those standards somewhat more explicit 
in the derivative proceeding context. In this regard, the qualified 
7-93 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT 
directors making the determination would be entitled to rely on 
information and reports from other persons in accordance with 
section 8.30(d). 
Section 744 is similar in several respects and differs in certain 
other respects from the law as it has developed in Delaware and 
been followed in a number of other states. Under the Delaware 
cases, the role of the court in reviewing the directors' determi-
nation varies depending upon whether the plaintiff is in. a 
demand-required or demand-excused situation. 
Since section 7.42 requires demand in all cases, the distinction 
between demand-excused and demand-required cases does not 
apply. Subsections (c) and (d) carry forward that distinction, how-
ever, by establishing pleading rules and allocating the burden of 
proof depending on whether there is a majority of qualified di-
rectors on the board* Subsection (c), like Delaware law, assigns 
to the plaintiff the threshold burden of alleging facts establishing 
that the majority of the directors on the board are not qualified. 
If there is a majority, then the burden remains with the plaintiff 
to plead and establish that the requirements of subsection (a) sec-
tion 7.44(a) have not been met. If there is not a majority of qual-
ified directors on the board, then the burden is on the corporation 
to prove that the issues delineated in subsection (a) have been 
satisfied; that is, .the corporation must prove both the eligibility 
of the decision makers to act on the matter and the propriety of 
their inquiry and determination. 
Thus, the burden of proving that the requirements of subsec-
tion (a) have not been met will remain with the plaintiff in several 
situations. First, where the determination to dismiss the derivative 
proceeding is made in accordance with subsection (b)(1), the bur-
den of proof will generally remain, with the plaintiff since the 
subsection requires a quorum of qualified directors and a quorum 
is normally a majority. See section 8.24. The burden will also 
remain with the plaintiff if a majority of qualified directors has 
appointed a committee under subsection (b)(2), and the qualified 
directors constitute a majority of the board. Under subsection (e), 
the burden of proof also remains with the plaintiff in the case of 
a determination by a panel appointed by the court. 
The burden of proof will shift to the corporation, however, 
where a majority of the board members are not qualified and the 
determination is made by a committee under subsection (b)(2). It 
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can be argued that, if the directors making the determination un-
der subsection (b)(2) are qualified and have been delegated full 
responsibility for making the decision, the composition of the 
entire board is irrelevant; This argument is buttressed by the sec-
tion's method of appointing the group specified in subsection 
(b)(2), since it departs from the general method of appointing 
committees and allows only qualified directors, rather than a ma-
jority of the entire board, to appoint the committee that will make 
the determination. Subsection (d)'s response to objections sug-
gesting structural, bias is to place the burden of proof on the cor-
poration (despite the fact that the committee making the deter-
mination is composed exclusively of qualified directors). 
Finally, section 7.44 does not authorize the court to review 
the reasonableness of the determination to reject a demand or seek 
dismissal. This contrasts with the approach in some states that 
permits a court, at least in some circumstances, to review the 
merits of the determination (see Zapata Corp. u. Maldonado, 430 
A. 2d 779, 789 (Dei 1981) and is similar to the approach taken 
in other states (see Auerbach v, Bennett, 393 N*E. 2d 994, 1002-
03 (NX1979). 
3. PLEADING 
The Model Act previously provided that the complaint in a 
derivative proceeding must allege with particularity either that 
demand had been made on the board of directors, together with 
the board's response, or why demand was excused. This require-
ment is similar to rule 23.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, Since demand is now required in all cases, this provision is 
no longer necessary. 
Subsection (c) sets forth a modified pleading rule to cover the 
typical situation where the plaintiff makes demand on the board, 
the board rejects that demand, and the plaintiff commences an 
action. In that scenario, in order to state a cause-of-action, sub-
section (c) requires the complaint to allege with particularity facts 
demonstrating either (1.) that no majority of qualified directors 
exists or (2) why the determination made by qualified directors 
does not meet the standards in subsection (a). Discovery should 
be available to the plaintiff only after the plaintiff has successfully 
stated a cause of action by making either of these two showings, 
7-95 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
MODEL BUSINESS 
CORPORATION ACT 
ANNOTATED 
Third Edition 
2000/01/02 Supplement 
Model Business Corporation Act 
with Official Comment and 
Reporter's Annotations 
Model Close Corporation Supplement 
Model Professional Corporation Supplement 
adopted by the 
Committee on Corporate Laws 
of the Section of Business Law 
with the support of the 
American Bar Foundation 
Volume 2 
10 A\ Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT ANNOTATED 
additional time is needed. The Texas statute also describes the 
effect of filing demand on the applicable statute of hmitations. 
For comparison to other state statutes, see the Annotation to 
section 7.40. 
§7.44. DISMISSAL 
(a) A derivative proceeding shall be dismissed by the court on 
motion by the corporation if one of the groups specified in 
subsections (b) or (f) has determined in good faith after 
conducting a reasonable inquiry upon which its conclusions 
are based that the maintenance of the derivative proceeding 
is not in the best interests of the corporation. 
(b) Unless a panel is appointed pursuant to subsection (f), the 
determination in subsection (a) shall be made by: 
(1) a majority vote of independent directors present at a 
meeting of the board of directors if the independent 
directors constitute a quorum; or 
(2) a majority vote of a committee consisting of two or 
more independent directors appointed by majority 
vote of independent directors present at a meeting of 
the board of directors, whether or not such indepen-
dent directors constituted a quorum. 
(c) None of the following shall by itself cause a director to be 
considered not independent for purposes of this section: 
(1) the nomination or election of the director by persons 
who are defendants in the derivative proceeding or 
against whom action is demanded; 
(2) the naming of the director as a defendant in the deriv-
ative proceeding or as a person against whom action 
is demanded; or 
(3) the approval by the director of the act being challenged 
in the derivative proceeding or demand if the act re-
sulted in no personal benefit to the director. 
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(d) If a derivative proceeding is commenced after a determi-
nation has been made rejecting a demand by a shareholder, 
the complaint shall allege with particularity facts establish-
ing either (1) that a majority of the board of directors did 
not consist of independent directors at the time the deter-
mination was made or (2) that the requirements of subsec-
tion (a) have not been met. 
(e) If a majority of the board of directors does not consist of 
independent directors at the time the determination is 
made, the corporation shall have the burden of proving that 
the requirements of subsection (a) have been met. If a ma-
jority of the board of directors consists of independent di-
rectors at the time the determination is made, the plaintiff 
shall have the burden of proving that the requirements of 
subsection (a) have not been met. 
(f) The court may appoint a panel of one or more independent 
persons upon motion by the corporation to make a deter-
mination whether the maintenance of the derivative pro-
ceeding is in the best interests of the corporation. In such 
case, the plaintiff shall have the burden of proving that the 
requirements of subsection (a) have not been met. 
CRQSS-REFERENCES 
Board of directors: 
committees, see § 8.25. 
meetings, see § 8.20. 
quorum and voting, see § 8.24. 
Demand, see §7.41. 
"Derivative proceeding" defined, see § 7.40. 
"Shareholder" defined, see § 7.40. 
OFFICIAL COMMENT 
The prior version of the Model Act did not expressly provide 
what happens when a board of directors properly rejects a demand 
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to bring an action. Judicial decisions indicate that a derivative 
action should be dismissed in these circumstances. See Aronson 
v. Lewis, A13> A.2d 805, 813 (Del. 1984). The prior version of the 
Model Act was also silent on the effect of a detennination by a 
special litigation committee of independent directors that a pre-
viously commenced derivative action can be dismissed. Several 
state corporation laws have been amended to provide for action 
by such a committee. IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-32-4 (Burns 1984 
& Supp. 1988); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-49 (1985). Section 
7.44(a) specifically provides that the proceeding shall be dis-
missed if there is a proper determination that the maintenance of 
the proceeding is not in the best interests of the corporation. This 
determination can be made prior to commencement of the suit in 
response to a demand or after commencement upon examination 
of the allegations of the complaint. 
The procedures set forth in section 7.44 are not intended to 
be exclusive. As noted in the comment to section 7.42, there may 
be instances where a decision to commence an action falls within 
the authority of an officer of the corporation depending upon the 
amount of the claim and the identity of the potential defendants. 
1. THE PERSONS MAKING THE DETERMINATION 
Section 7.44(b) prescribes the persons by whom the deter-
mination in subsection (a) may be made. The subsection provides 
that the determination may be made by a majority vote of inde-
pendent directors if there is a quorum of independent directors, 
or by a committee of independent directors appointed by a vote 
of the independent directors. These provisions parallel the me-
chanics for determining entitlement to indemnification in section 
8.55 of the Model Act. In this respect this clause is an exception 
to section 8.25 of the Model Act which requires the approval of 
at least a majority of all the directors in office to create a com-
mittee and appoint members. This approach has been taken to 
respond to the criticism expressed in a few cases that special 
htigation committees suffer from a structural bias because of their 
appointment by vote of non-independent directors. See Hasan v. 
Cleve Trust Realty Investors, 729 F.2d 372, 376-77 (6th Cir. 
1984). 
The decisions which have examined the qualifications of di-
rectors making the determination have required that they be both 
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"disinterested" in the sense of not having a personal interest in 
the transaction being challenged as opposed to a benefit which 
devolves upon the corporation or all shareholders generally, and 
"independent" in the sense of not being influenced in favor of 
the defendants by reason of personal or other relationships. See, 
e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812-16 (Del. 1984). Only 
the word * 'independent'' has been used in section 7.44(b) because 
it is believed that this word necessarily also includes the require-
ment that a person have no interest in the transaction. The concept 
of an independent director is not intended to be limited to non-
officer or "outside" directors but may in appropriate circum-
stances include directors who are also officers. 
Many of the special litigation committees involved in the re-
ported cases consisted of directors who were elected after the 
alleged wrongful acts by the directors who were named as defen-
dants in the action. Subsection (c)(1) makes it clear that the par-
ticipation of non-independent directors or shareholders in the 
nomination or election of a new director shall not prevent the new 
director from being considered independent. This sentence there-
fore rejects the concept that the mere appointment of new direc-
tors by the non-independent directors makes the new directors 
not independent in making the necessary determination because 
of an inherent structural bias. Clauses (2) and (3) also confirm 
the decisions by a number of courts that the mere fact that a 
director has been named as a defendant or approved the action 
being challenged does not cause the director to be considered not 
independent. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 816 (Del. 
1984); Lewis v. Graves, 701 F.2d 245 (2d Cir. 1983). It is be-
lieved that a court will be able to assess any actual bias in deciding 
whether the director is independent without any presumption aris-
ing out of the method of the director's appointment, the mere 
naming of the director as a defendant, or the director's approval 
of the act where the director received no personal benefit from 
the transaction. 
Subsection (f) also provides for a determination by a panel of 
one or more independent persons appointed by the court. Cf . VIR-
GINIA STOCK CORP. ACT § 13.1-672D (1987) (court may appoint 
a committee of two or more persons). The subsection provides 
for the appointment only upon motion by the corporation. This 
would not, however, prevent the court on its own initiative from 
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appointing a special master pursuant to applicable state rules of 
procedure. 
This procedure may be desirable in a number of circum-
stances. If there are no independent directors available, the cor-
poration may not wish to enlarge the board to add independent 
directors or may be unable to find persons willing to serve as 
independent directors. In addition, if there are independent direc-
tors, they may not have the available time to conduct the inquiry 
in an expeditious manner. 
Appointment by the court should also eliminate any question 
about the independence of the person making the determina-
tion. Although the corporation may wish to suggest to the court 
possible appointees, the court will not be bound by these sug-
gestions and, in any case, will want to satisfy itself with respect 
to independence at the time the person is appointed. When the 
court appoints a panel, section 7.44(f) places the burden on the 
plaintiff to prove that the requirements of section 7.44(a) have 
not been met. 
Although subsection (b)(2) requires a committee of at least 
two directors, subsection (f) permits the appointment of only one 
person in recognition of the potentially increased costs to the 
corporation for the fees and expenses of an outside person. 
2. STANDARD TO BE APPLIED 
Section 7.44(a) requires that the determination be made by 
the appropriate persons in good faith after conducting a reason-
able inquiry upon which their conclusions are based. The word 
"inquiry" rather than "investigation" has been used to make it 
clear that the scope of the inquiry will depend upon the issues 
raised and the knowledge of the group making the determination 
with respect to the issues. In some cases, the issues may be so 
simple or the knowledge of the group so extensive that little ad-
ditional inquiry is required. In other cases, the group may need 
to engage counsel and other professionals to make an investiga-
tion and assist the group in its evaluation of the issues. 
The phrase "in good faith" modifies both the determination 
and the inquiry. The test, which is also included in sections 8.30 
(general standards of conduct for directors) and 8.51 (authority 
to indemnify), is a subjective one, meaning "honestly or in an 
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honest manner." "The Corporate Director's Guidebook," 33 
Bus. LAW. 1595, 1601 (1978). As stated in Abella v. Universal 
Leaf Tobacco Co., 546 F. Supp. 795, 800 (E.D. Va. 1982), "the 
inquiry intended by this phrase goes to the spirit and sincerity 
with which the investigation was conducted, rather than the rea-
sonableness of its procedures or basis for conclusions." 
The phrase "upon which its conclusions are based" requires 
that the inquiry and the conclusions follow logically. This pro-
vision authorizes the court to examine the determination to ensure 
that it has some support in the findings of the inquiry. The burden 
of convincing the court about this issue lies with whichever party 
has the burden under section 7.44(e). This phrase does not require 
the persons making the determination to prepare a written report 
that sets forth their determination and the bases therefor, since 
circumstances will vary as to the need for such a report. There 
may, however, be many instances where good corporate practice 
will commend such a procedure. 
Section 7.44 is not intended to modify the general standards 
of conduct for directors set forth in section 8.30 of the Model 
Act, but rather to make those standards somewhat more explicit 
in the derivative proceeding context. In this regard, the indepen-
dent directors making the determination would be entitled to rely 
on information and reports from other persons in accordance with 
section 8.30(b). 
Section 7.44 is similar in several respects and differs in certain 
other respects from the law as it has developed in Delaware and 
been followed in a number of other states. Under the Delaware 
cases, the role of the court in reviewing the board's determination 
varies depending upon whether the plaintiff is in a demand-re-
quired or demand-excused situation. Demand is excused only if 
the plaintiff pleads particularized facts that create a reasonable 
doubt that a majority of directors at the time demand would be 
made are independent or disinterested, or that the challenged 
transaction was the product of a valid exercise of business judg-
ment by the approving board. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 
814 (Del. 1984); Levine v. Smith, 591 A.2d 194 (Del. 1991). If 
the plaintiff fails to make these two showings, demand is re-
quired. Since the Aronson requirements are difficult to satisfy, the 
plaintiff normally must make demand on the board. 
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In the unusual case where the plaintiffs demand is excused 
under either of the Aronson tests, the plaintiff has standing to 
bring the derivative suit. If the corporation seeks to reassert its 
right to control the litigation, the corporation will form a special 
litigation committee to determine if the litigation is in the best 
interests of the corporation. If the corporation files a motion to 
dismiss the litigation based upon the recommendation of the spe-
cial committee, Delaware law requires the corporation to bear the 
burden of proving the independence of the committee, the rea-
sonableness of its investigation, and the reasonableness of the 
bases of its decision reflected in the motion. Zapata Corp. v. 
Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981). Zapata also permits the 
court a discretionary second step to review the special commit-
tee's decision by invoking the court's "independent business 
judgment." Id. at 789. 
In the usual scenario where demand is not excused, the share-
holder must demand that the board take action and the Zapata 
principles do not apply. The board or special committee of in-
dependent directors decides whether the corporation should take 
the action the shareholder requests or respond in some other way. 
As in the case of all board decisions, the board's response to the 
shareholder's demand is presumptively protected by the tradi-
tional business judgment rule. Allison v. General Motors Corp., 
604 F. Su£>p. 1106, 1122 (D. Del. 1985). As a result, the share-
holder in filing suit bears the normal burden of creating by par-
ticularized pleadings a reasonable doubt that the board's response 
to the demand was wrongful. Levine v. Smith, No. 591 A.2d 194, 
210 (Del. 1991). The plaintiff must allege with particularity a 
lack of good faith, care, independence, or disinterestedness by the 
directors in responding to the demand. 
In contrast to Delaware's approach, some jurisdictions have 
adopted uniform tests to judge both demand-required and de-
mand-excused situations. For example, in New York, judicial re-
view is always limited to an analysis of the independence and 
good faith of the board or committee and the reasonableness of 
its investigation; the court does not examine the reasonableness 
of the bases for the board's decision, nor does the court have the 
discretionary authority to use its independent business judgment. 
Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619,633-34,419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 
928-29, 393 N.E.2d 994,1002-03 (1979). In contrast, the North 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
SECTION 7.44 
Carolina Supreme Court has interpreted that state's statutory pro-
visions on derivative actions as requiring the application of the 
Zapata criteria in both demand-required and demand-excused 
cases. Alford v. Shaw, 358 S.R2d 323, 327 (N.C. 1987). 
Since section 7.42 requires demand in all cases, the distinction 
between demand-excused and demand-required cases does not 
apply. Subsections (d) and (e) of section 7.44 carry forward the 
distinction, however, by establishing pleading rules and allocat-
ing the burden of proof depending on whether there is a majority 
of independent directors. Subsection (d), like Delaware law, as-
signs the plaintiff the threshold burden of alleging facts estab-
lishing that majority of the board is not independent. If there is 
an independent majority, the burden remains with the plaintiff to 
plead and establish that the requirements of section 7.44(a) have 
not been met. If there is no independent majority, the burden is 
on the corporation on the issues delineated in section 7.44(a). In 
this case, the corporation must prove both the independence of 
the decisionmakers and the propriety of the inquiry and deter-
mination. 
Subsections (d) and (e) of section 7.44 thus follow the first 
Aronson standard in allocating the burden of proof depending on 
whether the majority of the board is independent. The Committee 
on Corporate Laws decided, however, not to adopt the second 
Aronson standard for excusing demand (and thus shifting the bur-
den to the corporation) based on whether the decision of the board 
that decided the challenged transaction is protected by the busi-
ness judgment rule. The committee believes that the only appro-
priate concern in the context of derivative litigation is whether 
the board considering the demand has a disabling conflict See 
Starrels v. First Nat'l Bank, 870 F.2d 1168, 1172-76 (7th Cir. 
1989) (Easterbrook, J., concurring). 
Thus, the burden of proving that the requirements of 7.44(a) 
have not been met will remain with the plaintiff in several situ-
ations. First, in subsection (b)(1), the burden of proof will gen-
erally remain with the plaintiff since the subsection requires a 
quorum of independent directors and a quorum is normally a 
majority. See section 8.24. The burden will also remain with the 
plaintiff if there is a majority of independent directors which ap-
points the committee under subsection (b)(2). Under section 
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7.44(f), the burden of proof also remains with the plaintiff in the 
case of a determination by a panel appointed by the court. 
The burden of proof will shift to the corporation, however, 
where a majority of directors is not independent, and the deter-
mination is made by the group specified in subsection (b)(2). It 
can be argued that, if the directors making the determination un-
der subsection (b)(2) are independent and have been delegated 
full responsibility for making the decision, the composition of the 
entire board is irrelevant. This argument is buttressed by the sec-
tion's method of appointing the group specified in subsection 
(b)(2) since subsection (b)(2) departs from the general method of 
appointing committees and allows only independent directors, 
rather than a majority of the entire board, to appoint the com-
mittee which will make the determination. Nevertheless, despite 
the argument that the composition of the board is irrevelant in 
these circumstances, the Committee on Corporate Laws adopted 
the provisions of subsections (b)(2) and (e) of section 7.44 to 
respond to concerns of structural bias. 
Finally, section 7.44 does not authorize the court to review 
the reasonableness of the determination. As discussed above, the 
phrase in section 7.44(a)' 'upon which its conclusions are based'' 
limits judicial review to whether the determination has some sup-
port in the findings of the inquiry. 
3. PLEADING 
Former section 7.40(b) provided that the complaint in a de-
rivative proceeding must allege with particularity whether de-
mand has been made on the board of directors and the board's 
response or why demand was excused. This requirement is simi-
lar to rule 23.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Since 
demand is now required in all cases, this provision is no longer 
necessary. 
Subsection (d) sets forth a modified pleading rule to cover the 
typical situation where plaintiff makes demand on the board, the 
board rejects that demand, and the plaintiff commences an action. 
In that scenario, in order to state a cause of action, subsection (d) 
requires the complaint to allege facts with particularity demon-
strating either (1) that no majority of independent directors exists 
or (2) why the determination does not meet the standards in sub-
section (a). Discovery is available to the plaintiff only after the 
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plaintiff has successfully stated a cause of action by making either 
of these two showings. 
ANNOTATION 
HISTORY 
See the Annotation to section 7.40. 
STATUTES 
Ariz. Rev. Stat Ann. § 10-744 
Conn. Bus. Corp. Act § 33-724 (West) 
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 607.07401 (3) 
Ca. Code Ann. § 14-2-744 
Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 414-175 
Idaho Code §30-1-744 
Iowa Code Ann. § 490.744 
13-C Me. Rev. Stat Ann. § 755 
Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 450.1491a, 450.1495 (West) 
Miss. Code Ann. § 79-4-7.44 
Mont. Code Ann. § 35-1-545 
Neb. Rev. Stat. §21-2074 
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 293-A:7.44 
N.C. Gen. Stat § 55-7-44 
Tex. Bus. Corp. Act Ann. art. 5.14G, H (Vernon) 
Va. Code §13.1-672.4 
Wis. Stat Ann. § 180.0744 (West) 
Wyo. Stat §17-16-744 
For a list of other statutes dealing with derivative proceedings, 
see the Annotation to section 7.40. 
STATUTORY COMPARISON 
Arizona, Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Maine, 
Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Caro-
lina, and Wisconsin have adopted section 7.44 with little sub-
stantive change. 
Florida has no counterpart to subsection (c); its statute further 
provides that the court "may," rather than "shall," dismiss the 
proceeding, refers to "investigation," rather than "inquiry," and 
imposes the burden of showing good faith and reasonable inves-
tigation on the corporation in all instances. Michigan has no pro-
vision similar to section 7.44(c) and also requires that the cor-
poration bear the burden of establishing good faith and reasonable 
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or more disinterested persons or ' 'all" disinterested directors; a 
"disinterested" person is defined as someone who is not a party 
to the proceeding or against whom the claim asserted is "frivo-
lous or insubstantial." 
In Texas, one or more "disinterested and independent" di-
rectors may appoint a committee consisting of two or more dis-
interested and independent directors; plaintiff bears the burden of 
proof if the determination to dismiss is made by a majority of 
independent and disinterested directors or by a panel of indepen-
dent persons; if a majority of the board is not independent and 
disinterested and a committee makes the determination, the bur-
den of proof is on the corporation unless it provides "prima facie 
evidence'' that the committee members making the determination 
were independent and disinterested. 
The Virginia provision substitutes a ' 'review and evaluation 
of the allegations made in the complaint" and requires that the 
reviewing body submit in support of its motion to dismiss "a 
short and concise statement of the reasons for its determination''; 
the plaintiff has the burden of proof in all cases, except where 
the complaint pleads with particularity' 'facts raising a substantial 
question" concerning the independence of the board or board 
committee making the determination to dismiss. 
In Wyoming, a determination to dismiss may be made only 
by an independent panel appointed by the court. 
For comparison to other state statutes, see the Annotation to 
section 7.40. 
§7.45. DISCONTINUANCE OR SETTLEMENT 
A derivative proceeding may not be discontinued or settled with-
out the court's approval. If the court determines that a proposed 
discontinuance or settlement will substantially affect the interests 
of the corporation's shareholders or a class of shareholders, the 
court shall direct that notice be given to the shareholders af-
fected. 
CROSS-REFERENCES 
"Derivative proceeding" defined, see § 7.40. 
"Shareholder" defined, see § 7.40. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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[Subchapter] C 
SECRETARY OF STATE 
§ 1.30. Powers. 
§1.30. POWERS 
The secretary of state has the powers reasonably necessary to per-
form the duties required of the secretary of state by this [act]. 
Source Note; Patterned after Model Business Corporation Act, 
3d Ed. (2002) § 1.30. Reenactment of Revised Model Non-
profit Corporation Act (1987) § 1.30. 
CROSS-REFERENCES 
Administrative dissolution, see § 14.20, 
Revocation of certificate of authority of foreign nonprofit 
corporation, see Subch. 15C. 
Secretary of state's filing duty, see § 1,25. 
OFFICIAL COMMENT 
Section 1.30 is intended to grant the secretary of state the 
authority necessary for the efficient performance of the filing and 
other duties imposed by the act but is not intended to give the 
secretary of state general authority to establish public policy. The 
most important aspects of a modern corporation statute relate 
to the creation and maintenance of relationships among persons 
interested in or involved with a corporation, These relationships 
basically should be a matter of concern to the parties involved 
and not subject to regulation or interpretation by the secretary of 
state. Further, even in situations where it is claimed that the cor-
poration has been formed or is being operated for purposes that 
may violate the public policies of the state, the secretary of state 
generally should not be the governmental official who deter-
mines the scope of public policy through administration of the 
filing responsibilities under the act. Rather, the attorney general 
may seek to .enjoin the illegal conduct or to dissolve involuntarily 
the offending corporation. 
1-30 
SECTION 1.40 
[Subchapter] D 
DEFINITIONS 
§ 1,40. [Act] definitions. 
§ 1.41. Notice. 
§1.40. [ACT] DEFINITIONS 
In this [act], unless the context clearly indicates otherwise: 
(1) "Articles" or "articles of incorporation" means the origi-
nal articles of incorporation, all amendments thereof, 
and any other records filed with the secretary of state 
with respect to a domestic nonprofit corporation under 
any provision of this [act] except Section 16.21, If any 
record filed under this [act] restates the articles in their 
entirety, thenceforth the articles shall not include any 
prior filings. 
Source Note: Patterned after Model Business Corporation Act, 
3d Ed. (20Q2) § 1.40(1). Compare Revised Model Nonprofit 
Corporation Act (1987) § 1,40. 
(2) "Board" or "board of directors" means the group of indi-
viduals responsible for the management of the activities 
and affairs of the nonprofit corporation, regardless of 
the name used to refer to the group. The term includes a 
designated body to the extent: 
(i) the authority, powers, or functions of the board 
have been vested in, or are exercised by, the desig-
nated body; and 
(ii) the provision of this [act] in which the term appears 
is relevant to the discharge by the designated body 
of its authority, powers, or functions. 
Source Note; Patterned in part after first two sentences of 
15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5103 (2008) ("board of directors"). 
Compare Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act (1987) 
§ 1.40(3). 
(3) "Business corporation" or "domestic business corpora-
tion" means a corporation incorporated under the laws 
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Source Note: New. 
(26) "Governmental subdivision" includes an authority, 
county, district, and municipality. 
Source Note: Patterned after Model Business Corporation 
Act, 3d Ed. (2002) § 1.40(11)', Reenactment of Revised Model 
Nonprofit Corporation Act (1987) § 1.40(17). 
(27) "Governor" means a person by or under whose author-
ity the powers of an unincorporated entity are exercised 
and under whose direction the business, activities, or 
affairs of the entity are managed pursuant to the organic 
law and organic records of the entity. 
Source Note: Patterned after Model Entity Transactions Act 
§ 102(16). 
(28) "Includes" denotes a partial definition. 
Source Note: Patterned after Model Business Corporation 
Act, 3d Ed. (2002) § 1.40(12). Reenactment of Revised Model 
Nonprofit Corporation Act (1987) § 1.40(18). 
(29) "Individual" means a natural person. 
Source Note: Patterned after Model Business Corporation Act, 
3d Ed. (2002) § 1.40(13). Compare Revised Model Nonprofit 
Corporation Act (1987) § 1.40(19). 
(30)"Interest" means either or both of the following rights 
under the organic law of an unincorporated entity; 
(i) the right to receive distributions from the entity 
either in the ordinary course or upon liquidation; or 
(ii) the right to receive notice or vote on issues involving 
its internal affairs, other than as an agent, assignee, 
proxy, or person responsible for managing its busi-
ness, activities, or affairs. 
Source Note: Patterned after Model Business Corporation Act, 
3d Ed. (2002) § 1.40(13A). 
(31)"Interest holder" means a person who holds of record 
an interest, 
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Source Note: Patterned after Model Business Corporation Act, 
3d Ed. (2002) § 1.40(13B). 
(32)"Interest holder liability" means personal liability for 
a debt, obligation, or liability of a domestic or foreign 
business or nonprofit corporation or unincorporated 
entity that is imposed on a person: 
(i) solely by reason of the person's status as a share-
holder, interest holder, or member; or 
(ii) by the articles of incorporation, bylaws, or an organic 
record pursuant to a provision of the organic law 
authorizing the articles, bylaws, or an organic record 
to make one or more specified shareholders, interest 
holders, or members liable in their capacity as share-
holders, interest holders, or members for all or spec-
ified debts, obligations, or liabilities of the entity. 
Source Note: Patterned after Model Business Corporation Act, 
3dEd. (2002) § 1.40(15C), 
(33) "Internal Revenue Code" means the Internal Revenue 
Code of 1986 (Public Law 99-514, 26 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.), 
as amended. 
Source Note: New. 
(34) "Material interest" means an actual or potential benefit 
or detriment, other than one that would devolve on the 
nonprofit corporation or the members generally, that 
would reasonably be expected to impair the objectivity 
of an individual's judgment when participating in the 
action to be taken. 
Source Note: Patterned.after Model Business Corporation Act, 
3d Ed. (2005) § 1.43(b)(2). 
(35) "Material relationship" means a familial, financial, pro-
fessional, employment, or other relationship that would 
reasonably be expected to impair the.objectivity of an 
individual's judgment when participating in'the action 
to be taken. 
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Source Note: Patterned after Model Business Corporation Act, 
3d Ed. (2005) § 1.43(b)(1). 
(36) "Means" denotes an exhaustive definition. 
Source Note: Patterned after Model Business Corporation 
Act, 3d Ed, (2002) § 1.40(14), Substantially a reenactment of 
Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act (1987) § 1.40(20). 
(37) "Member" means: 
(i) A person who has the right, in accordance with the.; 
articles of incorporation or bylaws and not as a del-
egate, to select or vote for the election of directors 
or delegates or to vote on any type of fundamental 
transaction. See Section 6.02(d) (admission). 
(ii) A designated body to the extent: 
(A) the authority, powers, or functions of the mem-
bers have been vested in, or are exercised by, 
• the designated body; and 
(B) the provision of this [act] in which the term 
appears is relevant to the discharge by the 
designated body of its authority, powers, or 
functions. 
Source Note: Compare Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation 
Act (1987) § 1.40(21). 
(38) "Membership" means the rights and any obligations of a 
member in a nonprofit corporation. 
Source Note: Patterned in part after Revised Model Nonprofit 
Corporation Act (1987) § 1.40(22), Compare Model Business 
Corporation Act, 3d Ed. (2002) § i.40(14A), 
(39) "Membership corporation" means a nonprofit corpora-
tion whose articles of incorporation or bylaws provide 
that it shall have members. 
Source Note: New. 
(40) "Nonfiling entity" means an unincorporated entity that 
is no t created by filing a public organic record. 
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j 
Source Note: Patterned after proposed Model Business Corpo- j 
ration Act, 3d Ed. (2002) § 1.40(14B). j 
i 
(41)"Nonmembership corporation" means a nonprofit cor-
poration whose articles of incorporation or bylaws do 1 
not provide that it shall have members, |. 
Source Note: New. • |1 
(42) "Nonqualified foreign corporation" means a foreign j 
corporation that is not authorized to conduct activities ! 
in this state. ij 
Source Note; New. H 
ii 
(43) "Notice" is provided for in Section 1.41, j 
Source Note: Patterned after Model Business Corporation || 
Act, 3d Ed. (2002) § 1.40(15), Reenactment of Revised Model j 
Nonprofit Corporation Act (1987) § 1.40(24). || 
(44) "Officer" includes: ;.J 
' (i) a person who is an officer as provided in Section 1 
8.40; and - j] 
(ii) if a nonprofit corporation is in the hands of a cus- ; 
todian, receiver, trustee or other court-appointed ' 
fiduciary, that fiduciary or any person appointed j 
by that fiduciary to act as an officer for any purpose ; 
under this [act], r 
Source Note: Patterned after 15 PA, CONS. STAT, § 5103 (2008) J 
("officer"). • | 
(45)"Organic law" means the statute principally governing j 
the internal affairs of a domestic or foreign business or ; 
nonprofit corporation or unincorporated entity, j 
Source Note: Patterned after Model Business Corporation Act, 
3d Ed, (2002) § 1.40(15B). 1 
(46) "Organic record" means a public organic record or the H 
private organic rules, I 
Source Note; Patterned after Model Business Corporation Act, i. 
3d Ed, (2002) § 1.40(15A). j] 
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CROSS-REFERENCES 
"Derivative proceeding" defined, see § 13.01. 
OFFICIAL COMMENT 
The act and the statutes of many states have long required 
that a plaintiff must have been a member at the time of the trans-
action in question. This rule has been criticized as being unduly 
narrow and technical and unnecessary to prevent the transfer or 
purchase of lawsuits. 
The decision to retain the rule of contemporaneous status as 
a member in Section 13.02(b) was based primarily on the view 
that it was simple, clear, and easy to apply. Further, there has. 
been no persuasive showing that the contemporaneous member-
ship rule has prevented the litigation of substantial suits. Where 
the plaintiff is a director or member of a designated body, how-
ever, the plaintiff need only have that status at the time the pro-
ceeding is commenced. 
Section 13.02 does not permit a creditor to commence a 
derivative proceeding. 
§ 13.03, DEMAND 
A person may not commence a derivative proceeding until; 
(1) a demand in the form of a record has been delivered to the '. 
nonprofit corporation to take-suitable action; and 
(2) 90 days have expired from the date the demand was effective 7 
unless the person has earlier been notified that the demand 
has been rejected by the corporation or unless irreparable , 
injury to the corporation would result by waiting for the.." 
expiration of the 90-day period. •• 
Source Note: Patterned after Model Business Corporation.1 
Act, 3d Ed. (2002) § 7.42. Compare Revised Model Nonprofit.-;. 
Corporation Act (1987) § 6.30(c). 4; 
CROSS-REFERENCES . '* 
"Derivative proceeding" defined, see § 13,01, ''% 
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OFFICIAL COMMENT. ! 
Section 13.03 requires a demand on the nonprofit corpo- |j 
ration in all cases. The demand must be made at least 90 days 
before commencement of suit unless irreparable injury to the n 
corporation would result, This approach has been adopted for j 
two reasons, First, even though no director may be independent, r 
the demand will give the board of directors the opportunity to ; 
re-examine the act complained of in the light of a potential law- : 
suit and take corrective action. Secondly, the provision eliminates j] 
the time and expense of the litigants and the court involved in :-| 
litigating the question whether demand is required. It is believed ~ 
that requiring a demand in all cases does not impose an onerous \\ 
burden since a relatively short waiting period of 90 days is pro- i 1 
vided and this period may be shortened if irreparable injury to j. 
the corporation would result by waiting for the expiration of the j 
90-day period. Moreover, the cases in which demand is excused ii 
are relatively rare. Many plaintiffs' counsel as a matter of practice H 
make a demand in all cases rather than litigate the issue whether r4 
demand is excused. jj 
i! 
L Form of Demand \'\ 
Section 13,03 specifies only that the demand must be in 
the form of a record. The demand should, however, set forth i\ 
the facts concerning membership and be sufficiently specific '•! 
to apprise the nonprofit corporation of "the action sought to be ;| 
taken and the ground for that action so that the demand can be j 
evaluated. See Allison v. General Motors Corp., 604 F. SUPP. 1106, j 
1117 (D. Del. 1985), Detailed pleading is not required since the 
corporation can contact the member for clarification if there are j 
any questions, In keeping with the spirit of this section, the spec- i. 
ificity of the demand should not become a new source of dilatory 
motions. H 
2. Upon Whom Demand Should Be Made ?. 
Section 13.03 states that demand shall be made upon the j 
nonprofit corporation. Reference is not made specifically to the I 
board of directors since there may be instances, such as a decision 
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(b) See Section 13.06 (applicability to foreign corporations). 
Source Note: Patterned after Model Business Corporation-
Act, 3d Ed. (2002) § 7,43, Compare Revised Model Nonprofit-
Corporation Act (1987) § 6;30(c). Subsection (b) is new. 
CROSS-REFERENCES 
Demand, see § 13.03. 
"Derivative proceeding" defined, see § 13.01. 
OFFICIAL COMMENT 
Section 13.04 provides that if the nonprofit corporation-
undertakes an inquiry, the court may in its discretion stay the ; 
proceeding for such period as the court deems appropriate, This: 
might occur where the complaint is filed 90 days after demand-
but the inquiry into matters raised by the demand has not been; 
completed or where a demand has not been investigated but the.! 
corporation commences the inquiry after the complaint has been/.' 
filed. In either case, it is expected that the court will monitor the-' 
course of the inquiry to ensure that it is proceeding expeditiously.; 
and in good faith. •;; 
§ 13.05. DISMISSAL 
(a) A derivative proceeding shall be dismissed by the court oft',' 
motion by the nonprofit corporation if one of the groups/} 
specified in subsection (b) or (e) has determined in good:i 
. faith after conducting a reasonable inquiry upon which its';* 
conclusions are based that the maintenance of the derivative; 
proceeding is not in the best interests of the corporation. ;i 
(b) Unless a panel is appointed pursuant to subsection (e), the;"'? 
determination in subsection (a) shall be made by: '4 
(1) a majority vote of independent directors present at &* 
meeting of the board of directors if the independent;' 
directors constitute a quorum; or C; 
(2) a majority vote of a committee consisting of two or more •': 
independent directors appointed by majority vote ofl 
13-8 3 
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1 
f 
independent directors present at a meeting of the board j 
of directors, whether or not such independent directors I 
!.:. -constituted a quorum. 
"v. (c) If a derivative proceeding is commenced after a determina- ;-
tion has been made rejecting a demand by a member, the n 
complaint must allege with particularity facts establishing j. 
either: !' 
(1) that a majority of the board of directors did not consist |, 
of independent directors at the time the determination j 
was made; or || 
(2) that the requirements of subsection (a) have not been !-j 
met. p; 
'" (d) If a majority of the board of directors does not consist of \\ 
independent directors at the time the determination is made, j; 
the nonprofit corporation has the burden of proving that the |j 
requirements of subsection (a) have been met. If a majority jj 
of the board of directors consists of independent directors at jl 
the time the determination is made, the plaintiff has the bur- ;| 
den of proving that the requirements of subsection (a) have ;i 
not been met • \\ 
• (e) The court may appoint a panel of one or more independent
 :
; 
persons upon motion by the nonprofit corporation to make : 
a determination whether the maintenance of the derivative I 
proceeding is in the best interests of the corporation. In such ; 
case, the plaintiff shall have the burden of proving that the M 
requirements of subsection (a) have not been met. J 
(f) A person is independent for purposes of this section if the j] 
person does not have: :. 
(1) a material interest in the outcome of the proceeding, or 1 
(2) a material relationship with a person who has such an ; 
interest. ! 
(g) None of the following shall by itself cause a director to be ii 
considered not independent for purposes of this section: J 
(1) the nomination, election, or appointment of the direc- j; 
tor byivpersons who are defendants in the derivative pro- j] 
ceeding or against whom action is demanded; j j 
13-9 
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(2) the naming of the director as' a defendant in the deriva-
tive proceeding or as a person against whom action is 
demanded; or 
(3) the approval by the director of the act being challenged 
in the derivative proceeding or demand if the act resulted 
in no personal benefit to the director, 
Source Note: Patterned after Model Business Corporation Act, 
3d Ed, (2002) §7.44. 
CROSS-REFERENCES 
Board of directors; 
committees, see § 8.25. 
meetings, see § 8,20. 
quorum and voting, see § 8.24. 
Demand, see § 13.03. 
"Derivative proceeding" defined, see § 13.01. 
"Material interest" defined, see § 1.40. 
."Material relationship" defined, see § 1.40. 
OFFICIAL C O M M E N T 
When a board of directors properly rejects a demand to bring, i 
an action, judicial decisions indicate that the derivative action.? 
should be dismissed. See Aronson v. Lewis, 743 A.2D 805, 813 i^ 
(Del, 1984). The prior version of the act was silent on the effect $ 
of a determination by a special litigation committee of indepenvj-' 
dent directors that a previously commenced derivative action can.'.?; 
be dismissed. Several state business corporation laws have been;;}-; 
amended to provide for action by such a committee. See, e.g. IND.'V* 
CODE AKN. § 23-1-32-4 (Burns 1984 & Supp. 1988); N.D. CENX,:;S 
CODE § 10-19.149 (1985). This section adopts for nonprofit cor^Jd 
porations those developments in business corporation law. Secj?-^ 
tion 13.05(a) specifically provides that the proceeding shall be|J| 
dismissed if there is a proper determination that the ftiaintenanoe$| 
of the proceeding is not in the best interests of the corporationf|| 
This determination can be made prior to commencement of th&*J 
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suit in response to a d e m a n d or after the commencemen t u p o n 1 
examinat ion of the allegations of the complaint . j; 
The procedures set forth in Section 13,05 are n o t in tended f\ 
to b e exclusive. As no t ed in the c o m m e n t t o Section 13.03, there . 1 
m a y be instances where a decision to commence an action falls j ' 
within the author i ty of an officer of the nonprofi t corporat ion [1 
. depending u p o n the a m o u n t of the claim and the identi ty of the [! 
potent ia l defendants. 
\: L The Persons Making the Determination jj 
;•. Section 13.05(b) prescribes the persons by whom the deter- \\ 
r ruination in subsection (a) may be made. The subsection pro- ! | 
"'•• vides that the determination may be made by a majority vote of ;;! 
L independent directors if there is a quorum of independent direc- !.| 
.;- tors, or by a committee of independent directors appointed by a /. 
-.vote of the independent directors. These provisions parallel the j 
mechanics for determining entitlement to indemnification in [•] 
r Section 8.55. I n this respect this clause is an exception to Sec- \\ 
• tion 8.25 which required the approval of at least a majority of all ;; 
.. the directors in office to create a committee and appoint mem- J, 
.-•bers. This approach has been taken to respond to the criticism 111 
•/'expressed in a few cases that special litigation committees suf- j 
*'
:
 fer from a structural bias because of their appointment by a vote R 
.-.:of non-independent directors, See Hasan v. Cleve Trust Realty \\ 
.;• Investors, 729 F.2D 372, 376-77 (6th Cir. 1984). !' 
The decisions that have examined the qualifications of direc- i 
•.•tors making the determination have required that the directors j 
.'.be both "disinterested" in the sense of not having a personal 
\ interest in the transaction being challenged (as opposed to a ben-
efit which devolves upon the corporation or all shareholders gen- H 
.eraliy) and "independent" in the sense of not being influenced J; 
:,in favor of the defendants by reason of personal or other rela-
tionships. See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 743 A,2D 805, 812-16 (Del, i.: 
:1984). Only the word "independent" has been used in Section [I 
-'.13.05(b) because it is believed that a person who has an interest |! 
••in the transaction would not be independent. The concept of an ;'i 
.independent director is not intended to be limited to nonofficer h! 
[i 
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or "outside" directors but may in appropriate circumstances 
include directors who are also officers. 
Many of the special litigation committees involved in the 
reported cases consisted of directors who were elected after the 
alleged wrongful acts by the directors who were named as defen-
dants in the action. Section 13.05(g)(1) makes it clear that the 
participation of non-independent directors or members in the 
nomination, election, or appointment of a new director will 
not prevent the new director from being considered indepen-
dent. This sentence therefore rejects the concept that the mere 
appointment of new directors by the non-independent directors 
makes the new directors not independent in making the neces-
sary determination because of an inherent structural bias. Clauses 
(2) and (3) also confirm the decisions by a number of courts that 
the mere fact that a director has been named as a defendant or 
approved the action being challenged does not cause the direc-
tor to be considered not independent. See Aronson v. Lewis, 743 
A,2D 805, 816 (Del. 1984); Lewis v. Graves, 701 F.2D 245 (2d Cir. 
1983). It is believed that a court will be able to assess any actual 
bias in deciding whether the director is independent without any 
presumption arising out of the method of the director's appoint-
ment, the mere naming of the director as a defendant, or the 
director's approval of the act where the director received no per-
sonal benefit from the transaction. 
Section 13.05(e) also provides for a determination by a panel 
of one or more independent persons appointed by the court Cf. 
VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-672D (1987) (court may appoint a com-
mittee of two or more persons). The subsection provides for the 
appointment only upon motion by the nonprofit corporation. 
This would not, however, prevent the court on its own initiative 
from appointing a special master pursuant to applicable state 
rules of procedure. 
This procedure may be desirable in a number of circum-
stances. If there are no independent directors available, the non-
profit corporation may not wish to enlarge the board to add 
independent directors or may be unable to find persons willing 
to serve as independent directors. In addition, if there are inde-
pendent directors, they may not have the available time to con-
duct the inquiry in an expeditious manner. 
Appointment by the court should also eliminate any question 
;. about the independence of the person making the determination, 
Although the nonprofit corporation may wish to suggest to the 
• court possible appointees, the court will not be bound by these 
..'..suggestions and, in any case, will want to satisfy itself with respect 
ftp independence at the same time the person is appointed, 
•/' Although subsection (b)(2) requires a committee of at least 
;'.two directors, subsection (e) permits the appointment of only 
;
-pne person in recognition of the potentially increased costs to 
vthe nonprofit corporation for the fees and expenses of an outside 
tlperson. 
-}i. Under Section 8.12, a designated body may perform the 
^-functions of the"boar3~oFSiiectors under this section, 
y2, • Standards to Be Applied 
*??'" Section 13.05(a) requires that the determination be made by 
vtHe appropriate persons in good faith after conducting a reason-
able inquiry upon which their conclusions are based. The word 
^•inquiry" rather than "investigation" has been used to make it 
".clear that the scope of the inquiry will depend upon the issues 
Raised and knowledge of the group making the determination 
Ivwith respect to the issues. In some cases, the issues may be so 
jimple or the knowledge of the group so extensive that little addi-
.itibnal inquiry-is required, In other cases, the group may need to 
•••"engage counsel and other professionals to make an investigation 
Jand assist the group in its evaluation of the issues. 
£•;-• The phrase "in jgood faith" modifies both the determina-
tion and inquiry. The test, which is also included in Section 8.30 
^general standards of conduct for directors) and 8.51 (authority 
|to indemnijEy), is a subjective one, meaning "honestly or in an 
fhonest manner," The American Bar Association, The Corporate 
^Director's Guidebook 33 Bus. LAW. 1595, 1601 (1978). As stated 
viri Abella v. Universal Leaf Tobacco Co.} 546 F. Supp. 795, 800 
J:(E.D. Va. 1982), "the inquiry intended by this phrase goes to the 
.jjjJirit and sincerity with which the investigation was conducted, 
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rather than the reasonableness of its procedures or basis for 
conclusions." 
The phrase "upon which its conclusions are based" requires 
that the inquiry and the conclusions follow logically. This provi-
sion authorizes the court to examine the determination to ensure 
that it has some support in the findings of the inquiry. The bur-
den of convincing the court about this issue lies with whichever 
party has the burden under Section 13.05(d). This phrase does 
not require the persons maJking the determination to prepare a 
report that sets forth their determination and the bases therefore, 
since circumstances will vary as to the need for such a report 
There may, however, be many instances where good corporate 
practice will commend such a procedure. 
Section 13.05 is not intended to modify the general standards 
of conduct for directors set forth in Section 8.30 of the act, but 
rather to make those standards somewhat more explicit in the 
derivative proceeding contest, In this regard, the independent 
directors making the determination would be entitled to rely on 
information and reports from other persons in accordance with 
Section 8.30(b). 
Section 13.05 is similar in several respects and differs in 
certain other respects from the law as it has developed in Dela-
ware and been followed in a number of other states. Under the 
Delaware cases, the role of the court in reviewing the board's 
determination varies depending upon whether the plaintiff is 
in a demand-required or demand-excused situation. Demand is 
excused only if the plaintiff pleads particularized facts that cre-
ate a reasonable doubt that a majority of directors at the time 
demand would be made are independent or disinterested, or that • 
the challenged transaction was the product of a valid exercise of 
business judgment by the approving board. Aronson v. Lewis, 743 
A.2D 805, 814 (Del. 1984); Levine v. Smith, 591 A.2D 194 (Del. j 
1991). If the plaintiff fails to make these two showings, demand -i 
is required. Since the Aronson requirements are difficult to sat- •>• 
isfy, the plaintiff normally must make demand on the board. •$ 
In the unusual case where the plaintiffs demand is excused •*. 
under either of the Aronson tests, the plaintiff has standing to ;j; 
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bring the derivative suit. If the nonprofit corporation seeks to !j 
reassert its right to control the litigation, the corporation will ... 
form a special litigation committee to determine if the litigation : 
is in the best interests of the corporation. If the corporation files j: 
a motion to dismiss the litigation based upon the recommenda- :• 
tion of the special committee, Delaware law requires the corpo- j 
ration to bear the burden of proving the independence of -the I. 
committee, the reasonableness of its investigation, and the rea- i\ 
sonableness of the bases of its decision reflected in the motion. J 
Zapata Corp, v. Maldonado, 430 A.2D 779 (Del. 1981). Zapata j 
also permits the court a discretionaiy second step to review the I] 
special committee's decision by invoking the court's C(indepen- i 
dent business judgment." Id, at 789. i 
In the usual scenario where*demand is not excused, the mem- j 
ber must demand that the board take action and the Zapata prin- j 
ciples do not apply. The board or special committee of indepen- J 
dent directors decides whether the nonprofit corporation should j 
take the action the member requests or respond in some other n 
way. As in the case of all board decisions, the board's response . 
to the member's demand is presumptively protected by the tra- I' 
ditional business judgment rule. Allison v. General Motors Corp., ! 
604 R SUPP. 1106, 1122 (D.Del. 1985). As a result, the member !; 
in filing suit bears the normal burden of creating by particular- H 
ized pleadings a reasonable doubt that the board's response to H 
the demand was wrongful, Levine v. Smith, 591 A.2D 194, 210 II 
(Del. 1991), The plaintiff must allege with particularity a lack of h 
good faith, care, independence, or disinterestedness by the direc- jj 
tors in responding to the demand. j. 
In contrast to Delaware's approach, some jurisdictions have ! 
adopted uniform tests to judge both demand-required and 
demand-excused situations. For example, in New York, judicial [ 
review'is always limited to an analysis of the independence and j-
good faith of the board or committee and the reasonableness of ; 
the bases for the board's decision, and the court does not have j 
ihe discretionaiy authority to use itsindependent business judg- j 
nent. Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y,2D 619, 633-34, 419 N.Y.S. 2D i 
)20, 928-29, 393 N.E.2D 994, 1002-03 (1979). In contrast, the 
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North Carolina Supreme Court has interpreted that state's statu-
tory provisions on derivative actions as requiring the application 
of the Zapata criteria in both demand-required and demand- • • 
excused cases, Alford v. Shaw, 358 S.E.2D 323, 327 (N.C. 1987). 
Since Section 13.03 requires demand in all cases, the dis-
tinction between demand-excused and demand-required cases . 
does not apply. Subsections (c) and (d) of Section 13.05 carry 
forward the distinction, however, by establishing pleading rules , 
and allocating the burden of proof depending on whether there • 
is a majority of independent directions. Subsection (c), like Del- .'[ 
aware law, assigns the plaintiff the threshold burden of alleging ; 
facts establishing that a majority of the board is not independent.' \ 
If there is an independent majority, the burden remains with the. ' 
plaintiff to plead and establish that the requirements of Section ,': 
13,05(a) have not been met. If there is no independent major- ••' 
ity, the burden is on the nonprofit corporation on the issues £ 
delineated in Section 13.05(a). In this case, the corporation must »j 
prove both the independence of the decision makers and the :j 
propriety of the inquiry and determination. 
Subsections (c) and (d) of Section 13.05 thus follow the first-;'". 
Aronson standard in allocating the burden of proof depending o n | 
whether the majority of the board is independent. The commitr ;< 
tee decided, however, not to adopt the second Aronson standard
 :£ 
for excusing demand (and thus shifting the burden to the corpor.V 
ration) based on whether the decision of the board that decided.^ 
the challenged transaction is protected by the business judgment.;!: 
rule. The committee believes that the only appropriate concern-'; 
in the context of derivative litigation is whether the board con?"^ 
sidering the demand has a disabling conflict. See Starrels v. First?.* 
Nat'lBank, 870 F,2D 1168, 1172-76 (7th Cir. 1989) (Easterbrook,£ 
J. concurring). ;;* 
Thus, the burden of proving that the requirements of Section I 
13.05(a) have not been met will remain with the plaintiff in sey-^ ? 
eral situations. First, in subsection (b)(1), the burden of proof wilPj 
generally remain with the plaintiff since the subsection requires^ 
a quorum of independent directors and a quorum is normally^ 
a majority. See Section 8.24. The burden will also remain witft;^  
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•:.• the plaintiff if there is a majority of independent directors that j 
%-.- appoints the committee under subsection (b)(2), Under Section 
$ 13.05(e), the burden of proof also remains with the plaintiff in J 
!& the case of a determination by a panel appointed by the court. j 
wi , The burden of proof will shift to the nonprofit corporation, j 
if.-however, where a majority of directors is not independent, and ! 
%:. the determination is made by the group specified in subsection | 
&;' (b)(2). It can be argued that, if the directors making the deter- ! 
.J.'mination under subsection (b)(2) are independent and have J 
:W.ybeen delegated full responsibility for making the decision, the J 
••^composition of the entire board is irrelevant. This argument j 
Cg.js buttressed by the section's method of appointing the group j 
^..specified in subsection (b)(2) since subsection (b)(2) departs j 
§;'from the general method of appointing committees and allows jj 
f J; only independent directors, rather than a majority of the entire ; 
^Jboard, to appoint the committee which will make the determi- h 
.^nation. Nevertheless, despite the argument that the composition ] 
jyibf the board is irrelevant in these circumstances, the committee I] 
^adopted the provisions of subsections (b)(2) and (d) of Section j ! 
i'; 13.05 to response to concerns of s t ruc tura l bias. jj 
£$ . ' Finally, Section 13.05 does n o t au thor ize the cour t to review jj 
| \ the reasonableness of the de te rmina t ion . As discussed above, N 
&the phrase in Section 13.44(a) " u p o n wh ich its conclusions are | 
leased" limits judicial review to whether the determination has 1 
pspme support in finding of the inquiry. j. 
£;3.' Pleading \ 
|r;/:v; Section 13.05(c) sets forth a modif ied p leading rule to cover I 
jjjhe typical si tuation where a plaintiff makes d e m a n d on the I 
|£>bard, the boa rd rejects tha t demand , and the plaintiff com- [1 
?*nences an action. In that scenario, in order to state a cause of 1 
Action; subsection (c) requires the compla in t to allege facts with ; 
|;p4rticularity demonst ra t ing either (1) tha t n o majori ty of inde- !] 
p e n d e n t directors exists or (2) w h y the de te rmina t ion does n o t ; 
iSn'eet the s tandards in subsection (a). Discovery is available to j 
!t{ie plaintiff only after the plaintiff has successfully stated a cause j 
#f-action by m a k i n g either of these two showings. ! I 
K ^ 13-17 | Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
S 1.23 Interested, 1 Principles of Corp. Governance § 1.23 
l Principles of Corp. Governance § 1.23 
Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations 
As Adopted and Promulgated by The American Law Institute at Washington, D.C., May 13, 1992 
Current through April 2012 
Copyright © 1994-2012 by The American Law Institute 
Part I. Definitions 
§ 1.23 Interested 
Link to Case Citations 
(a) A director [§ 1.13] or officer [§ 1.27] is "interested" in a transaction or conduct if either: 
(1) The director or officer, or an associate [§ 1.03] of the director or officer, is a party to the transaction or 
conduct; 
(2) The director or officer has a business, financial, or familial relationship with a party to the transaction or 
conduct, and that relationship would reasonably be expected to affect the director's or officer's judgment with 
respect to the transaction or conduct in a manner adverse to the corporation; 
(3) The director or officer, an associate of the director or officer, or a person with whom the director or officer has 
a business, financial, or familial relationship, has a material pecuniary interest in the transaction or conduct (other 
than usual and customary directors' fees and benefits) and that interest and (if present) that relationship would 
reasonably be expected to affect the director's or officer's judgment in a manner adverse to the corporation; or 
(4) The director or officer is subject to a controlling influence by a party to the transaction or conduct or a person 
who has a material pecuniary interest in the transaction or conduct, and that controlling influence could 
reasonably be expected to affect the director's or officer's judgment with respect to the transaction or conduct in a 
manner adverse to the corporation. 
(b) A shareholder is interested in a transaction or conduct if either the shareholder or, to the shareholder's 
knowledge, an associate of the shareholder is a party to the transaction or conduct, or the shareholder is also an 
interested director or officer with respect to the same transaction or conduct. 
(c) A director is interested in an action within the meaning of Part VII, Chapter 1 (The Derivative Action), but not 
elsewhere in these Principles, if: 
(1) The director is interested, within the meaning of Subsection (a), in the transaction or conduct that is the subject 
of the action, or 
(2) The director is a defendant in the action, except that the fact a director is named as a defendant does not make 
the director interested under this section if the complaint against the director: 
(A) is based only on the fact that the director approved of or acquiesced in the transaction or conduct that is the 
subject of the action, and 
(B) does not otherwise allege with particularity facts that, if true, raise a significant prospect that the director 
would be adjudged liable to the corporation or its shareholders. 
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2 Principles of Corp. Governance § 7.09 
Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations 
As Adopted and Promulgated by The American Law Institute at Washington, D.C., May 13, 1992 
Current through April 2012 
Copyright © 1994-2012 by The American Law Institute 
Part VH. Remedies 
Chapter 1. The Derivative Action 
§ 7.09 Procedures For Requesting Dismissal Of A Derivative Action 
Link to Case Citations 
(a) The following procedural standards should apply to the review and evaluation of a derivative action by the 
board or committee under § 7.08 (Dismissal of a Derivative Action Against Directors, Senior Executives, Controlling 
Persons, or Associates Based on a Motion Requesting Dismissal by the Board or a Committee) or § 7.11 (Dismissal 
of a Derivative Action Based Upon Action by the Shareholders): 
(1) The board or committee should be composed of two or more persons, no participating member of which was 
interested [§ 1.23] in the action, and should as a group be capable of objective judgment in the circumstances; 
(2) The board or committee should be assisted by counsel of its choice and such other agents as it reasonably considers 
necessary; 
(3) The determinations of the board or committee should be based upon a review and evaluation that was sufficiently 
informed to satisfy the standards applicable under § 7.10(a); and 
(4) If the board or committee determines to request dismissal of the derivative action, it shall prepare and file with the 
court a report or other written submission setting forth its determinations in a manner sufficient to enable the court 
to conduct the review required under § 7.10 (Standard of Judicial Review with Regard to a Board or Committee 
Motion Requesting Dismissal of a Derivative Action Under § 7.08). 
(b) If the court is unwilling to grant a motion to dismiss under § 7.08 or § 7.11 because the procedures followed by 
the board or committee departed materially from the standards specified in § 7.09(a), the court should permit the 
board or committee to supplement its procedures, and make such further reports or other written submissions, as will 
satisfy the standards specified in § 7.09(a), unless the court decides that (i) the board or committee did not act on the 
basis of a good faith belief that its procedures and report were justified in the circumstances; (ii) unreasonable delay 
or prejudice would result; or (iii) there is no reasonable prospect that such further steps would support dismissal 
of the action. 
Comment: 
a. Comparison with existing law. Section 7.09(a) establishes four prerequisites to an objective review and evaluation that the 
court may normally rely upon for purposes of a motion under § 7.08: (1) a disinterested decisionmaker "capable of objective 
judgment in the circumstances"; (2) the assistance of counsel and other agents as may be reasonably necessary to assist the 
board or committee to reach an informed judgment; (3) an evaluative process that meets the standard of review applicable under 
§ 7.10; and (4) the preparation of a report or other written submission setting forth the board's or committee's determinations 
in a manner sufficient to enable meaningful judicial review. These procedural elements have been emphasized by a number of 
cases, and decisions generally concur that a court may examine the procedures followed by a board or committee in reaching 
a decision to seek dismissal of a derivative action. 
Section 7.09(b) recognizes that inadvertent, good faith errors need not be penalized, and therefore permits the board or 
committee to supplement its procedures when it has acted in good faith unless the court determines that one of the conditions 
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in § 7.09(b)(1)—(iii) is present. Relatively few cases have considered this issue of supplementation, but judicial discretion to 
permit defendants to renew a motion to dismiss a derivative action is generally recognized, particularly when the motion had 
earlier been denied for lack of compliance with procedural standards. 
b. Implementation. Section 7.09 can be implemented by judicial decision. 
c. Rationale. This Chapter prescribes a two-step test that must be satisfied before a court dismisses a derivative action under 
§ 7.08 as adverse to the best interests of the corporation in whose name it is brought. First, a procedural test must be passed: 
the tests of Subsection (a)(l)-(4) must be satisfied. The most logical way to accomplish this is for the board or committee to 
provide a description of the procedures followed by the board or committee in order to satisfy § 7.09(a)(l)-(4) in the report or 
other written statement required by § 7.09(a)(4). Second, a substantive standard must be satisfied, with the court determining 
either that the board's or committee's determinations satisfy the standards of review set forth in § 7.10, or, in the case of a 
shareholder-adopted resolution, that the decision did not amount to waste under § 7.11(d). Section 7.09 addresses simply the 
first step; its effect is only to qualify the report or other written submission for judicial consideration, not to set the standard 
under which the report or written submission will be reviewed. 
Section 7.09(a) is not, however, exclusive. Section 7.08(b) provides that a derivative action may be dismissed even though the 
standards of § 7.09 have not been fully satisfied, if the departures are "justified under the circumstances." 
d. Relationship to other corporate organs. Section 7.09 does not require that the review and evaluation that it contemplates be 
conducted wholly subsequent to the plaintiffs demand or the filing of the action. Nor need it be performed exclusively by one 
corporate organ. In particular, a committee delegated the board's authority under § 7.08 need not retrace all the steps already 
taken by the board or another committee at an earlier stage. For example, the board may have responded to the plaintiffs demand 
by engaging counsel and itself undertaking an investigation of some of the charges raised in the demand. When the action is later 
filed, the board may decide to delegate its authority to a committee of directors (possibly because a question has arisen whether 
one or more members of the board was interested in the action). Under these circumstances, there is no need to duplicate the 
work earlier performed, and the committee may retain the counsel who earlier served the board to advise it further. Of course, 
the circumstances would be different if the earlier inquiry and evaluation were conducted or guided by interested directors. 
In general, if the board or committee relies upon earlier performed work or findings, it should satisfy itself as to (i) the sufficiency 
of the inquiry, (ii) the absence of intervening factors or developments, and (iii) the independence of those conducting the initial 
inquiry. If an earlier motion made by the corporation under § 7.04(a)(2) has been denied by the court, special considerations 
apply, because the court may have found that the earlier determination to reject demand either did not comply with the business 
judgment rule or was unreasonable in the circumstances. In such a context, the committee conducting the review and evaluation 
under § 7.09 should take care to make certain that its determinations do not rest on an inadequate or flawed informational base. 
In addition, the court should not delay the action if the end result will only be to place the same flawed determinations before 
it a second time. Still, the burden rests on the plaintiff to show bias or prove some other deficiency in work that the committee 
incorporates in its report or other written submission from prior corporate efforts at the demand stage. In general, apart from 
the special care needed in the case of a § 7.09 inquiry following an earlier failed motion under § 7.04(a)(2), § 7.09 requires 
only a reasonable review of work done at an earlier stage before that work is relied upon for purposes of this section. Thus, 
earlier prepared legal or other expert opinions may be used and need not be duplicated if the board or committee finds that 
they continue to be relevant and reliable. 
Similarly, § 7.09 does not preclude a committee from reporting back to the board with its determinations for approval by the 
board as a whole, minus any members whose status as defendants in the action would impair their objectivity. (Some recent 
statutes have taken a contrary position and barred such an advisory use of the committee. See Reporter's Note 5.) If such an 
advisory procedure is used, however, all members of the board participating in a decision to approve the committee's report 
would have to satisfy the criteria set forth in § 7.09(a)(1). See Greenfield v. Hamilton Oil Corp., 760 P.2d 664 (Colo.App. 1988). 
Also, during the period that any committee is conducting its evaluation, care should be taken to minimize the contacts between 
the committee and the remainder of the board with respect to the committee's deliberations. In at least one instance such an 
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attempt to predispose the committee has led a court to reject a committee's decision. See Swenson v. Thibaut, 39 N.C.App. 
77,250S.E.2d279(1978). 
e. Short-form report. On occasion, derivative actions will be brought that are either plainly frivolous or otherwise clearly 
deficient of legal or factual merit, but which are nevertheless not easily dismissed on a motion for summary judgment. In such 
cases, the board might sometimes face the following dilemma: it may hope that a court would dismiss the action under § 7.08 
based on a relatively short report or other written submission and a limited consideration of the action, but it may also fear 
that if the court were to find some procedural infirmity in this process, it would not later permit a fuller-scale evaluation of the 
action by the same board or committee. Based on such a fear, boards and committees might engage in unnecessary overkill, 
conducting lengthy studies and writing overlong reports, for fear that any procedural blemish on the evaluation process could 
deprive the board or committee of its ability to speak for the corporation. 
Section 7.08(b) attempts to guard against this result by requiring only substantial compliance with the procedures of § 7.09 and 
expressly permitting even material departures if they were justified under the circumstances. Yet, there might still be a residual 
concern about the consequences of a material departure if the departure were later found to be unjustified and the law were that 
it could not be corrected. Section 7.09(b) resolves this problem by providing that any inadequacy in the board's or committee's 
initial evaluation will not bar the board or committee from correcting this deficiency and submitting a fuller study for purposes 
of § 7.08 or § 7.09, unless the board or committee did not act in good faith or the other circumstances specified in the final 
clauses of § 7.09(b) are present. The rationale for this position is that good faith mistakes should not be penalized and that 
expedited procedures should be encouraged where they are appropriate. 
The practical impact of § 7.09(b) is to permit a board or committee to rely on procedures that do not technically comply with 
§ 7.09(a), but that can be "justified under the circumstances" under § 7.08(b). Thus, in a given case, it might seem appropriate 
to rely on an "interested" counsel or to dispense with other experts whose advice might be deemed reasonably necessary. If the 
court determined that these procedures were not justified under the circumstances or that the report or other written submission 
submitted to it contained discrepancies or left important questions unanswered, it could still either withhold its decision on the 
motion to dismiss the action, pending supplementation, or deny the motion, with leave to replead it once a fuller study was 
conducted. 
Section 7.09(b) does not mean, however, to invite deliberate delay or dilatory tactics. Before a board or committee knowingly 
departs from the standards of § 7.09(a), it should determine that expedited procedures are justified or that the departure is 
necessary for other reasons. The reviewing court should also consider both the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff from 
the delay incident to a recommittal to the board or committee and whether a reasonable prospect exists that further steps or 
procedures would support termination. To be sure, it is difficult for a court to predict the likely effect of steps or procedures to 
be taken in the future, but the burden is placed on the plaintiff to show why the court should not permit supplementation. At this 
stage, the court may set time limits and structure further inquiry so that the evaluation process does not drag on unnecessarily. 
When an earlier motion has been unsuccessfully made under § 7.04(a)(2), such time limits may be particularly appropriate in 
order to prevent unnecessary delay. 
Precedent supports the supplementing procedure contemplated by § 7.09(b). In Watts v. Des Moines Register and Tribune, 
525 F.Supp. 1311 (S.D.Iowa 1981), the trial court was satisfied as to independence of the committee and the adequacy of 
the procedures it followed, but still found that certain inconsistencies in the record precluded dismissal of the action. Thus, it 
ordered a "further development of the record with regard to the committee's determinations." Id. This is the position taken by 
§§ 7.08 and 7.09: namely, that the court may allow the corporation an additional period to correct any deficiencies. See also 
Abella v. Universal Leaf Tobacco Co., Inc., 546 F.Supp. 795, 797 (E.D.Va.1982) (court has discretion to allow the corporation 
to renew its motion for dismissal). 
/ Use of "expansion " directors. A few decisions—most notably, Miller v. Register & Tribune Syndicate Inc., 336 N.W.2d 709 
(Iowa 1983)—have held that when all, or nearly all, the directors are named as defendants, the board cannot create a litigation 
committee by expanding its ranks and appointing the newly added directors to the committee. Section 7.09 does not adopt this 
sweeping a rule, which could prevent the corporation from advancing legitimate justifications for dismissal. Nevertheless, the 
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court should consider any relevant evidence relating to the selection of a committee appointed to consider demand or a litigation 
committee, including the participation of the actual or prospective defendants (other than nominal ones) in that process. If this 
participation was unnecessary, because other disinterested directors were available, the fact of such involvement should weigh 
heavily against acceptance of the report. But, when disinterested directors are not available to appoint the committee, then 
necessity justifies the involvement of the interested director, at least when the panel option discussed in § 7.12 is foreclosed or 
its availability is uncertain. This doctrine of necessity is a limited one. If quorum requirements necessitate the vote of interested 
directors, they should limit their participation to voting to ratify the choice of the other directors. In cases where all or a 
substantial majority of the board are interested, the optimal procedure would be an application for the appointment by the court 
of a special panel under § 7.12 (Special Panel or Special Committee Members). 
g. Committee composition. Section 7.09(a) requires that a litigation committee or a committee appointed to consider a demand 
be composed of two or more directors. Although three directors has been the more common practice, decisions have upheld the 
use of a litigation committee of two. See Reporter's Note 2. Use of a single individual is, however, disapproved, partly because 
of the importance of collegial interchange and deliberation. Some cases have also expressed doubt about the ability of a single 
individual to withstand pressure under these circumstances. 
Section 7.09 requires, first, that the committee members not be "interested," as this term is defined in § 1.23, and, second, that 
the committee "as a group be capable of objective judgment in the circumstances." This latter provision has a dual significance: 
First, it requires that the committee be able to understand and evaluate the transaction at issue. The absence of a disabling 
conflict of interest alone is insufficient; some affirmative capacity to judge the issues in dispute is necessary. Second, although 
the definition of "interested" looks only to economic and familial associations, the requirement of a capacity for "objective 
judgment" invites the court to look to other relationships that may also bias the inquiry. For example, a director who was the 
close personal friend and next-door neighbor of the defendant would probably lack this capacity and should not serve on the 
committee. See Reporter's Note 6. 
A difficult issue surrounds the question whether a director who is named as a defendant in the action must always be considered 
"interested" and hence disqualified from serving. Cases have recognized that mere acquiescence in, or approval of, the 
challenged transaction should not alone disqualify a board member. See Lewis v. Graves, 701 F.2d 245 (2d Cir.1983). Thus, § 
1.23(c) adopts a special definition of "interested" for purposes of this Chapter in order to allow directors who are only in effect 
nominal defendants to serve on a committee or to participate in the frill board's deliberations for purposes of approving board 
or committee action with respect to a derivative action. Although it is recognized that any director who has been sued will have 
a natural desire to secure the early termination of even a meritorious case, a broader rule that automatically disqualified such 
a director whenever the director was named as a defendant would create an incentive for the plaintiff to sue all the incumbent 
directors in order to disqualify them. Under § 1.23(c), a director is not "interested" if liability is asserted against the director 
"based only on the fact that the director approved of or acquiesced in the transaction or conduct that is the subject of the 
action" and the complaint "does not otherwise allege with particularity facts that, if true, raise a significant prospect that the 
director would be adjudged liable to the corporation or its shareholders." In effect, § 1.23(c) supplies a definition of the nominal 
defendant who should not be disqualified from serving on a committee based simply on plaintiffs creative manipulation of 
the pleadings. Operationally, the trial court could determine that there was no significant prospect of liability against such a 
defendant in much the same way as it would pass on a motion for summary judgment. If certainty is desired, the corporation 
could bring an early motion for a declaratory judgment that a specific director was not "interested" and thus could serve on a 
committee or participate on the board for purposes of § 7.09. 
h. Counsel. The role of counsel is especially sensitive in internal corporate evaluations of the type dealt with in § 7.09. 
Accordingly, § 7.09(a)(2) specifies that the board or committee should select a counsel of its choice to coordinate and advise 
such an inquiry. Case law has also placed considerable weight on the objectivity and ability of the special counsel retained 
by the committee. At least one decision has rejected the report of a special litigation committee in part because the committee 
failed to engage such a special counsel. See Grynberg v. Farmer, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) K 97,683, at p. 98,584 (D.Colo. 1980). 
See also cases cited at Reporter's Notes 3 and 4. 
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Section 7.09(a)(2) does not require that the counsel who assists the board or committee be "independent" of the corporation 
and thus it does not preclude house counsel from serving the board or committee in some circumstances. However, it assumes 
that such counsel must be capable of exercising independent professional judgment under the circumstances. Thus, whether the 
corporation's house counsel could advise the board or committee with respect to the conduct of corporate officers depends in the 
first instance on whether the counsel was in a subordinate or reporting position to those officers. If a counsel is in such a position, 
then the logic of § 1.23(a)(4), which deems "interested" a person subject to a "controlling influence," strongly suggests that 
an in-house counsel would not be in a position to exercise independent professional judgment with respect to the liability of a 
direct superior. Similarly, the corporation's principal outside corporate or securities counsel may also be disabled on these facts. 
Conversely, if the action were against an outside director or a corporate official below the general counsel's rank or position 
in the corporation, the general counsel or the corporation's regular outside counsel could serve the board or committee. In all 
cases, however, the committee or board should be free to make its own choice of counsel and should not allow this selection 
to be imposed upon it by others. 
/. Adequate evaluation. Section 7.09 does not specify the precise procedures the committee should follow in reaching an 
"evaluation that was sufficiently informed to satisfy the standards applicable under § 7.10(a)." In some cases, a relatively 
abbreviated process will demonstrate that the allegations are plainly frivolous and without support. In other cases, the committee 
will need to conduct detailed interviews with relevant witnesses and should preserve a record of such oral evidence. Affidavits 
or sworn depositions may also be desirable in many instances, particularly when dealing with corporate employees or agents 
who can be required to cooperate. Although reliance on the unsworn testimony of persons interested in a lawsuit seems generally 
ill-advised, sworn testimony is not a necessary element of § 7.09's procedures because it would be impractical in some cases 
and might chill the willingness to be interviewed of third parties not subject to the corporation's authority. However, the court 
should consider the justifications for dispensing with such testimony. In general, the nature of the inquiry that is required under 
§ 7.09(a)(1) depends on all of the circumstances, including such factors as the gravity and plausibility of the complaint, the 
detail with which the claims are alleged, and the underlying nature of the claim. Where the gravamen of a complaint concerns 
a claim that would be reviewed under the business judgment rule in the absence of a board or committee recommendation, the 
inquiry by the board or committee should be that which would be necessary to satisfy the informational component of that rule, 
and the board or committee should inform itself in a manner sufficient to satisfy that rule. See § 4.01(c)(2). If the gravamen 
of a complaint concerns a claim that would be reviewed under a more exacting standard than the business judgment rule in 
the absence of a board or committee recommendation, the inquiry may have to be more substantial to satisfy the standards 
of § 7.10(a). 
In all cases in which the board delegates authority to a committee, the committee should have unrestricted access to all corporate 
records, memoranda, files, correspondence, and witnesses that it deems relevant for purposes of its inquiry. No other person 
should define the limits of relevancy for the committee or its counsel. The cooperation of corporate officials in making available 
employees (who may often be located at remote or even foreign sites) is also essential to an adequate investigation on which 
a court may reasonably rely. 
Although termination of a derivative action may ultimately be justified even when the action is factually and legally well-
founded, the committee should evaluate the factual and legal basis of the action before determining that dismissal is justified, 
even when the basis for dismissal rests on extrinsic business justifications. However, when a request for injunctive relief 
constrains the time available for inquiry and the status quo cannot be otherwise preserved, this evaluative process might properly 
be an abbreviated one. 
The board's or committee's review and evaluation necessarily have a broader scope than those which the court must undertake 
in evaluating its report or other written submission. Under § 7.10, the court need not resolve all contested factual issues. The 
board or committee must, however, satisfy itself as to the action's factual and legal merit and not simply compute the cost and 
delay to which the action will subject the corporation. Although not all factual issues can be resolved, a reasonable effort to 
establish the relevant facts is required. 
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That degree of confidentiality should surround the board's or committee's proceedings as is necessary to assure the integrity of 
its evaluative process. Section 7.09 does not attempt to formulate precise rules in this regard, and certainly does not bar reports 
to the board by the committee or confrontation of the principal defendants with the charges raised against them. Still, in general, 
disclosure of confidential information, particularly that derived from witnesses appearing before the board or committee, should 
be restricted on a "need to know" basis. 
REPORTERS NOTE 
1. Most of the decisions that have rejected a litigation committee's motion to dismiss have identified inadequacies in the 
procedures followed or in the independence of the participating directors. See Swenson v. Thibaut, 39 N.C.App. 77, 250 
S.E.2d 279 (1978); Hasan v. CleveTrust Realty Investors, 729 F.2d 372 (6th Cir.1984); Miller v. Register & Tribune 
Syndicate, Inc., 336 N.W.2d 709 (Iowa 1983); Holmstrom v. Coastal Ind., Inc., 645 F.Supp. 963 (N.D.Ohio 1984). Two 
other cases have declined to accept a committee's recommendation for dismissal pending a fuller explanation of its reasons 
for seeking termination: Maldonado v. Flynn, 671 F.2d 729 (2d Cir.1982), and Watts v. Des Moines Register & Tribune, 
525 F.Supp. 1311 (S.D.Iowa 1981). In Swenson, it was deemed significant that the board had not delegated its full authority 
to the committee, but had only made an advisor/ referral. In Holmstrom, the court found the report inadequate because it 
was "devoid of factual findings to support the conclusions reached." It added: 
The summary treatment of the issue of self-dealing and the use of the power as directors to perpetuate their self-control 
negate the possibility of judicial approval of the work of the [committee]. 
645 F.Supp. at 972. In Hasan, a single director served as the litigation committee, and the Circuit Court found his prior 
relationship to the defendant to have been sufficiently close to bar reliance on his findings, even though it is not clear whether 
he would have been "interested" within the meaning of § 1.23(c). 
2. Although three-member committees have been more common, a number of decisions and a Minnesota statute have 
expressly approved two-member committees. See Minn. Bus. Corp. Act § 302 (1981) (two or more members); Zapata 
Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del.1981); Mills v. Esmark, Inc., 573 F.Supp. 169 (N.D.I11.1983); Abella v. Universal 
Leaf Tobacco Co., 546 F.Supp. 795 (E.D.Va.1982). In Hasan v. CleveTrust Realty Investors, 729 F.2d 372, 378-80 (6th 
Cir. 1984), the lower court had approved a one-member committee when the other eight members of the board had been 
named as defendants. However, this result was reversed on appeal because the committee member had been a minority 
investor in a real estate venture with one of the principal defendants (one being a 10% partner; the other, a 2% partner) and 
had had other business dealings in past years with him. See also Lewis v. Fuqua, 502 A.2d 962, 967 (Del.Ch.1985). ("If a 
single member committee is to be used, the member should, like Caesar's wife, be above reproach."); Houie v. Low, 407 
Mass. 810, 556 N.E.2d 51, 59 (1990) ("number of committee members should be a factor in determining the committee's 
ability to act independently"). Under the Indiana statute, the committee must have at least three members. See Ind. Code 
Ann. § 23-2-32-4. 
3. Recent decisions have also required that a litigation committee "conduct a thorough and careful analysis regarding the 
plaintiffs derivative suit." Houle v. Low, 407 Mass. 810, 556 N.E.2d 51, 58 (1990); David- owitz v. Edelman, 153 Misc.2d 
853, 583 N.Y.S.2d 340 (N.Y.Sup.1992) (committee's investigation rejected when it "did not fulfill the requirements of 
a thorough and reasonable inquiry"). Even though the court's own substantive power of review was limited under New 
York law, the Davidowitz court emphasized that it remained the committee's obligation to satisfy "the careful, diligent and 
meticulous standard required of a committee scmtinizing a possible breach of fiduciary duty." When this standard was not 
complied with, such a failure "vitiates the usefulness of the committee's findings as a defense to the action." Id. at 344. 
4. Judicial review of the procedures by which a board committee conducts its evaluation of the plaintiffs allegations 
has focused in particular on the interaction between the board and its special counsel. Some decisions have criticized 
excessive reliance on such counsel. See Rosengarten v. International Telephone & Telegraph Corp., 466 F.Supp. 817, 824-
25 (S.D.N.Y.1979). In rejecting the committee's determinations in Davidowitz v. Edelman, supra, the New York Supreme 
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Court emphasized that the corporation's general counsel had selected the attorney for the committee and that "the committee 
did not join in their counsel's investigation or review, save in the most perfunctory manner..." Id. at 344. See also Peller v. 
Southern Co., 911 F.2d 1532, 1538 (11th Cir.1990) (rejecting committee's report when committee relied almost exclusively 
on its special counsel to conduct the substance of the investigation). Decisions have also placed substantial weight on the 
independence and legal ability of the special counsel retained by the committee. For example, in In re Par Pharmaceutical, 
Inc. Derivative Litigation, 750 F.Supp. 641 (S.D.N. Y. 1990), the failure to appoint such a counsel was one of the salient facts 
relied upon by the court in failing to dismiss the action. See also Lasker v. Burks, 426 F.Supp. 844, 850 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); 
Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 635, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 929, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1003 (1979); Grynberg v. Farmer, 
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 197,683, at 98,586 (D.Colo.1980) (decision rejected when committee failed to retain independent 
counsel). One statute has adopted a more severe test of independence for a counsel in another context. See Ohio Rev. Code 
Ann. § 1701.13(E)(4)(C) (1979) (disqualifying any attorney who previously served the corporation over the prior five years 
from delivering an opinion on which indemnification can be awarded). 
5. Courts have also placed considerable weight on the extent of the power delegated to the full board by the committee. Where 
the committee has only advisory authority, rather than being vested with the board's full plenary authority, its independence 
has been found inadequate by some courts. See Swenson v. Thibaut, 39 N.C.App. 77, 250 S.E.2d 279, 297-98 (1978); 
Greenfield v. Hamilton Oil Corp., 760 P.2d 664 (Colo.App.1988). Midstream changes in the committee's composition or 
authority, or the scope of the investigation it was charged to make, have also produced judicial rejection of the committee's 
determinations. See Reilly Mortg. Group v. Mount Vernon Savings & Loan Ass'n, 568 F.Supp. 1067, 1072 (E.D.Va.1983). 
Recent statutory provisions authorizing the use of litigation committees have placed limitations on their composition and 
performance that do not apply to other board committees. For example, under the Minnesota statute, a committee member 
may not own more than one percent of the corporation's stock, may not be a present or former officer, employee, or agent 
of the corporation or any related corporation, and may not be a party to the action or a person who has been threatened 
with being named as such a party. See Minn. Stat. § 302A.243. Once a committee is appointed, it may not be suspended, 
terminated, or instructed by the board as to its findings; its determination binds the corporation and its directors, officers, 
and shareholders. In short, the committee cannot be confined to an advisory role. 
Under the Virginia statute, the committee directly reports its findings to the court. See Va. Code § 13.1-673(D). This 
seemingly bars the use of such a litigation committee as an advisory body to the board, and implies that no other procedure 
is acceptable. 
6. Section 7.09's requirement that committee members "should as a group be capable of objective judgment in the 
circumstances" is supported by Lewis v. Fuqua, 502 A.2d 962 (Del.Ch.1985). There, the principal defendant had been a 
major donor to a university whose president was selected as the one-person litigation committee that reviewed the pending 
action. Although no continuing economic relationship between the two individuals or specific bias was shown, the Delaware 
Chancery Court found that there had been a long association between the two individuals. It therefore declined to find that 
the litigation committee was independent, and, in so doing, specified a high standard for independence: 
The only instance in American Jurisprudence where a defendant can free itself from a suit by merely appointing a committee 
to review the allegations of the complaint is in the context of a stockholder derivative suit. A defendant who desires to 
avail itself of this unique power to self-destruct a suit brought against it ought to make certain that its Special Litigation 
Committee is truly independent. 
Similarly, in Davidowitz v. Edelman, 153 Misc.2d 853, 583 N.Y.S.2d 340 (N.Y.Sup.1992), the court found that the chairman 
of the "special litigation committee was the president of a college to whom the principal defendant (the corporation's CEO) had 
recently donated $1.5 million; in addition, the committee chairman had participated with the CEO's investment group in prior 
takeovers and takeover attempts engineered by the CEO. Another committee member was the CEO's personal tax attorney. On 
this basis, the court concluded: 
The close business and personal relations demonstrated among the committee members, the board and [the CEO] preclude 
this court from finding that the committee possessed the required disinterested independence...." 
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Id. at 343. 
7. New York decisions have generally required that committee members not stand "in a dual relation which prevents an 
unprejudicial exercise of judgment." Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 631, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 927, 393 N.E.2d 994, 
1001 (1979); Parkoff v. General Telephone & Electronics Corp., 53 N.Y.2d 412, 417, 442 N.Y.S.2d 432, 425 N.E.2d 820 
(1981). While Davidowitz suggests that reciprocal directorships may offend this standard, other decisions have been less 
restrictive. In Rosengarten v. Buckley, 613 F.Supp. 1493 (D.Md.1985), the court accepted a committee's recommendation to 
dismiss when one committee member was the chief executive officer of another corporation of which a principal defendant 
was also a director. The court rejected the theory that this relationship of reciprocal board membership gave the defendant 
control over the committee member's salary. In Genzer v. Cunningham, 498 F.Supp. 682 (E.D.Mich. 1980), a paid consultant 
to the corporation was found to be independent for purposes of litigation committee membership, and in In re General Tire 
& Rubber Co. Sec. Litigation, 726 F.2d 1075,1084 (6th Cir.1984), the committee was found to be independent even though 
one member was a partner in a law firm retained by the corporation who had performed prior investigative services for the 
corporation. Although the decision in Rosengarten seems correct on its facts, both Genzer and General Tire involve more 
questionably entangling prior relationships. It would be a close question of fact in such cases whether these individuals 
qualified under § 7.09(a)(l)'s test of "capable of objective judgment in the circumstances." For decisions holding that purely 
nominal defendants may serve on a litigation committee, see Mills v. Esmark, Inc., 544 F.Supp. 1275, 1283 (N.D.I11.1982); 
Klotz v. Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, Inc., 386 F.Supp. 577, 580-82 (S.D.N. Y. 1974); In re General Tire & Rubber 
Co. Securities Litigation, 726 F.2d 1075 (6th Cir.1984). But see Galef v. Alexander, 615 F.2d 51,61 (2d Cir.1980) ("[WJhere 
the directors, themselves, are subject to personal liability in the action, [they] cannot be expected to determine impartially 
whether it is warranted." (quoting Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724, 727 (8th Cir.1979), cert, denied, 444 U.S. 
1017, 100 S.Ct. 670, 62 L.Ed.2d 647 (1980)) (emphasis only in Galef)). 
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Supreme Court of Wisconsin. 
Stephen EINHORN, Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
v. 
James D. CULEA, Northern Labs, Inc. and Northern 
Labs Manufacturing, Inc., Defendants-Respondents. 
No. 97-3592. I Argued Jan. 5, 
2000. I Decided June 22, 2000. 
Minority shareholder brought direct action against majority 
shareholder who received retroactive bonus, alleging breach 
of fiduciary duty. After requiring minority shareholder to 
bring derivative action and special litigation committee 
determined derivative action was not in corporation's best 
interest, the Circuit Court, Ozaukee County, Joseph D. 
McCormack, J., dismissed action based on committee's 
recommendation, and minority shareholder appealed. The 
Court of Appeals affirmed, 591 N.W.2d 908, and review was 
granted. The Supreme Court, Shirley S. Abrahamson, Chief 
Justice, held that: (1) addressing an issue of first impression, 
objective test, considering totality of the circumstances, 
applied in determining whether committee members were 
independent, and (2) evidence raised significant questions 
concerning whether committee members were independent, 
requiring remand for sufficient findings of fact and 
application of proper legal standard. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Attorneys and Law Firms 
**80 *648 For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioner, there 
were briefs by Robert H. Friebert, Matthew W. O'Neill and 
Friebert, Finerty & St. John, S.C., Milwaukee, and oral 
argument by Matthew W. O'Neill. 
For the defendants-respondents, there was a brief by Dean P. 
Laing and O'Neil, Cannon & Hollman, S.C., Milwaukee, and 
oral argument by Dean P. Laing. 
Opinion 
K 1 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, Chief Justice. 
This is a review of a published decision of the court of 
appeals affirming a judgment and order of the circuit 
court for Ozaukee County, Joseph D. McCormack, Circuit 
Judge. The circuit court dismissed the derivative shareholder 
action of Stephen Einhorn, a minority shareholder and 
member of the board of directors of Northern Labs. The 
circuit court concluded that the threshold for determining 
whether a member of the special litigation committee is 
independent within the meaning of Wis. Stat. § 180.0744 
(1997-98) is "extremely low" and found that the special 
litigation committee was independent. Accordingly, the 
circuit court dismissed Einhorn's derivative action pursuant 
to §180.0744(1).3 
**81 *649 f 2 The court of appeals affirmed the judgment 
of the circuit court, concluding that the circuit court's 
assessment of whether each member of the special litigation 
committee was independent was based on facts supported by 
the record and was not clearly erroneous. 
U 3 The issue raised in the present case is the proper 
interpretation and application of the standard set forth in 
Wis. Stat. § 180.0744 of whether a member of a special 
litigation committee is independent. The issue is not whether 
the derivative action will succeed, but whether the derivative 
action should be dismissed on the basis of the decision of the 
special litigation committee. For the reasons set forth, we 
conclude that the circuit court and the court of appeals erred 
in declaring that the threshold established by the legislature 
in § 180.0744 in determining whether a member of a special 
litigation committee is independent is "extremely low." We 
further conclude that in deciding whether members of the 
special litigation committee are independent, the circuit court 
should determine whether, considering the totality of the 
circumstances, a reasonable person in the position of the 
member of the special litigation committee can base his or her 
decision on the merits of the issue rather than on extraneous 
considerations or influences. In other words, the *650 test 
is whether a member of the committee has a relationship 
with an individual defendant or the corporation that would 
reasonably be expected to affect the member's judgment with 
respect to the litigation at issue. Because the circuit court did 
not make sufficient findings of fact and did not apply the 
correct legal standard to determine whether the members of 
the special litigation committee were independent, we reverse 
the decision of the court of appeals and remand the cause to 
the circuit court for further proceedings not inconsistent with 
this decision. 
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I 
If 4 We set forth the background of the dispute here. 
Additional facts relevant to the issue of whether the members 
of the special litigation committee were independent are set 
forth later in the opinion. 
1f 5 In December 1985, James D. Culea (the defendant), 
Stephen Einhorn (the plaintiff), and Einhorn's business 
partner, Orville Mertz, acquired Northern Labs. The Northern 
Labs stock was distributed as follows: Culea 56.09%, Einhorn 
20.60% and Mertz 20.06%. The remaining stock was 
owned by other managers and directors. Culea has served 
as president, manager, director and majority shareholder of 
Northern Labs since 1986. Einhorn has been a director and 
minority shareholder. 
If 6 At the time of its acquisition in 1985, Northern Labs 
had annual sales of $16 million and generated little profit. 
During the period between 1986 and 1992, Northern Labs' 
sales and profits increased. In the 1993 *651 fiscal year, 
Northern Labs generated $33 million in sales and $1.9 million 
in profits. 
1f 7 In 1992, Culea sought a retroactive performance bonus, 
asserting that he had been undercompensated in the years 
following **82 the acquisition. In May 1992, he sent a 
notice to the directors scheduling a compensation committee 
meeting and a board of directors meeting for July 29, 1992. 
At that time the board of directors consisted of Culea, his 
wife Shelly Culea, Einhorn, Mertz, and the company's vice 
president of finance, Robert Bonk. Culea, Mertz and Bonk 
comprised the compensation committee. 
1f 8 On July 29, 1992, the compensation committee 
unanimously approved a retroactive bonus to Culea of 
approximately $300,000, a portion of which was to be paid 
with Northern Labs stock. A board of directors meeting was 
held immediately after the compensation committee meeting. 
The four directors in attendance - Culea, Mertz, Bonk and 
Shelly Culea - voted unanimously to ratify the compensation 
committee's decisions. Einhorn did not attend the July 29, 
1992, board of directors meeting. Following Culea's stock 
compensation, the stock was allocated as follows: Culea 76%, 
Einhorn 22%, and Bonk 2%.6 
f 9 On December 9, 1993, Einhorn filed a direct action 
against Culea, alleging that Culea had willfully breached his 
fiduciary duty to Einhorn by participating in and causing the 
corporation to award a self-dealing retroactive bonus to Culea 
of $300,000 and to issue stock for no consideration or at a 
grossly inadequate price. Einhorn alleged that he had been 
"damaged by the dilution of his percentage of ownership in 
the companies and by a reduction in the value of his interest in 
*652 the companies...." Einhorn sought a judgment ordering 
Culea to surrender stock to Northern Labs and to reimburse 
Northern Labs for all cash payments received by him for the 
retroactive bonus. 
1 10 On May 3, 1994, Culea filed a motion for 
summary judgment arguing, among other things, that Einhorn 
improperly filed his suit as a direct action instead of a 
derivative action. The circuit court agreed with Culea and 
gave Einhorn 30 days to amend his complaint. 
1f 11 Einhorn amended his complaint in November 1994 to 
state a derivative action with allegations similar to those in 
his original complaint. The members of the board of directors 
in November 1994 were, pursuant to a stock agreement, 
appointees of Culea and Einhorn. In addition to himself and 
his wife, Culea appointed his neighbor Dwight Chewning, 
Northern Labs CFO Robert Bonk, and Lolita Chua, a friend 
of Shelly Culea. Einhorn appointed himself and his business 
partner, John Beagle. 
Tf 12 Following Einhorn's amended complaint, on December 
9, 1994, Culea issued a notice of a special meeting of the 
board of directors for December 16, 1994. Culea's notice 
indicated that Chewning and Chua were new members of 
the board and that the board would be voting on whether 
the maintenance of Einhorn's derivative action was in the 
best interests of the corporation. Einhorn requested to bring 
an attorney to the meeting but his request was denied by 
the corporate counsel for Northern Labs. Corporate counsel's 
firm represented Culea in the action filed by Einhorn. 
1) 13 The board of directors met as scheduled on December 
16, 1994. Northern Labs' corporate counsel advised that 
because Einhom, Culea and Shelly Culea *653 had an 
interest in the dispute, they should not participate in any 
vote, whether as directors or as potential members of any 
special litigation committee. The board then created a special 
litigation committee composed of Chewning, Bonk, Chua and 
Beagle. 7 
**83 If 14 After five months of meetings and approximately 
500 hours of inquiry, the special litigation committee voted 
three to one that continuation of Einhorn's derivative action 
was not in the best interests of the corporation. Based on this 
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vote and pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 180.0744(1), Culea moved 
the circuit court to dismiss Einhom's derivative action. 
If 15 In a decision and order dated October 30,1995, the circuit 
court denied Culea's motion to dismiss the action, stating that 
it was not prepared to find that the special litigation committee 
met the criteria of being independent set forth in Wis. Stat. 
§ 180.0744. After a seven-day trial to the circuit court on 
the issue of whether the members of the special litigation 
committee were independent under § 180.0744, the circuit 
court concluded that the threshold established by the *654 
legislature in determining whether members of the special 
litigation committee were independent is "extremely low." 
The circuit court found that the members of the committee 
were independent within the meaning of § 180.0744, that they 
acted in good faith and that they made their determination 
from conclusions based upon a reasonable inquiry. The 
circuit court dismissed the derivative action. The court of 
appeals affirmed the judgment of the circuit court. 
II 
[1] f 16 The present case is a derivative action. A derivative 
action differs from ordinary commercial litigation and from 
a representative action such as a class action. In a derivative 
action, the claims belong to the corporation, not to the 
complaining shareholder. The complaining shareholder is 
challenging, on behalf of the corporation that has been 
unwilling to bring the suit, specific corporate conduct. 10 
[2] *655 H 17 A derivative action reflects competing 
interests: On the one hand, the action allows shareholders to 
assert the corporation's rights when corporate management 
refuses to do so. On the other hand, the board of 
directors or majority shareholders of a corporation, not 
the courts or minority shareholders, should resolve internal 
conflicts. A derivative action raises the specter of undue 
judicial interference with the business judgment of corporate 
management. In other words, a derivative action is a means 
to curb managerial misconduct, yet it also undermines the 
basic principle of corporate governance that the decisions 
of a corporation, including the decision to initiate litigation, 
should be made by the board of directors. 
If 18 Courts and legislatures have allowed corporations to 
use special litigation committees to dismiss derivative actions 
in an attempt to balance the competing interests at issue: 
the shareholders' need to protect the corporation and the 
corporation's need to prevent meritless or harmful **84 
litigation. If the special litigation committee is independent 
from the alleged wrongdoers, acts in good faith and conducts 
a reasonable inquiry upon which its conclusion is based, the 
committee's recommendation not to proceed with a derivative 
action is viewed as a proper exercise of the directors' business 
judgment and the court will dismiss the action. 12 
[3] [4] *656 Tf 19 The concept of the special litigation 
oversight committee flows from the business judgment rule, 
a judicially created doctrine that limits judicial review of 
corporate decision-making when corporate directors make 
business decisions on an informed basis, in good faith and 
in the honest belief that the action taken is in the best 
13 interests of the company. The business judgment rule 
shields, to a large extent, the substantive bases for a corporate 
decision from judicial inquiry. The business judgment rule 
also ensures that management remains in the hands of the 
board of directors and protects courts from becoming too 
deeply implicated in internal corporate matters. 14 
If 20 Under Wis. Stat. § 180.0744, the corporation may 
create a special litigation committee *657 consisting of 
two or more independent directors appointed by a majority 
vote of independent directors present at a meeting of 
the board of directors. The independent special litigation 
committee determines whether the derivative action is in the 
best interests of the corporation. If the independent special 
litigation committee acts in good faith, conducts a reasonable 
inquiry upon which it bases its conclusions and concludes 
that the maintenance of the derivative action is not in the best 
interests of the corporation, the circuit court shall dismiss the 
derivative action. The statute thus requires the circuit court to 
defer to the business judgment of a properly composed and 
properly operating special litigation committee. 
1f 21 The provisions of the Wisconsin statute relevant to the 
present case read as follows: 
180.0744. Dismissal 
(1) The court shall dismiss a derivative proceeding on 
motion by the corporation if the court finds, subject to the 
burden of proof assigned under sub. (5) or (6), that one 
of the groups specified in sub. (2) or (6) has determined, 
acting in good faith after conducting a reasonable inquiry 
upon which its conclusions are based, that maintenance of 
the derivative proceeding is not in the best interests of the 
corporation. 
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(2) Unless a panel is appointed under sub. (6), the 
determination in sub. (1) shall be made by any of the 
following: 
**85 ... 
*658 b) A majority vote of a committee consisting of 2 or 
more independent directors appointed by majority vote of 
independent directors present at a meeting of the board of 
directors, whether or not the voting, independent directors 
constitute a quorum. 
U 22 The most common challenge to the decision of a special 
litigation committee, and the one made in the present case, is 
that the members are not independent. Given the finality of 
the ultimate decision of the committee to dismiss the action, 
judicial oversight is necessary to ensure that the special 
litigation committee is independent so that it acts in the 
corporation's best interest. At issue is whether the special 
litigation committee created in the present case under Wis. 
Stat. § 180.0744 was composed of independent directors as 
required by statute. 
[5] K 23 Although the plain language of Wis. Stat. § 
180.0744 requires the directors who are members of the 
special litigation committee to be independent, the statute 
1 n 
does not define the word "independent." Rather, § 
180.0744(3) merely instructs that whether a director on the 
committee is independent should not be determined solely on 
the basis of any of the following three factors set forth in the 
statute: (1) whether the director is nominated to the special 
litigation committee or elected by persons who are defendants 
in the derivative action, (2) whether the director is a defendant 
in the action, or (3) whether the act being challenged in the 
derivative action was approved by *659 the director if the 
act resulted in no personal benefit to the director. 
\ 24 Wisconsin Stat. § 180.0744(3) provides as follows: 
(3) Whether a director is independent for purposes of this 
section may not be determined solely on the basis of any 
one or more of the following factors: 
(a) The nomination or election of the director by persons 
who are defendants in the derivative proceeding or against 
whom action is demanded. 
(b) The naming of the director as a defendant in the 
derivative proceeding or as a person against whom action 
is demanded. 
(c) The approval by the director of the act being challenged 
in the derivative proceeding or demand if the act resulted 
in no personal benefit to the director. 
\ 25 To determine the meaning of the word "independent" in 
Wis. Stat. § 180.0744, we examine the language of the statute, 
and its history, context, subject matter and purpose. See UFE, 
Inc. v. LIRC, 201 Wis.2d 274, 282, 548 N.W.2d 57 (1996). 
t 26 The factors identified in Wis. Stat. § 180.0744(3) 
that cannot be solely determinative of whether a director is 
independent would appear at first blush to render a director 
not independent. For example, by instructing a court that 
whether a director is independent may not be determined 
solely on the basis that the director is a named defendant in 
the derivative action, Wis. Stat. § 180.0744(3)(b) appears to 
direct a court to adopt a relaxed, lenient standard for the word 
"independent." Relying on this subsection and reviewing 
the legislative history, the circuit court concluded that "the 
threshold established by the legislature is *660 extremely 
low. This conclusion is inescapable under a statute where 
a director who is a defendant in a derivative suit cannot 
be excluded from an independent committee by that fact 
alone „18 
**86 H 27 A more nuanced examination of the statute shows, 
however, that the circuit court's reliance on Wis. Stat. § 
180.0744(3) for an "extremely low threshold" standard is 
incorrect. The legislature understood the significance of the 
factors it listed. It allows the circuit court to give weight to 
these factors; the statute simply states that the presence of one 
or more of these factors is not solely determinative of the issue 
of whether a director is independent. 
f 28 The legislature recognized, for example, that a 
shareholder could prevent the entire board of directors from 
serving on the special litigation committee merely by naming 
all the directors as defendants in the derivative action. Section 
180.0744(3)(b) instructs *661 a court to examine whether a 
director who is a member of the special litigation committee is 
a nominal defendant or a defendant with a personal interest in 
the dispute. The statute thus instructs the court that this factor 
is not solely determinative. 
[6] \ 29 The Official Comment to § 7.44 of the Model 
Business Corporation Act upon which Wis. Stat. § 180.0744 
is based19 explains that "the mere fact that a director has 
been named as a defendant... does not cause the director to 
be considered not independent.... It is believed that a court 
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will be able to assess any actual bias in deciding whether the 
director is independent without any presumption arising out 
of... the mere naming of the director as a defendant. „20 
K 30 We conclude that the circuit court's interpretation 
that the statute sets forth an "extremely low" threshold 
for determining whether a director is independent does not 
comport with the statute. The legislature directs in Wis. Stat. 
§ 180.0744(3) that a court is not to adopt a. per se exclusion 
of directors from the special litigation committee when 
these directors have certain relations with the corporation. 
Instead *662 the legislature directs a court to examine the 
characteristics of each member's relationship to a defendant 
director and the corporation carefully to determine whether 
the member is independent. 
[7] Tf 31 The statute requires judicial adherence to the 
decision of a special litigation committee that is independent 
and is operating in accordance with the statute. Judicial 
review to determine whether the members of the committee 
are independent and whether the committee's procedure 
complies with the statute is of utmost **87 importance, 
because the court is bound by the substantive decision of a 
properly constituted and acting committee. The power of a 
corporate defendant to obtain a dismissal of an action by the 
ruling of a committee of independent directors selected by 
the board of directors is unique in the law. The threshold 
established by the legislature in Wis. Stat. § 180.0744 to 
determine whether members of a committee are independent 
is decidedly not "extremely low," as the circuit court stated. 
We conclude the legislature intended a circuit court to 
examine carefully whether members of a special litigation 
committee are independent. 
H 32 The legislative history of Wis. Stat. § 180.0744 supports 
our interpretation of the word "independent" and the role of 
the circuit court. 22 
1 33 Wisconsin Stat. § 180.0744 is based on § 7.44 of 
23 
the Model Business Corporation Act, which *663 was 
adopted in 1989. The Wisconsin version of the Model 
Business Corporation Act, Wis. Stat. § 180.0744, was created 
by 1991 Act 16, § 27, effective May 13, 1991. Thus our 
inquiry into the meaning of the word "independent" under 
the Wisconsin statute considers the history of the enactment 
of both the Wisconsin statute and the Model Business 
Corporation Act. 
134 The language of Wis. Stat. § 180.0744(1), as originally 
adopted, differed from § 7.44 of the Model Business 
Corporation Act in its final phrase. The final phrase of § 
180.0744(1) as originally adopted, in contrast to the Model 
Business Corporation Act, provided that a court shall adhere 
to the decision of the special litigation committee to dismiss 
the derivative action "unless the court finds that the 
members of the group so voting were not independent or 
were not acting in good faith" (emphasis added). 
*664 U 35 According to the bill-drafting file for Wis. Stat. 
§ 180.0744, the purpose of the final clause, which could be 
considered merely redundant, was to make explicit that under 
the statute a court is to examine the rationality of the decision-
making process and whether the members of the group were 
25 
independent and acted in good faith. The final clause 
"strikes a proper balance between shareholders' rights and the 
business judgment principle of corporate governance. „26 
**88 1f 36 According to the legislative history, the 
statute does not dictate judicial adherence to the decision 
of a special litigation committee unless the committee 
members are independent under the statute. A court is 
required to adhere to the decision of the special litigation 
committee regarding dismissal of a derivative action on the 
ground that the committee's decision constitutes a matter of 
business judgment delegated by the board of directors to 
the committee. Thus, under the Wisconsin statute, judicial 
oversight is necessary to determine whether the members of 
the special litigation committee are independent. 
*665 K 37 In October 1991, the Committee on Business 
Corporation Law of the State Bar of Wisconsin sought 
amendment of Wis. Stat. § 180.744(1), as the attorneys 
explained, to retain the purpose of the final phrase but to 
clarify that the final phrase of the Wisconsin statute did 
not change the burden of proof set forth in the statute.28 
The amendment proposed by the lawyers, described as 
"nonsubstantive and 'housekeeping' in nature," and adopted 
by the legislature, thus expressly retains the concept of 
judicial review of whether members of the special litigation 
committee are independent. 29 
U 38 The legislative history contradicts the conclusion of 
the circuit court and court of appeals in the present case 
that the legislature intended an "extremely low" threshold 
for determining whether members of a special litigation 
committee are independent. The legislative history of Wis. 
Stat. § 180.0744 demonstrates the legislature's intent that 
the courts scrutinize whether the members of a special 
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litigation committee are independent in order to protect the 
shareholders' and the corporation's interests. 
Ill 
Tf 39 We now discuss the appropriate test to be applied to 
determine whether directors who are members of a special 
litigation committee are independent *666 under Wis. Stat. 
§ 180.0744. This question is one of first impression in 
Wisconsin. Nothing in the statute expressly states the factors 
to be examined to determine whether directors who are 
members of a committee are independent. 
K 40 The Model Business Corporation Act (upon which 
Wis. Stat. § 180.0744 is based) builds on the law relating 
to special litigation committees developed by a number of 
states. We are therefore informed by the case law of other 
30 
states, and we derive from this case law the following 
test to determine whether a member of a special litigation 
committee is independent. 
*89 
31 
Whether members are 
32 
[8] [9] [10] U 41 
independent is tested on an objective basis ^z as of the 
time they are *667 appointed to the special litigation 
committee. Considering the totality of the circumstances, 
a court shall determine whether a reasonable person in the 
position of a member of a special litigation committee can 
base his or her decision on the merits of the issue rather 
than on extraneous considerations or influences. In other 
words, the test is whether a member of a committee has a 
relationship with an individual defendant or the corporation 
that would reasonably be expected to affect the member's 
judgment with respect to the litigation in issue. The factors 
a court should examine to determine whether a committee 
member is independent include, but are not limited to, the 
following: 
(1) A committee member's status as a defendant and 
potential liability. Optimally members of a special 
litigation committee should not be defendants in the 
derivative action and should not be exposed to personal 
liability as a result of the action. 
(2) A committee member's participation in or approval 
of the alleged wrongdoing or financial benefits from the 
challenged transaction. Optimally members of a special 
litigation committee should not have been members of 
the board of directors when the transaction in question 
occurred or was *668 approved. Nor should they have 
participated in the transaction or events underlying the 
derivative action. Innocent or pro forma involvement 
does not necessarily render a member not independent, 
but substantial participation or approval or personal 
financial benefit should. 
(3) A committee member's past or present business 
or economic dealings with an individual defendant. 
Evidence of a committee member's employment and 
financial relations with an individual defendant should 
be considered in determining whether the member is 
independent. 
(4) A committee member's past or present personal, 
family, or social relations with individual defendants. 
Evidence of a committee member's non-financial 
relations with an individual defendant should be 
considered in determining whether the member is 
independent. A determination of whether a member is 
independent is affected by the extent to which a member 
is directly or indirectly dominated by, controlled by or 
beholden to an individual defendant. 
(5) A committee member's past or present business or 
economic relations with the corporation. For example, 
if a member of the special litigation committee was 
outside counsel or a consultant to the corporation, this 
factor should be considered in determining whether the 
member is independent. 
**90 (6) The number of members on a special litigation 
committee. The more members on a special litigation 
committee, the less weight a circuit court may assign to 
a particular disabling interest affecting a single member 
of the committee. 
(7) The roles of corporate counsel and independent 
counsel. Courts should be more likely to find a 
special litigation committee independent if the *669 
committee retains counsel who has not represented 
individual defendants or the corporation in the past. 35 
f 42 Some courts and commentators have suggested that 
a "structural bias" exists in special litigation committees 
•2/r 
that taints their decisions. They argue that members of 
a committee, appointed by the directors of the corporation, 
are instinctively sympathetic and empathetic towards their 
colleagues on the board of directors and can be expected to 
vote for dismissal of any but the most egregious charges. 
They assert that the committees are inherently biased and 
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untrustworthy.37 Wisconsin Stat. § 180.0744 and the Model 
Business Corporation Act are designed to combat this 
possibility 38 
t 43 Wisconsin Stat. § 180.0744 requires that only 
independent directors vote to create a special litigation 
committee and only independent directors serve on the 
committee. The statute recognizes that independent directors 
serving as members of a special *670 litigation committee 
are capable of rendering an independent decision even though 
they are members of the board of directors which includes 
defendants in the derivative action. 
[11] If 44 A court should not presuppose that a special 
litigation committee is inherently biased. Although members 
of a special litigation committee may have experiences 
similar to those of the defendant directors and serve with them 
on the board of directors, the legislature has declared that 
independent members of a special litigation committee are 
capable of rendering an independent decision. The test we 
set forth today is designed, as is the statute, to overcome the 
effects of any "structural bias." 
[12] [13] 1f 45 A circuit court is to look at the totality of 
the circumstances. A finding that a member of the special 
litigation committee is independent does not require the 
complete absence of any facts that *671 might point to non-
objectivity. A director may be independent even if he or she 
has had some personal or business relation with an individual 
director accused of wrongdoing. Although the totality 
of **91 the circumstances test does not necessitate the 
complete absence of any facts that might point to a member 
not being independent, a circuit court is required to apply the 
test for determining whether a member is independent with 
care and rigor. If the members are not independent, the court 
will, in effect, be allowing the defendant directors to render 
a judgment on their own alleged misconduct. The value of a 
special litigation committee depends on the extent to which 
the members of the committee are independent. 
[14] Tf 46 It is vital for a circuit court to review whether 
each member of a special litigation committee is independent. 
The special litigation committee is, after all, the "only 
instance in American Jurisprudence where a defendant can 
free itself from a suit by merely appointing a committee to 
review the allegations of the complaint...."40 We agree with 
the Delaware Court of Chancery that the trial court must 
be "certain that the SLC [special litigation committee] is 
truly independent." While ill suited to assessing business 
judgments, courts are well suited by experience to evaluate 
whether members of a special litigation committee are 
independent. 
1f 47 The test we set forth attains the balance the legislature 
intended by empowering corporations to dismiss meritless 
derivative litigation through special litigation committees, 
while checking this power with appropriate judicial oversight 
over the composition and conduct of the special litigation 
committee. 
IV 
[15] If 48 The circuit court declined to grant summary 
judgment for the defendant because there was a *672 dispute 
of material facts. After seven days of testimony on the issue 
of whether the members of the special litigation committee 
were independent, the circuit court made findings of fact 
and concluded that the threshold the legislature established 
for determining whether the members of the committee were 
independent is "extremely low." Applying this "extremely 
low" standard, the circuit court determined that the members 
of the special litigation committee in the present case were 
independent 42 
1f 49 We briefly explore the relations of the members of 
the special litigation committee to the corporation and the 
defendant Culea. In this case no member of the special 
litigation committee is a named defendant in the derivative 
action. 
1f 50 One member of the committee, Robert Bonk, received 
a $25,000 bonus at the same meeting of the compensation 
committee at which Culea's challenged bonus was approved. 
The circuit court found that "while [Bonk] did receive a bonus 
at the same meeting of the board where Mr. Culea received 
his bonus, it does not appear that there was a quid pro quo or 
any other type of linkage between the two bonuses. In fact, 
it should be noted that the plaintiff [Einhorn] has not made 
Bonk's $25,000 bonus a subject of this lawsuit." Einhorn has 
made the bonus an issue in this court. 
*673 1f 51 Bonk is an employee of the corporation, is a 
subordinate of Culea and considers Culea a friend. Bonk 
acknowledged that it would be "very difficult for [him] to 
even consider the possibility that **92 Mr. Culea would 
do something improper...." 43 Bonk's ability to independently 
evaluate the litigation may have been compromised by his 
own admission. The circuit court merely stated that "with 
the exception of him being an employee of Northern Labs, 
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this Court fails to find any inherent basis upon which his 
independence could be challenged." 
K 52 Outside counsel retained by the special 
litigation committee questioned whether Robert Bonk was 
independent: "[Bonk's] independence is questionable.... 
Because his interests in the financial outcome - would 
[strikethrough in original] was affected but it is such 
a small amount.... The input of [Bonk] throughout the 
process may taint the vote because his independence may 
be questioned." Whether Bonk was independent should 
be determined on the basis of his employment status, his 
financial interest in the outcome and his personal relation with 
Culea. 
K 53 Another member of the committee, John Beagle, was 
characterized by the circuit court as Einhorn's "right-hand 
man." Beagle admitted that he and Einhorn "have a very 
good business relationship" and are "also very good friends." 
Beagle wrote, in explaining his lone vote to maintain the 
derivative action, that "the special litigation committee is not, 
and never was, unbiased or independent... each of us is too 
close to one party or the other to have a chance at being 
independent...." *674 John Beagle, plaintiff Einhorn's 
good friend and close business partner, openly admits that he 
was not independent. 
is critical. "Good faith, reasonable inquiry, and the best 
interests ofthe corporation are not enough. „47 
46 
K 54 The other two members of the special litigation 
committee had personal and social relationships with Culea 
and Culea's wife. Einhorn argues strenuously that Culea's 
neighbor and friend, Dwight Chewning, and Culea's wife's 
friend, Lolita Chua, were not independent. The exact extent 
of these friendships is vigorously contested by the parties, but 
the existence of some relationship is evidenced in the record. 
K 55 The circuit court did not make findings of fact specifying 
the relationships of Chewning and Chua to Culea other 
than describing Chewning as a "neighbor" and Chua as a 
"social friend" of Mrs. Culea. In its discussion of Chewning 
and Chua, the circuit court examined their performance 
as witnesses and as members of the special litigation 
committee. While the care, attention and sense of individual 
responsibility of a member may touch on the issue of whether 
the member was independent, the test is primarily concerned 
with whether factors exist at the time the committee was 
formed that would prevent a reasonable person from *675 
basing his or her decisions on the merits ofthe issue. Whether 
members ofthe special litigation committee are independent 
**93 [16] H 56 As we stated previously, mere 
acquaintanceship and social interaction are not per se bars 
to finding a member independent. Relationships with an 
individual defendant and the corporation are, however, 
factors the circuit court must consider in the totality of 
circumstances. 
U 57 Einhorn also argues strenuously that the role of 
the corporation's counsel tainted the formation of the 
special litigation committee, in that the corporation's counsel 
was acting both as Culea's personal counsel and as the 
corporation's counsel. Relatively late in its investigation the 
special litigation committee retained a separate law firm from 
Washington, D.C., to act as its counsel. But the exact extent 
of the corporation's counsel's role in advising the special 
litigation committee is contested. The circuit court did not 
make findings about the roles ofthe corporation's counsel and 
outside counsel. The role ofthe corporation's counsel should 
be considered as one of the circumstances in determining 
whether the committee is independent. Several courts have 
stated that retention of objectively independent counsel is 
highly recommended, although failure to do so does not 
necessarily prevent a special litigation committee from being 
independent 48 
*676 \ 58 The circuit court did not apply the totality of 
the circumstances standard to determine whether a reasonable 
person in the position of the member of the special litigation 
committee could base his or her decision on the merits of 
the issue rather than on extraneous conditions or influences. 
Considered together, the relationships in the present case raise 
significant questions concerning whether the members of 
the special litigation committee were independent. *677 
The decision of this court is not intended to cast doubt on 
any committee member's integrity, honesty or hard work on 
the special litigation committee. Rather, we are concerned 
that, at the time of the formation of the special litigation 
committee, the members of the committee had relationships 
with the individual defendant and the corporation that call into 
question whether a reasonable person could base his or her 
decision on the merits of the issue rather than on extraneous 
considerations or influences. 
[17] f 59 The application of a statute to undisputed facts 
is ordinarily a question of law that this court determines 
independently of the circuit court and the court of appeals, 
benefiting from the analyses of these courts. But in this case 
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the facts are in dispute, and the circuit court has not made 
sufficient findings of fact upon which **94 this court can 
apply the legal test set forth. Accordingly, we remand the 
cause to the circuit court to make findings of fact and to apply 
the proper legal standard to the facts of this case. 
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(1) The court shall dismiss a derivative proceeding on motion by the corporation if one or more of the groups specified in sub. (2) 
or (6) has determined in good faith after conducting a reasonable inquiry upon which its conclusions are based that maintenance 
of the derivative proceeding is not in the best interests of the corporation, unless the court finds that the members of the 
group so voting were not independent or were not acting in good faith (emphasis of the final phrase added). 
See 1991 Wis. Act 16, § 27. 
Section 7.44(a) of the Model Business Corporation Act reads as follows: 
(a) A derivative proceeding shall be dismissed by the court on motion by the corporation if one of the groups specified in 
subsections (b) or (f) has determined in good faith after conducting a reasonable inquiry upon which its conclusions are based 
that the maintenance of the derivative proceeding is not in the best interests of the corporation. 
2 5 Letter from Attorney Jeffrey Bartell to Senator Charles Chvala dated January 23, 1991, Bill-Drafting File, 1991 Wis. Act 16, 
Legislative Reference Bureau, Madison, Wisconsin. 
2 6 Letter from Attorney Jeffrey Bartell to Senator Charles Chvala dated January 23, 1991, Bill-Drafting File, 1991 Wis. Act 16, 
Legislative Reference Bureau, Madison, Wisconsin. 
2 7 InHoule v. Low, 407 Mass. 810, 556 N.E.2d 51, 58 (1990), the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court explained: 
The value of a special litigation committee is coextensive with the extent to which that committee truly exercises business 
judgment. In order to ensure that special litigation committees do act for the corporation's best interest, a good deal of judicial 
oversight is necessary in each case.... At a minimum, a special litigation committee must be independent, unbiased, and act in 
good faith. 
2 8 Memorandum to the Committee on Business Corporation Law from Jeffrey Bartell and Molly Martin dated October 31, 1991, Bill-
Drafting File, 1991 Wis. Act 16, Legislative Reference Bureau, Madison, Wisconsin. 
2 9 See 1991 Wis. Act 173, § 2 (effective April 28, 1992). 
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See also Christopher S. Berry, Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Frank C. DeGuire and Clay R. Williams, Wisconsin Business Corporation 
Law at 7-116 (State Bar of Wisconsin CLE Books 1992). 
30 Seel Model Business Corporation Act Annotated, Official Comment to § 7.44 at 7-341-349 (3d ed. 1997 Supp.). 
31 For discussions and applications of various versions of this test, see, e.g., Strougo v. Padegs, 27 F.Supp.2d 442, 448-451 (1998); In 
re Oracle Sec. Litig, 852 F.Supp. 1437, 1441-42 (1994); Johnson v. Hui, 811 F.Supp. 479, 486-87 (N.D.Cal.1991); Peller v. The 
Southern Co., 707 F.Supp. 525,527-28 (1988); Kaplan v. Wyatt, 499 A.2d 1184,1189-90 (Del. 1985); Aronson v. Lewis, 413 A.2d 805, 
814-16 (Del.1984); Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (1981); Millsap v. American Fam. Corp., 208 Ga.App. 230,430 S.E.2d 
385, 387-88 (1993); Houle v. Low, 407 Mass. 810, 556 N.E.2d 51, 58-59 (1990); Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619,419 N.Y.S.2d 
920, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1001-02 (1979); Davidowitz v. Edelman, 153 Misc.2d 853, 583 N.Y.S.2d 340, 343-44 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1992); 
Lewis v. Boyd, 838 S.W.2d 215, 224-25 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1992). See also James L. Rudolph & Gustavo A. del Puerto, The Special 
Litigation Committee: Origin, Development, and Adoption Under Massachusetts Law, 83 Mass. L.Rev. 47, 51-52 (1998). 
3 2 "[Courts] have looked to an array of objective factors ... as criteria for evaluating the disinterestedness and independence of 
directors...." 1 Roger J. Magnuson, Shareholder Litigation § 8.17.60 (1993). 
33 An independent member might stop being independent while serving on a special litigation committee. 
3 4 This standard for determining whether a person is independent fits the dictionary definitions of independent. Black's Law Dictionary 
at 774 (7th ed. 1999) defines "independent" as "not subject to the control or influence of another." The American Heritage Dictionary 
of the English Language at 917 (3d ed.1992) defines "independent" as, among other things, "free from the influence, guidance, or 
control of another or others." 
3 5 For a discussion of cases involving the independent standard for members of special litigation committees, see Jay M. Zitter, Propriety 
of Termination of Properly Initiated Derivative Action by "Independent Committee" Appointed by Board of Directors Whose Actions 
(Or Inaction) Are Under Attack, 22 A.L.R. 4th (1983 and 1999 Supp.). 
36 See, e.g., Houle v. Low, 407 Mass. 810, 556 N.E.2d 51, 54 (1990); Miller v. Register & Tribune Syndicate Inc., 336 N.W.2d 709, 
718 (Iowa 1983); Carol B. Swanson, Juggling Shareholder Rights and Strike Suits in Derivative Litigation: The ALI Drops the Ball, 
11 Minn. L.Rev. 1339, 1356-59 (1993). 
37 See, e.g., George W. Dent, Jr., The Power of Directors to Terminate Shareholder Litigation: The Death of the Derivative Suit?, 75 
Nw.U.L.Rev.96,98(1980). 
38 See 2 Model Business Corporation Act Annotated, Official Comment to § 7.44 at 7-342 (3d ed. 1997 Supp.). 
39 See In re Oracle Securities Litigation, 852 F.Supp. 1437, 1442 (N.D.Cal.1994), stating: 
A "totality of the circumstances" test does not, however, necessitate the complete absence of any facts which might point to 
non-objectivity. In any business setting, associations and contacts of the type which [the committee member] has had with 
some of the individual defendants and [the corporation] are certainly neither inappropriate nor such as to suggest that [the 
committee member] would not faithfully discharge his obligations to [the corporation's] shareholders. Business dealings seldom 
take place between complete strangers and it would be a strained and artificial rule which required a director to be unacquainted 
or uninvolved with fellow directors in order to be regarded as independent. 
4 0 Lewis v. Fuqua, 502 A.2d 962, 967 (Del.Ch.1985). 
41 Lewis v. Fuqua, 502 A.2d 962, 967 (Del.Ch. 1985). 
4 2 The question of which party has the burden of proving, Wis. Stat. § 180.0744(5), whether members of the special litigation committee 
in the present case were independent has been raised in this case. At the trial before the circuit court, plaintiff Einhorn presented his 
case first. We do not address the issue of burden of proof because it was not fully analyzed or fully briefed by the parties. 
4 3 See 12/19/96 Bonk testimony, R. 206 at 35 (reproduced at Einhom's Appendix at 168). 
4 4 See "Chewning Notes of 5/22/95 Conversations With Outside Counsel," Einhorn's Appendix at 95. 
4 5 See letter from Beagle to Chewning, June 14, 1995, Einhorn's Appendix at 127. 
4 6 At oral argument, counsel for Culea asserted that Einhorn's trial counsel conceded that Beagle was independent. It was only when 
new appellate counsel was hired, Culea argues, that Einhorn challenged whether Beagle was independent. 
Wisconsin Stat. § 180.0744(3) focuses the inquiry of "independent" on the connections of a member of a special litigation 
committee to an individual defendant and the corporation, not on the connections with a plaintiff. See Wis. Stat. § 180.0744(3). 
We do not address the issue of a member's relationship with the plaintiff. 
4 7 See Christopher S. Berry, Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Frank C. DeGuire and Clay R. Williams, Wisconsin Business Corporation Law at 
7-116 (State Bar of Wisconsin CLE Books 1992). 
4 8 See, e.g., In reParPharm. Inc., 750 F.Supp. 641,647 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) ("Both New York and Delaware law contemplate that a special 
litigation committee be represented by independent counsel."); Kaplan v. Wyatt, 499 A.2d 1184, 1190 (Del. 1985) (although use of 
in-house counsel is not recommended, it is not fatal to the special litigation committee's investigation). 
A comment to Wis. SCR 20:1.13 of the Code of Professional Conduct states the following about derivative actions: 
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_ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ^ _ _ ^ ^ „ _ . _ _ _ , _ _ 
The question can arise whether counsel for the organization may defend such an action. The proposition that the organization 
is the lawyer's client does not alone resolve the issue. Most derivative actions are a normal incident of an organization's affairs, 
to be defended by the organization's lawyer like any other suit. However, if the claim involves serious charges of wrongdoing 
by those in control of the organization, a conflict may arise between the lawyer's duty to the organization and the lawyer's 
relationship with the board. In those circumstances, Rule 1.7 [relating to conflict of interest] governs who should represent the 
directors and the organization. 
4 9 Wisconsin Stat. § 180.0744 draws no distinction between publicly held corporations and closely held corporations. See §§ 
180.1801-180.1837 relating to close corporations. We acknowledge that it may be difficult for closely held corporations to assemble 
special litigation committees. If it is difficult for the corporation to create an independent special litigation committee, the remedy 
has been provided by the legislature. The corporation may move the court, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 180.0744(6), to "appoint a panel 
of one or more independent persons to determine whether maintenance of the derivative proceedings is in the best interests of the 
corporation." 
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Supreme Court of Minnesota. 
George JANSSEN, et al., Respondents, 
v. 
BEST & FLANAGAN, et a l , Defendants, 
and 
Minneapolis Police Relief 
Association, Petitioner, Appellant. 
No. CX-01-2207. I May 22, 2003 . 
Former members and trustees of police pension fund, a 
nonprofit corporation, brought derivative action against law 
firm for legal malpractice, naming corporation as nominal 
defendant. The District Court, Hennepin County, Bruce A. 
Peterson, J., dismissed action. Plaintiffs appealed. The Court 
of Appeals, 645 N.W.2d 495, reversed and remanded. Upon 
further appeal, the Supreme Court, Meyer, J., held that: (1) as 
a matter of first impression, boards of nonprofit corporations 
could receive the protection of the business judgment rule; 
(2) Minnesota Nonprofit Corporations Act did not prohibit 
corporations from appointing independent committees with 
authority to decide whether the corporation should join a 
member's derivative suit; (3) board failed to establish that 
investigator, appointed to determine whether corporation 
should join member's derivative suit, was independent and 
acted in good faith; and (4) board was not entitled to remedy 
defect in first investigation. 
Affirmed. 
Hanson, J., concurred in part and dissent in part with opinion 
in which Blatz, C.J., joined. 
*878 Syllabus by the court 
1. The boards of nonprofit corporations may receive the 
protection of the business judgment rule. 
2. Minnesota Statutes § 317A.241 (2002) does not 
prohibit nonprofit corporations from appointing independent 
committees with the authority to decide whether the 
corporation should join a member's derivative suit. 
3. Because the investigation conducted by appellant's 
litigation committee lacked independence and good faith, the 
conclusion of that committee does not deserve deference from 
the court as a business decision. 
4. When the committee authorized with making a business 
decision for the corporation lacks independence and good 
faith, a member's derivative suit proceeds on its merits. 
Attorneys and Law Firms 
*879 Patrick J. McLaughlin, Eric Moutz, Dorsey & 
Whitney, LLP, Minneapolis, for appellant. 
William J. Mavity, Pamela Marie Miller, Mavity & 
Associates, Minneapolis, for respondents. 
Martin J. Costello, Hughes & Costello, St. Paul, for Amicus 
Curiae, Minnesota Teamsters Joint Council 32, et al. 
Heard, considered, and decided by the court en banc. 
Opinion 
OPINION 
MEYER, Justice. 
We are called on to decide certain questions of first 
impression regarding the law of nonprofit corporations in 
Minnesota. The principal issue concerns how a nonprofit 
board may respond to a member's demand to commence 
legal action on behalf of the association. We also consider 
the degree of deference that a district court may give to a 
nonprofit board's decision to reject a member's demand to 
commence legal action. 
The board of directors of the Minneapolis Police Relief 
Association (MPRA) made an improvident investment in 
a company known as Technimar and lost approximately 
fifteen million dollars. Certain members of MPRA (Janssen, 
et al., whom we will refer to collectively as "Janssen") 
brought a derivative suit on behalf of MPRA against Best 
& Flanagan alleging attorney malpractice with respect to 
the Technimar investment. MPRA appointed special counsel 
to review the merits of the derivative suit. Special counsel 
concluded that proceeding with the derivative suit would 
not be in the best interests of MPRA and MPRA moved to 
dismiss the suit. The district court treated special counsel as 
a special litigation committee, applied the business judgment 
rule to the committee's decision not to proceed with the 
derivative action, and dismissed Janssen's suit. The court 
of appeals reversed, concluding that the legislature had not 
granted nonprofit corporations authority to appoint special 
litigation committees, and the district court was precluded 
from deferring to the decision of MPRA's special counsel. 
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MPRA petitioned for review, seeking a reversal of the court 
of appeals' decision. 
MPRA is a Minnesota nonprofit corporation that administers 
a pension plan for Minneapolis police officers hired before 
June 15, 1980. Minn.Stat. § 423B.01-.04 (2002). MPRA was 
formed under and is subject to Minn.Stat. ch. 317A (2002), 
the Minnesota Nonprofit Corporation Act, and is governed by 
a board of nine directors. See Minn.Stat. § 423B.05, subd. 1 
(2002). 
In 1996 and 1997, MPRA lost approximately fifteen million 
dollars that it had invested with David Welliver in a company 
called Technimar. The circumstances surrounding this loss 
were the subject of several investigations and at least two 
prior lawsuits. The most important aspect of this history for 
the instant case is that two law firms, Jones, Day, Reavis 
and Pogue (Jones Day) and Dorsey & Whitney, LLP (Dorsey 
Whitney), had already conducted investigations surrounding 
some of the issues. 
Janssen alleges in this action that MPRA's former attorneys, 
Best & Flanagan, committed malpractice in representing 
MPRA during and after the Welliver investments were made 
in 1996 and 1997. Janssen alleges, among other claims, 
that Best & Flanagan attorneys served as general counsel to 
MPRA and were negligent *880 in failing to conduct a "due 
diligence" inquiry into the Welliver investment. In bringing 
this derivative suit, Janssen did not have an attorney-client 
relationship with Best & Flanagan, so their suit depended 
upon MPRA joining them as a plaintiff. 
In response to this lawsuit, MPRA appointed attorney Robert 
A. Murnane (Murnane) as special counsel to investigate 
Janssen's claims and determine whether MPRA should join 
the derivative suit. The MPRA board issued a resolution in 
June of 2000 instructing Murnane to conduct an independent 
review and evaluate the derivative lawsuit to determine 
on behalf of MPRA's board of directors whether or not 
MPRA should join in legal action against Best & Flanagan. 
The resolution specifically instructed Murnane to "not 
reinvestigate, verify or otherwise attempt to prove or disprove 
the factual findings, determinations, events or circumstances" 
described in the prior investigative reports of Jones Day 
and Dorsey Whitney and a set of discovery materials in 
a related lawsuit. Murnane was specifically instructed to 
"accept as correct" the factual findings of these reports and 
discovery materials. Murnane was not limited, however, by 
the conclusions of the previous reports. 
Murnane reviewed "thousands of pages of reports, documents 
and deposition transcripts" over a few months in investigating 
the merits of a malpractice action against Best & Flanagan. 
However, the record does not indicate that he conducted any 
of his own investigation, nor did he personally speak to the 
Janssen claimants or their counsel. Murnane submitted his 
report to the MPRA board on September 26,2000, concluding 
that "the totality of the materials reviewed does not support a 
finding that Best & Flanagan committed legal malpractice in 
its handling of the MPRA affairs," and that "to spend money 
in the pursuit of a legal malpractice claim against Best & 
Flanagan would not be prudent use of the MPRA funds." 
Following submission of Murnane's report, the MPRA board 
brought a motion to dismiss the instant lawsuit under the 
principle of law that the court should defer to the business 
judgment of Murnane, MPRA's special litigation committee. 
In considering MPRA's motion to dismiss, the district 
court described the appropriate role that special litigation 
committees play in acting on behalf of for-profit corporations. 
The court determined that a nonprofit corporation is 
also authorized to utilize the special litigation committee 
procedure. The court treated Murnane as a special litigation 
committee and applied the business judgment rule to 
the committee's report. Under the business judgment rule 
enunciated by the court, it examined only whether the 
committee conducted its investigation with independence 
and good faith. The court concluded that "[Murnane's] 
investigation cannot survive even this limited review." The 
court could not find that Murnane was independent because 
"he was told by the board of directors what to believe." 
The court could not find good faith because there was no 
indication from Murnane that he sought or received input 
from the plaintiffs and the court was left to assume that such 
input was not sought because the board's instructions limited 
the scope of the investigation. Finally, the court could not 
clearly discern whether Murnane was offering legal advice or, 
in fact, rendering a business judgment decision. 
Rather than deny MPRA's motion to dismiss the Janssen 
lawsuit, the district court postponed a decision on the 
motion *881 to allow MPRA an opportunity to remedy 
the deficiencies in MPRA's delegation of authority to its 
special litigation committee. The court instructed MPRA 
that if it sought deference for its committee's litigation 
decision, the court would not grant such deference unless and 
"until adequate evidence of independence and good faith is 
submitted by the MPRA, and until it is clear that Murnane has 
rendered a business judgment." 
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Consequently, MPRA issued a second resolution in 
December of 2000 to Murnane, declaring that he was to 
function as a special litigation committee, not being limited 
in any way as to how to conduct his investigation or 
what material he may consider: "[sjpecial counsel shall 
have complete independence and may undertake whatever 
good faith investigation he chooses." The resolution asked 
Murnane to exercise his "business judgment" regarding 
whether it was in the best interest of MPRA to join in 
the derivative suit. Murnane conducted an investigation that 
included meeting with certain of the named plaintiffs in 
the action and the involved attorneys at Best & Flanagan. 
Murnane submitted a second report and in that report 
concluded it would be a "poor business judgment" for MPRA 
to join in litigation against Best & Flanagan. MPRA renewed 
its motion to dismiss. The district court reviewed Murnane's 
second report and concluded that MPRA's special litigation 
committee (Murnane) had conducted an investigation that 
was independent and conducted in good faith. The court 
deferred to the committee's business judgment and granted 
MPRA's motion to dismiss the complaint against Best & 
Flanagan. 
Janssen appealed and the court of appeals reversed. It 
concluded that a nonprofit corporation lacks the statutory 
authority to appoint a special litigation committee to evaluate 
derivative claims. Additionally, the court concluded that even 
if a nonprofit corporation has the authority to appoint a 
special litigation committee, in this case the special litigation 
committee failed to meet the threshold test of the business 
judgment rule. The court reversed and remanded for trial. This 
appeal followed. 
I. 
[1] We concern ourselves with two questions: (1) whether 
the Minnesota Nonprofit Corporations Act prohibits a 
nonprofit corporation's board of directors from establishing 
an independent committee with authority to make decisions 
about derivative lawsuits; and (2) whether Murnane, as 
special counsel, displayed sufficient independence and good 
faith to be entitled to the deference of the business judgment 
rule. We exercise de novo review of the primary issues 
in this case, as they involve statutory interpretation and 
novel questions of law. State v. Loge, 608 N.W.2d 152, 155 
(Minn.2000). We also note that other states have recently held 
that they will review de novo a decision of a district court to 
dismiss a derivative suit. SeeBrehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 
<KW-<*-:- ^ o n - i o - r i — . r-» _ . .* _ .__ K i 
253 (Del.2000); In re PSE & G S'holder Litig., 173 N.J. 258, 
801 A.2d 295, 313 (2002). 
A. The Business Judgment Rule and Derivative Lawsuits 
To resolve this case we must strike a balance between 
two competing interests in the judicial review of corporate 
decisions. See PSE & G, 801 A.2d at 306. On one hand, 
courts recognize the authority of corporate directors and 
want corporations to control their own destiny. Stoner v. 
*882 Walsh, 772 F.Supp. 790, 796 (S.D.N.Y.1991). On 
the other hand, courts provide a critical mechanism to 
hold directors accountable for their decisions by allowing 
shareholder derivative suits. See Barrett v. Southern Conn. 
Gas Co., Ill Conn. 362, 374 A2d 1051, 1055 (1977) 
(remarking that " '[i]f the duties of care and loyalty which 
directors owe to their corporations could be enforced only 
in suits by the corporation, many wrongs done by directors 
would never be remedied' " (citation omitted)); Brown v. 
Tenney, 125 I11.2d 348, 126 Ill.Dec. 545, 532 N.E.2d 230, 
232 (1988) (stating that "[t]he derivative suit is a device to 
protect shareholders against abuses by the corporation, its 
officers and directors, and is a vehicle to ensure corporate 
accountability"). Because shareholder-derivative litigation is 
not an everyday occurrence in Minnesota's courts, we address 
these issues for the first time. 
Courts have attempted to balance these two competing 
concerns by establishing a "business judgment rule" that 
grants a degree of deference to the decisions of corporate 
directors. The business judgment rule was developed by 
state and federal courts to protect boards of directors against 
shareholder claims that the board made unprofitable business 
decisions. "The business judgment rule is a presumption 
protecting conduct by directors that can be attributed to 
any rational business purpose." Dennis J. Block, et al, The 
Business Judgment Rule: Fiduciary Duties of Corporate 
Directors 18 (5th ed.1998). The business judgment rule 
means that as long as the disinterested directors) made an 
informed business decision, in good faith, without an abuse 
of discretion, he or she will not be liable for corporate losses 
resulting from his or her decision. Id. at 39. Two major 
reasons buttress the decision to grant a degree of deference 
to corporate boards. First, protecting directors' reasonable 
risks is considered positive for the economy overall, as those 
risks allow businesses to attract risk-averse managers, adapt 
to changing markets, and capitalize on emerging trends.1 
Second, courts are ill-equipped to judge the wisdom of 
business ventures and have been reticent to replace a well-
meaning decision by a corporate board with their own. See, 
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e.g., Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619,419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 
393 N.E.2d 994, 1000(1979). 
[2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] 
shareholders of a corporation believe the board has acted 
improperly, corporate law recognizes the shareholders' 
ability to bring a derivative lawsuit. Derivative suits allow 
shareholders to bring suit against wrongdoers on behalf of 
the corporation, and force liable parties to compensate the 
corporation for injuries so caused. Tenney, 126 111.Dec. 545, 
532 N.E.2d at 233. A derivative action actually belongs to 
the corporation, but the shareholders are permitted to bring 
the action where the corporation has failed to take action for 
itself. See id. Because of the business judgment rule, however, 
not all shareholders' derivative *883 suits proceed on their 
merits. While derivative suits may benefit a corporation, 
any benefit must be weighed against the possibility that 
disgruntled shareholders will bring nuisance lawsuits with 
little merit and that even legitimate suits may not be worth 
pursuing when the likelihood of victory is compared with the 
time, money, and hostility necessary to win. The substantive 
decision about whether to pursue the claims advanced in a 
shareholder's derivative action involves "the weighing and 
balancing of legal, ethical, commercial, promotional, public 
relations, fiscal and other factors familiar to the resolution 
of many if not most corporate problems." Auerbach, 419 
N.Y.S.2d 920, 393 N.E.2d at 1002. The careful balancing of 
those factors is best done by the board of directors, which is 
familiar with the appropriate weight to attribute to each factor 
given the company's product and history. Thus, courts apply 
the business judgment rule when evaluating the decision by 
a board of directors whether to join or quash a derivative suit 
belonging to the corporation. Block, supra, at 1702-03. 
Having established the principles by which we apply the 
business judgment rule to a for-profit corporate board's 
decision whether to join a derivative lawsuit, we consider 
whether to grant similar deference to nonprofit boards of 
directors. The parties in this case have presumed the business 
judgment rule will apply to MPRA. Other states have 
applied the business judgment rule to decisions of nonprofit 
corporations, explicitly or implicitly. The highest courts of 
Alabama, Hawaii, and South Dakota have done so, as have 
intermediate appellate courts of Colorado, New York, Ohio, 
South Carolina, Tennessee, and Wisconsin. We find no 
case denying a nonprofit organization the protection of the 
business judgment rule. 
[10] In addition to finding support in other jurisdictions for 
giving judicial deference to nonprofit corporate decisions, the 
primary rationales for applying the business judgment rule in 
the for-profit context apply in the nonprofit context as well. 
Organizations are autonomous agents that should control 
^ ^ W r P o w n destiny. See Auerbach, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 393 
N.E.2d at 1000-01. Directors of nonprofits may take fewer 
risks than would be optimal if they were overly concerned 
about liability for well-meaning decisions. See Daniel R. 
Fischel & Michael Bradley, The Role of Liability Rules 
and the Derivative Suit in Corporate Law: A Theoretical 
and Empirical Analysis, 71 Cornell L.Rev. 261, 270 (1986). 
Additionally, courts are not well-equipped to scrutinize the 
decisions of a corporation; judges should not be caught in the 
middle of fighting factions of nonprofits any more than they 
should be thrust between dissatisfied shareholders and profit-
seeking boards. See id. at 273. Therefore, we conclude that the 
boards of nonprofit corporations may receive the protection 
of the business judgment rule. 
B. Special Litigation Committees 
We turn now to consider whether a nonprofit board of 
directors that is not sufficiently *884 independent to decide 
whether to join a member's derivative lawsuit may establish 
a special litigation committee with authority to make the 
decision. Janssen claims a nonprofit may not appoint a 
special litigation committee because the Minnesota Nonprofit 
Corporation Act (Nonprofit Act) provides no such authority. 
Minn.Stat. § 317A.241 (2002). MPRA argues that the 
Nonprofit Act permitted them to appoint Murnane as its 
special litigation committee, and the district court agreed. 
The court of appeals concluded that the statute prohibited 
nonprofits from appointing special litigation committees. We 
agree with the district court. 
[11] [12] [13] [14] Special litigation committees are 
made up of disinterested board members or individuals 
appointed by the board who are charged with informing 
themselves fully on the issues underlying the derivative 
suit and deciding whether pursuit of litigation is in the 
best interests of the corporation. See, e.g., Houle v. Low, 
407 Mass. 810, 556 N.E.2d 51, 53 (1990); Drilling v. 
Berman, 589 N.W.2d 503, 505-07 (Minn.App.1999); PSE 
& G, 801 A.2d at 303. The key element is that the board 
delegates to a committee of disinterested persons the board's 
power to control the litigation. Block, supra, at 1689. 
A mere advisory role of the special litigation committee 
fails to bestow a sufficient legitimacy to warrant deference 
to the committee's decision by the court. If the board 
properly delegates its authority to act to the special litigation 
committee, the court will extend deference to the committee's 
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decision under the business judgment rule. See Drilling, 589 
N.W.2d at 510; Skoglund v. Brady, 541 N.W.2d 17, 22 
(Minn.App.1995); Black v. NuAire, Inc., 426 N.W.2d 203, 
211 (Minn App. 1988). 
C. Minnesota Nonprofit Corporations Act 
We look to the Nonprofit Act to determine whether MPRA 
had statutory authority to appoint its special litigation 
committee. The relevant part of the statute reads: 
A resolution approved by the affirmative 
vote of a majority of the board may establish 
committees having the authority of the 
board in the management of the business 
of the corporation to the extent provided 
in the resolution. Committees are subject at 
all times to the direction and control of the 
board. 
Minn.Stat § 317A.241, subd. 1 (2002). 
The first inquiry in statutory interpretation is whether the law 
is ambiguous. See Minn.Stat. § 645.16 (2002). If the words 
are clear and unambiguous, "the letter of the law shall not 
be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing the spirit." Id. 
MPRA argues the statute unambiguously allows nonprofit 
boards to create independent committees. It maintains that the 
statute does not limit the types of committees that nonprofits 
can create in any way, thereby making litigation committees 
acceptable. In addition, MPRA posits that the phrase "subject 
at all times to the direction and control of the board" does 
not strip the committees of the independence necessary for 
the protection of the business judgment rule. Instead, it argues 
that "subject *885 * * * to" simply indicates a "possibility 
of control," not a necessity of constant control. 
Janssen also argues that the statute is unambiguous but urges 
a contrary meaning: a committee that must be "subject to" 
the "control" of the board cannot be sufficiently independent 
from the board to deserve the protection of the business 
judgment rule. Janssen also points to subdivision 5 of the 
statute, noting that a director cannot fulfill his or her standard 
of conduct by delegating authority to the board, as an 
indication that nonprofit directors have to retain control over 
all board committees. 
The language in subdivision 1 indicating that committees 
must be subject to the board's control and direction could 
reasonably be interpreted to mean either that the board must 
control every move of the committees, or simply that the 
board has a duty to oversee the work of the committees. 
The former interpretation would make true independence 
impossible, while the latter interpretation is flexible enough 
to allow for independent committees. As both parties' 
interpretations are plausible, we conclude the statute is not 
clear and free from all ambiguity. 
If the words of a statute are not explicit, we interpret the 
statute's meaning by considering the intent of the legislature 
in drafting the law. Minn.Stat. § 645.16 (2002). There are 
three overarching considerations we consider in discerning 
legislative intent in this case: the context of the 1989 revision 
of the Nonprofit Act, contemporaneous legislative history, 
and consequences of a particular interpretation. Id. We will 
address each of these in turn. In addition, we presume that 
the legislature did not intend an absurd result or to violate 
the Constitution, and that it intended the entire statute to 
have effect and favor the public interest. Minn.Stat. § 645.17 
(2002). 
The 1989 revision of the Nonprofit Act was carried out 
eight years after the legislature enacted a wholesale revision 
of the Minnesota Business Corporation Act (Business Act), 
Minn.Stat. ch. 302A (2002), in 1981. See Minnesota Business 
Corporation Act of 1981, ch. 270, §§ 1-125, 1981 Minn. 
Laws 1141-1222. Shortly after the revised Business Act 
was adopted, the Minnesota State Bar Association organized 
a group to study the counterpart statute for nonprofits, 
and found it was outdated and unworkable, with many 
ambiguities. Hearing on H.F. 1203, H. Subcomm. Civil Law, 
76th Minn. Leg., April 24, 1989 (audio tape) (comments 
of Kathleen Pontius). The act had not been revised since 
1951, when the archetypal nonprofit in legislators' minds was 
a social club like the Jaycees or Rotary. Hearing on H.F. 
1203, H. Subcomm. Civil Law, 76th Minn. Leg., April 24, 
1989 (audio tape) (comments of Patrick Plunkett, president 
of Ramsey County Bar Ass'n). This original conception made 
the statute a poor fit for the growing number and variety of 
nonprofit organizations, and for the lawyers who served them. 
Id. A legislative committee drafted a new statute governing 
nonprofits, with three major sources: the Business Act, the 
ABA's Revised Model Nonprofit Act, and Minnesota's old 
nonprofit act. Hearing on H.F. 1203, H. Subcomm. Civil Law, 
76th Minn. Leg., April 24, 1989 (audio tape) (comments of 
Rep. Thomas Pugh, bill's sponsor). 
Minnesota Statutes § 317.241 was passed in the context of 
a wholesale revision of the Nonprofit Act. The legislature 
did not pass the statute to specifically address the committee 
structure of nonprofits *886 or their ability to control 
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derivative suits. We conclude that the legislature's purpose in 
revising the Minnesota Nonprofit Corporations Act in 1989 
had nothing to do with special litigation committees, and 
sheds little light on our inquiry. 
We next examine the contemporaneous legislative history 
to determine legislative intent. In reaching its decision that 
the legislature did not intend to empower nonprofit boards 
to create special litigation committees, the court of appeals 
emphasized the difference between the Business Act and the 
Nonprofit Act on this subject. The Business Act specifically 
says a board of directors may establish special litigation 
committees of one or more directors "to consider legal rights 
or remedies of the corporation and whether those rights and 
remedies should be pursued. Committees other than special 
litigation committees * * * are subject at all times to the 
direction and control of the board." Minn.Stat. § 302A.241, 
subd. 1 (2002) (emphasis added). The court of appeals was 
concerned that not only does the Nonprofit Act lack a specific 
provision for special litigation committees, it also does not 
exempt any committees from board control. 
The comparison between the Business Act and the Nonprofit 
Act does not illuminate as much legislative intent as the court 
of appeals derived, however. The Nonprofit Act was passed 
eight years after the Business Act, making any attempt to infer 
meaning from a comparison between the two less convincing. 
A careful review of the available legislative history produced 
no discernible indication why the special litigation committee 
language was dropped. The absence of the special litigation 
language in the nonprofit statute could mean several things, 
including that the drafters did not think derivative suits were 
an issue for nonprofits and therefore did not address litigation 
committees in the Nonprofit Act. 
[15] Given that little legislative intent concerning section 
317A.241 can be inferred from either the purpose of the 1989 
revision of the Nonprofit Act or the comparison with the 
Business Act, we are left with one remaining consideration 
in discerning legislative intent under Minn.Stat. § 645.16: 
the consequences of a particular interpretation. On this point 
it becomes clear that the district court reached the correct 
result. The district court noted that if nonprofit corporate 
boards are unable to establish independent committees 
whose informed business judgments merit deference from 
the courts, the judiciary would be forced to review the 
merits of every lawsuit brought by a member of a nonprofit 
corporation. Reviewing all derivative suits for nonprofit 
corporations would intrude on the authority of nonprofit 
boards, significantly tax our court system's limited resources, 
and require judges to step significantly beyond their expertise. 
The district court concluded that "[s]uch a procedure-totally 
removing from the board of directors any control over 
litigation brought on behalf of the organization the board 
is supposed to govern-is clearly untenable." We agree. We 
see no reason to assume that the courts are better equipped 
to make business judgments about the merits of a lawsuit 
brought by a member of a nonprofit corporation than is a 
properly functioning board of directors whose duty it is to 
govern and promote the nonprofit corporation's best interests. 
There are no characteristics of nonprofits that justify treating 
nonprofit and for-profit corporations differently in terms 
of their ability to delegate board authority to independent 
committees to review the *887 merits of derivative suits. 
There are nonprofits, like MPRA, that function very much 
like for-profit corporations and would benefit from the 
ability to weed out nuisance suits. In addition to pension 
funds, these nonprofits may include hospitals, schools, and 
homeowners associations. We are not alone in reaching this 
conclusion; two other states have used the business judgment 
rule when reviewing decisions by nonprofit litigation 
committees: Finley v. Superior Court, 80 Cal.App.4th 1152, 
96 Cal.Rptr.2d 128, 132 (2000); Miller v. Bargaheiser, 70 
Ohio App.3d 702, 591 N.E.2d 1339, 1343 (1990). 
Refusing nonprofit corporations the ability to create special 
litigation committees is counter to our common law tradition 
as well. While statutes govern certain aspects of corporate 
life, including the initial incorporation, corporate litigation 
has been largely a creature of the common law. Derivative 
suits developed during the nineteenth century as an equitable 
means of protecting corporations and minority shareholders 
from fraudulent directors. Block, supra, at 1380. The first 
judicial opinions to apply the business judgment rule to 
the decision of a special litigation committee did not rely 
on statutory authority, but rather relied upon case law to 
determine whether a committee could terminate a shareholder 
lawsuit. Block, supra, at 1690-93. 
[16] [17] A nonprofit corporation's power to appoint a 
special litigation committee, in the absence of a statutory 
prohibition, may also spring from the existence of corporate 
"incidental" powers to carry out corporate purposes. Aiple 
v. Twin City Barge & Towing Co., 274 Minn. 38, 45, 143 
N.W.2d 374, 378 (1966) (identifying corporate powers as 
being limited to "those actions expressly authorized by statute 
and such as are incidental thereto and necessary to carry 
them into effect"). It is now universally accepted in corporate 
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jurisprudence that corporations have the ability to exercise 
incidental or necessary powers: 
Formerly, corporations were viewed as possessing only 
such powers as were specifically granted to them by the 
state. This grant of powers was found in the certificate 
of incorporation * * * or in the special statute granting a 
charter to the corporation. 
* * * * 
Today, in all the states, a corporation is deemed to possess 
all the powers of a natural person except those powers 
which are specifically forbidden to such corporations by 
the law. The old concept of a corporation as a bundle of 
only a few, specifically granted powers, has been replaced 
by the concept of a corporation as an artificial person, 
lacking only those powers which the law specifically 
denies to it. 
Howard L. Oleck, Non-Profit Corporations, Organizations, 
& Associations § 168 (6th ed.1994); see also 13 William 
Meade Fletcher, et al., Fletcher's Cyclopedia of the Law of 
Private Corporations § 5963 (perm.ed., rev.vol.1984). 
The untenable consequence of concluding the Nonprofit 
Act prohibits litigation *888 committees, in combination 
with the common law tradition favoring corporate control 
of derivative actions, leads us to conclude that nonprofit 
corporations have the power to create committees that are 
sufficiently independent to merit judicial deference. We hold 
the Minnesota Nonprofit Corporations Act does not prohibit 
corporations from appointing independent committees with 
the authority to decide whether the corporation should join a 
member's derivative suit. 
II. 
Having determined that nonprofit corporations have the 
power to create special litigation committees, the question 
remains whether Murnane deserved the deference of the 
business judgment rule. The court of appeals concluded that 
Murnane, as a special litigation committee, failed to meet the 
threshold test of independence and good faith, and ordered 
the lawsuit to proceed. We agree and affirm. 
[18] All the state variations upon the business judgment 
rule as applied to committees reviewing litigation have two 
common elements. At a minimum, the board must establish 
that the committee acted in good faith and was sufficiently 
independent from the board of directors to dispassionately 
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review the derivative lawsuit. See, e.g., Grimes v. Donald, 
673 A.2d 1207, 1219 (Dei. 1996); Houle, 556 N.E.2d at 59; 
PSE&G, 801 A.2dat312;Auerbach, 419N.Y.S.2d920,393 
N.E.2d at 1000. A key factor in evaluating independence is 
whether the board delegates to a committee of disinterested 
persons the board's power to control the litigation. Block, 
supra, at 1689. A mere advisory role of the special litigation 
committee fails to bestow a sufficient legitimacy to warrant 
deference to the committee's decision by a court. Thus, 
we consider whether Murnane conducted his investigation 
with sufficient independence and good faith to deserve the 
deference of the business judgment rule. If not, the committee 
does not receive the court's deference and the derivative suit 
proceeds. 
[19] In reviewing Murnane's first report, we conclude that 
the board failed to establish the independence and good 
faith of Murnane's investigation. We agree with the district 
court's determination that Murnane lacked independence 
because the MPRA's initial resolution restricted his factual 
investigation. Murnane was told to rely on facts developed 
by law firms that had been hired to represent MPRA in 
lawsuits about other legal issues. Additionally, Murnane's 
independence is suspect because his conduct suggests that 
he saw his role in conformance with his title: special 
counsel. Murnane did not talk to Janssen or their attorneys in 
investigating the suit and gave a conclusion that sounds like 
legal advice. That behavior belies MPRA's attempt to portray 
Murnane as a special litigation committee; instead MPRA 
hired Murnane to serve as its special counsel and he acted 
more like a legal advisor than a neutral decision maker. 
*889 In addition, we conclude that Murnane did not engage 
in a good faith attempt to deduce the best interest of MPRA 
with respect to the litigation against Best & Flanagan. 
Murnane never interviewed Janssen or their attorneys, a 
fundamental task in reaching an informed decision about the 
merits of their complaints. Murnane also gave no indication 
that he had undertaken the careful consideration of all the 
germane benefits and detriments to MPRA that is indicative 
of a good faith business decision. Murnane opined that 
"the totality of the materials reviewed does not support a 
finding that Best & Flanagan committed legal malpractice 
in its handling of the MPRA affairs," and that "to spend 
money in the pursuit of a legal malpractice claim against 
Best & Flanagan would not be prudent use of the MPRA 
funds." The language of his conclusion hints that his decision 
was that of a special counsel evaluating the likelihood of 
a legal victory. But a much more comprehensive weighing 
and balancing of factors is expected in situations like this, 
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taking into consideration how joining or quashing the lawsuit 
could affect MPRA's economic health, relations between the 
board of directors and members, MPRA's public relations, 
and other factors common to reasoned business decisions. 
See Auerbach, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 393 N.E.2d at 1002. We 
conclude that Murnane's initial investigation of the derivative 
action instituted by Janssen against Best & Flanagan lacked 
the independence and good faith necessary to merit deference 
from this court. 
[20] [21] Implicitly acknowledging the failures in 
its first resolution and investigation, the MPRA board 
urges us to consider the second resolution and improved 
investigation. We decline to do so. Generally, when the 
committee authorized with making a business decision for 
the corporation is found to lack the independence needed 
to grant summary judgment, or where the independence 
is uncertain, the derivative suit proceeds on its merits. 
See, e.g., Hasan v. CleveTrust Realty Investors, 729 F.2d 
372, 380 (6th Cir.1984); Will v. Engebretson & Co., 
Inc., 213 Cal.App.3d 1033, 1043-45, 261 Cal.Rptr. 868 
(1989); Lewis v. Fuqua, 502 A.2d 962, 972 (Del.Ch.1985); 
Davidowitz v. Edelman, 153 Misc.2d 853, 858, 583 N.Y.S.2d 
340 (Sup.Ct.1992). See also Houle, 556 N.E.2d at 58-60 
(reversing summary judgment in favor of defendant board 
of directors and remanding for an evidentiary hearing before 
a judge regarding a committee member's independence, and 
noting that "[u]nless the defendant sustains its burden of proof 
as to both of those questions, the case should proceed to 
trial."). The Auerbach court was blunt in its assessment of 
the consequences when proof of an investigation shows that 
the investigation is too restricted in scope or so shallow in 
execution as to constitute a pretext; such proof "would raise 
questions of good faith * * * which would never be shielded 
by that doctrine." Auerbach, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 393 N.E.2d 
at 1003 (emphasis added). 
The practice of allowing derivative suits to proceed to trial 
if a corporate board's initial attempt at a business decision 
fails the minimal requirements for judicial deference *890 
is supported by the principles underlying the application of 
the business judgment doctrine. We strike a balance between 
allowing corporations to control their own destiny and 
permitting meritorious suits by shareholders and members by 
limiting a board of directors to one opportunity to exercise its 
business judgment. See, e.g., Kaplan v. Wyatt, 484 A.2d 501, 
508 (Del.Ch.1984) (explaining that if the court determines 
the litigation committee failed the minimal review of the 
business judgment rule, the "court shall deny the motion for 
such reason and need go no farther, the result being that the 
shareholder plaintiff may resume immediate control of the 
litigation"). If the courts allow corporate boards to continually 
improve their investigation to bolster their business decision, 
the rights of shareholders and members will be effectively 
nullified. We conclude that the district court erred in deferring 
MPRA's motion to dismiss and permitting the board to 
remedy defects in its first grant of authority to Murnane. We 
further conclude that Murnane failed to conduct his initial 
investigation with sufficient independence and good faith to 
deserve the deference of the business judgment rule and, 
therefore, hold that the district court erred when it granted 
MPRA's motion to dismiss the suit against Best & Flanagan. 
Affirmed. 
GILBERT, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of 
this case. 
HANSON, Justice (concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
Although I concur with the decisions that boards of nonprofit 
corporations are protected by the business judgment rule, 
that nonprofit corporations may avail themselves of that 
rule by appointing a special litigation committee to decide 
whether the corporation should join a members' derivative 
suit, and that Murnane may be viewed as a special litigation 
committee, I respectfully dissent on the decision to limit our 
review to Murnane's first report. The district court did not 
base its dismissal order on Murnane's first report because it 
concluded that procedural deficiencies precluded deference 
to Murnane's recommendations. The district court granted 
MPRA's motion to dismiss specifically on the basis of 
Murnane's second report, concluding that it was entitled to 
deference because it reflected an independent investigation 
that was conducted in good faith. 
I find no authority to support the majority opinion's 
development of a "one strike you're out" rule for conducting 
an investigation of claims made in a derivative action. The 
cases cited by the majority stand only for the proposition 
that the derivative action proceeds to trial when a motion to 
dismiss, based on the recommendation of a special litigation 
committee, is denied. They do not address the question 
of whether such denial is with prejudice to later renewal 
or, more specifically applicable here, whether the district 
court has discretion to defer ruling on the motion to dismiss 
to allow further investigation. Drawing on the analogy to 
summary judgment motions generally, the federal decisions 
are unanimous in holding that the denial of a motion for 
summary judgment does not become the "law of the case" 
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so as to preclude the later grant of a renewed motion. See, 
e.g., Paulson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 628 F.Supp. 888, 
891 (D.Minn. 1986), and cases cited in *891 10A Charles 
Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, & Mary Kay Kane, Federal 
Practice and Procedure. § 2718 n. 6 (1998). This rule has been 
recognized by the Minnesota Court of Appeals in Invest Cast, 
Inc. v. City of Blaine, All N.W.2d368,370 (Minn.App.1991); 
Brantner v. Fruehauf Corp., 1991 WL 10225 (Minn.App.). 
Even more to the point are those cases which hold that it 
is within the trial court's discretion to deny a motion for 
summary judgment without prejudice to it being renewed at a 
later time. See Wright, Miller and Kane § 2718 n. 5; 2 David 
F. Herr & Roger S. Hay dock, Minnesota Practice § 56.11 
(1998). 
For these reasons, I would not limit review to Mumane's 
first report. Under these facts, where the deficiencies of the 
first report resulted from structural impediments imposed 
by the corporation upon the scope of the special litigation 
committee's investigation, I would conclude that the district 
court has discretion to defer (or to deny without prejudice) a 
motion to dismiss to allow the corporation an opportunity to 
remove those structural impediments. 
Moreover, I would conclude that MPRA did remove the 
structural impediments to Mumane's investigation and that 
Mumane's second report did reflect sufficient independence 
and good faith to warrant dismissal. 
In reaching this conclusion, I am persuaded that the 
deficiencies in Mumane's first report were not the product of 
any wrongdoing by Mumane, but instead were the necessary 
result of the structural impediments imposed by MPRA. 
That conclusion is confirmed by the majority opinion's 
review of Mumane's first report, which concludes that 
"Mumane lacked independence because the MPRA's initial 
resolution restricted his factual investigation." The resolution 
of the MPRA board, authorizing Mumane's continuing 
investigation after his first report, was appropriately broad: 
Special Counsel is not required to assume 
as correct any portion of the previous 
reports prepared on behalf of the Board of 
Directors. Special Counsel is encouraged 
to solicit facts, argument and other input 
from the parties to the litigation in such 
manner and form as Special Counsel 
deems appropriate. Special Counsel is 
not limited in any way as to how to 
conduct his investigation or what material 
he may consider. Special Counsel shall 
have complete independence and may 
undertake whatever good faith investigation 
he chooses. 
The fault in Mumane's first report was cured by his 
further investigation and second report. Mumane interviewed 
Janssen and their attorneys, reviewed documents they 
provided and analyzed the arguments they presented. 
Mumane considered all of the germane benefits and 
detriments to MPRA of participating in the litigation. 
There may be situations where an initial investigation by a 
special litigation committee is so tainted that an expanded 
investigation, at least by the same committee, could not 
cure the deficiencies in the required independence and good 
faith. For example, if there was evidence that Mumane had 
developed some bias or was committed to reach the same 
recommendation no matter what facts or arguments were 
brought to his attention, the second report would stand no 
better than the first. However, I see no evidence that this was 
the case. 
Finally, I cannot agree with the majority opinion's view 
that Mumane's legal evaluation of the likely outcome of the 
derivative action somehow discredited the independence or 
good faith of his investigation. *892 Although Mumane, as 
a special litigation committee, was expected to exercise the 
"business judgment" of a board of directors, that business 
judgment must be applied to the merits of the derivative 
action. The best interests of MPRA depend upon an objective 
assessment of whether the likely outcome of the derivative 
action justifies the expenditure of time, effort and collegiality. 
In such a cost-benefit analysis, the potential benefit depends 
directly upon the likelihood of a favorable outcome in the 
litigation-the less likely a favorable outcome, the less benefit. 
Mumane's report concludes that there would be no benefit to 
participating in the derivative action-"the association would 
be unsuccessful in prosecuting a cause of action against Best 
& Flanagan, Brian Rice and Charles Berquist"-but that the 
cost would be significant, despite the willingness of Janssen's 
counsel to proceed on a contingent fee basis-"the ongoing 
viability of the association and a harmonious relationship 
between its board of directors and legal counsel" would be 
adversely affected. This is precisely the type of business 
judgment that a special litigation committee is expected to 
make and, when made in good faith by a committee that 
is independent of the corporation's board, it is entitled to 
deference by the court. Accordingly, I would reverse the court 
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of appeals and conclude that the district court did not err when B L A T Z ' C h i e f J u s t i c e ( c o n c u ™ g i n Part> dissenting in part). 
it dismissed the derivative action based on Murnane's second
 T • • • *u J J- * r r *• TT 
I join m the concurrence and dissent of Justice Hanson. 
report and recommendation. 
Footnotes 
1 For a thorough discussion of the rationale behind judicial deference to business decisions, see Peter V. Letsou, Implications of 
Shareholder Diversification on Corporate Law and Organization: The Case of the Business Judgment Rule, 11 Chi.-Kent L.Rev. 
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Ass'n, Inc. v. Detyens, 291 S.C. 214, 352 S.E.2d 714, 716 (App.1987); Burke v. Tennessee Walking Horse Breeders' & Exhibitors' 
Ass'n, 1997 WL 277999, *9 (Tenn.Ct.App.1997); John v. John, 153 Wis.2d 343, 450 N.W.2d 795, 801-02 (Wis.Ct.App. 1989). 
3 Both Janssen and MPRA accepted the premise that the full MPRA board was not independent enough to merit judicial deference as 
a decision maker, and made no arguments about deferring to the decision of the board of directors to accept Murnane's report. Thus, 
we are focusing on whether Murnane's decision is entitled to deference. 
4 See Peter Frumkin & Alice Andre-Clark, Nonprofit Compensation and the Market, 21 U. Haw. L.Rev. 425, 427 (1999) (describing a 
lawsuit by a trustee of an educational organization against another trustee); Miller v. Bargaheiser, 70 Ohio App.3d 702, 591 N.E.2d 
1339, 1341 (1990) (involving a derivative suit on behalf of a nonprofit hospital); Dockside Ass'n, 352 S.E.2d at 714 (involving a 
suit against a property association). 
5 We do not adopt a particular version of the business judgment rule for use with Minnesota nonprofit organizations today. Because we 
hold that Murnane's investigation failed the most minimal version of a business judgment rule, requiring that a litigation committee 
act in good faith, with independence, we need not reach the question of whether a more exacting standard of judicial review may be 
appropriate for nonprofit corporations than in the case of for-profit corporations. The members of nonprofits are not akin to diversified 
shareholders-any risk sustained by them cannot necessarily be spread among their other investments. Nor can they necessarily protect 
themselves by taking their assets elsewhere. 
6 We note that the district court could have deferred the motion in order to simply supplement the record. However, there is a marked 
difference between allowing a corporation to supply documents that better indicate the process it employed in reaching its business 
decision, and allowing the corporation to reconstitute its litigation committee and revamp its investigation. The former is permitted 
by a judge's authority to continue a summary judgment motion to more fully develop the record; the latter is not supported by the 
principles underlying the application of the business judgment doctrine. 
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Opinion 
CHANDLER, Chancellor. 
*1 After a four-month investigation of plaintiffs' claims 
in this derivative action, a special litigation committee 
(the "SLC") formed by nominal defendant iGov has 
recommended dismissal of plaintiffs' suit. I deny the SLC's 
motion to dismiss because there are material questions of fact 
regarding (1) the SLC's independence, (2) the good faith of 
its investigation, and (3) whether the grounds upon which 
it recommended dismissal of this lawsuit are reasonable. 
Accordingly, plaintiffs may continue to pursue this action. 
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I. FACTS 
This dispute springs from the approval and implementation 
of an equity incentive plan on January 30, 2007 (the "2007 
Plan") by defendants in their role as iGov directors. To better 
understand the context of that approval, I begin our review of 
the facts at an earlier date and tell the story chronologically. 
A. iGov Begins to Reinvent Itself and Wins the TACLAN 
Contract 
In 1996, plaintiffs Craig London and James Hunt, defendants 
Patrick Neven and Walter Hupalo, and others founded MA 
Federal, Inc., which does business as iGov ("iGov" or 
the "Company"). iGov is a government contracting firm 
that initially focused on the reseller market for information 
technology hardware, primarily selling to federal military 
and civilian agencies. After nine years in the low margin, 
highly competitive reseller market, however, the Company 
decided to change its focus from product sales to the higher-
margin government services market. This shift in focus, 
which occurred in 2005, was driven by management's view 
that iGov could not sustain itself over the long term in 
the reseller business because of increasing competition from 
larger players. 
In October 2005, iGov won its first government services 
contract with the United States Special Operations Command. 
iGov refers to this agreement as the TACLAN contract, 
which stands for Tactical Local Area Network Production. 
TACLAN units are portable centers capable of coordinating 
communications for special operations forces ail over 
the world. Under the TACLAN contract, iGov was to 
engineer, manufacture, test, train, and support TACLAN 
units, something it had little to no previous experience doing. 
Plaintiffs' complaint alleges that the TACLAN contract was 
a 5-year, $300 million competitive contract that would 
likely provide iGov with a substantial stream of high-
margin services revenue. The $300 million figure in the 
TACLAN contract was an expenditure ceiling that could 
not be exceeded without government authorization, not a 
guarantee that the government would actually spend $300 
million. iGov's ongoing performance under the TACLAN 
contract would largely determine how much the government 
spent. iGov's gross profit margins on the TACLAN contract 
would, of course, depend on how well iGov managed its 
costs. Thus, profitability under the TACLAN contract was 
driven by the volume of government orders and iGov's cost 
management. 
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B. Tyrrell is Hired to Help Solve iGov's Financial 
Difficulties 
*2 iGov incurred substantial non-recurring expenses when 
it began to reinvent itself as a service provider in 2005. These 
expenses placed iGov in a financially precarious position. In 
an effort to lift the Company out of its fiscal doldrums, iGov's 
CEO, Neven, sought help from a professional "turn-around 
expert" called Tatum LLC. Tatum provided Michael Tyrrell 
for the job and Tyrrell began to work for iGov as a consultant 
in September 2005. 
As a result of the financial difficulties iGov experienced in 
2005, its relationship with its primary lender soured. By May 
2006, iGov was searching for a new lender to supply it with 
an operating line of credit. Textron Financial ("Textron") 
emerged as a promising source of credit. To induce Textron 
to extend the needed credit, Tyrrell kept Textron apprised 
of iGov's financial condition on an ongoing basis. Tyrrell 
created and approved the financial information transmitted to 
Textron, which included monthly income statements, balance 
sheets, and forecasts for fiscal years 2006 and 2007. 
C. The First Textron Forecast and the DHS Contract 
On May 4, 2006, Tyrrell sent Textron an email with a 
fiscal year 2007 ("FY07") forecast reflecting an EBITDA of 
approximately $3.5 million (the "First Textron Forecast"). In 
the email Tyrrell explained that the First Textron Forecast 
assumed iGov "will be successful in winning the Department 
of Homeland Security (DHS) contract." The DHS contract 
is a competitive contract under which multiple vendors 
compete to provide information technology hardware to the 
various agencies directed by the DHS. Tyrrell included $10 
million in DHS contract revenue in the First Textron Forecast. 
Tyrrell explained to Textron that he was normally "very 
hesitant to put unawarded contracts into [iGov] forecasts" but 
nevertheless included $10 million in DHS contract revenue 
because he had "been pretty conservative in other areas" 
of the First Textron Forecast and felt that $10 million was 
"a reasonable figure." He further noted that if iGov was 
awarded the DHS contract it would probably yield $30-50 
million in first year business. Other important line items in 
the First Textron Forecast included $6 million in revenue 
for iGov's Air Force unit, $35 million in revenue for GCG 
(an iGov subsidiary), and $195 million in revenue for the 
TACLAN contract. 
By July 2006 negotiations with Textron were nearing 
completion. To finalize a $12 million line of credit, London 
was asked to execute a personal guarantee required by 
Textron's lending guidelines. Defendants allege that on the 
due date of the guarantee, London demanded an employment 
contract in exchange for signing. Apparently Neven did not 
look favorably on this demand and decided to remove London 
from his position as CFO in response. Shortly thereafter, 
Neven asked Tyrrell to become iGov's full-time CFO. Neven 
signed the personal guarantee and the $12 million line of 
credit was obtained. 
E. The Second Textron Forecast 
*3 On August 15, 2006, Tyrrell sent Textron an updated 
FY07 forecast showing an EBITDA of roughly $3 million 
(the "Second Textron Forecast"). The major differences 
between the Second Textron Forecast and the First Textron 
Forecast were that projected revenues for the GCG subsidiary 
were lowered to $25 million and projected revenues from the 
TACLAN contract were lowered to $ 183 million. 
F. The Original Chessiecap Forecast 
At some point in 2006 defendants decided that it would 
be advisable to implement the 2007 Plan for the benefit of 
key members of management. Defendants caused iGov to 
retain Chessiecap Securities, Inc. ("Chessiecap") to value 
iGov stock for purposes of setting the exercise price of 
options under the 2007 Plan. Plaintiffs complaint alleges that 
defendants "secretly decided to implement [the 2007 Plan] 
at an unfair price to benefit themselves at the expense of the 
other stockholders." 
Chessiecap was to perform a valuation of iGov as of July 
31, 2006. To support the valuation, Tyrrell sent Chessiecap a 
FY07 forecast on August 23, 2006 that showed an EBITDA 
of roughly $3 million (the "Original Chessiecap Forecast"). 
The Original Chessiecap Forecast was identical to the Second 
Textron Forecast. 
G. The Revised Chessiecap Forecast and the Final 
Valuation 
On October 2, 2006, Chessiecap completed its Draft 
Valuation, concluding that iGov equity was worth $5.5 
million. After reviewing the Draft Valuation, Tyrrell sent an 
! I I O .-^.-x, , , - s ^ . ^ ^ ^ f \h?l~.rirc- 9 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
London v. Tyrrell, Not Reported in A.2d (2010) 
email to Chessiecap expressing his view that it was "probably 
on the high side." Tyrrell gave various reasons for this view. 
Three of these reasons are of note. First, Tyrrell asserted that 
the projected $10 million in revenue (and associated costs) 
for FY07 from the DHS contract should not be considered 
in the valuation because the DHS contract had not been 
formally awarded. Second, Tyrrell asserted that the projected 
$25 million in revenues (and associated costs) from the GCG 
subsidiary for FY07 should be removed because GCG would 
be closed before year-end. Third, Tyrrell asserted that most of 
the projected $6 million in revenues and associated costs from 
the Air Force unit for FY07 should be removed because iGov 
was also likely to close down that unit before year-end. On 
October 18, 2006, Tyrrell sent Chessiecap a revised forecast 
that eliminated the revenues and expenses from these three 
line items. 7 This updated FY07 forecast showed an EBITDA 
of $1.8 million (the "Revised Chessiecap Forecast"), 40% 
less than the $3 million EBITDA reflected in the Original 
Chessiecap Forecast. 
Plaintiffs' complaint asserts that in preparing the Revised 
Chessiecap Forecast, Tyrrell made material changes based 
on developments that had occurred after the July 31, 2006 
valuation date. For example, iGov did not announce that 
it was going to close down GCG until October 4, 2006, 
but Tyrrell incorporated this development into the Revised 
Chessiecap Forecast. Thus, Chessiecap's Final Valuation, of 
which more will be said momentarily, was not strictly an 
evaluation based on what was known or anticipated as of July 
31,2006. According to plaintiffs, this is problematic because, 
although the Revised Chessiecap Forecast accounted for 
negative developments that occurred after July 31, 2006, it 
did not reflect positive developments that occurred after the 
valuation date. Specifically, plaintiffs allege that iGov had 
been awarded a $7 million contract with the U.S. Patent 
and Trademark Office ("PTO") in September 2006, but this 
was not reflected in the Revised Chessiecap Forecast. Also, 
plaintiffs allege that by October 2006 the TACLAN contract 
was generating higher profits than management had originally 
expected but this was ignored when preparing the Revised 
o 
Chessiecap Forecast. 
*4 Plaintiffs contend that the Revised Chessiecap Forecast 
was never disclosed to Textron. Plaintiffs also allege that the 
Revised Chessiecap Forecast was never used by the Company 
in managing its business. Rather, the Revised Chessiecap 
Forecast was purposely designed to suppress the value of the 
Company and was only used by Chessiecap. 
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On October 31,2006, Chessiecap certified its Final Valuation 
of iGov, which was partially based on the Revised Chessiecap 
Forecast. The Final Valuation placed the value of iGov equity 
at $4.7 million, approximately 15% lower than Chessiecap's 
Draft Valuation of $5.5 million. At the time the Final 
Valuation was issued, Chessiecap did not calculate the fair 
market value per share of iGov equity. This was done later to 
support approval of the 2007 Plan on January 30, 2007. 
H. The Third Textron Forecast 
After the Final Valuation was issued, Tyrrell continued 
to update Textron on iGov's finances. Tyrrell's updates 
portrayed a brighter outlook on the EBITDA front than had 
been communicated to Chessiecap in the Revised Chessiecap 
Forecast. For example, on December 1, 2006, Tyrrell resent 
the Second Textron Forecast to a different Textron employee. 
In the accompanying email Tyrrell explained that iGov was 
in the process of further updating its FY07 forecast and that 
he expected the revised forecast to be "just as good, if not 
better."9 
On December 8, 2006, as promised, Tyrrell sent Textron 
an updated FY07 forecast that showed an EBITDA of 
approximately $3.1 million (the "Third Textron Forecast"). 
The individual line items in the Third Textron Forecast 
differed in many respects from the Second Textron Forecast, 
though the overall EBITDA was substantially the same.10 
The important factual consideration for present purposes 
is the many respects in which the Third Textron Forecast 
differed from the Revised Chessiecap Forecast. For instance, 
the Third Textron Forecast included approximately $1.9 
million in revenue for the Air Force unit (as opposed to 
$900,000), $950,000 in revenue for GCG (as opposed to 
$0), and $15 million in revenue for the DHS contract (as 
opposed to $0). The Third Textron Forecast also reflected 
$7 million higher projected revenues for the Navy unit. 
Although TACLAN revenues were projected to be roughly $8 
million lower, the projected gross profit from the TACLAN 
contract was $2 million higher. The net result of all these 
changes was a stark difference in EBITDA between the Third 
Textron Forecast and the Revised Chessiecap Forecast: $3.1 
million versus $1.8 million. 
/. The Tyrrell Baseline Forecast 
Defendants allege that in December 2006 Tyrrell developed 
three additional forecasts, presumably for internal purposes. 
Each forecast was based on different assumptions about 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
London v. Tyrrell, Not Reported in A.2d (2010) 
36 Del. J.Corp.L. 359 ' ' ' ' " " — — — ~ " — " ~ ~ ~ — 
the future and accordingly yielded different results. The 
"Baseline Forecast" showed an EBITDA of $2.1 million (the 
"Tyrrell Baseline Forecast"). It was nearly identical to the 
Third Textron Forecast. The one major difference was that the 
$15 million in revenue from the DHS contract and associated 
expenses were eliminated from the Tyrrell Baseline Forecast. 
The gross profit margin on the DHS contract accounted for 
most of the $1 million difference in EBITDA between the two 
12 projections. In addition to the Tyrrell Baseline Forecast, 
Tyrrell allegedly developed a $4.3 million EBITDA forecast 
which he dubbed the "Better Forecast" and a $6.1 million 
EBITDA forecast which he dubbed the "Stretch Forecast." 
From the record, it is not entirely clear what, if anything, these 
latter two forecasts were used for. 
J. iGov's Internal Forecasts Remain Higher than the 
Revised Chessiecap Forecast 
*5 In addition to showing that the First, Second, and 
Third Textron Forecasts were decidedly more positive 
than the Revised Chessiecap Forecast, plaintiffs proffered 
evidence that iGov continued to project a FY07 EBITDA 
of approximately $3-4 million internally after Chessiecap 
had been given the Revised Chessiecap Forecast showing an 
EBITDA of only $1.8 million. For example, in December 
2006, a strategic management plan prepared by Hupalo 
included a goal to "exceed $3 million in EBITDA by year-
end FY#07." 13 On December 15, 2006, Neven represented 
in an email to a stockholder that "iGov is financially healthy 
again, ... we expect to be at $150 million this coming year 
with an EBITAD [sic] of $3 million ..."14 On January 7, 
2007, Tyrrell sent the Third Textron Forecast to the incoming 
CFO Rich Marksberry and informed him that it was "the 
baseline case forecast for iGov for FY07" and that iGov 
was "currently updating a version that shows EBITDA of 
over $4 million, which we think is possibly achievable this 
year." OnJanuary 12,2007, Tyrrell made a presentation at 
a business development strategy meeting that projected FY07 
EBITDA at over $4 million.17 And on February 10, 2007, 
Tyrrell sent an email to a strategic consultant representing that 
18 
"our working internal forecast shows EBITDA of $3MM." 
K. Plaintiffs Object to the Final Valuation 
On December 22,2006, Tyrrell became concerned that nearly 
half a year had passed since the July 31, 2006 valuation date 
on Chessiecap's Final Valuation. The 2007 Plan was taking 
longer to implement than defendants had anticipated. Tyrrell 
contacted Chessiecap and asked them if the Final Valuation 
needed to be updated "since our 2006 valuation is dated July 
31, 2006 and the stock options will not be given until the 
end of next month ... ?" Chessiecap replied that the Final 
Valuation was good for one year, unless significant events 
had occurred that would materially change the financial 
20 
prospects of the Company. 
On December 29, 2006, plaintiffs were provided a copy of 
Chessiecap's Final Valuation placing iGov's equity value at 
$4.7 million. After reviewing the Final Valuation plaintiffs 
requested copies of the information Chessiecap had relied on. 
Among other things, they were given the Revised Chessiecap 
Forecast. In the meantime, on January 7,2007, Tyrrell sent an 
email to iGov management regarding a proposal to purchase 
London's shares for $4 per share, plus a "kicker" down the 
road if iGov was sold. In the email, Tyrrell expressed the view 
that "since [iGov's] valuation is a few months old, [iGov] will 
probably have to have it updated and the valuation will likely 
21 
be higher than $4.7 million...." Tyrrell concluded that the 
$4 per share figure would still be fair to London because the 
number of iGov's issued shares was soon to be increased by 
the 2007 Plan. On January 16,2007, however, after reviewing 
the Revised Chessiecap Forecast, London objected to iGov 
relying on Chessiecap's Final Valuation for purposes of the 
2007 Plan because he felt the information upon which the 
Final Valuation was based was stale and inaccurate. The 
next day, Hunt, who also believed the Final Valuation was 
unreliable, made an offer to buy all of Neven's stock at $28 per 
share. Hunt later made the same offer to other shareholders, 
apparently with the design of purchasing enough shares to 
gain voting control of iGov. 
L. Plaintiffs are Removed from the Board 
*6 At this point, in a narrative much belabored with 
disorienting descriptions of multiple financial forecasts, the 
human controversy begins. Plaintiffs London and Hunt 
comprised half of the iGov board on January 16 and 17, when 
it became clear that they disagreed with using Chessiecap's 
Final Valuation in its then-current form. The other half of 
the iGov board consisted of defendants Neven and Hupalo. 
Collectively, Neven and Hupalo owned 42.5% of iGov's 
voting stock. On January 19,2007, Neven and Hupalo teamed 
up with iGov officer and shareholder Jack Pooley, the three of 
them collectively owning 50.1% of iGov's voting stock, and 
executed written stockholder consents removing plaintiffs 
from the board. At the same time, they elected Tyrrell to the 
board. Thus, after January 19, 2007, defendants made up the 
entire iGov board. 
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M. The 2007 Plan is Adopted 
On January 30, 2007, the core series of events occurred 
that gave rise to this litigation. To address Hunt's $28 per 
share offer, defendants engaged Chessiecap to prepare an 
addendum to its Final Valuation. In the addendum, dated 
January 30, 2007, Chessiecap opined that Hunt's offer did 
not affect or change Chessiecap's opinion that iGov's equity 
value was $4.7 million. The addendum stated that Hunt's offer 
was conditioned on his receiving enough shares to own a 
majority of iGov's voting stock and that this excluded Hunt's 
offer "from any consideration in Chessiecap's valuation of the 
Company, which was premised upon privately-held, minority 
discounted stock." The addendum then determined for 
the first time the share price of iGov stock, concluding 
that the fair market value per share as of July 31, 2006 
was $4.92. In calculating this per-share price, the addendum 
incorrectly included 65,000 shares and 300,000 options that 
were not outstanding as of the July 31, 2006 valuation date. 
These shares and options were not approved until January 
30, 2007 (the day the addendum was issued) as part of 
the 2007 Plan, which I will describe in detail momentarily. 
Plaintiffs assert that defendants knew these shares and options 
were inappropriately included in Chessiecap's per share 
calculation, but ignored the purported error as it resulted in a 
lower value that benefitted defendants. 
Defendants also held a special meeting of the iGov board 
on January 30, 2007. As Hunt, the former chairman, had 
just been removed as a director, the first order of business 
was appointing a new chairman. Neven was appointed by 
unanimous consent and he then called the meeting to order. 
During the meeting Tyrrell was named President, Chief 
Operating Officer, and Treasurer of iGov and Marksberry was 
named CFO. 
The primary purpose of the meeting was to consider the 
2007 Plan. Under the 2007 Plan, 300,000 stock options were 
to be issued to various directors and senior executives. Of 
the 300,000 options, Tyrrell was to receive 80,000, Neven 
50,000, and Hupalo 50,000. Thus, collectively, defendants 
were to be given 60% of the options granted under the 
2007 Plan. In addition, the 2007 Plan contemplated the sale 
of 65,000 shares of stock to Tyrrell. In contrast, plaintiffs 
were not to be given any options or shares under the 2007 
Plan, presumably because they had been removed from their 
director and management positions. 
*7 The 2007 Plan provided that the exercise price of the 
options could not be less than 100% of the fair market 
value of iGov common stock on the date the options were 
granted and that the sale of shares to Tyrrell would be 
at their fair market value on the date of sale. Defendants 
unanimously voted as directors to approve the 2007 Plan. 
Defendants simultaneously adopted $4.92 per share as the 
fair market value of iGov shares on January 30, 2007 based 
on Chessiecap's Final Valuation, dated July 31, 2006, and 
the associated addendum. Before approving the 2007 Plan, 
Tyrrell represented to Chessiecap that no material change 
had occurred and so it was still appropriate, in his view, to 
23 
rely on the Final Valuation. All defendants then implicitly 
accepted that no material change had occurred by approving 
$4.92 per share as the fair market value. Tyrrell purchased his 
65,000 shares the next day. 
Plaintiffs allege that the 2007 Plan was designed to 
substantially reduce their ownership interests in iGov and 
increase defendants' interests to a level that would permit 
defendants to entrench themselves as iGov directors and 
managers. In support of this theory, plaintiffs assert that 
implementation of the 2007 Plan immediately reduced their 
collective ownership interests from 44% to 40%. On a fully 
diluted basis, the 2007 Plan allegedly reduced plaintiffs' 
collective ownership interests from 42.3% to 28.7%. At the 
same time, the 2007 Plan allegedly increased defendants' 
collective ownership interests from 50.1% to 54.1% and, on a 
fully diluted basis, defendants' collective ownership interests 
allegedly increased from 48.2% to 54.2%.24 
As we have discussed, plaintiffs contend that defendants 
manipulated the Final Valuation by excluding positive 
developments which occurred after July 31, 2006 from the 
Revised Chessiecap Forecast. Plaintiffs also contend that 
defendants wrongfully declined to update either the Revised 
Chessiecap Forecast or the Final Valuation before approving 
the 2007 Plan, falsely representing that no material change 
had occurred between July 31, 2006 and January 30, 2007. 
Plaintiffs point to three specific developments which were 
purportedly ignored. First, the $7 million PTO contract had 
been awarded on September 29, 2006, but was not reflected 
in the Revised Chessiecap Forecast or the Final Valuation. 
Second, on December 20, 2006, iGov received a pre-award 
notice that it had been selected as one of the vendors 
under the DHS contract, putting the Company one step 
further towards realizing DHS revenue in 2007, but no such 
revenues were included in the Revised Chessiecap Forecast 
or the Final Valuation. And third, by January 30, 2007, 
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iGov was aware that the TACLAN contract was performing 
better than expected but did not have Chessiecap update its 
Final Valuation to reflect the increased profitability of the 
TACLAN contract.25 
Other features of the 2007 Plan should be noted to tell the 
full story. For starters, the 2007 Plan replaced an existing 
equity incentive plan at iGov. In February 2001, the iGov 
board had approved the 2000 Stock Option and Incentive Plan 
(the "2000 Plan"). The 2000 Plan gave iGov the power to 
grant stock options to various officers, directors, consultants, 
and other employees at an exercise price of $5.00 per share. 
No formal valuation appears to have supported the $5.00 
strike price, though options were granted to employees and 
exercised at this price. A few years later, on February 26, 
2003, London proposed that Neven, Hupalo, and London 
should each be awarded 50,000 options under the 2000 Plan at 
an exercise price of $1.25 per share as compensation for their 
services to iGov. The board approved London's proposal, but 
these options were never exercised. In fact, there is a dispute 
over whether they were ever actually granted. Evidently, 
in 2005 iGov's auditors noted that the marked difference 
between the $5.00 and $1.25 strike prices under the 2000 Plan 
had not been properly accounted for, and would give rise to 
a substantial charge on the financial statements if iGov was 
determined to leave the $1.25 options in place. 
*8 Defendants contend that the 2007 Plan was an effort 
to revamp the 2000 Plan, which was imperfectly structured, 
and to replace the $1.25 options granted to Neven, Hupalo, 
and London. Accordingly, defendants assert that in adopting 
the 2007 Plan Neven and Hupalo gave up options with a 
strike price of $1.25 for options with a strike price of $4.92, 
sacrificing personally for the good of the Company. Plaintiffs, 
on the other hand, contend that the $1.25 options were never 
actually granted and so Neven and Hupalo gave up nothing. I 
will explore this dispute later. For now, I simply note that the 
2007 Plan as adopted explicitly superseded the 2000 Plan (at 
least to the extent it was legitimate). 
The 2007 Plan also gave Neven and Tyrrell the collective 
authority to grant up to 25,000 options to the new CFO, 
Marksberry, at an exercise price equal to the fair market value 
of the shares on the date of the grant. If Neven and Tyrrell 
both wished to grant Marksberry these options, the 2007 Plan 
required them to do it by April 15, 2007. Marksberry did 
not receive a grant of options by that date and the delegated 
authority to Neven and Tyrrell expired. 
Finally, the 2007 Plan provided that stockholder approval 
would be obtained within twelve months. Plaintiffs, who 
remained stockholders in iGov after their removal from the 
board, allege that they never voted on the 2007 Plan. 
N. The DHS Contract is Awarded 
A few months later, in March 2007, iGov announced that it 
had formally been awarded the DHS contract. This placed 
the Company firmly in the position of being able to realize 
DHS revenues in 2007. The amount of DHS revenues to 
be realized, of course, would depend on how well iGov 
performed under the DHS contract relative to the other 
approved vendors. As we have seen, Tyrrell had excluded 
DHS revenues from the Revised Chessiecap Forecast because 
the DHS contract had not been formally awarded. 
O. Marksberry is Granted 25, 000 Shares 
Despite having formally secured the DHS contract, on May 
30, 2007, defendants approved the grant of 25,000 options to 
27 
Marksberry at a strike price of $4.92 per share. Apparently 
cognizant that ten months had passed since the date of 
Chessiecap's Final Valuation, defendants explicitly stated 
in the board resolution approving the grants that "there 
ha[d] been no material changes affecting the Company's 
financial operations or prospects which would affect [the 
Final] Valuation since the date of its last determination of 
28 
Fair Market Value." Thus, in approving the option grants 
to Marksberry, defendants relied on Chessiecap's advice that 
the Final Valuation was good for one year absent any material 
changes and on its own determination that no material 
changes had occurred between July 31, 2006 and May 30, 
2007. Defendants made this determination even though the 
DHS contract had been formally awarded in the interim. 
P. Plaintiffs'Suit 
After the 2007 Plan was approved, plaintiffs made a books 
and records request under 8 Del C. § 220. The ground for the 
request was plaintiffs' objection to iGov using Chessiecap's 
Final Valuation as the basis for the $4.92 per share strike 
price. Plaintiffs also engaged the McLean Group, a valuation 
firm, to conduct separate valuations of iGov's equity as of 
October 31, 2006 and December 31, 2006 (the "McLean 
Valuations"). In performing the McLean Valuations, McLean 
used the Second Textron Forecast rather than the Revised 
Chessiecap Forecast. McLean noted that Chessiecap's Final 
Valuation incorrectly included in its option-pricing model 
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the 300,000 options and the 65,000 shares approved by the 
2007 Plan, rather than the outstanding 745,000 shares that 
actually existed as of July 31, 2006. The McLean Valuations 
placed the per share value of iGov equity at $13.32 on 
October 31, 2006 and $15.45 on December 31, 2006. The 
McLean Valuations were sent to iGov on September 18,2007, 
along with McLean's separate critique of Chessiecap's Final 
Valuation. 
*9 While the McLean Valuations were being conducted, 
iGov expanded the size of its board from three members 
to five. In August 2007, Vincent Salvatori and John Vinter 
became iGov directors. Both men were first approached by 
Tyrrell and both had connections to him, which I will discuss 
at some length later. Both men also had extensive experience 
in government contracting that understandably made them 
attractive candidates for iGov's board. 
On October 31, 2007, after attempts to resolve the dispute 
failed, plaintiffs filed their complaint. The counts in the 
complaint are characterized as derivative and individual, 
alleging harm to iGov as a company and to plaintiffs in 
their personal capacity. In February 2008, the complaint was 
amended in response to defendants' motion to dismiss. 
The amended complaint contains three counts. Count I is 
a derivative claim for breach of fiduciary duty alleging 
defendants failed to honor their duties of care and loyalty. 
With regards to the duty of loyalty, Count I alleges 
that defendants materially misrepresented iGov's business 
prospects to Chessiecap in order to ensure a low valuation so 
that they could personally obtain iGov stock at an artificially 
low price. Count I also alleges that defendants breached 
their duty of loyalty by approving the 2007 Plan with the 
intent that it would firmly entrench them in their positions as 
directors and managers of iGov. Regarding the duty of care, 
Count I alleges that defendants failed to consider all material 
information available to them in determining the value of 
iGov stock for purposes of the 2007 Plan. In that vein, Count 
I alleges that defendants knew when they approved the 2007 
Plan that Chessiecap's Final Valuation was based on stale and 
inaccurate information and was therefore an inappropriate 
tool for determining the fair value of iGov shares as of January 
30, 2007. Count I also alleges that defendants had even more 
reason to believe the Final Valuation was outdated by May 
30, 2007 because the DHS contract had been definitively 
awarded by that date, but defendants still declined to have 
the Final Valuation updated. Count II is a request for relief 
rather than a cause of action. It seeks rescission of the option 
grants to defendants and the stock sale to Tyrrell based on the 
breaches of fiduciary duty described in Count I. Count III is 
characterized by plaintiffs as an individual claim, the personal 
harm being that defendants improperly diluted plaintiffs' 
ownership interests by implementing the 2007 Plan, thereby 
expropriating economic value and voting power from them. 
For their part, defendants contend that Count III is a derivative 
claim. 
Q. iGov Forms a Special Litigation Committee after its 
Motion to Dismiss is Denied 
After plaintiffs' complaint was amended, defendants again 
filed a motion to dismiss on several grounds, including 
plaintiffs' failure to make a demand on the board before filing 
suit. In my June 24, 2008 Opinion, I found that plaintiffs' 
complaint "easily survived" defendants' motion to dismiss; 
demand being excused because a majority of the board was 
interested in the transaction. Thereafter, on November 21, 
2008, the iGov board voted to form a two-member SLC 
comprised of Salvatori and Vinter to consider whether it 
was in iGov's best interest to pursue the derivative claims in 
plaintiffs' complaint. 
*10 After its formation, the SLC obtained advisors. In 
February 2009 the SLC engaged Blank Rome LLC as 
independent counsel and in March 2009 the SLC engaged 
Stout Risius Ross ("SRR") as its independent financial 
advisor. 
From April 2009 to July 2009 the SLC conducted its 
investigation. Discovery was stayed during this time. In 
conducting the investigation the SLC interviewed twelve 
witnesses and reviewed relevant documentation produced by 
the parties, iGov, Textron, Chessiecap, McLean, and others, 
including the documents provided to plaintiffs in response 
to their § 220 action. To inform their investigation, the 
SLC sought counsel's advice as to the legal principles that 
determine whether defendants complied with their fiduciary 
duties. 
During the investigation, the SLC charged SRR with two 
tasks. First, SRR was instructed to perform independent 
valuations of iGov as of October 31, 2006 and as of January 
30, 2007 (the "SRR Valuations"). The SLC required SRR 
to complete the SRR Valuations without reviewing the work 
done by Chessiecap and McLean, presumably to ensure that 
SRR would not be influenced by any previous valuation 
work performed. The SLC determined that October 31, 2006 
was an appropriate valuation date because it believed that 
Chessiecap's Final Valuation was essentially current as of 
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October 31, 2006, despite being dated July 31, 2006.3l The 
SLC determined that January 30, 2007 was an appropriate 
date for more obvious reasons; it was the date the challenged 
2007 Plan was adopted. I will discuss the SRR Valuations at 
greater length later but for now I note that the FY07 EBITDA 
forecast SRR used was the Tyrrell Baseline Forecast. The 
SRR Valuations concluded that iGov was worth $3.90-$4 .15 
per share as of October 31, 2006 and $5.24-55.39 per share 
as of January 30, 2007. The SLC concluded that the $4.92 
per share price was "within the range of fair market value" 
based on the SRR Valuations as well as Salvatori and Vinter's 
3? 
own professional experience in government contracting. 
Notably, despite the SRR Valuations, the SLC reasoned that 
$4.92 per share "was likely too high, from a practical, real 
world perspective, to express the Company's value." 
The second task SRR was charged with was to review the 
Chessiecap Final Valuation and the McLean Valuations and 
opine on them. SRR did this and helped the SLC prepare a 
summary comparison between the Chessiecap Valuation and 
McLean Valuations that was included in the SLC Report. The 
SLC concluded that both sets of valuations were "tainted" 
and reasoned that it was not necessary to determine which 
set of valuations was better. The SLC concluded that it 
could make a recommendation respecting this suit and iGov's 
best interests without declaring a winner in the battle between 
plaintiffs' and defendants' experts. 
On August 5, 2009, the SLC Report was filed. The SLC 
Report concludes that the suit is not in the best interests 
of the Company and recommends that it be dismissed. The 
SLC believes that the discovery that will resume if the 
suit is allowed to continue will be extremely disruptive 
to iGov's operations. The SLC also believes that negative 
publicity associated with the suit will immediately damage 
the Company's goodwill and reputation in the government 
contracting community. 
*11 As to the actual claims asserted in plaintiffs' complaint, 
the SLC Report concludes as follows. First, as to Count I, 
the SLC concluded that defendants acted properly in adopting 
the 2007 Plan and did not breach their duties of care or 
loyalty. With regards to the duty of care, the SLC found that 
the 8 Del. C. § 102(b)(7) provision in iGov's certificate of 
incorporation exculpates directors from personal liability not 
involving intentional misconduct or knowing violations of the 
law. The SLC concluded that a duty of care claim should not 
be pursued because defendants breach of care conduct, if it 
occurred, would be covered by the § 102(b)(7) provision. As 
« : .—v r-. /-% j . ts - r i ._ ! - > _ , . * _ _ „ K\* ^ 1 ^ . ; , 
to the duty of loyalty, the SLC concluded that defendants' 
approval of the 2007 Plan and actions leading to that approval 
would satisfy the entire fairness standard because the process 
employed was fair and the $4.92 strike price was fair. As to 
Count II the SLC determined that no rescission of the options 
granted and shares sold to defendants under the 2007 Plan 
should occur because $4.92 was in the range of fair market 
value. Finally, the SLC determined that Count III should 
be dismissed based on its belief that any dilution plaintiffs 
suffered was experienced equally by other shareholders and 
thus, no individual claim exists. Count III, according to the 
SLC, is a derivative claim arising out of the conduct alleged 
in Count I and should be dismissed for the same reasons that 
Count I should be dismissed. 
After reviewing the SLC Report plaintiffs filed an opposition 
brief arguing that the SLC has not met the standard required 
35 by Zapata Corporation v. Maldonado and its progeny for 
dismissal of a claim based on an SLC's recommendation in a 
demand-excused case. I now consider whether the SLC has 
met the Zapata standard and, consequently, whether the suit 
should be dismissed or permitted to proceed. 
II. STANDARD 
The Supreme Court's decision in Zapata governs demand-
excused derivative cases in which the board sets up an SLC 
that investigates whether a derivative suit should proceed 
and recommends dismissal after its investigation. In 
Zapata, the Supreme Court rejected the notion that the SLC's 
recommendation, made in the form of a motion to dismiss, 
37 
should be subject to business judgment review. Rather, the 
Supreme Court established a two-step analysis that must be 
applied to the SLC's motion to dismiss. The first step of the 
analysis is mandatory. The Court reviews the independence 
of SLC members and considers whether the SLC conducted 
a good faith investigation of reasonable scope that yielded 
38 
reasonable bases supporting its conclusions. The second 
step of the analysis is discretionary. The Court applies its 
own business judgment to the facts to determine whether the 
corporation's best interests would be served by dismissing the 
suit. The second step is designed for situations in which the 
technical requirements of step one are met but the result does 
not appear to satisfy the spirit of the requirements. 
*12 An SLC's motion to dismiss is a bit of a curiosity, 
procedurally speaking. It does not arise directly out of one 
of our rules of civil procedure. Rather, it is derived by 
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analogy to a motion to dismiss a derivative suit based 
upon a voluntary settlement between parties and by analogy 
to a Rule 41(a)(2) motion whereby a plaintiff unilaterally 
seeks voluntary dismissal of a complaint after the defendant 
files an answer. The Court treats the SLCs motion in a 
manner akin to a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment; 
the SLC bears the burden of demonstrating that there are 
no genuine issues of material fact as to its independence, 
the reasonableness and good faith of its investigation, and 
that there are reasonable bases for its conclusions. If the 
Court determines that a material fact is in dispute on any 
of these issues it must deny the SLCs motion. When an 
SLCs motion to dismiss is denied, control of the litigation 
is returned to the plaintiff shareholder. With the relevant 
standard broadly articulated, I now proceed to step one of 
Zapata. 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. Were the SLC Members Independent? 
Whether an SLC member is independent "is a fact-specific 
determination made in the context of a particular case." 
When an SLC member has no personal interest in the disputed 
transactions, the Court scrutinizes the members' relationship 
with the interested directors, as that would be the source of 
any independence impairment that might exist. The Court 
considers the relationship between each SLC member and the 
interested directors. 
An SLC member does not have to be unacquainted 
or uninvolved with fellow directors to be regarded as 
independent. But an SLC member is not independent 
if he or she is incapable, for any substantial reason, of 
making a decision with only the best interests of the 
48 
corporation in mind. Essentially, this means that the 
independence inquiry goes beyond determining whether SLC 
members are under the "domination and control" of an 
49 
interested director. Independence can be impaired by 
lesser affiliations, so long as those affiliations are substantial 
enough to present a material question of fact as to whether 
the SLC member can make a totally unbiased decision. For 
example, independence could be impaired if the SLC member 
senses that he owes something to the interested director based 
on prior events. This sense of obligation need not be of a 
financial nature. 
The independence inquiry under the Zapata standard has 
often been informed by case law addressing independence in 
the pre-suit demand context and vice-versa. This is a useful 
exercise but not one without limits. As the Supreme Court 
noted in Beam v. Stewart: 
Unlike the demand-excusal context, where the board is 
presumed to be independent, the SLC has the burden 
of establishing its own independence by a yardstick that 
must be "like Caesar's wife"-"above reproach." Moreover, 
unlike the presuit demand context, the SLC analysis 
contemplates not only a shift in the burden of persuasion 
but also the availability of discovery into various issues, 
including independence. 
*13 Unlike a board in the pre-suit demand context, SLC 
members are not given the benefit of the doubt as to their 
impartiality and objectivity. They, rather than plaintiffs, bear 
the burden of proving that there is no material question 
of fact about their independence. The composition of an 
SLC must be such that it fully convinces the Court that 
the SLC can act with integrity and objectivity, because the 
situation is typically one in which the board as a whole 
is incapable of impartially considering the merits of the 
suit. Thus, it is conceivable that a court might find a 
director to be independent in the pre-suit demand context but 
not independent in the Zapata context based on the same 
set of factual allegations made by the two parties. This is 
not because the substantive contours of the independence 
doctrine are different in these two contexts. Rather, it is 
primarily a function of the shift in the burden of proof from 
the plaintiff to the corporation when the suit moves from the 
pre-suit demand zone to the Zapata zone. 
It is undisputed that neither SLC member had a personal 
stake in the challenged transactions. Neither Salvatori nor 
Vinter received shares of stock or options under the 2007 
Plan and neither faces any risk of personal liability in this 
suit. Moreover, Salvatori and Vinter were not appointed 
to the board until after the 2007 Plan was adopted. In 
addition, plaintiffs do not allege that any of the defendants 
dominate or control Salvatori or Vinter. Thus, the focus 
must be on whether the relationships Salvatori and Vinter 
have with defendants are of such a nature that they might 
have caused Salvatori and Vinter to consider factors other 
than the best interests of the corporation in making their 
decision to move for dismissal. Such a relationship would 
raise a material question as to the SLCs independence. After 
carefully reviewing the evidence produced by the limited 
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discovery thus far permitted, I conclude that there is a material 
question of fact as to the independence of both SLC members 
based on their relationships to Tyrrell. 
I begin by discussing Vinter. Plaintiffs argue that Vinter's 
independence is impaired by one simple fact; Vinter's wife 
is Tyrrell's cousin. According to plaintiffs, it was that 
association that caused Tyrrell to approach Vinter about 
joining the iGov board. Defendants counter that this 
familial relationship does not impair Vinter's independence 
because Tyrrell and Vinter's wife are not close cousins; 
they only occasionally cross paths at large family functions 
once or twice each year. Plaintiffs respond that, even though 
Tyrrell and Vinter's wife may not be particularly close, 
it would have been impossible for Vinter not to think of 
Tyrrell as "my wife's cousin" when grappling with the 
difficult decision of recommending whether civil litigation 
against him should proceed. According to plaintiffs, this is a 
sufficient connection to create an unacceptable risk of bias in 
Vinter's mind. 
*14 Defendants cite Beam v. Stewart, a case in which 
the Supreme Court stated that "allegations of mere personal 
friendship or a mere outside business relationship, standing 
alone, are insufficient to raise a reasonable doubt about a 
en 
director's independence." Defendants argue that, under 
Beam, the familial connection between Tyrrell and Vinter 
is simply not enough to raise a material question of fact 
as to Vinter's independence. I disagree. Beam was a pre-
suit demand case, and the burden in that case was on the 
plaintiffs to allege facts sufficient to create a reasonable 
doubt that the board could not objectively consider a suit 
against its Chairman, Martha Stewart. In their complaint, 
the plaintiffs broadly alleged that Stewart had personal 
friendships or outside business dealings with certain of the 
directors. This was not enough, standing alone, to create 
a reasonable doubt about the ability of the directors to 
objectively consider the merits of a suit against Stewart. In 
this case, however, the burden is on iGov to show that it 
has appointed SLC members whose independence cannot 
seriously be doubted. The Company, not plaintiffs, must do 
the explaining in the first instance if there are associations 
that cast a shadow on independence. Frankly, appointing an 
interested director's family member to an SLC will always 
position a corporation on the low ground. From there, the 
corporation must fight an uphill battle to demonstrate that, 
notwithstanding kinship, there is no material question as 
to the SLC member's objectivity. Put simply, explaining 
away a familial association in Zapata territory is a more 
difficult challenge for a corporation than confronting a broad 
allegation of personal or business relationships in pre-suit 
demand territory. 
I admit that it is not possible, at this stage of the proceedings, 
to say unequivocally that Vinter's independence is impaired. 
On the one hand, the relationship between Vinter's wife 
and Tyrrell does not seem to be particularly close. They do 
not frequently associate with one another as some cousins 
are wont to do. On the other hand, they do see each 
other regularly, albeit infrequently, at family functions. For 
example, each year Vinter and his wife attend a large family 
party at Tyrrell's in honor of Tyrrell's mother, who has passed 
58 
away. Vinter also testified in his deposition that, while he 
did not see Tyrrell on a regular basis or personally discuss 
Tyrrell's work with him before joining the iGov board, he 
"sort of knew where he was at any given time...." Thus, 
the familial relationship appears to be close enough that 
Vinter has been kept apprised of Tyrrell's comings and goings 
through the family grapevine. To my mind, there is a material 
question of fact as to how much Vinter's family association 
with Tyrrell may have influenced his objectivity. I cannot 
say with certainty that Vinter would not have considered 
the potentially awkward situation of showing up to Tyrrell's 
annual party after the family rumor mill had spread the word 
that Vinter had recommended that a lawsuit should proceed 
against the host. Therefore, I am not convinced, as I 
must be under Zapata, that Vinter's recommendation would 
have been solely influenced by considerations of iGov's best 
interests. 
*15 Now to Salvatori. Like Vinter, Salvatori's contact with 
iGov was based on an association with Tyrrell. In 1993, 
Tyrrell was hired by Salvatori to work as an internal auditor 
for a company called QuesTech. Salvatori was a QuesTech 
cofounder and served as its President, CEO, and Chairman 
while Tyrrell was employed there for six years. During that 
time, Salvatori promoted Tyrrell to CFO, in which role he 
reported directly to Salvatori. Tyrrell worked as QuesTech's 
CFO until it was sold in 1998. Tyrrell appears to have made 
a significant and valued contribution to the efforts to sell 
QuesTech. In his deposition, Salvatori testified that he has "a 
great respect for [Tyrrell]. And he was very helpful in helping 
me get a good price for my company. Very helpful." 
Tyrrell's employment with QuesTech ended when it was 
sold. After the sale, Tyrrell and Salvatori maintained minimal 
connections. Their professional association was reinstated 
when Tyrrell approached Salvatori about joining the iGov 
board. 
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As noted, the independence of an SLC member may be 
impaired if that member feels he owes something to an 
interested director. That sense of obligation does not have 
to be financial in nature. In this case, I believe there is 
a material question of fact as to Salvatori's independence 
because his earlier associations with Tyrrell may have given 
rise to a sense of obligation or loyalty to him. Salvatori 
appears to have been satisfied with the price he received 
for QuesTech, and he continues to feel that Tyrrell was an 
important factor in securing that price. In saying this, I do not 
find that Salvatori in fact does feel a sense of obligation to 
Tyrrell, but there is certainly a strong possibility that he does, 
and that is enough under Zapata to preclude dismissal. 
Before moving on I note a few pieces of evidence that 
buttress my conclusion that there is a material question 
of fact regarding the SLC's independence. First, the SLC 
members appear to have reviewed the merits of plaintiffs' 
claims before the SLC was ever formed. In September 2007, 
plaintiffs' counsel sent a letter to iGov outlining many of the 
allegations that ultimately appeared in plaintiffs' complaint 
and requesting a meeting to begin resolving the dispute. 
The McLean Valuations were attached to the letter. In 
response, iGov's counsel sent a letter explaining that iGov 
disagreed with plaintiffs' allegations and would not meet 
until defendants and "iGov's new board members, John 
Vinter and Vincent Salvatori, had time to review the McLean 
Valuations." Vinter and Salvatori both testified that they 
could not remember reviewing the McLean Valuations, but 
it is clear that the iGov audit committee, on which both 
men sit, reviewed the McLean Valuations on October 29, 
2007. When SLC members are simply exposed to or 
become familiar with a derivative suit before the SLC is 
formed this may not be enough to create a material question 
of fact as to the SLC's independence. But if evidence suggests 
that the SLC members prejudged the merits of the suit based 
on that prior exposure or familiarity, and then conducted the 
investigation with the object of putting together a report that 
demonstrates the suit has no merit, this will create a material 
question of fact as to the SLC's independence. In this case, 
that is what has occurred. 
*16 Two similar pieces of evidence suggest that Vinter 
and Salvatori may not have conducted their investigation 
objectively after having considered plaintiffs' claims. First, 
Salvatori was asked in his deposition about the SLC's efforts 
to investigate the allegations in plaintiffs' complaint. Salvatori 
responded "I know we read it all over and I know we 
attacked it all." Plaintiffs' counsel followed up with "[y]ou 
did what it all?" to which Salvatori answered "[ajttacked 
it all." Salvatori's counsel then repeated "[a] Hacked 
it all" after which Salvatori changed his answer to "[w]e 
/ T O 
considered it." To my mind, the word "attack" in this 
context suggests something other than objectivity. But I 
readily admit that expressions can be misinterpreted and 
words can be inadvertently misused. In fact, if this were the 
only piece of evidence suggesting that the SLC might have 
engaged in a combative assault rather than an investigation 
I would be inclined to consider Salvatori's use of the verb 
"attack" as ambiguous. But the second piece of evidence has 
Vinter using the same verb-"attack"-in relation to the McLean 
Valuations. 
Vinter's notes from a June 26, 2009 meeting, at which SRR 
gave an update of its views of the $4.92 strike price, state as 
follows: 
McLean attack 
-forecast 
-low margin 1.3 # 1.5 
-marketability discount 
-fully diluted approach 
As one can see, this appears to be a bullet-point summary 
of what is purportedly wrong with the McLean Valuations. 
Some of these criticisms of the McLean Valuations ended 
up in the SLC Report. In his deposition, Vinter stated his 
belief that he thought the word "attack" in the notes really 
70 
said "attach." But "attach" does not make any sense in the 
context of the note. 
Plaintiffs characterize Salvatori and Vinter's uses of the 
word "attack" as an indication that from the outset of the 
investigation the SLC was gathering information with the 
object of putting together a report that cast doubt on the merits 
of plaintiffs' claims, rather than objectively considering 
plaintiffs' claims. Given the SLC members' relationships to 
Tyrrell, their exposure to the merits of plaintiffs' suit well 
before the SLC was formed,7i and the unsatisfactory scope 
of the investigation conducted (of which more will be said 
below), Salvatori and Vinter's use of the word "attack" does 
not help to fully convince me that the SLC was independent. 
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In sum, the independence inquiry under Zapata is critically 
important if the SLC process is to remain a legitimate 
7? 
mechanism in our corporate law. SLC members should be 
selected with the utmost care to ensure that they can, in both 
fact and appearance, carry out the extraordinary responsibility 
placed on them to determine the merits of the suit and the 
best interests of the corporation, acting as proxy for a disabled 
board. In this case, I am not satisfied that the independence 
prong of the Zapata standard has been met. 
B. Did the SLC Conduct an Investigation of Reasonable 
Scope in Good Faith and Did the SLC Have Reasonable 
Bases for its Conclusions? 
*17 Because the manner in which the SLC investigated 
plaintiffs' complaint bears directly on whether it had 
reasonable bases for its conclusions, I will address both of 
these aspects of the Zapata test together. I begin with an 
overview of the legal standards for these two components of 
the test. 
To conduct a good faith investigation of reasonable scope, 
the SLC must investigate all theories of recovery asserted 
in the plaintiffs' complaint. In doing this, the SLC should 
explore all relevant facts and sources of information that bear 
on the central allegations in the complaint. If the SLC fails 
to investigate facts or sources of information that cut at the 
heart of plaintiffs' complaint this will usually give rise to a 
material question about the reasonableness and good faith of 
75 
the SLC's investigation. In addition, before an SLC decides 
not to explore specific acts of alleged misconduct because 
the costs of a full investigation outweigh any harm that may 
have been caused by those specific acts, the SLC should 
carefully analyze whether a summary investigation of those 
specific acts could shed light on the more serious allegations 
in the plaintiffs' complaint. A total failure to explore 
the less serious allegations in plaintiffs' complaint may cast 
doubt on the reasonableness and good faith of an SLC's 
investigation when exploring those less serious allegations, 
at least in summary fashion, would have helped the SLC 
gain a full understanding of the more serious allegations 
in plaintiffs' complaint.77 Finally, an SLC fails to conduct 
a reasonable investigation if it simply accepts defendants' 
version of disputed facts without consulting independent 
sources to verify defendants' assertions. 78 
To demonstrate that its recommendations are supported 
by reasonable bases, the SLC must show that it correctly 
understood the law relevant to the case. If the SLC's 
recommendation is based on an error of law then the basis 
70 
for that recommendation is not reasonable. Moreover, 
if the SLC gets the undisputed facts wrong in its report, 
and then relies on its erroneous recitation of the undisputed 
facts in making its dismissal recommendation, it also goes 
without saying that the basis for the recommendation is not 
80 
reasonable. 
Having articulated the relevant standards I turn to the 
SLC Report to determine if it demonstrates a reasonable 
investigation conducted in good faith and reasonable bases 
for the SLC's recommendation that this case be dismissed. 
The SLC Report identifies the SLC's recommendations 
for each of the three counts in plaintiffs' complaint. As 
we have seen, Count I alleges that defendants breached 
their fiduciary duties of care and loyalty by adopting the 
2007 Plan. The duty of care claims are based on the 
allegation that defendants approved the 2007 Plan knowing 
that Chessiecap's Final Valuation was based on stale and 
incomplete information in the Revised Chessiecap Forecast. 
The duty of loyalty claims are based on the allegation that 
defendants intentionally provided misleading and incomplete 
information to Chessiecap in order to artificially depress 
iGov's value so that defendants would receive underpriced 
options and shares when the 2007 Plan was implemented. 
Count II seeks rescission of the 2007 Plan and is essentially 
dependent on the success of Count I. Count III is styled as 
an individual claim, the personal harm being that defendants 
improperly diluted plaintiffs' ownership interests, thereby 
expropriating economic value and voting power from them. I 
analyze the SLC's recommendation on each count in turn. 
1. The Duty of Care Claims in Count I 
*18 The SLC first addressed Count I, ultimately concluding 
that it should be dismissed. As to the duty of care claims 
in Count I, the SLC found that the 8 Del C. § 102(b)(7) 
provision in iGov's corporate charter exculpates directors 
from personal liability for monetary damages so long as the 
director did not engage in intentional misconduct or knowing 
O 1 
violations of the law. The SLC concluded that a duty of 
care claim should not be pursued because defendants breach 
of care conduct, if it occurred, would be covered by the § 
102(b)(7) provision. 
I take this opportunity to note the first of many concerns 
I have with the conclusions in the SLC Report. In finding 
that the action should not be pursued on the basis of duty of 
care claims, the SLC noted that § 102(b)(7) provisions such 
19 
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as iGov's are routinely upheld by Delaware courts and that 
such a provision protects defendants from personal liability, 
in the form of money damages, for gross negligence. On 
that basis alone, the SLC concluded that duty of care claims 
against defendants should not be pursued. I find this to 
be an unreasonable conclusion because the SLC failed to 
consider that the requested relief in plaintiffs' complaint is 
not limited to money damages; it specifically requests that 
the 2007 Plan be rescinded. Under Delaware law, exculpatory 
provisions do not bar duty of care claims "in remedial 
82 contexts ..., such as in injunction or rescission cases." 
Thus, if I became convinced at the summary judgment stage 
or after a trial on the merits that defendants breached their 
duty of care the exculpatory provision in the iGov charter 
would not preclude me from ordering rescission of the 2007 
Plan, even though it might preclude me from entering a 
83 judgment for monetary damages against defendants. It was 
unreasonable, therefore, for the SLC to conclude that the duty 
of care claims in Count I should not go forward solely on 
the basis of iGov's § 102(b)(7) provision. The SLC simply 
fails to understand that Delaware law permits a suit seeking 
rescission to go forward despite a § 102(b)(7) provision 
protecting directors against monetary judgments. 
2. The Duty of Loyalty Claims in Count I 
The SLC's investigation of plaintiffs' duty of loyalty claims, 
as well as its conclusion that those claims should be 
dismissed, merits the most discussion in my analysis of the 
Zapata requirements. The SLC concluded that plaintiffs' duty 
of loyalty claims should be dismissed because it believes 
the 2007 Plan was entirely fair to iGov. Underlying this 
conclusion are the SLC's findings that (1) the process 
defendants' employed to secure approval of the 2007 Plan, 
particularly the process employed to develop the exercise 
price, was entirely fair, and (2) $4.92 was a fair exercise price. 
a. Fair Process 
I begin by analyzing whether the SLC's investigation of 
defendants' process was reasonable in scope. I also analyze 
whether the SLC's conclusion that the process was fair is 
supported by reasonable bases. In conducting this analysis 
I avoid considering the merits of plaintiffs' claims. My 
findings here relate only to the SLC's investigation. 
*19 In concluding that defendants would be able to show 
fair dealing, the SLC first determined that plaintiffs' claims 
can be: 
distilled... to one key issue. Can a CFO have 
one forecasting model for the purpose of 
seeking an increase in the Company's credit 
availability and for [internal] goal-setting 
while, at the same time, have a substantially 
lower forecast for the purpose of valuing the 
Company's equity? 85 
A natural place for me to begin my inquiry is with the SLC's 
own characterization of the key issue underlying plaintiffs' 
complaint. Namely, was it acceptable for Tyrrell to provide 
Chessiecap with the Revised Chessiecap Forecast showing 
an EBITDA of $1.8 million while simultaneously providing 
Textron with multiple iterations of EBITDA forecasts, all of 
which showed an EBITDA of at least $3 million, and using 
internal EBITDA forecasts that also projected an EBITDA 
of at least $3 million? The SLC concluded that this was an 
acceptable thing for Tyrrell to do. The SLC Report explains 
this conclusion as follows: 
The existence of multiple forecasts 
circulated internally and externally during 
the same time frame, in and of itself, is 
not indicative of anything nefarious or ill-
motivated. It is not unusual for CFOs to 
analyze and estimate a company's future 
performance and test their predictions and 
assumptions. It is also not unusual for CFOs 
to provide an optimistic outlook to its lender 
when the goal is to instill confidence in 
the company's ability to comply with its 
covenant requirements and seek an increase 
in the availability of the credit line. A 
forecast that is optimistic is not misleading, 
it merely reflects the guessing of what 
the Company may accomplish if certain 
favorable events occur as the management 
hopes they will. We see no value for a CFO 
to present a pessimistic case when seeking 
financing. By the same token, an optimistic 
forecast is often used by management as a 
goal setting tool to inspire and incentivize 
the company's employees who may have 
incentive based compensation rooted in 
hitting certain set benchmarks. Setting a 
high goal is a necessary tool to motivate 
performance. Such practice is widespread 
and not misleading, ill-motivated or self-
dealing. On the other hand, a CFO can also 
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have a forecast that he believes the company 
will actually achieve, rather than a wishful 
"may" achieve. It is that forecast that the 
Committee believes should be utilized for 
estimating the value of the Company's 
equity.86 
Elsewhere in the SLC Report this conclusion is reemphasized: 
With regard to the forecasts identified by 
Plaintiff but not provided to Chessiecap, 
[ ] Tyrrell stated to the SLC that it was 
his usual practice regularly to create such 
varying forecasts for purpose of motivating 
employees and testing "what i f scenarios. 
He also created optimistic forecasts 
showing "the art of the possible " to 
instill confidence in the Company's lender 
by showing what the Company hoped to 
achieve, and to illustrate to management 
how best to position the Company for 
future growth. The Committee finds that it 
is not uncommon for CEOs of companies 
to run varies (sic) scenarios and forecasts 
particularly for a company like iGov that 
remained in transition mode through 2006 
and 2007. Moreover, the record compiled 
by the SLC for the period 2006-2007 and 
the SLC's experience serving on the Board 
of iGov, corroborate [ ] Tyrrell's statements 
and confirm his business practices 87 
*20 As is evident from the SLC Report, the SLC concluded 
that the process of adopting the 2007 Plan was fair primarily 
because the SLC believes it was perfectly normal for Tyrrell 
to provide "optimistic" and "art of the possible" forecasts 
to Textron and use those forecasts internally, while at the 
same time providing a forecast to its valuation expert that 
was "substantially lower" but something the Company could 
"actually achieve," rather than being "wishful." To put it 
mildly, this is an interesting conclusion, especially in light 
of the current credit environment. One would suspect that 
lenders would prefer a forecast projecting what management 
believes is actually achievable as opposed to wishful. In and 
of itself, this conclusion does not inspire confidence that the 
SLC conducted a good faith investigation. But I need not rest 
my decision solely on the merits of this crucial conclusion, 
because, broadly speaking, I do not believe that the SLC's 
investigation was sufficient in scope to adequately address 
plaintiffs' duty of loyalty claims. Nor do I believe the SLC 
developed reasonable bases for concluding plaintiffs' duty of 
loyalty claims should be dismissed. 
An obvious first question that was not adequately explored 
by the SLC is this: why did Tyrrell provide Chessiecap with 
the Original Chessiecap Forecast (showing an EBITDA of 
roughly $3 million) if he did not believe that the projections in 
that forecast were actually achievable? Why put Chessiecap 
to the time, expense, and effort of developing a valuation 
based on an overly optimistic projection? The SLC addresses 
this question, but provides an answer that contradicts the 
key conclusion of its investigation. Specifically, the SLC 
Report states that the Original Chessiecap Forecast was the 
"only operating forecast available" to give to Chessiecap 
88 in August 2006. Of course, that is inconsistent with the 
SLC's finding that it was Tyrrell's "usual practice regularly 
89 to create [ ] varying forecasts...." By August 2006, Tyrrell 
had worked at iGov for nearly a year, plenty of time to have 
developed more than one forecast if he actually did that on 
a regular basis. Moreover, iGov was nearing the end of its 
fiscal year at that time and so, if it was Tyrrell's usual practice 
to create varying forecasts, one would assume he would 
have developed more than one forecast for the next year by 
then. The SLC does not explain this inconsistency, and it is 
the only basis on which it attempts to explain away Tyrrell 
first providing Chessiecap with the Original Chessiecap 
Forecast, a projection that was identical to the Second Textron 
Forecast that iGov had sent to its lender the same month. The 
SLC's finding that the Original Chessiecap Forecast was the 
only one available actually provides evidentiary support for 
plaintiffs' assertion that Tyrrell began manipulating forecasts 
to depress iGov's valuation. This cannot be a reasonable basis 
upon which to conclude that plaintiffs' complaint should be 
dismissed. 
*21 A second question that was not adequately investigated 
by the SLC is why did Tyrrell provide Textron with the 
Third Textron Forecast (showing an EBITDA of 3.1 million) 
after he provided Chessiecap with the Revised Chessiecap 
Forecast (showing an EBITDA of $1.8 million)? The SLC 
Report explains that the SLC interviewed Tyrrell multiple 
times and that in those interviews Tyrrell testified that he 
provided Chessiecap with the Revised Chessiecap Forecast 
on October 18, 2006 because he believed it was a more 
realistic projection for FY07. The SLC accepted Tyrrell's 
testimony on this point as true without adequately exploring 
contrary evidence. For example, why would Tyrrell have been 
comfortable continuing to provide Textron with forecasts that 
were higher than what he believed was realistic?90 The SLC 
^ r ^ ^ t \A/.orL-« 14 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
London v. Tyrrell, Not Reported in A.2d (2010) 
36DeTj. ^0f^j^b§~~ — — — — 
found that Tyrrell provided Textron with the Third Textron 
Forecast because he wanted to ensure that financing would 
be obtained. But the SLC never tested whether Tyrrell 
genuinely believed he was sending Textron overly optimistic 
forecasts by asking him why he was comfortable providing a 
potential creditor with data he did not believe was realistic. It 
was not reasonable for the SLC to accept Tyrrell's assertion 
that the Revised Chessiecap Forecast was the most realistic 
without exploring Tyrrell's conduct that suggests otherwise. 
The SLC also did not adequately address the ample evidence 
that internal forecasts continued to project EBITDA of 
roughly $3-4 million, a figure much higher than the Revised 
Chessiecap Forecast. As we have seen, Tyrrell's own 
emails suggest that he believed these higher internal forecasts 
where achievable, in direct contradiction to the testimony 
he provided the SLC, but the SLC does not appear to have 
questioned him thoroughly about these emails. Instead, the 
SLC explains away these internal forecasts with its finding 
that they were used to motivate and inspire management by 
demonstrating what might be achievable, rather than what 
Tyrrell actually believed was achievable. The SLC's finding 
on this point appears to be completely based on Tyrrell's 
assertions about the purpose of the internal forecasts. Nothing 
in the SLC Report suggests that management was questioned 
to see if they understood that the internal projections being 
circulated were not what the CFO believed was actually 
achievable. In fact, there was evidence that iGov management 
generally believed that an EBITDA of $3 million or more was 
realistic for FY07.93 
Based on the SLC's own investigation, it appears that the 
only character in this story to rely on the relatively lower, 
but "actually achievable" numbers reflected in the Revised 
Chessiecap Forecast was Chessiecap-the firm that, according 
to plaintiffs' complaint, was manipulated to provide a low 
valuation that directly benefitted defendants. Per the SLC's 
own findings, then, all other characters were relying on 
projections that were "art of the possible" but probably 
not achievable. From the point of view of an objective 
SLC conducting a good faith investigation, this discovery 
is clearly problematic. Absent some further explanation, it 
inferentially supports plaintiffs' allegations that manipulation 
had occurred. An objective SLC would have been duty 
bound at this point to thoroughly explore why management 
pervasively used forecasts it did not believe were realistic, but 
the SLC failed to do this. Rather, it appears to have accepted 
Tyrrell's representations that the Revised Chessiecap Forecast 
was the most accurate without pressing him on why he felt the 
h !-.=.- h /7?< o n A o -r« r^ _ . .*. 
only appropriate use of the most accurate forecast was valuing 
iGov's equity in connection with the 2007 Plan. 
*22 A third question the SLC Report did not adequately 
address was the assertion in plaintiffs' complaint that Tyrrell 
only considered negative developments that had occurred 
after the July 31, 2006 valuation date when preparing the 
Revised Chessiecap Forecast. Plaintiffs' complaint provides 
examples of positive developments that had occurred but 
were purportedly ignored by Tyrrell; specifically, the $7 
million PTO contract that was awarded in September 2006 
and the increased profitability in the TACLAN contract 
that was becoming apparent. Moreover, plaintiffs' complaint 
alleges that when the 2007 Plan was finally approved on 
January 31, 2007, defendants were even more aware of the 
TACLAN contract's better-than-expected performance, as 
well as the increasing likelihood that the DHS contract would 
be awarded, but made no efforts to have Chessiecap update 
its Final Valuation to reflect this. 
Nothing in the SLC Report indicates that the SLC 
seriously investigated plaintiffs' allegations that the Revised 
Chessiecap Forecast ignored positive developments while 
incorporating negative developments. Nor does the SLC 
Report provide me with any comfort that the SLC adequately 
investigated whether defendants adopted the 2007 Plan 
despite knowing that the Final Valuation upon which it was 
based failed to reflect the positive developments that had 
occurred since July 31, 2006. Tyrrell had specifically stated 
his belief on January 7, 2007 that the Final Valuation was old 
and would likely be higher when it was updated and then just 
a few days later represented to Chessiecap that no material 
changes had occurred since July 31, 2006. Likewise, Neven 
and Hupalo implicitly represented that no material changes 
had occurred by adopting the 2007 Plan based on the Final 
Valuation. There is no evidence that the SLC questioned 
any of defendants as to why they felt the PTO contract, the 
increased TACLAN profitability, or the increasing likelihood 
of a DHS contract award were not material developments. 
Perhaps there would have been defensible reasons for 
defendants to come to these conclusions, but we are left 
wondering because the SLC did not investigate it. This was 
a failure to investigate a fundamental theory of recovery 
in plaintiffs' complaint that precludes me from granting the 
SLC's motion to dismiss. 
While I am on the subject of the absence of "material 
changes" I should discuss a fourth question that the SLC 
did not investigate; namely, the award of 25,000 options to 
Marksberry in May 2007. These options were awarded at 
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$4.92 per share, the same price as the options under the 
2007 Plan. The SLC reasoned that it would not have been 
useful to explore this grant because Marksberry was no longer 
employed by iGov at the time of the investigation and could 
not exercise any of the 25,000 shares he had been granted. The 
SLC believed that iGov was in no danger of being harmed 
by this grant and therefore it would not be cost-beneficial to 
investigate it. 
*23 The SLC is undoubtedly correct that the 25,000 option 
grant to Marksberry does not threaten iGov economically. 
But that does not mean investigating the option grant would 
not have shed light on the merits of plaintiffs' complaint. 
The grant occurred ten months after the Final Valuation 
upon which the $4.92 per share price was based. Plaintiffs 
allege that by that time it was abundantly clear that positive, 
material developments had occurred that made the Final 
Valuation upon which the $4.92 strike price was based 
unreliable. Among other things, plaintiffs point out that the 
DHS contract had been formally awarded in March 2007. 
Tyrrell's rationale for excluding the DHS contract from the 
Revised Chessiecap Forecast was that it had not been formally 
awarded. Thus, it at least seems reasonable that once the 
DHS contract was formally awarded the Revised Chessiecap 
Forecast should have been revised again to account for profits 
from the DHS contract. Nevertheless, defendants did not 
provide Chessiecap with any revised forecast or ask them to 
update their Final Valuation. Rather, defendants adopted a 
formal resolution that specifically stated no material changes 
had occurred since July 31, 2006 and awarded Marksberry 
options on that basis. 
The SLC declined altogether to investigate this transaction. 
They did not question defendants about their resolution 
that no material change had occurred as of May 2007, 
despite the DHS contract having been formally awarded. If 
the SLC had investigated this transaction, it likely would 
have shed light on the broader allegations in plaintiffs' 
complaint. Specifically, the SLC could have gained insight 
into defendants' motivations with respect to the 2007 Plan. 
By simply asking defendants why they believed no "material 
change" had occurred for equity valuation purposes since the 
Final Valuation, the SLC could have determined what sort 
of change defendants needed to see before they would feel 
it necessary to update the Final Valuation and could have 
evaluated whether defendants' assessments were being made 
in good faith or whether they were ill-motivated. Defendants 
were willing to award Marksberry options at the $4.92 strike 
price despite the formal award of the DHS contract. This 
behavior calls into question the sincerity of Tyrrell's earlier 
assertion that the DHS contract should not be included in 
a forecast until it was formally awarded. The SLC should 
have challenged defendants on this point. It may have taken 
nothing more than a few questions. But the SLC declined to 
do so. Seeing this omission, I must conclude that the SLC's 
investigation into plaintiffs' duty of loyalty claims was not 
reasonable in scope. 
A fifth problem is that the SLC Report fails to investigate 
the timing of plaintiffs' removal from the board. As we've 
seen, plaintiffs were removed from the board just days after 
they protested the use of the Final Valuation, alleging that it 
was based on stale and inaccurate information in the Revised 
Chessiecap Forecast. Plaintiffs' complaint contends that 
defendants' plan was to procure iGov shares for themselves 
at artificially low prices and to entrench themselves in 
management and directorship positions through the increased 
ownership percentages they would realize under the 2007 
Plan. To that end, plaintiffs allege that they did not receive 
any shares under the 2007 Plan, which was adopted just 
days after their removal from the board, and that their 
ownership percentages were decreased by the 2007 Plan 
while defendants' ownership increased. 
*24 The SLC Report characterizes plaintiffs' removal from 
the board as the product of a disagreement between plaintiffs 
and defendants over the direction that iGov should take. 
The SLC Report characterizes plaintiffs, specifically Hunt, as 
wanting iGov to drop all other pursuits so that it could "milk" 
the TACLAN contract. In contrast, the SLC Report describes 
defendants, specifically Neven and Hupalo, as wanting to 
grow iGov and use the TACLAN contract as a stepping stone 
to reinvent the Company from a low-margin information 
technology reseller into a higher-margin service provider. The 
SLC Report states: 
During their interviews, Neven and Hupalo 
displayed a sense of personal responsibility 
for the employment of almost one 
hundred people and felt that the Company 
had become the home to hardworking 
individuals who were committed to serving 
the government and building a great 
product. It was that sense of long-term 
commitment to iGov by Neven and Hupalo, 
in contrast to Hunt's short-term objectives, 
that divided ... and ultimately shattered the 
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Conspicuously absent from the SLC Report are any citations 
to interview notes or other evidence supporting the SLC's 
finding that this disagreement was the cause of plaintiffs' 
removal from the board. In fact, there is evidence in the 
record that shows defendants may have been just as interested 
in maximizing short-term profits from iGov as plaintiffs' 
purportedly were, but the SLC Report fails to investigate 
Q7 
or explain this. The biggest problem, though, is that the 
SLC Report wholly fails to analyze or explain why plaintiffs 
were removed from the board only three days after objecting 
to the Final Valuation and a little less then two weeks 
before the 2007 Plan was adopted. There is no indication 
that the SLC probed defendants on why they felt it was 
necessary or advisable to remove plaintiffs from the board 
almost immediately after they objected to the Final Valuation 
and then shortly thereafter approve the 2007 Plan, which 
plaintiffs were certain to vote against. In fact, the SLC Report 
gets the date of plaintiffs' removal from the board wrong. 
It states: "By the end of December 2006, the relationship 
among the Founders had deteriorated and Neven and Hupalo, 
acting as majority shareholders removed London and Hunt 
98 
from the Board of Directors." Thus, the SLC Report gets 
a fundamental, undisputed fact from plaintiffs' complaint 
wrong and then fails to conduct the investigation that would 
have been necessary if the SLC had the facts right. This does 
not demonstrate that the SLC conducted an investigation of 
99 reasonable scope. 
A sixth area of inadequate investigation deserves mention. 
The SLC Report assumes that defendants Neven and Hupalo 
gave up options with a $1.25 strike price from the 2000 
Plan for options with a strike price of $4.92 in adopting 
the 2007 Plan. Presumably this finding is included in the 
SLC Report to demonstrate the good faith of defendants in 
adopting the 2007 Plan. The SLC concludes that ail parties 
agreed that the 2007 Plan was adopted to replace the 2000 
Plan to correct the defects in the 2000 Plan. The SLC fails to 
acknowledge, however, evidence suggesting that defendants' 
knew the options under the 2000 Plan were never granted 
to them. Specifically, in September 2006, Tyrrell told Neven 
that the options under the 2000 plan were never issued. In 
addition, on October 26,2006, iGov's corporate counsel gave 
the opinion that the options were never granted.101 
*25 Since the SLC believed that the 2007 Plan was designed 
to replace the problematic $ 1.25 options that had been granted 
under the 2000 Plan, it should have investigated why London 
did not receive options under the 2007 Plan to replace the 
options he had purportedly been granted under the 2000 Plan. 
According to the SLC, London, Neven, and Hupalo had all 
been given defective options under the 2000 Plan. Yet only 
Neven and Hupalo had those defective options replaced when 
they voted to adopt the 2007 Plan. London was not permitted 
to vote on the 2007 Plan (because he had been removed 
from the board) and was not given replacement options under 
the 2007 Plan. Surely this should have suggested something 
about the fairness of the 2007 Plan adoption process from the 
SLC's perspective. And yet the SLC did nothing to investigate 
this. 
I could go on, but I decline to. What I have written is 
sufficient to demonstrate that there is a material question 
of fact as to whether the SLC conducted a good faith 
investigation of reasonable scope into the fairness of the 2007 
Plan's adoption process. 
b. Fair Price 
Having determined that the SLC did not conduct a reasonably 
thorough investigation into defendants' process for adopting 
the 2007 Plan and did not have reasonable bases for 
concluding that the process was fair, I could dispense with 
the remainder of the entire fairness inquiry. Nevertheless, to 
be thorough, I will briefly explore the SLC's investigation of 
price and whether it had reasonable bases to conclude that 
$4.92 per share was a fair price. 
The SLC ultimately determined that both the Chessiecap 
Final Valuation and McLean Valuations were "tainted" and 
did not rely on either valuation in concluding that $4.92 was a 
fair price. The SLC partially relied on the SRR Valuations 
in concluding that $4.92 was a fair price. I say "partially" 
because the SLC Report summarily marginalizes the SRR 
Valuations, which concluded that iGov equity was worth 
$3.90-$4.15 as of October 31, 2006 and $5.24-$ 5.30 as of 
January 30, 2007. The SLC Report concludes that $4.92 was 
in the range of fair market value based on the SRR Valuations, 
but then states that "$4.92 ... was likely too high, from 
a practical, real world perspective...." 104 The SLC Report 
takes the position that the SRR Valuations $5.24-$5.30 per 
share estimate for January 30,2007 was largely a function of 
iGov's cash position on that date, and was not an indication 
of the real value of the Company. This disagreement about 
the effect of iGov's cash position on value, combined with 
the SLC's hunches about the Company's value, led the SLC 
to conclude that even the SRR Valuations missed the mark. 
Thus, the SLC is left with no professional valuation upon 
which to hang its hat entirely. That is certainly enough to 
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create a material question of fact about whether the SLC had 
a reasonable basis to conclude that $4.92 was a fair price. 
Compounding this problem though is the fact that SRR 
utilized the Tyrrell Baseline Forecast (showing an EBITDA 
of $2.1 million) in preparing its valuation. The SLC Report 
indicates that SRR was given the Tyrrell Baseline Forecast 
because: 
*26 ... Tyrrell testified that he viewed 
the [Tyrrell Baseline Forecast] as a more 
realistic projection for FY2007. Tyrrell 
testified that this forecast was a revision 
of the [Revised Chessiecap Forecast] 
previously provided to Chessiecap and did 
not contain the operational or motivational 
assumptions found in the [Third Textron 
Forecast]. The SLC concluded, therefore, 
that as of December 2006, the [Tyrrell 
Baseline Forecast] was the most accurate 
prediction of the Company's likely 
performance.... 105 
There are at least two problems with the SLC's decision 
to provide SRR with the Tyrrell Baseline Forecast for its 
analysis. First, as is evident from the language cited, the 
SLC determined that the Tyrrell Baseline Forecast was the 
most appropriate forecast for SRR to use solely based on 
Tyrrell's testimony. This was not a reasonable basis for such 
a determination. Serious doubts are raised about an SLC's 
investigation where it does not consult sources of information 
other than one of the defendants to make conclusions. 106 
The second problem is related to the first. The SLC does 
not appear to have actually understood the Tyrrell Baseline 
Forecast. Tyrrell described the Tyrrell Baseline Forecast as 
being a revision of the Revised Chessiecap Forecast, but 
this was inaccurate. The SLC appears to have accepted this 
characterization, and included it in the SLC Report, without 
actually testing it. A close comparison reveals that the Tyrrell 
Baseline Forecast was identical to the Third Textron Forecast 
with the exception that two line items differed. The principal 
difference between the Tyrrell Baseline Forecast and the 
Third Textron Forecast was the revenues and expenses from 
the DHS contract. As we have seen, the DHS contract was 
one of the major line items, if not the major line item, 
that plaintiffs accuse Tyrrell of adjusting to manipulate the 
valuations. If the SLC had compared the Tyrrell Baseline 
Forecast to the Third Textron Forecast it would have noticed 
that the two were substantially identical with the exception 
that DHS contract revenue and expenses were omitted from 
the Tyrrell Baseline Forecast. This omission largely caused 
the Tyrrell Baseline Forecast to project an EBITDA of 
$2.1 million, 32% lower than the Third Textron Forecast's 
EBITDA projection of $3.1 million. This difference should 
have been addressed by the SLC because it provides 
evidentiary support for plaintiffs' assertion that Tyrrell was 
manipulating the DHS contract in his projections. But the 
SLC did not do this because it accepted Tyrrell's inaccurate 
description of the Tyrrell Baseline Forecast at face value. 
SRR's consequent reliance on the Tyrrell Baseline Forecast 
leaves me with a material doubt as to the bases upon which 
the SLC grounded its conclusion that $4.92 was a fair price. 
I cannot grant the SLC's motion under the Zapata standard 
where such doubts exist. 
Before moving on to Counts II and III I wish to make 
something clear. I have no opinion at this stage of the 
proceedings as to the fair market value of iGov shares on 
January 30, 2007. I have not attempted to determine which 
valuation is the most accurate. I have simply evaluated the 
scope of the SLC's investigation into the $4.92 price and the 
bases of its conclusions regarding the $4.92 price and have 
found that it leads me to conclude that the SLC's investigation 
did not meet the Zapata requirements. 
3. Counts II and III 
*27 I briefly address Counts II and III before concluding 
my Zapata step-one analysis. The SLC recommended that 
Count II be dismissed because it believed adoption of the 
2007 Plan was entirely fair to iGov and, therefore, plaintiffs 
would not prevail on Count I. Because the SLC failed to meet 
the Zapata standard its recommendation to dismiss Count I 
is denied. Accordingly, Count II, which seeks rescission of 
the 2007 Plan, will not be dismissed for the obvious reason 
that rescission may be the appropriate remedy if plaintiffs 
ultimately prevail on the merits of Count I. 
With respect to Count III, the SLC concluded it was a 
derivative claim and should be dismissed along with Count 
I (and for the same reasons). Plaintiffs assert that this is an 
individual claim over which the SLC has no power. Because I 
am permitting plaintiffs to continue piloting derivative claims 
through this litigation, I will not spend time at this juncture 
attempting to resolve whether Count III alleges individual 
or derivative claims. Either way the claims survive. We can 
leave determination of the exact nature of Count III for 
another day. In fact, a more accurate determination may be 
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made at a later time when the benefits of full discovery have 
enlarged the record. 
C. The Court9s Independent Business Judgment 
Having determined that I will not grant the SLCs motion 
to dismiss after fully applying the first step of the Zapata 
standard to the motion, I find it unnecessary to apply the 
second step of Zapata. In my view, this is not a case where 
application of the second step will add anything of value, and 
so I exercise my discretion not to apply this step. 
Footnotes 
1 Pis.'Answer Ex. 12. 
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4 Compl. \ 26. 
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6 SLC Report Ex. L-8. 
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to reflect this. 
9 SLC Report Ex. L-16. 
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million in the Second Textron Forecast. 
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13 SLC Report Ex. L-20. 
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voting block. If Pooley's shares are not included in the calculation, the 2007 Plan increased defendants' collective ownership interests 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
Because there are material questions of fact as to the SLCs 
independence, the reasonableness of its investigation, and 
whether it had reasonable bases for its conclusions, the SLCs 
motion to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint is DENIED. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
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A director of the corporation shall not be personally liable to the corporation or its stockholders for monetary damages for 
breach of fiduciary duty as a director, except for liability (i) for any breach of the director's duty of loyalty to the Coiporation 
or its stockholders; (ii) for acts or omissions not in good faith or which involve intentional misconduct or a knowing violation 
of law; (iii) under Section 174 of the Delaware General Corporation Law; or (iv)for any transaction from which the director 
derived an improper personal benefit. If the Delaware General Corporation Law is amended to authorize corporate action further 
eliminating or limiting the personal liability of directors, then the liability of a director of the corporation shall be eliminated or 
limited to the fullest extent permitted by the Delaware General Corporation Law, as so amended (emphasis added). 
82 BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN, THE DELAWARE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 4.15[C] 
(3d. ed.2009); Arnold v. Soc'yfor Sav. Bancorp, Inc., 678 A.2d 533, 542 (Del 1996). 
83 I also note that iGov's § 102(b)(7) provision might not even protect defendants against liability for monetary damages because the 
provision makes an exception for "any transaction from which the director derived an improper personal benefit." See n. 79 above. 
Plaintiffs' complaint alleges that defendants were able to obtain iGov stock for themselves at an artificially low price as a result of 
breaching their duty of care. Thus, the exculpatory clause might not apply to adoption of the 2007 Plan. The SLC failed to address 
this issue in the SLC Report. For the moment, I make no finding on whether the exculpatory clause would or would not apply to 
adoption of the 2007 Plan. I simply mention this to highlight that it was not considered by the SLC. 
84 Kaplan v. Wyatt, 484 A.2d 501, 508 (Del.Ch.1984). 
85 SLC Report 40-41 (emphasis added); see also id. 25 ("The [SLC] determined that the crux of the Derivative Complaint goes to the 
allegation that Tyrrell manipulated the information he was providing to Chessiecap so as to depress the value of the Company"); id. 
60 ("Plaintiffs' only meaningful attack on the procedural process through which the 2007 Plan was adopted is focused on their belief 
that Mike Tyrrell deliberately supplied Chessicap (sic) with overly pessimistic financial data for iGov"). 
86 SLC Report 41 (emphasis added). 
87 SLC Report 61 (emphasis added). 
88 SLC Report 42-43. 
89 SLC Report 61. This inconsistency is problematic for the SLC because its finding that Tyrrell regularly prepared multiple forecasts 
for different purposes was critical to its conclusion that it was acceptable for him to provide different forecasts to Chessiecap and 
Textron. The SLC's ultimate conclusion is undermined by this inconsistency. 
9 0 The Third Textron Forecast showed an EBITDA that was 60% higher than the Revised Chessiecap Forecast. 
91 Presumably Textron would have been less willing to lend iGov money if Tyrrell sent them the Revised Chessiecap Forecast. 
9 2 This evidence is outlined in Part I-J of this Opinion. 
93 See part I-J of this Opinion describing communications from management other than Tyrrell indicating a belief that an EBITDA of 
$3 million or more was realistic. 
9 4 Lewis v. Fuqua, 502 A.2d 962, 967 (Del.Ch. 1985). In their depositions, Salvatori and Vinter testified that they did not recall whether 
they investigated the allegation that the Revised Chessiecap Forecast failed to reflect the increased profitability in the TACLAN 
contract. Salvatori Dep. 207:19-20, Oct. 6,2009; Vinter Dep. 95:14, Oct. 7,2009. Salvatori admitted that knowing whether TACLAN 
had a large backorder would have been relevant, but he could not say what the SLC did to investigate this allegation. Salvatori Dep. 
208:15-16. 
9 5 Electra Inv. Trust PLC v. Crews, 1999 WL 135239, at *4 (Del.Ch. Feb.24, 1999). 
9 6 SLC Report 23. 
9 7 For example, the SLC's interview notes indicate that Neven and Hupalo both made statements to the SLC that it was their goal to sell 
or merge the Company. Pis.' Answer Ex. 5 at 38, 47. Similarly, Mr. Tyrrell told Chessiecap in an email dated September 19, 2006 
that "[tjhere are very few people here with knowledge of our plan to sell in 2 or 3 years...." Id. Ex. 55. 
98 SLC Report 24. 
9 9 See Lewis v. Fuqua, 502 A.2d 962, 968 (Del.Ch. 1985). 
100 Pis.'Answer Ex. 56. 
101 MExs. 57,58. 
102 For example, at one point in the SLC Report the SLC speculates that the adoption of the 2007 Plan might actually be subject to 
business judgment review, rather than entire fairness review. The SLC bases this conclusion on the theory that the option grants and 
direct share purchases under the 2007 Plan might not have been "material" to defendants. Of course, this speculation is irrelevant 
because defendants stood on both sides of the transaction in adopting the 2007 Plan and entire fairness review would thus apply 
regardless of whether the options and direct share purchases were "material" to defendants. London v. Tyrrell, 2008 WL 2505435, 
at *5 (Del.Ch. June 24, 2008) (citing Orman v. Cullman, 794 A.2d 2, 25 n. 50 (Del. Ch.2002)). But in speculating as to materiality 
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the SLC failed to conduct any investigation into the net worth or income of defendants so it had no basis in any event upon which 
to conclude that the options and direct share purchases might not have been "material." 
103 SLC Report 47. 
104 SLC Report 50. 
105 SLC Report 21. 
106 ElectroInv. TmstPLCv. Crews, 1999 WL 135239, at *5 (Del.Ch. Feb.24, 1999). 
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Supreme Court of Delaware. 
ZAPATA CORPORATION, 
Defendant Below, Appellant, 
v. 
William MALDONADO, Plaintiff Below, Appellee. 
Submitted Dec. 31,1980 . 
I Decided May 13,1981. 
Stockholder instituted derivative action, on behalf of 
corporation, to recover against ten officers and/or directors 
on theory there had been breaches of fiduciary duty. The 
Court of Chancery denied corporation's alternative motions to 
dismiss complaint or for summaryjudgment, and corporation 
took interlocutory appeal. The Supreme Court, Quillen, J., 
held that: (1) even though demand was not made on board of 
directors to sue and the initial decision of whether to litigate 
was not placed before the board, it retained all of its corporate 
power concerning litigation decisions; (2) self-interest taint 
of majority of the board was not per se a bar to delegation 
of board's power over litigation decisions to independent 
committee composed of two disinterested board members; 
and (3) in ruling on the motions, Court of Chancery was to 
inquire into independence and good faith of the committee 
and the bases supporting its conclusions, and, if independence 
and good faith were found, Court was to exercise its own 
independent business judgment in determining whether a 
motion should be granted. 
Reversed and remanded. 
*780 Upon appeal from the Court of Chancery. Reversed 
and Remanded. 
Attorneys and Law Firms 
Robert K. Payson, (argued) of Potter, Anderson & Corroon, 
Wilmington, and Thomas F. Cumin, Thomas J. Kavaler, P. 
Kevin Castel and Edward P. Krugman of Cahill, Gordon & 
Reindel, New York City, of counsel, for defendant-appellant. 
Charles F. Richards, Jr. of Richards, Layton & Finger, 
Wilmington, for individual defendants. 
Irving Morris and Joseph A. Rosenthal of Morris & 
Rosenthal, Wilmington, Sidney L. Garwin (argued), and 
Bruce E. Gerstein of Garwin, Bronzaft & Gerstein, New York 
City, of counsel, for plaintiff-appellee. 
Arthur G. Connolly, Jr. of Connolly, Bove & Lodge, 
Wilmington, for amici curiae. 
Before DUFFY, QUILLEN and HORSEY, JJ. 
Opinion 
QUILLEN, Justice: 
This is an interlocutory appeal from an order entered on 
April 9, 1980, by the Court of Chancery denying appellant-
defendant Zapata Corporation's (Zapata) alternative motions 
to dismiss the complaint or for summaryjudgment. The issue 
to be addressed has reached this Court by way of a rather 
convoluted path. 
In June, 1975, William Maldonado, a stockholder of Zapata, 
instituted a derivative action in the Court of Chancery on 
behalf of Zapata against ten officers and/or directors of 
Zapata, alleging, essentially, breaches of fiduciary duty. 
Maldonado did not first demand that the board bring this 
action, stating instead such demand's futility because all 
directors were named as defendants and allegedly participated 
in the acts specified. In June, 1977, Maldonado commenced 
an action in the United States District Court for the Southern 
District of New York against the same defendants, save 
one, alleging federal security law violations as well as the 
same common law claims made previously in the Court of 
Chancery. 
*781 By June, 1979, four of the defendant-directors were 
no longer on the board, and the remaining directors appointed 
two new outside directors to the board. The board then created 
an "Independent Investigation Committee" (Committee), 
composed solely of the two new directors, to investigate 
Maldonado's actions, as well as a similar derivative action 
then pending in Texas, and to determine whether the 
corporation should continue any or all of the litigation. The 
Committee's determination was stated to be "final, ... not... 
subject to review by the Board of Directors and ... in all 
respects ... binding upon the Corporation." 
Following an investigation, the Committee concluded, in 
September, 1979, that each action should "be dismissed 
forthwith as their continued maintenance is inimical to the 
Company's best interests ...." Consequently, Zapata moved 
for dismissal or summary judgment in the three derivative 
actions. On January 24, 1980, the District Court for the 
Southern District of New York granted Zapata's motion for 
summary judgment, Maldonado v. Flynn, S.D.N.Y., 485 
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F.Supp. 274 (1980), holding, under its interpretation of 
Delaware law, that the Committee had the authority, under 
the "business judgment" rule, to require the termination of 
the derivative action. Maldonado appealed that decision to the 
Second Circuit Court of Appeals. 
On March 18, 1980, the Court of Chancery, in a reported 
opinion, the basis for the order of April 9, 1980, denied 
Zapata's motions, holding that Delaware law does not 
sanction this means of dismissal. More specifically, it held 
that the "business judgment" rule is not a grant of authority 
to dismiss derivative actions and that a stockholder has an 
individual right to maintain derivative actions in certain 
instances. Maldonado v. Flynn, Del.Ch., 413 A.2d 1251 
(1980) (herein Maldonado). Pursuant to the provisions of 
Supreme Court Rule 42, Zapata filed an interlocutory appeal 
with this Court shortly thereafter. The appeal was accepted by 
this Court on June 5, 1980. On May 29, 1980, however, the 
Court of Chancery dismissed Maldonado's cause of action, 
its decision based on principles of res judicata, expressly 
conditioned upon the Second Circuit affirming the earlier 
New York District Court's decision. The Second Circuit 
appeal was ordered stayed, however, pending this Court's 
resolution of the appeal from the April 9th Court of Chancery 
order denying dismissal and summary judgment. 
[1] Thus, Zapata's observation that it sits "in a procedural 
gridlock" appears quite accurate, and we agree that this Court 
can and should attempt to resolve the particular question 
of Delaware law. As the Vice Chancellor noted, 413 
A.2d at 1257, "it is the law of the State of incorporation 
which determines whether the directors have this power 
of dismissal, Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 99 S.Ct. 
1831, 60 L.Ed.2d 404 (1979)". We limit our review in this 
interlocutory appeal to whether the Committee has the power 
to cause the present action to be dismissed. 
We begin with an examination of the carefully considered 
opinion of the Vice Chancellor which states, in part, that 
the "business judgment" rule does not confer power "to a 
corporate board of directors to terminate a derivative suit", 
413 A.2d at 1257. His conclusion is particularly pertinent 
because several federal courts, applying Delaware law, have 
held that the business judgment rule enables boards (or their 
committees) to terminate derivative suits, decisions now in 
conflict with the holding below. 
*782 As the term is most commonly used, and given the 
disposition below, we can understand the Vice Chancellor's 
comment that "the business judgment rule is irrelevant to 
the question of whether the Committee has the authority 
to compel the dismissal of this suit". 413 A.2d at 1257. 
Corporations, existing because of legislative grace, possess 
authority as granted by the legislature. Directors of Delaware 
corporations derive their managerial decision making power, 
which encompasses decisions whether to initiate, or refrain 
from entering, litigation, from 8 Del.C. s 141 (a).6 This 
statute is the fount of directorial powers. The "business 
judgment" rule is a judicial creation that presumes propriety, 
under certain circumstances, in a board's decision. Viewed 
defensively, it does not create authority. In this sense the 
"business judgment" rule is not relevant in corporate decision 
making until after a decision is made. It is generally used 
as a defense to an attack on the decision's soundness. The 
board's managerial decision making power, however, comes 
from s 141(a). The judicial creation and legislative grant 
are related because the "business judgment" rule evolved to 
give recognition and deference to directors' business expertise 
when exercising their managerial power under s 141(a). 
In the case before us, although the corporation's decision 
to move to dismiss or for summary judgment was, literally, 
a decision resulting from an exercise of the directors' (as 
delegated to the Committee) business judgment, the question 
of "business judgment", in a defensive sense, would not 
become relevant until and unless the decision to seek 
termination of the derivative lawsuit was attacked as 
improper. Maldonado, 413 A.2d at 1257. Accord, Abella 
v. Universal Leaf Tobacco Co., Inc., E.D.Va., 495 F.Supp. 
713 (1980) (applying Virginia law); Maher v. Zapata Corp., 
S.D.Tex., 490 F.Supp. 348 (1980) (applying Delaware law). 
See also, Dent, supra note 5, 75 Nw.U.L.Rev. at 101-02, 135. 
This question was not reached by the Vice Chancellor because 
he determined that the stockholder had an individual right to 
maintain this derivative action. Maldonado, 413 A.2d at 1262. 
Thus, the focus in this case is on the power to speak 
for the corporation as to whether the lawsuit should be 
continued or terminated. As we see it, this issue in the 
current appellate posture of this case has three aspects: the 
conclusions of the Court below concerning the continuing 
right of a stockholder to maintain a derivative action; the 
corporate power under Delaware law of an authorized board 
committee to cause dismissal of litigation instituted for the 
benefit of the corporation; and the role of the Court of 
Chancery in resolving conflicts between the stockholder and 
the committee. 
Accordingly, we turn first to the Court of Chancery's 
conclusions concerning the right of a plaintiff stockholder 
~~l \ I O O^x/^Kr-rv-.^r^i \A/nr!^c 2 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (1981) 
22A.LR.4th1190 
in a derivative action. We find that its determination that a 
stockholder, once demand is made and refused, possesses an 
independent, individual right to continue a derivative suit for 
breaches of fiduciary duty over objection by the corporation, 
Maldonado, 413 A.2d at 1262-63, as an absolute rule, is 
erroneous. The Court of Chancery relied principally upon 
*783 Sohland v. Baker, Del.Supr., 141 A. 277 (1927), for 
this statement of the Delaware rule. Maldonado, 413 A.2d at 
1260-61. Sohland is sound law. But Sohland cannot be fairly 
read as supporting the broad proposition which evolved in the 
opinion below. 
In Sohland, the complaining stockholder was allowed to file 
the derivative action in equity after making demand and 
after the board refused to bring the lawsuit. But the question 
before us relates to the power of the corporation by motion 
to terminate a lawsuit properly commenced by a stockholder 
without prior demand. No Delaware statute or case cited to 
us directly determines this new question and we do not think 
that Sohland addresses it by implication. 
The language in Sohland relied on by the Vice Chancellor 
negates the contention that the case stands for the broad rule 
of stockholder right which evolved below. This Court therein 
stated that "a stockholder may sue in his own name for the 
purpose of enforcing corporate rights ... in a proper case if 
the corporation on the demand of the stockholder refuses to 
bring suit." 141 A. at 281 (emphasis added). The Court also 
stated that "whether ("(t)he right of a stockholder to file a bill 
to litigate corporate rights") exists necessarily depends on the 
facts of each particular case." 141 A. at 282 (emphasis added). 
Thus, the precise language only supports the stockholder's 
right to initiate the lawsuit. It does not support an absolute 
right to continue to control it. 
Additionally, the issue and context in Sohland are simply 
different from this case. Baker, a stockholder, suing on behalf 
of Bankers' Mortgage Co., sought cancellation of stock issued 
to Sohland, a director of Bankers', in a transaction participated 
in by a "great majority" of Bankers' board. Before instituting 
his suit, Baker requested the board to assert the cause of 
action. The board refused. Interestingly, though, on the same 
day the board refused, it authorized payment of Baker's 
attorneys fees so that he could pursue the claim; one director 
actually escorted Baker to the attorneys suggested by the 
board. At this chronological point, Sohland had resigned from 
the board, and it was he, not the board, who was protesting 
Baker's ability to bring suit. In sum, despite the board's refusal 
to bring suit, it is clear that the board supported Baker in 
o 
his efforts. It is not surprising then that he was allowed to 
proceed as the corporation's representative "for the prevention 
of injustice", because "the corporation itself refused to litigate 
an apparent corporate right." 141 A. at 282. 
Moreover, McKee v. Rogers, Del.Ch., 156 A. 191 (1931), 
stated "as a general rule" that "a stockholder cannot be 
permitted... to invade the discretionary field committed to the 
judgment of the directors and sue in the corporation's behalf 
when the managing body refuses. This rule is a well settled 
one." 156 A. at 193.9 
[2] The McKee rule, of course, should not be read so 
broadly that the board's refusal will be determinative in every 
instance. Board members, owing a well-established fiduciary 
duty to the corporation, will not be allowed to cause a 
derivative suit to be dismissed when it would be a breach of 
their fiduciary duty. Generally *784 disputes pertaining to 
control of the suit arise in two contexts. 
[3] Consistent with the purpose of requiring a demand, a 
board decision to cause a derivative suit to be dismissed as 
detrimental to the company, after demand has been made and 
refused, will be respected unless it was wrongful. See, e. g., 
United Copper Securities Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 
244 U.S. 261, 263-64, 37 S.Ct. 509, 510, 61 L.Ed. 1119, 
1124 (1917); Stockholder Derivative Actions, supra note 5, 
44 U.Chi.L.Rev. at 169, 191-92; Note, Demand on Directors 
and Shareholders as a Prerequisite to a Derivative Suit, 73 
Har.L.Rev. 746, 748, 759 (1960); 13 W. Fletcher, Cyclopedia 
of the Law of Private Corporations s 5969 (rev.perm.ed. 
1980). A claim of a wrongful decision not to sue is thus 
the first exception and the first context of dispute. Absent a 
wrongful refusal, the stockholder in such a situation simply 
lacks legal managerial power. Compare Maldonado, 413 
A.2d at 1259-60. 
[4] But it cannot be implied that, absent a wrongful board 
refusal, a stockholder can never have an individual right to 
initiate an action. For, as is stated in McKee, a "well settled" 
exception exists to the general rule. 
"(A) stockholder may sue in equity in his 
derivative right to assert a cause of action 
in behalf of the corporation, without prior 
demand upon the directors to sue, when it 
is apparent that a demand would be futile, 
that the officers are under an influence that 
sterilizes discretion and could not be proper 
persons to conduct the litigation." 
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156 A. at 193 (emphasis added). This exception, the second 
context for dispute, is consistent with the Court of Chancery's 
statement below, that "(t) he stockholders' individual right to 
bring the action does not ripen, however, ... unless he can 
show a demand to be futile." Maldonado, 413 A.2d at 1262. 
11 
These comments in McKee and in the opinion below make 
obvious sense. A demand, when required and refused (if not 
wrongful), terminates a stockholder's legal ability to initiate a 
12 
derivative action. But where demand is properly excused, 
the stockholder does possess the ability to initiate the action 
on his corporation's behalf. 
[5] These conclusions, however, do not determine the 
question before us. Rather, they merely bring us to the 
question to be decided. It is here that we part company with 
the Court below. Derivative suits enforce corporate rights and 
any recovery obtained goes to the corporation. Taormina v. 
Taormina Corp., Del.Ch., 78 A.2d 473, 476 (1951); Keenan 
v. Eshleman, Del.Supr., 2 A.2d 904, 912-13 (1938). "The 
right of a stockholder to file a bill to litigate corporate rights 
is, therefore, solely for the purpose of preventing injustice 
where it is apparent that material corporate rights would not 
otherwise be protected." Sohland, 141 A. at 282. We see 
no inherent reason why the "two phases" of a derivative 
suit, the stockholder's suit to compel the corporation to sue 
and the corporation's suit (see 413 A.2d at 1261-62), should 
automatically result in the placement in the hands of the 
*785 litigating stockholder sole control of the corporate 
right throughout the litigation. To the contrary, it seems to 
us that such an inflexible rule would recognize the interest 
of one person or group to the exclusion of all others within 
the corporate entity. Thus, we reject the view of the Vice 
Chancellor as to the first aspect of the issue on appeal. 
The question to be decided becomes: When, if at all, should an 
authorized board committee be permitted to cause litigation, 
properly initiated by a derivative stockholder in his own right, 
to be dismissed? As noted above, a board has the power 
to choose not to pursue litigation when demand is made 
upon it, so long as the decision is not wrongful. If the board 
determines that a suit would be detrimental to the company, 
the board's determination prevails. Even when demand is 
excusable, circumstances may arise when continuation of the 
litigation would not be in the corporation's best interests. 
Our inquiry is whether, under such circumstances, there is a 
permissible procedure under s 141(a) by which a corporation 
can rid itself of detrimental litigation. If there is not, a single 
'
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stockholder in an extreme case might control the destiny of 
the entire corporation. This concern was bluntly expressed by 
the Ninth Circuit in Lewis v. Anderson, 9th Cir., 615 F.2d 
778, 783 (1979), cert, denied, - U.S. --, 101 S.Ct. 206, 66 
L.Ed.2d 89 (1980): "To allow one shareholder to incapacitate 
an entire board of directors merely by leveling charges against 
them gives too much leverage to dissident shareholders." 
But, when examining the means, including the committee 
mechanism examined in this case, potentials for abuse must 
be recognized. This takes us to the second and third aspects 
of the issue on appeal. 
[6] Before we pass to equitable considerations as to 
the mechanism at issue here, it must be clear that an 
independent committee possesses the corporate power to seek 
the termination of a derivative suit. Section 141(c) allows 
a board to delegate all of its authority to a committee. 
Accordingly, a committee with properly delegated authority 
would have the power to move for dismissal or summary 
judgment if the entire board did. 
[7] Even though demand was not made in this case and 
the initial decision of whether to litigate was not placed 
before the board, Zapata's board, it seems to us, retained 
all of its corporate power concerning litigation decisions. 
If Maldonado had made demand on the board in this case, 
it could have refused to bring suit. Maldonado could then 
have asserted that the decision not to sue was wrongful 
and, if correct, would have been allowed to maintain 
the suit. The board, however, never would have lost its 
statutory managerial authority. The demand requirement 
itself evidences that the managerial power is retained *786 
by the board. When a derivative plaintiff is allowed to bring 
suit after a wrongful refusal, the board's authority to choose 
whether to pursue the litigation is not challenged although 
its conclusion reached through the exercise of that authority 
is not respected since it is wrongful. Similarly, Rule 23.1, 
by excusing demand in certain instances, does not strip the 
board of its corporate power. It merely saves the plaintiff the 
expense and delay of making a futile demand resulting in a 
probable tainted exercise of that authority in a refusal by the 
board or in giving control of litigation to the opposing side. 
But the board entity remains empowered under s 141(a) to 
make decisions regarding corporate litigation. The problem is 
one of member disqualification, not the absence of power in 
the board. 
[8] The corporate power inquiry then focuses on whether the 
board, tainted by the self-interest of a majority of its members, 
can legally delegate its authority to a committee of two 
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disinterested directors. We find our statute clearly requires an 
affirmative answer to this question. As has been noted, under 
an express provision of the statute, s 141(c), a committee can 
exercise all of the authority of the board to the extent provided 
in the resolution of the board. Moreover, at lest by analogy to 
our statutory section on interested directors, 8 Del.C. s 141, 
it seems clear that the Delaware statute is designed to permit 
disinterested directors to act for the board. Compare Puma 
v. Marriott, Del.Ch., 283 A.2d 693, 695-96 (1971). 
We do not think that the interest taint of the board majority 
is per se a legal bar to the delegation of the board's power to 
an independent committee composed of disinterested board 
members. The committee can properly act for the corporation 
to move to dismiss derivative litigation that is believed to be 
detrimental to the corporation's best interest. 
Our focus now switches to the Court of Chancery which 
is faced with a stockholder assertion that a derivative suit, 
properly instituted, should continue for the benefit of the 
corporation and a corporate assertion, properly made by a 
board committee acting with board authority, that the same 
derivative suit should be dismissed as inimical to the best 
interests of the corporation. 
At the risk of stating the obvious, the problem is relatively 
simple. If, on the one hand, corporations can consistently 
wrest bona fide derivative actions away from well-meaning 
derivative plaintiffs through the use of the committee 
mechanism, the derivative suit will lose much, if not all, of 
its generally-recognized effectiveness as an intra-corporate 
means of policing boards of directors. See Dent, supra note 5, 
75 Nw.U.L.Rev. at 96 & n. 3, 144 & n. 241. If, on the other 
hand, corporations are unable to rid themselves of meritless 
or harmful litigation *787 and strike suits, the derivative 
action, created to benefit the corporation, will produce the 
opposite, unintended result. For a discussion of strike suits, 
see Dent, supra, 75 Nw.U.L.Rev. at 137. See also Cramer v. 
General Telephone & Electronics Corp., 3d Cir., 582 F.2d 
259, 275 (1978), cert, denied, 439 U.S. 1129, 99 S.Ct. 1048, 
59 L.Ed.2d 90 (1979). It thus appears desirable to us to find a 
balancing point where bona fide stockholder power to bring 
corporate causes of action cannot be unfairly trampled on by 
the board of directors, but the corporation can rid itself of 
detrimental litigation. 
As we noted, the question has been treated by other courts 
as one of the "business judgment" of the board committee. 
If a "committee, composed of independent and disinterested 
directors, conducted a proper review of the matters before 
V-^c t i^^KiEvr rPi o r n o x^~.-~,-.~~ r->~,.^-_ M _ _•_!.— ±-
it, considered a variety of factors and reached, in good faith, 
a business judgment that (the) action was not in the best 
interest of (the corporation)", the action must be dismissed. 
See, e. g., Maldonado v. Flynn, supra, 485 F.Supp. at 282, 
286. The issues become solely independence, good faith, 
and reasonable investigation. The ultimate conclusion of the 
committee, under that view, is not subject to judicial review. 
We are not satisfied, however, that acceptance of the 
"business judgment" rationale at this stage of derivative 
litigation is a proper balancing point. While we admit an 
analogy with a normal case respecting board judgment, it 
seems to us that there is sufficient risk in the realities of a 
situation like the one presented in this case to justify caution 
beyond adherence to the theory of business judgment. 
The context here is a suit against directors where demand 
on the board is excused. We think some tribute must be 
paid to the fact that the lawsuit was properly initiated. It is 
not a board refusal case. Moreover, this complaint was filed 
in June of 1975 and, while the parties undoubtedly would 
take differing views on the degree of litigation activity, we 
have to be concerned about the creation of an "Independent 
Investigation Committee" four years later, after the election 
of two new outside directors. Situations could develop where 
such motions could be filed after years of vigorous litigation 
for reasons unconnected with the merits of the lawsuit. 
Moreover, notwithstanding our conviction that Delaware 
law entrusts the corporate power to a properly authorized 
committee, we must be mindful that directors are passing 
judgment on fellow directors in the same corporation and 
fellow directors, in this instance, who designated them to 
serve both as directors and committee members. The question 
naturally arises whether a "there but for the grace of God go 
I" empathy might not play a role. And the further question 
arises whether inquiry as to independence, good faith and 
reasonable investigation is sufficient safeguard against abuse, 
perhaps subconscious abuse. 
There is another line of exploration besides the factual context 
of this litigation which we find helpful. The nature of this 
motion finds no ready pigeonhole, as perhaps illustrated by its 
being set forth in the alternative. It is perhaps best considered 
as a hybrid summary judgment motion for dismissal because 
the stockholder plaintiffs standing to maintain the suit has 
been lost. But it does not fit neatly into a category described 
in Rule 12(b) of the Court of Chancery Rules nor does 
it correspond directly with Rule 56 since the question of 
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genuine issues of fact on the merits of the stockholder's claim 
are not reached. 
It seems to us that there are two other procedural analogies 
that are helpful in addition to reference to Rules 12 and 56. 
There is some analogy to a settlement in that there is a request 
to terminate litigation without a judicial determination of the 
merits. See Perrine v. Pennroad Corp., Del.Supr., 47 A.2d 
479, 487 (1946). "In determining whether or not to approve 
a proposed settlement of a derivative stockholders' action 
(when directors are on both sides of the transaction), the 
Court ofChancery is called upon to exercise its own business 
judgment." Neponsit Investment Co. v. Abramson, Del.Supr., 
405 A.2d 97, 100 (1979) and cases therein cited. In this case, 
*788 the litigating stockholder plaintiff facing dismissal of a 
lawsuit properly commenced ought, in our judgment, to have 
sufficient status for strict Court review. 
Finally, if the committee is in effect given status to speak for 
the corporation as the plaintiff in interest, then it seems to us 
there is an analogy to Court ofChancery Rule 41(a)(2) where 
the plaintiff seeks a dismissal after an answer. Certainly, the 
position of record of the litigating stockholder is adverse to 
the position advocated by the corporation in the motion to 
dismiss. Accordingly, there is perhaps some wisdom to be 
gained by the direction in Rule 41(a)(2) that "an action shall 
not be dismissed at the plaintiffs instance save upon order of 
the Court and upon such terms and conditions as the Court 
deems proper." 
Whether the Court of Chancery will be persuaded by the 
exercise of a committee power resulting in a summary motion 
for dismissal of a derivative action, where a demand has 
not been initially made, should rest, in our judgment, in the 
independent discretion of the Court of Chancery. We thus 
steer a middle course between those cases which yield to 
the independent business judgment of a board committee 
and this case as determined below which would yield to 
unbridled plaintiff stockholder control. In pursuit of the 
course, we recognize that "(t)he final substantive judgment 
whether a particular lawsuit should be maintained requires 
a balance of many factors ethical, commercial, promotional, 
public relations, employee relations, fiscal as well as legal." 
Maldonado v. Flynn, supra, 485 F.Supp. at 285. But we are 
content that such factors are not "beyond the judicial reach" of 
the Court ofChancery which regularly and competently deals 
with fiduciary relationships, disposition of trust property, 
approval of settlements and scores of similar problems. 
We recognize the danger of judicial overreaching but the 
alternatives seem to us to be outweighed by the fresh view 
of a judicial outsider. Moreover, if we failed to balance all 
the interests involved, we would in the name of practicality 
and judicial economy foreclose a judicial decision on the 
merits. At this point, we are not convinced that is necessary 
or desirable. 
[9] After an objective and thorough investigation of a 
derivative suit, an independent committee may cause its 
corporation to file a pretrial motion to dismiss in the 
Court of Chancery. The basis of the motion is the best 
interests of the corporation, as determined by the committee. 
The motion should include a thorough written record of 
the investigation and its findings and recommendations. 
Under appropriate Court supervision, akin to proceedings on 
summary judgment, each side should have an opportunity 
to make a record on the motion. As to the limited issues 
presented by the motion noted below, the moving party 
should be prepared to meet the normal burden under Rule 56 
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that 
the moving party is entitled to dismiss as a matter of law. 
The Court should apply a two-step test to the motion. 
15 
[10] First, the Court should inquire into the independence 
and good faith of the committee and the bases supporting its 
conclusions. Limited discovery may be ordered to facilitate 
such inquiries. The corporation should have the burden 
of proving independence, good faith and a reasonable 
investigation, rather than presuming independence, good faith 
and reasonableness. *789 If the Court determines either 
that the committee is not independent or has not shown 
reasonable bases for its conclusions, or, if the Court is not 
satisfied for other reasons relating to the process, including 
but not limited to the good faith of the committee, the Court 
shall deny the corporation's motion. If, however, the Court 
is satisfied under Rule 56 standards that the committee was 
independent and showed reasonable bases for good faith 
findings and recommendations, the Court may proceed, in its 
discretion, to the next step. 
The second step provides, we believe, the essential key in 
striking the balance between legitimate corporate claims as 
expressed in a derivative stockholder suit and a corporation's 
best interests as expressed by an independent investigating 
committee. The Court should determine, applying its own 
independent business judgment, whether the motion should 
1 R 
be granted. This means, of course, that instances could 
arise where a committee can establish its independence and 
sound bases for its good faith decisions and still have the 
corporation's motion denied. The second step is intended to 
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thwart instances where corporate actions meet the criteria of 
step one, but the result does not appear to satisfy its spirit, or 
where corporate actions would simply prematurely terminate 
a stockholder grievance deserving of further consideration 
in the corporation's interest. The Court of Chancery of 
course must carefully consider and weigh how compelling 
the corporate interest in dismissal is when faced with a 
non-frivolous lawsuit. The Court of Chancery should, when 
appropriate, give special consideration to matters of law and 
public policy in addition to the corporation's best interests. 
If the Court's independent business judgment is satisfied, the 
Court may proceed to grant the motion, subject, of course, to 
any equitable terms or conditions the Court finds necessary 
or desirable. 
The interlocutory order of the Court of Chancery is reversed 
and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
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Footnotes 
* The appeal was argued on Oct. 16, 1980 but certain procedural matters required by this Court were not accomplished until the date 
indicated. 
1 Court of Chancery Rule 23.1 states in part: "The complaint shall also allege with particularity the efforts, if any, made by the plaintiff 
to obtain the action he desires from the directors or comparable authority and the reasons for his failure to obtain the action or for 
not making the effort." 
2 Maldonado v. Flynn, Del.Ch., 417 A.2d 378 (1980). Proceedings in the Trial Court are not automatically stayed during the pendency 
of an interlocutory appeal. Supreme Court Rule 42(d). 
3 The District Court for the Southern District of Texas, in Maher v. Zapata Corp., S.D.Tex., 490 F.Supp. 348 (1980), denied Zapata's 
motions to dismiss or for summary judgment in an opinion consistent with Maldonado. 
4 Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 8th Cir., 603 F.2d 724 (1979), cert, denied, 444 U.S. 1017, 100 S.Ct. 670, 62 L.Ed.2d 647 (1980); 
Lewis v. Adams, N.D.OkL, No. 77-266C (November 15, 1979); Siegal v. Merrick, S.D.N. Y., 84 F.R.D. 106 (1979); and, of course, 
Maldonado v. Flynn, S.D.N.Y., 485 F.Supp. 274 (1980). See also Abramowitz v. Posner, S.D.N.Y., 513 F.Supp. 120, (1981) which 
specifically rejected the result reached by the Vice Chancellor in this case. 
5 See Dent, The Power of Directors to Terminate Shareholder Litigation: The Death of the Derivative Suit? 75 Nw.U.L.Rev. 96, 98 
& n. 14 (1980); Comment, The Demand and Standing Requirements in Stockholder Derivative Actions, 44 U.Chi.L.Rev. 168, 192 
& nn. 153-54 (1976) (herein Stockholder Derivative Actions). 
6 8DeLC.s 141(a) states: 
"The business and affairs of every corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the 
direction of a board of directors, except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter or in its certificate of 
incorporation. If any such provision is made in the certificate of incorporation, the powers and duties conferred or 
imposed upon the board of directors by this chapter shall be exercised or performed to such extent and by such 
person or persons as shall be provided in the certificate of incorporation." 
7 See Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 Hofstra L.Rev. 93, 97, 130-33 (1979). 
8 Compare Baker v. Bankers' Mortgage Co., Del.Ch., 129 A. 775, 776-77 (1925), the lower Sohland. In Baker, Chancellor Wolcott 
posed a rhetorical question that is entirely consistent with the result we reach today: "(W)hy should not a stockholder, if the managing 
body absolutely refuses to act, be permitted to assert on behalf of himself and other stockholders a complaint, not against matters 
lying in sound discretion and honest judgment, but against frauds perpetrated by an officer in clear breach of his trust?" 129 A. at 777. 
9 To the extent that Mayer v. Adams, Del.Supr., 141 A.2d 458, 462 (1958) and Ainscow v. Sanitary Co. of America, Del.Ch., 180 
A. 614, 615 (1935), relied upon in Maldonado, 413 A.2d at 1262, contain language relating to the rule in McKee, we note that 
each decision is dissimilar from the one we examine today. Mayer held that demand on the stockholders was not required before 
maintaining a derivative suit if the wrong alleged could not be ratified by the stockholders. Ainscow found defective a complaint that 
neither alleged demand on the directors, nor reasons why demand was excusable. 
10 In other words, when stockholders, after making demand and having their suit rejected, attack the board's decision as improper, the 
board's decision falls under the "business judgment" rule and will be respected if the requirements of the rule are met. See Dent, supra 
note 5, 75 Nw.U.L.Rev. at 100-01 & nn. 24-25. That situation should be distinguished from the instant case, where demand was not 
made, and the power of the board to seek a dismissal, due to disqualification, presents a threshold issue. For examples of what has 
M-v>- /F\ on-io T U . ^ . 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Zapata C o r p . v. M a l d o n a d o , 430 A .2d 779 (1981) 
2 2 A . L R . 4 t h 1190 " " " ' • - ' — — — — — — — ^ ^ 
been held to be a wrongful decision not to sue, see Stockholder Derivative Actions, supra note 5, 44 U.Chi.L.Rev. at 193-98. We 
recognize that the two contexts can overlap in practice. 
11 These statements are consistent with Rule 23.l's "reasons for ... failure" to make demand. See also the other cases cited by the Vice 
Chancellor, 413 A.2d at 1262: Ainscow v. Sanitary Co. of America, supra note 9, 180 A. at 615; Mayer v. Adams, supra note 9, 141 
A.2d at 462; Dann v. Chrysler Corp., Del.Ch., 174 A.2d 696, 699-700 (1961). 
12 Even in this situation, it may take litigation to determine the stockholder's lack of power, i. e., standing. 
13 8Del.C. s 141(c) states: 
"The board of directors may, by resolution passed by a majority of the whole board, designate 1 or more committees, 
each committee to consist of 1 or more of the directors of the corporation. The board may designate 1 or more 
directors as alternative members of any committee, who may replace any absent or disqualified member at any 
meeting of the committee. The bylaws may provide that in the absence or disqualification of a member of a 
committee, the member or members present at any meeting and not disqualified from voting, whether or not he 
or they constitute a quorum, may unanimously appoint another member of the board of directors to act at the 
meeting in the place of any such absent or disqualified member. Any such committee, to the extent provided in 
the resolution of the board of directors, or in the bylaws of the corporation, shall have and may exercise all the 
powers and authority of the board of directors in the management of the business and affairs of the corporation, and 
may authorize the seal of the corporation to be affixed to all papers which may require it; but no such committee 
shall have the power or authority in reference to amending the certificate of incorporation, adopting an agreement 
of merger or consolidation, recommending to the stockholders the sale, lease or exchange of all or substantially 
all of the corporation's property and assets, recommending to the stockholders a dissolution of the corporation or 
a revocation of a dissolution, or amending the bylaws of the corporation; and, unless the resolution, bylaws, or 
certificate of incorporation expressly so provide, no such committee shall have the power or authority to declare 
a dividend or to authorize the issuance of stock." 
14 8Del.C. s 144 states: 
"s 144. Interested directors; quorum. 
(a) No contract or transaction between a corporation and 1 or more of its directors or officers, or between a corporation and any 
other corporation, partnership, association, or other organization in which 1 or more of its directors or officers are directors or 
officers, or have a financial interest, shall be void or voidable solely for this reason, or solely because the director or officer is 
present at or participates in the meeting of the board or committee which authorizes the contract or transaction, or solely because 
his or their votes are counted for such purpose, if: 
(1) The material facts as to his relationship or interest and as to the contract or transaction are disclosed or are known to the board 
of directors or the committee, and the board or committee in good faith authorizes the contract or transaction by the- affirmative 
votes of a majority of the disinterested directors, even though the disinterested directors be less than a quorum; or 
(2) The material facts as to his relationship or interest and as to the contract or transaction are disclosed or are known to 
the shareholders entitled to vote thereon, and the contract or transaction is specifically approved in good faith by vote of the 
shareholders; or 
(3) The contract or transaction is fair to the corporation as of the time it is authorized, approved or ratified, by the board of directors, 
a committee, or the shareholders. 
(b) Common or interested directors may be counted in determining the presence of a quorum at a meeting of the board of directors 
or of a committee which authorizes the contract or transaction." 
15 We do not foreclose a discretionary trial of factual issues but that issue is not presented in this appeal. See Lewis v. Anderson, supra, 
615 F.2d at 780. Nor do we foreclose the possibility that other motions may proceed or be joined with such a pretrial summary 
judgment motion to dismiss, e. g., a partial motion for summary judgment on the merits. 
16 See, e. g., Galef v. Alexander, 2d Cir., 615 F.2d 51, 56 (1980); Maldonado v. Flynn, supra, 485 F.Supp. at 285-86; Rosengarten v. 
International Telephone & Telegraph Corp., S.D.N.Y., 466 F.Supp. 817, 823 (1979); Gall v. Exxon Corp., S.D.N.Y., 418 F.Supp. 
508, 520 (1976). Compare Dent, supra note 5, 75 Nw.U.L.Rev. at 131-33. 
17 Compare Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619,419 N.Y.S.2d 920,928-29,393 N.E.2d 994 (1979). Our approach here is analogous to 
and consistent with the Delaware approach to "interested director" transactions, where the directors, once the transaction is attacked, 
have the burden of establishing its "intrinsic fairness" to a court's careful scrutiny. See, e. g., Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 
Del.Supr, 93 A.2d 107 (1952). 
18 This step shares some of the same spirit and philosophy of the statement by the Vice Chancellor: "Under our system of law, courts 
and not litigants should decide the merits of litigation." 413 A.2d at 1263. 
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Special Litigation Committee Report 
May 29, 2010 
To: The Hi Country Estates Homeowners Association Board of 
Directors and Members 
From: Kim Wilson, Chair, Special Litigation Committee 
This report contains the results of inquiries into 1) the claim and demand 
set forth by Lindsay Atwood, Dave Moore, T o m Chace , Lenell Chace , 
Branden Frank and Jerry Gilmore in a letter to Hi Country Estates Phase I! 
Homeowers Association dated June 12, 2009 and 2) the claim filed in Third 
District Court on November 25, 2009, Hi-Country Property Rights Group, 
Lindsay Atwood, Jerry Gilmore and Brandon Frank V S Keith Emmer, Tom 
Williams, Anthony Sarra, Arlene Johnson, Carol Dean and Hi Country 
Estates Homeowners Association, Phase II. 
Special Litigation Committee Members: 
Kim Wilson, Chair 
Tony Sarra 
Arlene P. Johnson 
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I. Methodology 
A. During the fall of 2009, the Special Litigation Committee (SLC) members individually began 
reviewing the complaint documents, meeting minutes, governing documents, email 
communication, miscellaneous other communication, statistical data and past expenditures 
related to Hi Country Estates Phase II Homeowners1 Association. (HCE1I). 
B. The SLC asked Keith Emmer and the Architectural Control Committee (ACC) to print out emails 
and to collect any records relating the complaint Their emails and other information are used as 
supporting documentation for this report 
C. In November 2009 the SLC completed a study comparing the volume of traffic on different roads 
within the association with the amount of money spent on roads over the past fifteen years.1 
D. It was determined by the SLC that information gleaned from interviewing members of the 
association would be an important element in determining if there was evidence supporting the 
plaintiffs' claims.2 A postcard was mailed on February 9,2010 to everyone owning property in Hi 
Country Estates Phase IL The content of the postcard read as follows: 
Dear HCII Member, 
A group of HCII property owners has recently asserted certain claims regarding the board 
of director's decisions regarding road maintenance and improvement, snow removal, livestock 
housing and management policies in connection with greenbelt tax status and whether or not a 
member who does not own a home In HCII is eligible to serve as a member of the board of 
directors. For information on the claim and to review the demand letter, go to the HCII website 
www.hi-country2.com 
Pursuant to Utah law, the board has appointed a special litigation committee to 
investigate these claims and demands to determine if they have merit In an effort to obtain as 
much information on these issues as is possible, we are inviting property owners to meet with 
the special litigation committee to discuss these issues. We plan to be available for these 
interviews on: March 16 and March 17, 6 p.m. to 9 p.m. If you have information regarding these 
claims and are willing to discuss that information with us, please call Kim Wilson, Chairperson of 
the Committee, at 801-571-5490 to arrange an appointment Leave a message and your call will 
be returned. 
We appreciate your participation. 
Kim Wilson, Chair Special Litigation Committee 
1
 Various Documents HCEII, Hi-Country li Road Maintenance Patterns 1994-2009, Pages 99-104 
2
 Special Litigation Committee Interviews, Plaintiffs, Kim Wilson informed the plaintiffs that the SLC is trying to get 
their support for the claim, Page 2, Line 74 
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E. Select individuals were contacted by telephone for interviews. They included: 
1. Keith Emmer, President of H\ Country Estates II 
2. Rex Facer, Road grading and snow removal contractor 
3. Tern" Williams, Architectural Control Committee 
4. Walter and Ronna Hoffman, Former Chair of the Greenbelt Committee and former owners 
of Lindsey Attwood's property 
5. Tom Chace, Chair of the Greenbelt/ Property Rights Committee. He declined the interview.3 
6. Lindsay Atwood declined then later agreed to meet with the committee but only if 
accompanied with Jerry Gilmore, Brandon Frank and their attorney, Wade Budge. 
F. Individuals were contacted to answer written questions. They included: 
1. Susan Yoshinaga, Salt Lake County Assessor's Office4 
2. Ca! Schneller, Former Director of Salt Lake County Development Services5 
3. Tom Williams, Board Member6 
G. In response to the postcard sent on February 9, 2010, four HCEH members contacted the 
Special Litigation Committee for Interviews: (One did not show up for the interview) 
1. Richard and Dorothy Mittlestaedt, residents located on Rose Canyon Road 
2. Robert Messmer, resident located on a HCEII maintained road. 
H. The SLC identified and listed claims as they understood them from the June 12, 2009 demand 
letter and the complaint document. Using the data available to them, they attempted to find facts 
that would either validate or invalidate claims. 
1. The plaintiffs are listed in the claim as Hi-Country Property Rights Group, Lindsay Atwood, 
Brandon Frank and Jerry Gilmore. Tom and Lenell Chace and Dave Moore are included with 
the three plaintiffs in the June 12, 2009 Demand tetter. The plaintiffs are part of the Property 
Rights/ Greenbelt Committee^and Tom Chace is the leader of the Property Rights/ 
Greenbelt Committee9. No other names of plaintiffs were given to the S LC by the plaintiffs 
or their Attorney but they stated that there were 29 members of their legal litigation 
committee.10 
2. The Special Litigation Committee did not explore annexation to the sewer district and the 
installation of sewer because these items were not included in the complaint. 
3. Annexation into Herriman and the Salt Lake County Foothills and Canyons Overlay Zone 
(FCOZ) are mentioned in several of Tom Chace's emails. FCOZ is a Salt Lake County zone 
and annexation to Herriman is addressed where it was offered by the plaintiffs and Tom 
Chace as a way to avoid filing the claim. 
I. This report is the result of the Special Litigation Committee's findings. 
3
 Various Documents HCEII, Notes.from telephone conversation between Arlene Johnson and Tom Chace. 2/10-
12/10 Tom felt that the Committee was not independent and they were collecting information for their Attorney 
and for their own defense, February 10, 2010, Page 106 
4
 Various Documents HCEII, Notes from Communication between Arlene Johnson and Susan Yoshinaga regarding 
Greenbelt, March 3 & 17, 2010, Pages 109-110 
5
 Various Documents HCEII, Notes from Communication between Arlene Johnson and Cal Schneller, Mr. Schneller 
regarding subdivisions and the Foothill and Canyons Overlay Zone (FCOZ), March 10 &. 23,2010, Pages 111-114 
6
 Various Documents HCE II, Letter from Tom Williams to HCEII HOA regarding distributing gate keys, March 6, 
2010, Page 108 
7
 Keith Emmet's Emails, Tom & Lenell Chace to Keith Emmer, August 18, 2008, Page 7 & 8 
8
 Keith Emrner's Emails, Tom & Lenell Chace to Keith Emmer, September 1-9, 2008, Page 12 
9
 Keith Emmer's Emails, Tom & Lenell Chace to Keith Emmer, March 31, 2009, Page 52 
10
 Special Litigation Committee interviews, Plaintiffs, Page 1, Line 45 
2 
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If. Demographics 
There are 460.5 tots (voting units) in the HECII development11 A voting unit is a lot. An equal annual 
assessment ts assigned to each voting unit 39% percent of the units have houses. 61% of the units 
are not developed. 
Percent of Units according to level of Road Maintenance and Land Use 
11% Houses on Rose Canyon Rd (Maintained by SLCo) 
4% Unbuilt Lots on Rose Canyon Rd (Maintained by SLCo) 
28% Houses on Roads Maintained by HCEII 
41% Unbuilt Lots on Roads Maintained by HCEII 
0% Houses on Roads not maintained 
16% Unbuilt Lots on Roads not maintained 
Percentage of Units with Greenbelt Status 
30% On Greenbelt Qualified by Bob Chew's Horses12 
23% On Greenbelt Qualified by other 
47% Not on Greenbelt 
Unpaid Assessments as of January 2010, (133.5 units or 33% owe HCEII assessments) 
69 Units are on Rose Canyon Road (Maintained by SLCo) 
16 units out of 69 units owe a total of $7,251 in assessments 
24% of resident units were past due on assessments 
15% of nonresident units were past due on assessments 
319.5 Units are on roads maintained by HCEII 
89.5 units out of 319.5 units owe a total of $62,326 
19% of resident units were past due on assessments 
34% of nonresident units were past due on assessments 
72 Units are on roads not maintained 
29 units out of 72 owe a total of $63,300, 
There are no residents 
40% of nonresident units were past due on assessments 
u
 The smallest unit Is 2.5 acres. The largest unit is a five to 9.9 acre portion of a larger lot 
12
 Documentation for the ACQ Letter from Tom Chace to the ACC, January 7,2009; Bob Chew is the man used by 
the Property Rights/ Greenbelt Committee to qualify their members for greenbelt with his horses. Page 34 
HCE00097 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
III. Favoritism 
Claim: The Board has adopted an informal, non-written policy favoring resident lot owners over 
those who have not yet developed their properties. The Association adopted this policy even though 
assessments are based on lot size, not improvements. The Board has imposed a de facto residency 
requirement for members before they can serve on the governing boards of the Association. 
A. In the interview with the SLC Lindsay Atwood stated "And if we are paying the same dues as 
someone with a home we should get the same service$pi3. Lindsay Atwood is actually paying 
less in assessments than other members with similar lot sizes. Lindsay Attwood's property is 
located on Step Mountain.14 Geologically this is a 36HniHion-year-old volcano.15 In 1993 Lot 99, 
27.92 acres, was assessed for five units and Lot 98, 23,17 acres, was assessed for four units.16 
In 2007 Lot 99 was assessed for two units and Lot 98 was assessed for two units.17 This likely 
happened in 1993 as the result of Directors' Proposition 1992-C.18 No documentation has been 
found showing Salt Lake County Planning and Zoning determination of the number of buildable 
Jots or that Board approval was obtained for the removal of assessments per the requirements 
outlined in the proposition 1992-C.19 
B. Brandon Frank owns Lot 102 on an unmaintained portion of Step Mountain Road and he owns 
or represents Lots 112 and 122C on a regularly maintained portion of Step Mountain Road. ^ 21 
(Tom Chace's records show that he represents lot 122C under the name of Ryan Frank that has 
been qualified for greenbelt by Bob Chew.22) As of April 2010, Mr. Frank owed $1,270 in back 
assessments on lot 112 and $635 on Lot 122C. He paid $1,372 for back assessments owed on 
Lot 102 on December 2, 2009 after the complaint was filed on November 25, 2009.23 Mr. Frank 
benefits from a longer distance of maintained roads to his lots 112 and 122C than any of the 
defendants and he has not paid assessments on those lots. 24 
Between 1994 and 2009 the Area D roads which access the plaintiffs' lots have received 
47.92% of the maintenance funds spent by HCEI1 and they convey 26.69% of the traffic on 
13
 Special Litigation Committee Interviews, Plaintiffs, April 28, 2010, Page 13, Line 618 
u
 Section XII this report, Photograph #2 
15
 Various Documents HCEII, The Canyon Breeze. February 2010, Fascinating Geologic Features Surround Rose 
Canyon, Pat Renrie, Page 105 
16
 Various Documents HCEII, Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Association, Phase II Membership list as of 5/21/93, 
Randy Anderson, Lot 98, Units 4, Page 29, Earl Dillman Lot 99, Units 5, Page 30 
17
 Various Documents HCEII, Hi Country Estates Phase It, Home/lot owners as of June 2, 2007. Lindsay Atwood Lot 
98 - Units 2, Lot 99 - Units 2, Page 72. 
18
 Various Documents HCEU, Directors Proposition 1992-C, "The primary justification for a change in assessable 
units would be based on the maximum numbers ofparceb with buildable home sites, as determined by the Salt 
take County Planning and Zoning Commission*' Page 27 
15
 Special Litigation Committee interviews, Walt Hoffman, the owners previous to him never requested the 
assessment change, it was just changed. Page 36, Line 1636 
20
 Map, Status of HCEII Roads, Plaintiffs' Property 
21
 Section XII of this report, Photograph #9 
22
 Documentation For the ACC, Attachment to letter from Greenbelt Committee to ACC, January 7,2009, Page 35 
23
 Hi Country Estates Financial Records 
24
 Map, Status of HCEII Roads 
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HCEH maintained roads. In comparison, Mountain Top Road and roads feeding into it received 
29.31% of the maintenance funds and Mountain Top Road conveyed 22.43% of the traffic on 
HCEII roads. Rose Creek Road received 4.49% of the maintenance funds and it conveyed 
16.74% of the traffic on HECII maintained roads and 14900 South received 6.21% of the 
maintenance funds and it conveyed 12.68% of the traffic on HCEII maintained roads.25 
D. Lindsay Atwood stated that he has requested financial documentation and records many times 
and has not gained access to accounting records of the HOA26 27. The Bylaws state that "the 
books, records, ledgers and papers of the Association shall... be subject to inspection by any 
member" 28 
SLC Recommendation #1: Only one place could be found in the association records where 
Lindsay Atwood asked about financial records and that was for an analysis. The Board does not 
need to provide any analysis but the financial records are to be available to the membership per 
the Bylaws. In order to clear up any communication problems, the SLC recommends that Mr. 
Emmer contact Mr. Atwood and suggest that he set a time with the Association Treasurer to 
review the records so that he can find the information that he needs. 
SLC Recommendation #2: The Association has information including unlisted phone numbers 
and addresses, members who owe the association money, bank account numbers, who is 
paving bills on behalf of another and other information that may be considered confidential. The 
Board has made a judgment that some of this information is confidential. It is recommended that 
they seek legal counsel regarding what is confidential and request advice as to the procedures 
for distributing this information when it is requested. 
1. Lindsay Atwood requested that the Association supply him an income statement broken 
down by landowners VS homeowners.29 Keith Emmer never did this analysis. 
2. Tom and Lenell Chace asked Keith Emmer for a list of people who owed HCEII money and 
how much. ^  S1 ^ . Mr. Emmer responded to the Chaces* requests with the statement 'Out 
of privacy concerns we will not give specifics as to who owes what to the association. We 
have a yearly audit and that you can examine. That tells how much assessments are 
owed.'*3 Tom Chace made another request for unpaid assessments and stated that he did 
not think the information was sensitive or confidential. u 
25 Various Documents HCEII, HCEII Road Maintenance Patterns 1994 to 2009. Spread Sheet, Page 104 
26
 Special Litigation Committee Interviews, Plaintiffs, April 28, 2010, Page 16, Line 718 
27
 Special Litigatron Committee Interviews, Plaintiffs, April 28, 2010, Jerry Gllmore cited Tom and Lenell Chace's 
requests for records as proof, Page 16, Line 730 
28
 HCEII Bylaws, Article XI: Books and Records 
29
 Various Documents HCEII, Monthly Meeting Minutes September 29, 2008 
30
 Keith Emmerys Emails, Keith Emmer to Tom &Lenelf Chace, December 19,2008, Page 43 
31
 Keith Ernrner's emails, Tom & Lenell Chace to Keith Emmer, January 8, 2009, Page 46 
52
 Keith Ernrner's Emails, Tom & Lenell Chace to Keith Emmer, March 4,2009, Page 48 
53
 Keith Ernrner's emails, Keith Emmer to Tom & Lenell Chace, March 4, 2009, Page 49 & 50 
34
 Keith Ernrner's Emails, Tom Chace to Keith Emmer, April 25, 2009, Page 76 
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3. On May 11. 2010 Tom Chace sent an email asking for access to records. Keith Emmer 
referred him to.the HCEII Treasurer. ^ This is the only request outside of items 1 and 2 
above that could be found. 
£. Tom Chace has presented himself as the lead for both the Property Rights and the Greenbelt 
Committees36 At the September 29, 2008 monthly meeting, he requested that HCEH fund the 
following three items and the Board responded in writing on October 5, 2008 37 38 
1. Provide $20,000 for a property survey to find lot corners. The Property Rights Committee 
felt that the Board owed them this survey because they (the owners of undeveloped land) 
have funded roads for other property owners over the years. The board responded that 
there are not funds in the 2003-2009 budget to do the survey. 
2. Fund five fire hydrant water meters so that greenbelt properties that do not have a water 
connection but need horses to qualify for greenbelt can get water.,The Board responded 
that they would allow two meters for a $5,000 deposit. The deposit would insure against 
damage to the Fire hydrant as well as insure payment for the water at the same rate 
charged to residential users. 
3. Provide $20,000 to hire a consultant to look at the feasibility of incorporating into a city. 
The Board responded thai the Association did not have $20,000 to fund a study to 
incorporate and it is an individual property owners concern to consider incorporation, not 
the Board's. 
F. On October 16, 2008, Tom Chace sent out an email "Hi Country Greenbelt Letter" to a group of 
landowners. He stated "Residents of Hi Country get a newsletter in their water bill. Those of us 
who are non- residents remain uninformed and it is up to each of us to pay attention if we ever 
hope to build on or sell our property. ...To access the Board minutes you need to register This 
means someone can track who goes into different areas on the Hi Country web site. Therefore, 
if you want to use the group registration we have set up... when you log in screen,, the User 
Name is- Kilroy was here....'39 
G. The plaintiffs believe that there is de facto residency requirement to be on the board. 
SLC Observation #1: The Plaintiffs did not show that there is or has been a de facto residency 
requirement to be on the Board. 
1. The majority of past Board members and officers have been residents of HCEII however 
there have been individuals that were not residents at the time they were on the Board or 
the ACC. Some of them include Terry Shobe, Joe Chivala, Ray Meyers, Marty Philips, 
Warren Cole, Dale Jones, Eldon Howard, Kim Wilson, Lionel Brown, Ray Meyers, Gus 
Colovos, Larry Fuller and Ken Johnson.40 
35 Various Documents HCEII, Tom Chace to Keith Emmer, May 11, 2010, Page 144 
Keith Emmer's Emails: Tom & Lenell Chace to Keith Emmer, Tue, 31, Mar 2009, Page 52 
37
 Various Documents HCEII, Monthly Meeting Mmutes, September 29 2008, Page 76 
3B
 Keith Emmerys Emails, To Tom & Lenell Chace from Keith Emmer October 8, 2008, Page 18 
39
 Keith Emmer's emails, Tom and Lenell Chace to some Greenbelt Property Owners. October 16, 2008 
40
 Review of past annual meeting minutes and correspondence by Arlene Johnson 
6 
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Z Scott Royal, nonresident, was nominated for a Board position by the plaintiffs at the 2007 
Annual meeting, 41 A2 He was not elected and did not attempt to run for the Board again. 
Mike Huber, a nonresident, was also nominated at the 2007 annual meeting. ° He was not 
elected. 
3. Tom and Lenell Chace were asked in advance of the 2009 Annual Meeting if they wanted to 
put any names on the ballot so it could be mailed out before the annual meeting.44 Tom 
Chace, representing the Property Rights/ Greenbelt Committee, wanted to know how many 
board positions were open. AS Keith Emmer responded that the roads position and the water 
position were open. He emphasized the time commitment of both positions.46 The Property 
Rights/ Greenbelt Committee did not identify anyone to run for the Board in 200947 but they 
did nominate Jeff Ohlson as a candidate for the ACC. ^ 49 Jeff Ohlson is a resident and he 
owns greenbelt property qualified under Bob Chew. ^  He was elected in June 2009 to 
replace Annette Emmer, a resident 
4. Plaintiffs were asked by the Special Litigation Committee if they knew of any nonresident 
who was told they could not run for the board. 51 They produced an email Keith Emmer sent 
to Tom Chace on April 21, 2009 outlining the time commitment and the responsibilities of the 
positions up for electron. This email does not mention residency. w The plaintiffs did not 
produce any other communication or relevant information. 
5. The plaintiffs mentioned that there was a requirement that if a committee member misses 
one emergency meeting they will be taken off the committee.53 No evidence of this alleged 
requirement has been found. The Bylaws state that the Board can declare the office of a 
Director to be vacant in the event such Director shall be absent from three consecutive 
regular meetings of the Board.54 
6. At every annual meeting members are solicited to serve on the ACC, the Board, area 
coordinators, treasurer and secretary. None of the three plaintiffs, Tom Chace. or Lenell 
Chace have ever volunteered to run for office. 
41 Special Litigation Committee Interviews, plaintiffs, April 28, 2010, Brandon Frank Page 14 Line 643 
42
 Various Documents HCEII, Annual Meeting Minutes, June 7,2007, Page 69, Paragraph 4 
43
 Various Documents HCEII, Annual Meeting Minutes, June 7, 2007, Page 69, Paragraph 4 
44
 Keith Emmer's Emails, Keith Emmer to Tom and Lenell Chace, Monday April 20, 2009. Page 65 
43
 Keith Emmer's Emails, Tom and Lenell Chace to Keith Emmer, Tue, 21 Apr 2009, bottom of Page 68 
46
 Keith Emmer's Emails, Keith Emmer to Tom and Lenell Chace, Tuesday April 21,2009, Page 68 
47
 Keith Emmer's Emails, Tom and Lenell Chace, Tuesday, April 21, 2009."We have no names to add to the ballot.", 
Page 69 
48
 Special Litigation Committee Interviews, plaintiffs, April 28,2010, Brandon Frank Page 14 Line 653 
49
 Keith Emmer's Emails, Tom & Lenell Chace to Keith Emmer, Fri, 24 Apr 2009 stating "We would like to add Jeff 
Ohlson's name as a candidate for the ACC, Page 74 
50
 Documentation for Architectural Control Committee, Letter dated January 7,2009 from the Greenbelt 
Committee to the ACC. attachment includes everyone qualified by Bob Chew's horses from Greenbelt 
51
 Special Litigation Committee Interviews, Plaintiffs, April 28, 2010, Page 14, Line 663 
K
 Keith Emmer's Emails, Keith Emmer to Tom Chace, April 21, 2009, Page 68 
5S
 Special Litigation Committee Interviews, Plaintiffs, April 28,1010, Page 15, Line 694 
54
 Bylaws of HECU Article VII, Section 1 -d 
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IV. Roads 
Claims: The Board has denied some members access to their property on safe or maintained roads. 
The Board has failed to maintain roads in a safe and reasonable uniform manner and condition. The 
Board is engaged in self dealing in that roads near Board members homes are maintained and 
improved. 
A. HCEII was never a properly platted and recorded subdivision. The "roads" are defined as 50 foot 
right-of-way easements for access to parcels of land in Hi Country Estates Phase IL55 These 
right-of-ways are recorded as meets and bounds legal descriptions of centerlines with 25 feet on 
each side. These "roads" were never designed for traffic flow, grade changes, fire truck access 
or storm water runoff controls as normally required by a governing agency for residential access 
roads. Salt Lake County has never approved the roads in HCEII as a group of residential roads. 
Once Salt Lake County approves a building permit it has been assumed by HCEII that 
improvements to the easement are adequate to treat it as a road and regular maintenance 
begins. 
B. There are three types of roads in Hi Country Estates Phase II. Each is maintained in a different 
manner. 
1. Properties owned by both residents and nonresidents located on the paved Rose Canyon 
Road receive road maintenance from Salt Lake County. This is a public road with the right-of 
-way dedicated to Salt Lake County. ** Salt Lake County uses property taxes paid by all 
owners of taxable real estate in the unincorporated areas of Salt Lake County to pay to 
maintain Rose Canyon Road. 15% or 69 out of 460.5 units front on Rose Canyon Road. 
They do not need to access any HCEII private roads in order to travel in and out of HCEII or 
to access their property. They pay the same assessments as the rest of HCEII.57 
2. Properties owned by both residents and nonresidents located on private roads receive 
maintenance from HCEII. This is about 69% or 319.5 out of 460.5 unrts. All of the 
defendants in the lawsuit (with the exception of Carol Dean who has since resigned and 
moved out of state) are residents of HCEII and the roads fronting their properties were 
maintained by HCEII before they were on the board. M The cost of maintenance of roads 
maintained by HCEII is covered by assessments shared by all members of the homeowners 
association. Tom and Lenell Chace's 40 acres front these roads. Brandon Prank has two 
tots fronting these roads. 
3. Properties owned by only nonresidents front rough graded right-of-way easements that are 
not regularly maintained by HCEII. They receive minimal maintenance, they do not lead to 
any residences and there is minimal traffic. This includes about 16% or 72 out of 460.5 
ss
 Various Documents HCEII, Special Warranty Deed, Zion's First National Bank to James and Frieda Mascara, 
March 20,1974, Page 122 
56
 Various Documents HCEII, Salt Lake County VS HCEII, December 20,1985, Page 129 
57
 Special Litigation Committee Interviews, Richard and Dorothy Mittlestaedt, They live on Rose Canyon which is 
maintained by Salt Lake County and expressed disagreement with using their assessments to pay for everyone 
else's improvements. Page 42, line 1882 
58
 Map, Status of HCEII Roads, Defendant's Property 
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units. All three plaintiffs own property on these easements that are not regularly maintained 
by HCEII59. They travel on about 1 3/4 miles of HCEII maintained roads to get to the area 
where maintenance ends. They must travel about3 / miles of rough graded easements to 
access, their Jots. 
C. The HCEII Certificate of Incorporation states: T h e Association is also formed to promote the 
health, safety and welfare of the residents within Hi Country Estates il "60 
S L C Observation #2: Past boards and the current board have treated annual road 
maintenance, improvements and snow removal as health, safety and welfare responsibilities to 
the residents within Hi Country Estates ll. Historically, maintenance does not begin on a road 
until the County issues a building permit for a residence on that road. 
1. In the early to mid 1980s, Mascaro Trucking was hired to grade and remove snow from the 
entrance of Hi- Country Estates II to existing residents; Lot 44 (Andreason) on Rose 
Canyon Road 6 \ Lot 18 and 23 {Larry Fuller and Harvey Heed) on Mountain Top Road.62 
In 198463 and 1986 M the practice of grading and improving roads to existing homes and 
homes under construction was articulated by the Board. 
2. The only road work done in "Area D" (Area D encompasses the roads from Rose Canyon 
Road to the plaintiffs' properties) between the times when the right-of-way easements were 
originally rough graded in the 1970s and when a pad (fire truck turnaround) was constructed 
for Jerry Gilmore in the early 1990s was for access to construction of the upper water tank, 
the upper well and related piping.65 ^ 
3. Larry Fuller, President of HCEII in 1992, articulated to Salt Lake County that the Association 
was committed to grade and improve Step Mountain Road between lot 100 and lot 106; 
however, he also stated that the timing for totally completing the work was based on Mr. 
Gilmore, the owner of lot 100, applying for a building permit 67 
4. Regular annual road maintenance in Area D from Rose Canyon Road to lot 92 began when 
the Step Mountain LLC development was started in the 1995. M ^ 
5. There are no residences on the segment of Step Mountain Road between lots 76 and 92. 
After the water lines were installed in 1993, the segment of Step Mountain Road between 
lots 76 and 100 was treated as a utility right-of-way rather than a road because Salt Lake 
59
 Map, Status of HCEII Roads, Plaintiffs Property 
Certificate of Incorporation, Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Association; Third Article 
61
 Various Documents HCEII, Salt Lake County VS HCEII, Salt Lake County did not claim ownership to Rose Canyon 
Road and start maintaining it until 1991, Page 130 section 4. 
62
 Special Litigation Committee Interviews, Rex Facer, Page 15, Line 668 
E3
 Various Documents HCEII, Letter to Members from Board, May 10,1984, Page 1 
64
 Various Documents HCEH, Fall 1986 Membership Status Letter, Capital Improvements and Maintenance, Page 4 
Special Litigation Committee Interviews, Rex Facer, Page 19, Line 860 
66
 Various Documents HCEII, Monthly Meeting Minutes, August 27,1991, Page 10 
67
 Various Documents HCEII, Letter: Larry Fuller to Salt Lake County RE Subdivision Application PL 92-1077, By Jerry 
Gilmore, August 13,1009, Page 115 
68
 Special Litigation Committee Interviews, Rex Facer, Page 19, Line 843 
59
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County would not approve the steep grade for residential access.70 Other parts of this right-
of-way also lead through a drainage subject to storm water runoff. This is the location of the 
plaintiffs' properties.7172 
D. Certificate of Incorporation, Article II, Subsection 2 states" The homeowners Association is 
obligated to provide maintenance and all services stated above only to the extent that such 
maintenance and services can be provided with the proceeds of such annual payments0 About 
$60,000 per year is spent to maintain 10.5 miles of roads. Residents complain about the 
condition of the gravel roads. 
1. A visual inspection shows that the roads receive minimal maintenance in order to stay 
within this budget.73 In the SLC interview, Robert Messmer complained about Shaggy 
Mountain Road where he lives 74 
2. Keith Emmer stated that road maintenance projects and needs are identified by the Board 
on an annual basis. They drive the HOA area and identify deteriorated areas on roads that 
lead to residences. They also respond to complaints regarding the condition of roads75 
E. Step Mountain Road leading to the plaintiffs' properties was drivable in 1993. Walt Hoffman 
owned lot 99 between 1993 and 2006. Mr. Hoffman stated that \n 1992 when he purchased his 
tot he could drive a two wheel drive vehicle up the steep section of Step Mountain Road 
(between lots 76 and 100)76 Jerry Gilrnore stated that he could drive a sedan to his lot 100 in 
1992 when he purchased it.77 
SLC Observation #3: Upper Step Mountain Road was made passable in the early 1990s 
primarily for construction equipment to deliver supplies for the well and water tank and to install 
water lines. 
1. On August 27,1991 the Board authorized grading Arnold Hollow Road and Step Mountain 
Road in order to get pipe delivered for water transport from the well and so that a generator 
could be set up at the well house. The Board consisting of Larry Fuller, Ed Huish and 
Sydney Morganson voted on making a passable road. n In summer of 1992 the upper well 
and associated water lines were under construction. These lines were installed in Step 
Mountain Road.79 Rough grading was necessary to complete the installation of water lines. 
2. In 1993 Larry Fuller stated that Salt Lake County Planning and Zoning would not accept the 
use of Step Mountain Road and Arnold Hollow Roads as the primary access to the lots or 
}
 Various documents HCEII, Directors Proposition 1992-D, Page 28 70\ 
71
 Map, Status of HCEII Roads, Plaintiffs' Property 
72
 Section XII of this document, Photograph #1 
73
 Section XII of this document, Photographs 1-13 
74
 Special Litigation Committee Interviews, Robert Messmer, resident, Page 50, Line 2266 
75
 Special Litigation Committee Interviews, Kefth Emmer, Page 11, Line 499 
76
 Special Litigation Committee Interviews, Walt Hoffman, Page 34, Line 1513 
77
 Special Litigation Committee Interviews, Plaintiffs, April 28, 2010, Page 6, Line 255 
7
* Various Documents, Monthly Meeting Minutes, August 27,1991, Page 10 
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homes on the southeast side of the HCEH. Step Mountain is too steep and Arnold Hollow 
Road is too long for public safety vehicle (police and fire) response. 80 
F. Past practices show that capital improvement projects are needed to bring some "roads" up to a 
standard that they can effectively be maintained by the Association and they meet Salt Lake 
County standards for access in order to issue a residential building permit.81 These projects 
have been funded with past assessments, lot foreclosures, developers and special 
assessments. The segment of Step Mountain Road between Lot 92 and 76 as well as other 
unmaintained easements in the development, are not included in this list because there has 
never been a capital improvement project to bring these roads to Salt Lake County standards. 
In December of 2008 Keith Emmer suggested to Tom Chace, representing the Greenbelt/ 
Property Rights Committee, to determine from the County what the roads require to meet 
standards.B2 There was no response to that request. 83 
1. At the time building permits were granted, there were roads within HCE II that met Salt Lake 
County standards for granting a building permit without substantial improvements after the 
original road was cut in 1974. 
a. Shaggy Mountain Road Lot 18 to 7 
b. Country View Lane 
c. Rose Creek Lane, lower section 
d. Mountain Top Road 
e. Sharose Road 
f. Lower Step Mountain Road 
2. Capita! Improvement projects were completed by developers on roads that needed to be 
improved to meet Salt Lake County standards for a building permiL These roads have been 
maintained by HCEII from the time they were completed. They include the following: M 
a. Step Mountain LLC - East part of Area D K 
b. Wapti Heights-West part of Area D 
c. Mascaro Estates - All Roads that feed into 14900 South and 14900 South to Rose 
Canyon Road *6 
3. In 1993 a special assessment was approved for some roads. ** 
a. Step Side Road (Salt Lake County never granted approval) 
b. Shaggy Mountain Road Lots 1 to 7 
c. Shaggy Mountain Road Lots 1 to 162 
d. Rose Creek Lane, Upper Y* mile 
e. Arnold Hollow Road Lot 77 to 170 
80
 Various documents HCEII, Directors Proposition 1992-D, Page 28 
81
 Various Documents HCEII, Letter from Step Mountain LLC to Area D Lot Owners, Feb 8,1996, Page 47 
82
 Keith Emmer's Emails, Keith Emmer to Tom Chace, Monday, December 15,2008 paragraph 6, Page 40 
85
 Special Litigation Committee interviews, Keith Emmer, Page 3, Line 117 
84
 Special Litigation Committee Interviews, Keith Emmer, Page 12, line 533 
85
 Various Documents HCEH, Letter from Step Mountain LLC to Area D members summarizing the project. Feb. 8, 
1996. Page 47 
Special litigation Committee interviews, Rex Facer, Page 20, Line 920 
87
 Various Documents HCEII, Director's Proposition 1992-D, Page 28 
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G. Jerry Gllmore stated that the owners of lots along upper Step Mountain Road (from Lot 92 to lot 
100) should not have to pay a special assessment for capital improvements per Certificate of 
Incorporation because HCEll had made a commitment to complete the capital improvements 
that would upgrade Step Mountain Road leading to his lot 100. 8B 
SLC Observation #4: Because Mr. Gilmore closed on the property he purchased from HCEll 
before his subdivision was recorded, he purchased Lot 100 as is and the Association had no 
contractual obligation to Mr. Gilmore. Even though he knew he could not get a building permit 
because Salt Lake County Health Department would not approve a septic tank. Mr. Gilmore 
continued to reguest that the Association grade his road with the justification that he needed it 
graded to get a building permit. 
1. Jerry Gilmore purchased his lot 100 from HCEll. He signed an earnest money agreement in 
April 1992 and closed on property in October 1992. He agreed that the buyer will obtain 
subdivision approval from Salt Lake County Planning and Zoning. If the county will not 
qualify property for building this earnest money agreement is cancelled.89 
2. Before Mr. Gilmore closed on his lot, Larry Fuller, (President of the Association) sent a letter 
to Salt Lake County stating that the Homeowners Association would upgrade Step 
Mountain Road by recrowning it, placing culverts at appropriate grade points, from Lot 100 
and to Lot 106 to allow surface water to run from the east side of the natural drainage to 
the west. The timing for totally completing the work was based on Mr. Gilmore applying for a 
building permit Mr. Fuller asked that the County approve the Gilmore subdivision with the 
stipulation that a building permit not be granted without the roadway upgrading by the 
association and approved by the County *° The S LC was not able to find any such written 
stipulation by Salt Lake County. There is also no documentation addressing Salt Lake 
County's position on the condition of the segment of road from lot 106 to Arnold Hollow 
Road. 
3. The Gilmores closed on their lot in October 1992. In the June 1993 Annual Meeting a 
proposition was presented by Larry Fuller requesting approval for a special assessment for 
various roads in the association and an extension of Step Side Lane, (The extension of Step 
Side Road was never approved by the County but use of Arnold Hollow Road for 
ingress/egress was eventually approved.) Improvements to the section of Step Mountain 
Road that fronts the plaintiffs' properties and improvements to roads between Arnold Hollow 
Road and lot 106 were not included in this proposition.91 
4. In the Special Litigation Committee Interview Mr. Gllmore stated: "The subdivision was 
recorded, everything was approved with exception of the roads and Salt Lake County was 
waiting for High Country Estates to fulfill their commitments to make the roads and that 
was the only thing that was holding them back."91 He also stated "The subdivision was 
never completed because High Country Estates didn't complete their agreement."** Salt 
88
 Special Litigation Committee Interviews, Plaintiffs, April 28, 2010, Page 11. Line 484 
89
 Various Documents HCEll, Earnest Money Sales Agreement dated April 14,1992, Considerations and 
Contingencies. Page 12 
90
 Various Documents HCEll, Letter: Larry Fuller to Salt Lake County RE Subdivision Application PL 92-1077, By Jerry 
Gilmore, August 13,1009, Page 115 
91
 Various Documents HCEll, Proposition 1992-0, Page 28 
92
 Special Litigation Committee Interviews, Plaintiffs, April 28, 2010, Page 11, Line 512 
93
 Special Litigation Committee Interviews, Plaintiffs, April 28, 2010, Page 11, Line 518 
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Lake County Development Services has no record of stipulations for approval or that Mr. 
Giimore recorded his subdivision thus he could not have applied for a building permit94 
5. Mr. Atwood also stated that a subdivision was recorded for his lot 98. x 
6. Step Mountain Road from Step View Drive to Step Side Road was funded between 1995 
and 1996 by Step Mountain LLC and other members whose property fronted on this road. 
Improvements installed by Step Mountain LLC and other association members were 
originally planned to extend along High Step Lane to Jerry Gilmore's lot 10096. These 
planned Improvements would also have extended to Lindsay Atwood's lot 98. 
7. February 4,1995, 2.5 years after closing on his lot, Mr. Giimore wrote a letter to the Board 
of Directors stating that then Association president, Larry Fuller, made a verbal agreement 
that if (Giimore) purchased this property, HEClI would provide Salt Lake County Planning 
and Zoning approved Ingress and Egress. 97 This was also discussed in the 2009 Annual 
Meeting and there were conflicting memories of previous commitments.98 In the meeting 
with the Special Litigation Committee Mr. Giimore stated: "Actually whenever I bought my 
property the Homeowners Association agreed to bring all roads to my property up to county 
code so that I can get a building permit for that/1" 
8. The February 4,1995 letter from Mr. Giimore also requested that the fire truck turn-around 
be builL The Board seemed to think it had been completed- 10° 101 In the interview with the 
Special litigation Committee Mr. Giimore stated "... / agreed to afire truck turnaround on 
my property and the association actually came in there and they put road base down for 
the turn and they started going back up that road and then It came to a stop. The Board 
put a stop to it. So It was, the Homeowners Association actually paid for the road base that 
was on the turnaround on my property." 102 
9. Fifteen years ago, the Board determined that the Association had no obligation to Mr. 
Giimore for building a road based on a July 20,1995 opinion by Daniel Gibbons," the 
association's legal counsel, regarding Gilmore's Ernest Money Agreement It was stated 
that the language in the Earnest Money Agreement was unenforceable after closing since 
the only result of nonperformance is cancellation of the Earnest Money Agreement The 
performance must occur, if at all, while the Earnest Money Agreement is still pending.103 
Salt Lake County Development Services, File on Jerry Gilmore's subdivision PL-92-1077, renumbered as 5853 
95
 Special Litigation Committee interviews, Plaintiffs, April 28, 2010, Page 11. Line 493 
Various Documents HCE1I, Letter to Board of Directors from Area D property owners. June 23,1995, 
Map, Page 41 
97
 Various Documents HCEII, Letter from Jerry and Catherine Giimore to HCEH. February 4,1995, Page 32 
9B
 Recording of 2010 Annual Meeting 
99
 Special Litigation Committee Interviews, plaintiffs April 28, 2010, Page 11, Line 484 
100
 Various Documents HCEiJ, Letter from Jerry Giimore to HCEH, February 4,1995. "Lack of progress on the fire 
truck turnaround" Handwritten note on Mr. Gilmore's letter stating that this was complete. Page 31 
101
 Special Litigation. Committee Interviews, Rex Facer Page 19, Line 860 and 874 
102
 Special Litigation Committee Interviews, Plaintiffs, April 28, 2010, Page 10, Ljne 435 
103
 Various Documents HCEII, Opinion on Giimore Earnest Money Agreement, Daniel Bay Gibbons, July 20,1995. 
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10. Salt Lake County's adoption of the Foothills and Canyons Overlay Zone (FCOZ) in 1998 
created development limitations and increased the costs of development in HCEII.1(* The 
Property Rights Committee considers this "the cruelest form of imminent domain".105106 
Even if they have a recorded subdivision, before obtaining a building permit each of the 
plaintiffs will need to comply with FCOZ.1 0 7 Because the slope of their lots exceeds 30% 
and parts of the plaintiffs' lots are on the ridgefine, Chapter 19.72.030 Section B, 3 &4of 
FCOZ may cause the plaintiffs' lots to be undevelopable. t 0 8 1 0 9 (This determination can 
only be made by the Sail Lake County Development Services Division) 
11. In 2001 a drinking water source protection plan for Herriman City's spring along Arnold 
Hollow Road was completed and filed with the State. This led to a septic tank moratorium for 
the parts of Area D that drain into this spring. Because there is no sewer and septic 
systems are the only source of waste water treatment in that area, development was 
effectively halted in most of Area D as a direct consequence of Herriman's water source 
protection plan and the Salt Lake County Health Department's unwillingness to consider 
alternative septic (i.e. closed) systems. The plaintiffs' properties are not in this moratorium in 
that they drain along Step Mountain Road to the north. 
12. Mr. Gilmore stated at the January 31,2006 monthly meeting that the road and subdivision 
had been approved but he has not been through FCOZ. He said that he could not get a 
building permit until the road is improved. Mr. Gilmore was advised to work with the Board 
and go through the County to make sure he could build on his lot 11° 1 1 \ Jerry Gilmore 
appeared at several other meetings of the Board requesting that his road be graded.112113114 
The section of Step Mountain Road fronting Jerry Gllmore's property also serves the other 
plaintiffs' properties and the HCEII well house. It runs along a gully through deep clay and 
becomes rutted when it is wet and driven on.115 The "road" has never been engineered and 
104
 C-2 Chapter 19.72 FOOTHILLS AND CANYONS OVERLAY ZONE (FCOZ) Salt Lake County Government Web Site 
http://WWW.co.slc.ut.us/) 
105
 Keith Emmerys Emails, Hr Country Property Owners, Lindsay Atwood, Dave Moore and Tom Cbace, August 18, 
2008, Page 9, #2, last sentence 
106
 Various Documents HCEII, Letter from the Property Rights Committee to HCEII members, May 6, 2010, Page 
139. 
107
 Various Documents HCEII, Cal Schneller, Salt Lake County Planning Director 1996-2002, Page 114 
108
 Various Documents HCEII, Unbuildable Area>30%, Page 136 
109
 Map, HCEII Non-Buildable Land Area, Hansen Allen & Luce Engineers 
uc
 Various Documents HCEII, HCEII, Agenda for January 31, 2006 monthly meeting with handwritten note by 
Ariene Johnson, Page 60 
111
 Various Documents HCEII, Cal Schneller, Salt Lake County Foothill Overlay Zone, The FCOZ zone came into effect 
in December 1997. tf the subdivision had been recorded before that date it would have been a legal 
nonconforming lot and exempt from the FCOZ provisions but obtaining a building permit from a structure would 
require compliance with FCOZ. Page 114, Item 6 
112
 Various Documents HCEII, Minutes from the July 5, 2006 Directors' meeting, Mr. Gilmore stated that his road 
had been neglected for thirteen years. He has decided not to build on his property and Is trying to sell it. Page 65 
113
 Various Documents HCEII, Annual Meeting Minutes, June 9, 2007, Jerry Gilmore stated that he had his land 
since 1992 and his road had never been graded. He cannot get to his property and cannot build because the 
County says he needs a better road. The Board of Directors stated that the Board provided the most money where 
the most people live. Page 68 
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lacks culvert pipes and road base installed to divert storm water. Upper Step Mountain 
Road was graded and Tony Mascaro filled in a washed out area along the water line in the 
fall of 2006116 117( it was graded to the well house the spring of 2008.118 119 and in 
November 2009 it was graded for access to the well house.120 
13. Mr. Giimore stated that he met with Salt Lake County Health Department Director about four 
years ago (2006) and he was told that they would not approve a septic tank on his 
property.121 If he could not get a septic tank approved, he could not get a building permit. 
14. At various annual meetings, some form of a proposition to create a special assessment for 
improvements to roads has been presented by the Board. Every proposal has been voted 
down since 1993. The recent vote in 2009 showed that all of the plaintiffs voted against 
paying additional funds in addition to annual assessments for roads. 122 
H. The June 12, 2009 Demand letter from Wade Budge, Plaintiffs' Attorney, states that the Board 
has failed to act in accordance with its fiduciary duties in that the Board does not maintain the 
roads within the Association in an equal or nondiscriminatory manner. AH members of HCE II 
pay the same assessments and they receive a different level of road maintenance. 
SLC Observation #5: Some property owners do not have maintained roads that front their 
property. However this is not due to neglect of fiduciary duties of the Board in that the governing 
documents were complied with, and were consistent with past practices. The Board's method of 
prioritizing road maintenance and improvement is consistent with state and local government 
practice. Furthermore, the Board must operate within the funds actually available. 
SLC Observation #6: The Board's legal counsel's opinion differs from Wade Budge's opinion. 
Where an issue results in a conflicting interpretation of the law between Attorneys, the Board's 
most responsible option is to act according to the opinion of their legal counsel. 
1. The Certificate of Incorporation, Addendum Part II allows the Homeowners Association the 
power and purpose to Install utility improvements within an area designated by the 
association. Utilities have been interpreted lo include water and road improvements.123 
2. The Special Litigation Committee compared traffic patterns with money spent on road 
maintenance. Records from the past fifteen years show that segments of roads with the 
highest traffic volume receive the greatest level of maintenance and efforts have been made 
116Various Documents HCEII, Board Meeting Minutes, July 5, 2006, Tfte Board decided to get a cost estimate. Page 
65. The road was graded and a washed Dur area filled in fall of 2006. Tony Mascaro was paid for this work. 
117
 Section Xff of this document, Photograph #4 
118
 Annual Meeting Recording, June 2008, a statement was made by the Board that the road to the upper well had 
been graded. 
119
 Special Litigation Committee Interviews, Rex Facer, Page 17 Line 773 
120
 Section XII this report, Photograph #8 
m
 Special Litigation Committee Interviews, Plaintiffs, April 28,2010, Page 17, Line 788 & 802 
122
 Various Documents HCEII, 2009 Proposition Voting Results, Page 83 
123
 Various Documents HCE II, Opinion on June 23,1995 Proposal from Area "D" Owners, Dan Gibbons, July 10, 
1995, Roads ware treated as utilities per Certificate of Incorporation, Page 42 
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to construct them to the most durable standard.124 The Board spends funds to remedy the 
wear and tear on the roads created by traffic volume. This is consistent with practices of the 
State of Utah and local governments. If equal money were spent on all roads, the collectors 
most used would fall into disrepair while the roads seldom used would remain in the best 
condition. 
3. In the November 24, 2008 annual meeting Jerry Gilmore suggested that the "roads should 
all be equal and that nicer roads should be allowed to degrade if needed so that the other 
roads reach better condition *1*5 
4. In an email to Tom Chace dated December 15, 2008, Keith Emmer stated "l/Ve maintain 
roads that receive the most vehicle traffic because vehicle traffic causes a high amount of 
wear, wash boarding, uneven compaction and redistribution of road base. In that the 
Association funds are not adequate to even repair this ongoing damage, we cannot be 
expected to repair low traffic areas that have not been engineered to prevent water runoff 
damage."1Z6 
5. In a letter, dated February 27, 2009, from Mike and Laurel Bruun, nonresident members, 
they quoted Greg Schmidt, attorney and nonresident member, "...HCEIL Has violated its 
obligations in how they have used the assessments they have collected historically, if they 
did not have enough money to maintain ail of the roads to a high standard, then they should 
have maintained all of the roads to a lesser standard, not some of the roads to a high 
standard with some of the roads receiving no maintenance. ...the Board of Directors of a 
HO A owes a fiduciary obligation to ail members of the association not to provide services in 
a discriminatory fashion.... "127 
6. In a discussion of the Addendum to the Certificate of Incorporation, Daniel Gibbons, 
previous legal counsel to the Board, pointed out that the association "shall have the right* to 
install utilities or roads. Nowhere is the Association bound by a 50% vote to install roads, the 
directors are limited in debt and bound to stay within a budget.128 
7. This question of not giving all roads in HCEII an equal level of maintenance was addressed 
with Howard Lundgren, the association's attorney, after receipt of the June 12,2009 
Demand letter. Howard Lundgren's verbal advice to the Board was that the Board was 
within its rights to manage the load maintenance projects according to a consistent business 
plan. 129 
124
 Various Documents HCEII, Hi Country Estates H Road Maintenance Patterns 1994 to 2009, December 2009, 
Page 99 
125
 Various Documents, HCEH, Monthly Meeting Minutes November 24,2008, Page 117 
126
 Keith Emmer's Emails, Keith Emmer to Tom and Lenell Chace, December 15, 2008, Page 39 
127
 Various Documents HCEII, Letter from Mike and Laurel Bruun to HCEIJ, February 27, 2009, Page 80 
128
 Various Documents HCEII, Opinion on June 23,1995 Proposal from Area "D" owners. Daniel Gibbons, Page 42 
129
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I. When Mr. Atwood and Mr. Frank purchased their lots they were aware of the road conditions. 
They have not changed since that time. 
1. Mr. Atwood commented that he had to walk Vz mile to get to his property when he first 
looked at it before purchasing it. 130 In the Special Litigation Committee Interviews Mr. 
Atwood stated: "... in my first HOA meeting that i went to I explained that the roads were a 
disaster,, that we're paying associations dues, I was told by the Board the intent of the 
Board was they would work on the roads the following year. That was four years ago they 
were going to start working on the roads/' m The Board stated at the 2005 Annual 
meeting that they would grade Step Mountain Road.132 It was graded form lot 106 to lot 100 
in the fall of 2006.133 
2. In the September 2006 monthly meeting Mr. Atwood wanted to know when the road up to 
his area was going to be repaired because he was having difficulty getting to the property 
he recently purchased. Keith Emmer told him that High Step Lane was in fairly good shape 
and the steep section of Step Mountain Road could not be repaired.134 
3. Brandon Frank purchased his lot in January 2006. He stated that he had a difficult time 
accessing it when he purchased it135 
4. Sometime between 6/08 and 6/09 Mr. Atwood purchased another lot, 64A, with slope and 
access limitations.136 
5. All three Plaintiffs' properties are located within an area termed "Area D*. They must travel 
on HCEII maintained roads (Arnold Hollow Road, the S Curve and Step Mountain Road) a 
distance of approximately 1.75 mile to get to the unmaintained segment of Step Mountain 
road that starts at lot 92. At that point they must travel approximately .75 miles on the 
unmaintained segment of Step Mountain Road to the frontage of their properties. The 
plaintiffs' lots are located on the 1.25 mile long segment of Step Mountain Road between 
Lot 76 and Lot 92 where there are no residences. This segment of Step Mountain Road 
has never been engineered and constructed to a standard where a building permit can be 
granted and annual maintenance can occur.137 Part of that segment has been ruled by 
Salt Lake County to be too steep for safe access.138 The fact that this segment of "road" is 
unmaintained has been interpreted as unfair by the plaintiffs as well as by Walt Hoffman, a 
previous owner of Mr. Atwood's Lot 99.139 
las . 
230
 Various Documents HCEII, Keith Emmer's Recollections, Page 119 
131
 Special Litigation Committee Interviews, Plaintiffs, April 28, 2010,, Page 7, Line 314 
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J. The plaintiffs have claimed that the HCEII Directors are self dealing in that their property fronts 
on roads that have received more maintenance than the Plaintiffs' roads. 14° 
SLC Observation #7: All of the HCEII Directors live on roads shared by other members and 
maintenance began on their roads when building permits were issued. Their frontage does not 
differ from other frontage of other members on the roads that are maintained by HCEII. There is 
no evidence of self dealing and denying access to property by the Board 
1. Rex Facer has maintained the roads periodically since the early 1980s. (The years he did 
not maintain the roads they were maintained by other contractors including Apache Sky, 
VanGo, Boyd Hansen and TNT General Contractors) Mr. Facer stated in his interview that 
he has never been asked by a board member to do special work on their road at the cost of 
141 
the association. 
2. In their complaint, the plaintiffs included a photograph of Shaggy Mountain Road past 
Arlene Johnson's property as proof of self dealing. The lots 7,10 and 5 that Arlene 
Johnson owns front on a relative flat grade and the area receives minimal traffic and does 
not develop washboard.142 That area does not receive annual grading.143 No road 
maintenance or snow removal was done on this part of Shaggy Mountain road until the 
Johnson's received a building permit in summer of 1986. 
3. Mountain Top Road was paved in 2006. This project was initiated by Rick Andrus, Board 
President. Mr. Andrus lived on Rose Canyon Road. Arlene Johnson presented the project 
at the 2005 annual meeting. U4 The project was justified in that Mountain Top Road was 
becoming costly to maintain and the patchwork that was previously done was not working. 
145
 Mountain Top Road receives a level of traffic second to Arnold Hollow Road and the 
area from which it collects traffic has received the second highest level of funding in the last 
fifteen years.146 In the complaint, the plaintiffs showed photographs of Mountain Top Road 
as their evidence that Tony Sarra, Board Member, was self dealing. They also showed his 
paved driveway which he paid for himself. Tony Sarra as well as many other residents 
uses Mountain Top Road for daily ingress/ egress.147 
4. Keith Emmer and Tom Williams front on 14900 South and use it for ingress/ egress. This is 
the collector road for Mascaro Estates and often develops washboard due to the amount of 
traffic it receives.148 Tony Mascaro voluntarily grades it as a favor to family members who 
use that road.149 Maintenance began on 14900 South before Tom Williams and Keith 
Emmer were on the board. 
5. Carol Dean's property is in the general location of Brandon Frank's lots 112 and 122C, 15° 
Her lot receives the same level of maintenance as all of the residential lots in Area D.151 
140
 Special Litigation Committee Interviews, Plaintiffs, April 28, 2010, Page 14, Line 630 
141
 Special Litigation Committee interviews, Rex Facer, Page 16, Line 699 
142
 Section XII this Report, Photograph #11 
143
 Special Litigation Committee interviews, Rex Facer, Page 20, line 894 
144 
145 
Various Documents HCEII, Annual meeting June 11,2005, Page 56 
Special Litigation Committee Interviews, Rex Facer, Page 16, Line 743 
146
 Various Documents HCEII, Hi Country Estates II Road Maintenance Patterns 1994 to 2009, Page 104 
147
 Section XII of this report, Photograph #13 
148
 Section XII of this Report, Photograph #12 
149
 Special Litigation Committee Interviews, Rex Facer. Page 20 Line 906 
150
 Map, Status of HCEII Roads 
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V. Snow Removal 
151 
Claim: The Board has given winter access rights to some lot owners (pn'ncipalty residents as 
opposed to nonresidents who are members) The association wastes and spends limited resources 
on winter snow removal for some roads but not all roads in the Association thus preventing some 
Association members from accessing their prosperities in the winter while others enjoy year round 
access 
A. There are three types of snow removal service in HCEII. 
SLC Observation #8: Snow is removed from roads that allow access to residents/ 
homeowners. This is not due to neglect to fiduciary duties of the Board in that the Board has 
followed governing documents, are consistent with past practices and the Board has to operate 
within the funds actually available. 
1. 15% of HCEII assessed units are properties owned by both residents and nonresidents 
located on Rose Canyon Road. They receive snow removal service from Salt Lake County. 
They do not need to access any HCEII owned roads for ingress/egress. 
2. 69% of HCEII assessed units are properties owned by both residents and nonresidents 
located on roads maintained by HCEIi receive snow removal from HCEII. All of the 
defendants in the lawsuit (with the exception of Carol Dean who has since resigned from 
the Board and moved out of state) are residents of HCEII and live on roads maintained by 
HCEII. The cost of snow removal from roads maintained by HCEII is covered by 
assessments shared by all members of the homeowners association. 
3. 16% of the HCEII assessed units are properties owned by only nonresidents that are 
located on rough graded "roads" not regularly maintained by HCEII. These "roads" do not 
receive any snow removal because they do not lead to any residences. All three plaintiffs 
own property where there are no residents thus snow is not removed from their frontage. 
They travel on about 1 3/4 miles of HCEII maintained roads to get to the area where 
maintenance ends. 
B. Justification for not removing snow on certain roads. 
SLC Observation #9: Legal Counsel has advised the Board that they are in their right to 
remove snow only on roads that lead to residents in the same way they regularly maintain 
roads that lead to residents. While the plaintiffs' attorney may argue otherwise, the Board has 
chosen to follow the legal advice of the Attorney that the Board hired to advise them 
1. In attempting to build a case to create a special snow removal assessment for only 
residents, Tom Chace, representing the Property Rights/ Greenbelt Group stated that land 
owners do not go to their roads in the winter * / have not talked to anyone who has un-built 
property that goes to their land in the winter. All they do is drive the road as they have no 
driveway or access off the road that is kept open in the winter. Many of the landowners 
Section XII of this report, Photograph #10 
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don't even live in Salt Lake."152 In another email attempting to justify reducing 
assessments paid by nonresidents for snow removal Tom Chace made the statement "The 
] point is that most of this land (owned by nonresidents) has no driveway access and unless 
\ you go up each time it snows and clear a path, access through heavy snow would be very 
j difficult I don't understand how they use their land?"*15* 
I 2. The Board considers snow removal for residents a safety responsibility in the same way 
• they consider road maintenance a safety responsibility as spelled out in the Certificate of 
} Incorporation. "The Association is also formed to promote the health, safety and welfare of 
|i the residents within Hi Country Estates II "154 There are no residents on Step Mountain 
*• Road between Lots 92 and 76 
• 3. As in road maintenance, snow removal for existing residences has been done since the 
£ early 1980s/55 Tl 
t local government. 
his has been a cost consideration and it is consistent with practices of 
The Protective Covenants infer that even though nonresident members do not receive snow 
removal, they are still obligated to pay their share of the cost. "Each grantee and lot owner for 
himself, his heirs, executors and assigns, covenants and agrees to pay annually his pro rata 
share of the costs to maintain roads, streets, and common areas " *56 It is the opinion of 
Legal Counsel for HCEll that road maintenance includes snow removal. 157 
Tom Chace, representing the Property Rights/ Greenbelt Group, disputed snow removal as a 
safety issue." Using the safety issue is also debatable. This is a broad term and could also be 
applied to road conditions other than snow. There are places in the United States where the 
roads are not plowed. They drive them all winter and pack them out...."158 
\ * " Keith Emmer's Email. Email Tom & Lenell Chace to Keith Emmer, April 28,2009, Page 79 
| ^ Keith Emmer's emails, Tom Chace to Keith Emmer, May 3,2009, Page 95 
\ 1SA Certificate of Incorporation, Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Association; Third Article 
t ** Special Litigation Committee Interviews, Rex Facer, Page 15, Line 668 
> 1S6 Protective Covenants for Hi Country Estates Phase II, Article II, Section 2 
I m Keith Emmer's Emails, Letter from Howard Lundgren to Keith Emmer dated May 6, 2009, Page 104 
:: *** Keith Emmer's Email. Email from Tom & Lenell Chace to Keith Emmer, Monday May 4, 2009, Page 97 
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VI. Architectural Control Committee 
Claim: The Architectural Control Committee (ACC) has prepared a policy even though the governing 
documents do not allow the ACC to enact or create any such policy. 
Pursuant to Article VII, Section 1(a) of the Bylaws, The Board of Directors shall have the power 
to (a) adopt and publish rules and regulations governing the use of roads, streets, common 
areas, properties and facilities owned or under the control of the Association"159 In November 
2004 K was recommended by legal counsel that a policy and procedure manual was needed for 
the purpose of consistency and clarification. 
1. The need for a policies and procedures manual was presented to the membership by Tony 
Sarra and Shane Capaldl in the June 11,2005 annual meeting. 1B0 In the July 6, 2006 
director's meeting Dave Winters, an association member as well as the Zoning Enforcer for 
Herriman City, stated that the ACC will write a policies and procedures (manual) in order to 
be consistent. 
2. The assessment of fines for Protective Covenant violations was suggested by Dave Winters 
in the August 9, 2006 meeting.162 Legal counsel advised Keith Emmerthat even though the 
documents do not give a specific amount of fines, it can be done in a book of policies and 
procedures.163 On July 28,2008 the ACC sent out a letter to all of the membership letting 
them know that they were in the process of compiling a policies and procedures manual.164 
3. As of May 2010, no fines have been assessed on the plaintiffs or any Association members 
for animal related issues. No fines have been collected from anyone in the Association.165 
The June 12,2009 Demand letter states that the ACC "policy attempts to restnct certain property 
owners ability to maintain their properties in greenbeit status and to burden historic grazing 
operations with new standards and requirements". 
SLC Observation # 10: The plaintiffs are not impacted by the ACC's policy in that they have not 
submitted any applications to the ACC nor have any activities on their properties been 
questioned, noted, cited or denied by the ACC. 
1. Historically, open, summer grazing of cattle qualified members for greenbeit Individuals, not 
the Board, were responsible for greenbeit qualification.156 The Board was brought into 
discussions regarding greenbeit when the cattle became a nuisance to members by grazing 
159
 Bylaws of Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Association Phase II, INC 
160
 Various Documents HCEH, Annual Meeting Minutes, June 11, 2005, Architectural Control Committee Report, 
Shane Capaldi and Legal Report, Tony Sarra, Page 56 
161
 Documentation of the Architectural Control Committee, HCEII Board meeting July 5, 2006, Page 7 
1E2
 Documentation for the Architectural Control Committee, HCEII Board meeting, August 9,2006, Page 8 
163
 Documentation for the ACC, email Annette Emmer to Terri Williams dated Saturday July 26, 2008, Page 9 
1 M
 Documentation for the Architectural Control Committee, Letter to HCEII Members, July 28, 2008, Page 12 
165
 Special Litigation Committee Interviews, Terri Williams Page 27, Line 1198 
166
 Various Documents HCEII, Annual Meeting Minutes 1992, Page 13 
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on irrigated lawns.1s7 168169 Open, summer, cattle grazing came to an end on June 10, 
2008 when members who were on greenbelt were informed by the Salt Lake County 
Assessor that their property could no longer be qualified by Lon Burrow's open cattle 
grazing.170 171 At the June 14, 2008 Annua! HCEH Meeting, Tom Chace suggested that lot 
owners coordinate to fence in combined parcels and obtain animals to qualify for greenbelt 
Walt Hoffman moved to form a committee to address greenbelt issues.172 In July of 2008, 
Bob Chew brought his horses to HCEH to qualify some properties for greenbelt and there 
was positive interaction with the ACC. 1 7 3 Mr. Chew's intent was to keep the horses in HCEH 
year round, not just for the summer. In October 2008, Terri Williams verbally reminded Tom 
Chace that Bob Chew's horses need to have shelters.174 175 Other members, including 
residents, have received similar reminders.176177 178 
2. Year round horse grazing in fenced areas has not historically been used for greenbelt 
qualification on an association^wide scale until the Property Rights/ Greenbelt Committee 
introduced Bob Chew and his horses to some properties in HCEH Not all members who 
have horses can qualify for greenbelt because their lots are less than five acres in size. 
Some people qualify for greenbelt with horses other than Bob Chew's horses. Some people 
qualify for greenbelt by other means such as cattle, burros or honeybees. 
3. The Plaintiffs are currently receiving a greenbelt property tax break and they are on the list 
of properties submitted to Salt Lake County to be qualified for greenbelt by Bob Chew.179180 
Tom Chace has horses on his property for only the summer and the property is fenced, His 
fence was approved by the ACC.181 None of the three plaintiffs have horses or any indication 
of grazing operations on their properties. Their lots are not fenced and there are no shelters, 
horse corrals or feeding areas. None of the plaintiffs have submitted applications or requests 
to the ACC. Discussions involving ACC control of grazing operations do not appear relevant 
to their situation. 
1E7 Various Documents HCEH, letter to Board of Directors from Tom Chace, lenell Chace, Nancy McGahey and Dan 
McGraw Dated June 18, 2001, Page 50 
168
 Various Documents HCEH, Letter to David Yocom, Salt lake County Attorney from concerned residents of the 
Rose Canyon Area, June 26, 2001, Page 52 
1619
 Various Documents HCE II, The Salt lake Tribune, Council Delays Cattle Decision in Hopes Residents Will Settle 
Tiff, August 2, 2001, Page 54 
170
 Keith Emmerys Emails, Keith Emmer to Board, Dec. 17,2007, Page 1 
171
 Various Documents HCEH, letter from Susan Yoshinaga to HCEH, June 10, 2008, Page 73 
172
 Various Documents HCEH, Annual Meeting Minutes, June 14, 2008, Page 74 
173
 Documentation for the AC C, email from Terri Williams to the Board, Tuesday, July 29, 2008, Page 13 
174
 Keith Emrner's Emails, Terri Williams to Keith Emmer, Wednesday October8,2008, Page 18 
175
 Protective Covenants, Article I, Section 11, 
176
 Special Litigation Committee Interviews, Terri Williams, Page 30, Line 1373 and 1383 
177
 Special Litigation Committee Interviews, Robert Messrner, He has horses, is not on Greenbelt and received a 
letter regarding shelter, Page 51, Line 2335 
178
 Documentation for ACC, Letters sent to people who have horses without shelter, Jan. 25, 2009, Page 3 
179
 Salt Lake County Assessor's online records 
180
 Documentation for ACC, letter from the Greenbelt Committee to the ACC, January 7, 2009, Page 34 
181
 Documentation for the ACC, Fencing Application- Tom and Lenell Chace, Page 17 
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4. Tom Chace let Keith Emmer know that there may not be horses on all of the property that 
Bob Chew js qualifying. He also wanted the Board to sign a contract with Bob Chew but 
Keith declined the offer.182 
c Mr. Budge stated to the SLC: 'Historically they (the ACC) completely, totally changed all the 
rules. The other thing that needs to be voted into the analysis, Mr. Wilson, is you cannot try to 
control uses on that, within that subdivision or within the project in a way that doesn't comply 
with historic norm for regulating those and that's based out of Utah law."1*3 Mr. Budge feels 
that since the County does not require horse shelters the HOA cannot require them.184 
SLC Observation #11: This claim involves a difference tn legal opinions between Howard 
Lundgren and Wade Budge. The Board has followed the advice of Howard Lundqren because 
he is their legal counsel. 
1 Salt Lake County increased land development restrictions when FCOZ was adopted in 
1997. t a5 A comparison of the zone FA2.5 18S (Lots 99,100 and 102 are in this zone), 
FCOZ and the H C E II Protective Covenants will show that the HCEH Protective Covenants 
are more restrictive because they require setbacks and a minimum floor area for a dwelling. 
2 The FR5 zone, where Mr. Atwoocfs lot 98 resides, lists horses as a conditional use subject 
to F C O Z review and approval.187188 If horse grazing is considered "historic norm" then 
"historic norm* was not a consideration in the zoning of Mr. Atwood's Jot 98 by Salt Lake 
County. 
3 The Special Litigation Committee asked the plaintiffs where the documents state that a 
Policies and Procedure manual would be forbidden. Wade Budge responded: "It's the other 
way, it's not what's forbidden it's what's allowed. In other the words the CC&Rs sets the 
baseline on what the board may do by way of regulations. They don't open the gate and 
allows us continually expansive readings and the reasons is, is because when you are 
someone who is starting a subdivision and there's a lot of case law in this, you set the 
standard or the baseline for everyone's expectations based on the initial governing 
documents and you cannot then encroach upon those property rights that are maintained by 
everyone else by changing your interpretation and expanding your requirements. The 
reason being that any time you grant someone the right to regulate your property that grant 
is limited to the terms in that specific grant cause it's important that when there is any sort of 
question that the rights of the property owners be maintained; an example would be there's 
a lot of litigation in Florida about this issue and in Flon'da there are situations whereas 
property values would increase, see new owners would come in and try and get new 
interpretations of the long standing CC&R's and they would do so cause maybe they were 
going to remodel their homes in a way that was inconsistent with the way it had been done 
historically and so the courts have come down and said they're not going to allow you to do 
something that would constitute substantial change in the way it had been done previously. 
W2 
183 
184 
IBS 
186 
Keith Emmer's emails, Keith Emmer to Bob Dean, September 26, 2008, Page 15 
Litigation Committee interviews, Plaintiffs, April 28,2010 Page 19, Line 874 
Special Litigation Committee Interviews, Plaintiffs, April 28, 2010 Page 19, Line 882 
Various Documents HCEII, Cal Schneller, March 23, 2010, Page 112 
Chapter 19.54 FA:2.5, FA-5, FA-10 AND FA-20 FOOTHILL AGRICULTURE ZONES (From Salt Lake County 
Government Web Site http://WWW.co.slc.ut.us/} 
n i
 C-1 Chapter 19.12 FR-0.5, FR-1, FR-2.5, FR-5 f FR-10, FR-20, FR-50 AND FR-100 F O R E S T R Y AND 
RECREATION ZONES (From Salt Lake County Government Web Site http:/A/WvW.co.slc.ut.us/) 
188
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The examples would be they were mobile homes and now they are all mansions on a golf 
course. They can't now change that particular subdivision in a way that is more restrictive 
than it was when it was created." m 
The June 12, 2009 demand letter questions the authority of the Policies and Procedures Manual 
and states that it is inconsistent with governing documents. 
1. As set forth in A of this section, the Bylaws of the organization specifically allow the adoption 
of rules and regulations to govern the use of properties under the control of the association. 
The ACC justified the level of detail based on the Protective Covenants: "Any animals to be 
kept outside shall be housed and managed, based upon a plan for such housing and 
management, which shall have had prior Architectural Control Committee Approval"190 
2. No standards for housing and management were included in the Protective Covenants. 
"Housing* is interpreted as shelter. "Management" Is interpreted as providing food and water 
for grazing animals. The ACC determined that the standards used by the Humane Society 
would provide the detail needed to be consistent These standards are referenced in the 
Policy and Procedures Manual as worded in C~1 above. 1&1 192 
3. The June 12, 2009 Demand letter cites, Page 9, section 5. Livestock, of the Policies and 
Procedures Manual an example and makes the statement "... The Policy attempts to 
specify the type and quantity of hay and the type of shelters that must be maintained for 
people to enjoy agricultural uses Unfortunately the Board has sanctioned an effort to 
change the nature and general plan of the Association from one where agriculture uses are 
allowed and fostered to one where they are discouraged in favor of residential uses. " 
SLC Recommendation #3: On Page 11, Clarification of Protective Covenants and Bylaws. 
Section 7-f. the documents states "Structure must have County Conditional use approval/ 
This is covered on Page 8. Section 1 - e. "Compliance with state and county regulation rests 
with the owner". Property owners are required to get the proper permits from Salt Lake 
County by County ordinance. The ACC should not be accountable for an owner's obtaining 
County approval. It is recommended that the Board amend the document so that Page 11. 
Chapter 5. Section f. is removed. 
Page 9, Section 5. Livestock!183 
d. Animals must be housed and managed 
j . Adequate food end water 
1. Adequate water is defined as access to drinking water at alt times (per Humane Society 
recommendations) 
Z For alt grazing animals where pasture is depleted, adequate food is defined as a minimum of 
1.5 pounds of dean hay per 100 lbs per animal daily (per Humane society recommendations 
/L Adequate shelter 
1. Permanent Shelter 
Z Temporary Shelter 
189
 Special Litigation Committee Interviews, Plaintiffs, April 28,2010 Page 20 Line 915 
130
 Protective Covenants, Article I, Section 11 
191HCEI1 Architectural ControlCommittee, Policies and Procedures Manual, Page 9 
191
 Special litigation Committee interviews, Terri Williams, Page 23, Line 1022 
193
 ACC Policies and Procedures Manual, Page 9 
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See clarifications section for additional information 
Clarification of Protective Covenants and Bylaws . 
(Chapter 5) Clarification of Temporary Shelter for Livestock 
a. Structure must be removable within 48 hours 
b. Structure cannot have a permanent foundation 
c. A CC will inspect property within seven (7) days after installation of removal of temporary structure to 
insure ail stipulations are met 
o*. Materials must be durable enough for the length of use and the intended purpose. 
e. Owner and/ or lessee is responsible for maintenance of shelter and must insufc that the structure does 
not become a nuisance and or visually offensive 
f. Structure must have County Conditional use approval and this document must be presented for approval 
of the shelter to the ACC. 
During the winter of 2009 there were a series of complaints from members to the ACC about the 
treatment of horses owned by Bob Chew. These complaints included improper housing, neglect, 
lack of food, loose horses and a dead horse 195196 Keith Emmer contacted Tom Chace about 
these complaints.197 
1. Tom Chace, representing the Property Rights/ Greenbelt Committee, took responsibility to 
manage lots where Bob Chew's horses grazed. In one case Mr. Chace requested ail 
communication to be sent to the Group Greenbelt Committee due to the legal action against 
the HCEII HOA and the ACC. 1 9 8 1 " 20° According to Terri Williams, Mr. Miyagi (other than 
Tom Chace) was the only member of Group Greenbelt that sent fence plans to the ACC for 
approval. 201 It is not clear why Tom Chace, as the committee leader, submitted the fencing 
plans for his own property to the ACC but the rest on the Greenbelt Group did not submjt 
plans as individuals. The ACC felt that the Property Rights/ Greenbelt Committee wanted 
special treatment from the ACC and the County. 2D2 
2. Tom Chace stated" The main reason properties are in greenbelt is because the property 
cannot be developed. These property owners are far more concerned about buiiding on their 
land than maintaining greenbelt.* 2°3 
194 
ACC Policies and Procedures Manual, Page 11 
135
 Documentation for the Architectural Control Committee, Feb 2, 2009, note to ACC from Terri Williams, Page 39 
196
 Special Litigation Committee interviews, Terri Williams, Voice mail left by Animal Control Officer on Terri 
Williams phone stating that a horse had to be put down. Page 29, Line 1330 
"^Keith Emmer's Emails, Keith Emmer to Tom Chace, March 4, 2009, page 49 & 50 
198
 Special Litigation Committee interviews, Terri Williams, Page 22, Line 998 
199
 Documentation for the ACC, Letter to Ms Taylor from the AAC dated November 23,2009, Page AS 
200
 Documentation for the ACC, Letter from Group Greenbelt Committee to HCEII, December 16, 2009, Page 49 
203
 Special Litigation Committee Interviews, Terri Williams, Page 25, Line 1123. 
202
 Special Litigation Committee Interviews, Terri Williams, Mr. Ely complained that he had to follow FCOZ but Tom 
Chace did not, Page 23, line 1009 
203
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VIL Greenbelt 
Claim: The Board has allowed the creation of policies to deny individuals the benefit of a preferred 
property tax benefit known as "greenbelt0 status. A Board member has contacted Salt Lake County 
to determine what can be done to disqualify land within the Association from being treated as 
greenbelt 
SLC Observation #12: No evidence was produced by the plaintiffs that the ACC recommendations 
have denied the plaintiffs of qreenbett status or that a Board member has attempted to disqualify 
land within the Association of greenbelt. None of the plaintiffs have lost greenbelt status. 
A. The majority of the land area in HCEII is on greenbelt204 53% of the voting units and 66% of the 
land area are in Greenbelt205 Bob Chew (he is the owner of the horses and he is coordinated by 
the Greenbelt Committee) qualifies 30% of the HCEII voting units and 37% of the land for 
greenbelt with his horses. 2°e. The remaining 23% of voting units and 29% of the land are 
qualified for greenbelt by other means.207 
B. "Susan Yoshinaga, Greenbelt Manager for Salt Lake County Assessor's Office, stated that no 
one has involuntarily lost greenbelt status in the last two years. 20B Bob Chew qualifies most of 
the people in HCEII and none of the people he qualifies are at risk of losing that status. The 
HCEII Board has nothing to do with that status. 209 
C. In the SLC interview, the plaintiffs were asked what actions were taken by the Board to interfere 
with Greenbelt status. They responded that it was the entire Board because they approved the 
ACC recommendations. 21°. Tom Chace expressed his frustration with the ACC's involvement 
with the fencing that was needed for livestock that qualified members for greenbelt in an email 
dated December 9,2008211 Tom Chace stated that Susan Yoshinaga told him that she received 
complaints that the land is not suitable for greenbelt and should not have that status. 212The 
plaintiffs' Attorney could not identify a Board member that he assumed had contacted Salt Lake 
County to disqualify land within the Association from being treated as greenbelt 213 
D. In an email dated April 6, 2009f Torn Chace stated "777© greenbelt Property Owners can't 
understand why the Board and ACC seem determined to interfere with their greenbelt issues. 
They perceive that the goal is to make the HCII parameters of compliance more and more 
impossible so that the requirement cannot be met They cannot understand the reasoning 
behind the time consuming effort to monitor the horses to "make sure they are in compliance 
*" Map, Land Qualified for Greenbelt. 
205
 Salt Lake County Assessor's Records (From Salt Lake County Government Web Site 
http://WWW.co.slc.ut.us/) 
206
 Documentation for ACC, Email from Greenbelt Committee to ACC, January 7, 2009, Attachment, Page 35 
207
 Salt Lake County Assessor's Records(From Salt Lake County Government Web Site 
http://WWW.co.slc.utus/) 
208
 Special Litigation Committee Interviews, Plaintiffs, April 28, 2010, Wade Budge agreed, Page 21, Line 968 
209
 Various Documents HCEII, Communication between Susan Yoshinaga and Arlene Johnson, Page 109 
210
 Special Litigation Committee Interviews, Plaintiffs, Page 20, Line 951 
111
 Documentation for ACQ Tom Chace to the ACC, December 9, 2008, Page 27 
212
 Keith Emmer's Emails, Tom and Lenell Chace to Keith Emmer, April 6,2009, Page 55 
213
 Special Litigation Committee Interviews, Plaintiffs, Page 21, Line 956 
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and report back to the Assessor" from a governing body that is supposed to be on our side and 
didn%t have time to help with keeping us in greenbeft. Susan (Yoshinaga) has told me that the 
calls she has received complain that land is not suitable for greenbelt and should not have that 
E. Susan Yoshinaga stated that no Board member has tried to get anyone off greenbelt. For years, 
residents in Rose Canyon have complained about roaming livestock from people on greenbelt 
This dates back to Tony Mascara 215 216 Susan Yoshinaga \s not aware of any HCEII policies 
that were, designed to deny individuals of greenbelt status.217 
F. The HCEII Board has historically taken a hands-off approach to greenbelt They are not 
responsible for greenbelt status impact resulting from decisions made by the State of Utah, Salt 
Lake County or the Association Member. 218 219 m **1 m 
Keith Emmerys Emails, Tom and Lenell Chace to Keith Emmer, April 6, 2009, Page 55 214 
225
 Various Documents HCEII, Communication between Susan Yoshinaga and Arlene Johnson, Page 110 
216
 Special Litigation Committee Interviews, Plaintiffs, April 28, 2010, Wade Budge could not remember which 
Board member had contacted the Assessor about disqualifying greenbelt land, Page 21 Line 956 
217
 Various Documents HCEII, Communication between Susan Yoshinaga and Arlene Johnson, Page 109 
Special Litigation Committee interviews, Keith Emmer, Page 1, Line 42 
219
 Various Documents HCEII, Annual Meeting Minutes 1992, Bill 45, The Utah Farmland Assessment Act, Page 15 
220
 Various Documents HCEII, Letter from "The Cow Committee" to the Board of Directors, June 18, 2001. Page 50 
Various Documents HCEII, Letter from individuals opposed to open grazing as a way for members to qualify for 
greenbelt to Dave Yocorn, SLCo Attorney, June 26, 2001, The person who grazes the cattle (Lon Burrows) has an 
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222
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VIII. Gate Keys 
Claim: The Board has allowed the installation of gates and not provided keys to members within the 
Association including the Plaintiffs. 
SLC Observation # 13: This should have not been included in the claim in that the plaintiffs and 
their attorney knew five months before the claim was filed that the gate had been unlocked. 
A. Two gates were installed on Step Mountain Road. 223 Keys were issued by Tom Williams. Mr. 
Atwood was provided keys to both the upper and the lower Step Mountain Gates. Mr. Gilmore 
was provided keys to both gates on two occasions. Mr. Frank never requested a key from Tom 
Williams. 224 Keith Emmer stated that Brandon Frank came to his house and Mr. Emmer gave 
Mr. Frank a key.22S During the time the gates were locked, Mr. Frank was behind on his 
assessments and should not have been given a key.226 227 When he paid his back assessments 
of $1,372 on December 2, 2009 for lot 102, the upper gate had been unlocked for five months.228 
When the complaint was filed on November 25, 2009, the upper gate had been unlocked for five 
months and the plaintiffs' attorney, Wade Budge, had been informed of this by Howard Lundgren 
three months before the lawsuit was filed.229 
B. The upper gate is located south of the plaintiffs' property. In the June 2009 Annual Meeting, Scott 
Royal, a property owner above the gate, requested that the upper gate be unlocked. It was 
unlocked after the 2009 annual meeting and is currently unlocked. 
C. The lower gate is located to the northwest of the plaintiffs' property. It was left locked in order to 
discourage ORVs from driving up the steep gully leading to Step Mountain (Step Mountain Road) 
No requests from the plaintiffs to unlock this gate are known. 
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IX. 2009-10 Budget. 
Claim: The Association is operating without a budget 
SLC Observation #14: Legal Counsel has advised the Board that they do not need a membership 
vote to establish a budget Where an issue results in a conflicting interpretation of the law between 
attorneys, the Board's most responsible option is to listen to the opinion of the Attorney they have 
hired to represent them. 
A. The plaintiffs questioned the line [tern for legal fees in the 2009-2010 budget presented in the 
2009 annual meeting. 230The plaintiffs attempted to block the budget by proposing a hand vote 
at the meeting. 23 t They claim that their hand vote represented the majority of the voting units 
present at the meeting thus they had the power to approve or deny the passing of the budget 
B. A review of the governing documents has found nothing that states a membership vote is 
necessary to pass or adopt a budget. Past annual meetings do not consistently reflect attending 
membership votes regarding the budget 
C. Plaintiffs were asked by the Special Litigation Committee to point out in the governing 
documents where it states that the association is obligated to get member approval for the 
budget Their Attorney, Wade Budge, stated that would be addressed as legal issue; they have 
no comment at this time,232. 
Various Documents HCEH, Proposed 2009 -2010 Budget, Page 81 
Recording of the 2009 Annual Meeting 
230 
231 
Special litigation Committee interviews. Plaintiffs, April 28, 2010, Page 2, Line 65 
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Resolution 
Claim: The Plaintiffs have tried to resolve issues with the HCEH Board. 
A. In the November 2008 monthly meeting there were discussions about the condition of roads 
fronting the plaintiffs' properties, the philosophies behind prioritizing road maintenance, County 
zoning, sewer, water rights and annexation . 233 Mr. Atwood threatened to bury the association in 
legal fees.234 Tom Williams stated that after the November 24, 2008 meeting Mr. Atwood stopped 
him in the parking lot and marie a statement that "you have not seen anything yet** 
B. The Greenbelt Committee expanded its scope to the Property Rights Committee.235 23e Tom 
Chace also represented the Greenbelt Committee as "Group Greenbelt".237 23a 239Tom Chace 
provided almost all of the email communication between the Board and the Property Rights 
Committee.240 241 242 243 He refused to meet with the Special Litigation Committee and it is 
unclear what communication he has had with the three plaintiffs.244 
C. In December 2008 Keith Emmer responded to accusations from Tom Chace regarding the Board 
being resentful to greenbelt, having no respect for those who cannot build, and generally not 
supporting development. 245 Tom and Lenell Chace stated that the Property Rights Committee' 
has one simple goal - to do anything we can to make it possible for un-built property to be 
developed: ZA* 
D. At the March 28, 2009 monthly meeting, the Board presentedinformation regarding development 
issues. 247 Tom Chace was complimentary of the effort with the exception that greenbelt issues 
were not presented. 248 249 
E The demand letter was written on June 12, 2009.25D Howard Lundgren, the defendants' attorney, 
and Wade Budge, the plaintiffs' attorney, exchanged telephone conversations and emails after 
the demand letter was received. Howard Lundgren recapped the conversations " As I told you in 
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our initial conversation, my letter of July 1,2009, our second conversation in fate July 2009 and 
my email of August 6, 2009 the Board of Directors of Hi Country Estates Homeowners 
Association Phase I! is ready, willing and able to begin a dialogue with group greenbelt, the 
Property Rights Committee and your individual clients regarding the issues raised in your June 
12, 2009 fetter and the draft complaint which you provided with your August 19, 2009 letter"2S1 
In a letter from Wade Budge to Howard Lundgren dated August 19, 2009, Mr. Budge stated that 
his clients wanted concessions to the items brought out in the June 12, 2009 Demand letter. Mr. 
Budge stated that his clients were especially interested in roads, greenbelt and bars to 
nonresident involvement on Boards252 He attached a copy of a draft complaint * Hi-Country 
Property Rights Group, Lindsay Atwood, Tom Chase, Lenell Chace, Jerry Gilmore and Brandon 
Frank vs. Hi-Country Estates Homeowner's Association Phase II"253 
G. On September 1, 2009 Howard Lundgren responded to Wade Budge and suggested using a 
mediator before litigation is filed. 2BA No meeting with the Attorneys or a mediator was set up. 
Instead Tony Sarra met with Tom Chace on September 8, 2009 to discuss the various issues, 
H. In the September 8, 2009 meeting. Tom Chace stated to Tony Sarra that greenbelt was the least 
of the Property Rights Committee's concerns. Their interest is in developing their properties. 
The priority was to get out from under FCOZ restrictions, getting sewer installed and deal with 
roads and water. Further, they want all issues resolved together and are unwilling, to quote, 
"salami" these into separate initiatives. At this meeting it became clear for the first time that 
greenbelt was not their main concern. Tony told Tom Chace that he did not think the wording of 
the June 12, 2009 demand letter was clear and a meeting to clarify thai would be helpful. 25S 25B 
I. On September 10,2009 Howard Lundgren sent Wade Budge a notice that the Board had elected 
to form a Special Litigation Committee. He asked Mr. Budge to provide specific bases for 
allegations and evidence that the Board has violated its fiduciary duty to the association in 
regards to maintaining the roads. 257 That was never received. 
J , Keith Emmer told Tom Chace that the Board is willing to meet with the Property Rights 
Committee but legal counsel had advised that Tony Sarra and Arlene Johnson not meet in any 
negotiations because they were on the Special Litigation Committee and they must remain 
independent from the negotiations. He suggested that if the June 12, 2009 demand letter were 
rescinded then it would be possible for the full board to meet with them25a 23*260 Tom Chace sent 
251
 Various Documents HCEII, Howard Lundgren to Wade Budge, September 1, 2009. Page 92 
252
 Various Documents HCEII, Letter to Howard Lundgren from Wade Budge, August 19, 2009, Page 91 
253
 Keith Emmer's Emails, Draft Complaint, August, 2009, Page 117 
Various Documents HCEII, Howard Lundgren Letter to Wade Budge, September 1,2009, Page 93, last paragraph 
Keith Emmets emails, Tom Chace to Keith Emmer, October 10,2009, Page 132 
Recollection by Tony Sarra of a lunch meeting with Tom Chace on September 8,2009, 
Various Documents HCEII, Letter to Wade Budge from Howard Lundgren, September 10, 2009. Page 95 
Keith Emmerys emails, Keith Emmer to Tom Chace, October 8,2009, Page 133 
Keith Emmer's emails, Keith Emmer to Tom Chace, October 12,2009, Page 132 
Keith Emmer's Emails, Keith Emmer to Tom Chace, October 13,2009, Page 134 
31 
254 
2S5 
256 
2S7 
258 
259 
HCE00125 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
email to Keith Emmer stating "If the entire Board is not wilting to meet Then we will proceed 
with filing a lawsuit against the HOA and members of the Board individually."251 
K. On October 14, 2009 Keith Emmer, Carole Dean, Kim Wilson, Lindsay Atwood, Tom Chace, 
Lenell Chace, Jerry Gilmore and Brandon Frank met The content of the meeting did not relate to 
the concerns set forth in the June 12, 2009 demand letter or the draft complaint or Wade Budge's 
letter dated August 19, 2009. Lindsay Atwood stated that the threat of a lawsuit would go away if 
the Board would support them in convincing the membership to annex to Herriman and bonding 
for improvements. 2BZ 253 2 M 26S In the interview with the Special Litigation Committee, Mr. 
Atwood stated that Herriman City had not promised them anything.266 ,267 Tom Chace has 
promoted getting out of unincorporated Salt Lake County in order to get out from under FCOZ.2 6 8 
269 270 j^Q pr0perty Rjghts Committee said in a letter to the membership that Herriman would 
remove the Salt Lake County Foothills and Canyons Overlay Zone (FCOZ). 271 
L. Tom Chace told Arlene Johnson that after the meeting on October 14, 2009 Tom and Lenell 
Chace broke away from the group. Tom and Lenell Chace refused to meet with the Special 
Litigation Committee.272 
M. On October 23, 2009, one month before the complaint was filed, Lindsay Atwood sent an email to 
Keith Emmer stating that he believed the Board had no interest \n settling the lawsuit in that they 
had not responded to the requests he made at the October 14, 2009 meeting.273 Keith Emmer 
informed Lindsay Atwood that the association's attorney has instructed the board that they must 
remain neutral on annexation to Herriman. Keith offered to facilitate a meeting with the 
membership where Lindsay's group could present their ideas on annexation 274 Mr. Atwood 
forwarded Keith Emmerys offer to set up a meeting on annexation to Wade Budge, Tom Chace, 
Brandon Frank and Jerry Gilmore but they did not respond to Keith Emmer's offer.275 
N. A meeting was scheduled on November 11, 2009 in Howard Lundgren's office to attempt to 
discuss issues. All of the Board was present but the Plaintiffs did not show up. The plaintiffs 
Counsel left Mr. Lundgren a voicemail approximately 30 minutes before the scheduled meeting 
time to advise that he and the plaintiffs would not be attending the meeting and apologized for his 
clients4 "unprofessionalism". 
O. The complaint was filed on November 25, 2009. 
P. The plaintiffs met with the Special Litigation Committee on April 28, 2010. Their responses 
relative to the complaint are throughout this document. 
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XL Photographs 
1. Plaintiffs' Property from the West Steep section of Step Mountain Road where it bisects Lindsay 
Atwood's Property. Photo by SLC 
2> Step Mountain, from the Southwest, Photo by SLC 
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3, Frontage of lot 100 on Step Mountain Road looking northwesterly toward the top of Step Mountain. 
4/25/10, Photo by SLC 
4. Lot 99 looking Northwesterly before Road drops in elevation. A small part of road is visible on the left 
Top of Step Mountain at the Center. 11/5/06. Photo by Arlene Johnson 
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5. Step Mountain Road 1992-1993. Road had been graded for delivery and installation of water pipe. Photo 
by Plaintiffs included in complaint. 
6. Step Mountain Road from Lot 100 frontage looking south 4/25/10. Photo by SLC 
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7. Step Mountain Road Fall 2009. Photo by Plaintiffs included in complaint. 
8. Step Mountain Road at well house. 11/28/09 Photo by Keith Emmer. 
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9. Brandon Frank's frontage, Lots 112 and 122C on Step Mountain Road, 4/25/10 Photo by SLC 
10. Carol Dean's Frontage on Step Mountain Road. 4/25/10 Photo by SLC 
I L Artene Johnson's frontage on Shaggy Mountain Road, 4/15/10 Photo by SLC 
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12. Keith Ernmer's and Tom William's frontage, 14900 S looking west. 4/24/10 Photo by SLC 
13. Tony Sarra's house upper left. Paved portion of Mountain Top Road extends from the square to a point 
beyond the right edge of the photograph. 4/24/10 Photo by SLC (Closer views of the asphalt are 
contained in the claim) 
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